Business Description
Ingram Micro Holding Corporation, operating globally through its various subsidiaries, delivers a broad spectrum of technology services and solutions. Its client base spans vendors, resellers, and retailers across regions such as North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America. The company offers a comprehensive Ingram Micro Cloud Marketplace portfolio, featuring a wide array of third-party cloud-based services and subscription products accessible via its Ingram Micro Xvantage platform. Beyond these, it also furnishes crucial support services like training, IT asset disposition (ITAD), reverse logistics, repair, and various financial solutions. For both corporate and individual consumers, Ingram Micro supplies a range of client and endpoint technologies. These encompass devices such as desktop PCs, laptops, and tablets, alongside printers, various application software, and a selection of peripherals and accessories. The company also distributes its own branded solutions and essential components like hard drives, motherboards, and video cards. Furthermore, its portfolio extends to enterprise-grade hardware and software. This includes robust solutions for servers, data storage, networking, and general infrastructure, alongside hybrid and software-defined technologies. Specialized offerings also cover cybersecurity, power and cooling management, and virtualization. Other specialized product categories include data capture/point-of-sale (DC/POS) systems, physical security setups, audio-visual and digital signage equipment, unified communications and collaboration (UCC) tools, telephony systems, smart office and home automation technologies, and artificial intelligence products. A significant portion of its services comprises third-party cloud-based subscriptions and offerings, spanning critical areas such as business applications, robust security solutions, communication and collaboration tools, cloud enablement services, and infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) offerings. Moreover, Ingram Micro manages the CloudBlue digital commerce platform, which delivers comprehensive software-as-a-service (SaaS) solutions for multi-channel and multi-tier catalog administration, subscription oversight, billing processes, and overall orchestration. Established in 1979, the company maintains its headquarters in Irvine, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 19, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:00am (8d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.40
Total Equity: $4.25B
Shares: 235,350,268
Total Debt: $3.30B
Cash: $1.86B
EBITDA: $1.16B
Total Debt: $3.30B
Cash: $1.86B
Revenue: $52.56B
Revenue: $52.56B
Revenue: $52.56B
Total Equity: $4.25B
Tax Rate: 38.2%
Equity: $4.25B
Total Debt: $3.30B
Cash: $1.86B
Current Liabilities: $13.68B
Long-Term Debt: $2.75B
Total Debt: $3.30B
Total Equity: $4.25B
Shares: 235,350,268
Shares: 235,350,268
CapEx: -$130.75M
Shares: 235,350,268
Stock Price: $28.30
Net Income: $327.88M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Ingram Micro is a classic distribution business: ~$52.6B of 2025 revenue at a 6.7% gross margin and a 1.8% operating margin — razor-thin economics where the business model is working capital management, not pricing power. Revenue is essentially flat over five years ($54.5B → $52.6B), gross margin has actually compressed from 7.5% to 6.7%, and net income has bounced from $475M to a one-off $2.39B (2022 looks like a tax/one-time event given OpM jumped to 6.4% then reverted) back down to $328M. This is a mature, scale-driven middleman, not a compounder.
Cash quality is the live debate. 2025 FCF of $785M looks healthy, but cumulative FCF over 2021-2024 was meaningfully negative (-$1.74B) — distribution FCF swings violently with working capital, so one strong year doesn't yet prove durable conversion. Accruals at 4.2% of assets and OCF/NI at 0.33x flag that reported net income is running ahead of cash on a multi-year basis, even if Beneish (-2.5) and Altman Z (3.21) don't scream manipulation. Net debt of $1.44B against $785M FCF is manageable but not a cushion.
The loudest signal is the insider tape: Platinum Equity, the sponsor, dumped ~33.5M shares for ~$807M across four sales in March–June 2026, with zero insider buying. Share count is roughly flat (224.7M → 235.4M), and buybacks only recover 72% of SBC, so per-share value isn't being actively compounded. This is a competent, scaled operator in a structurally low-margin industry — solid, not great.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- What drove the 2022 net income spike to $2.39B and OpM of 6.4% — one-time gain, tax benefit, or accounting reclass?
- Working capital movements behind 2025's $785M FCF — is it sustainable conversion or a one-time inventory/receivables release?
- Customer and vendor concentration (top OEMs like Cisco, HP, Microsoft, Apple) and rebate accounting policies — critical for a distributor
- Platinum Equity's remaining ownership stake and any lockup/registration rights schedule signaling further sales
- Reconciliation of the OCF/NI gap — is it timing, or is reported NI being flattered by non-cash items?
- Convertible/term debt structure within the $3.3B gross debt and refinancing schedule
Ingram Micro trades at a $6.55B market cap on roughly $48B+ of revenue — classic distributor optics. With ~2% operating margins, that implies ~$1B of operating profit, putting EV/EBIT in the mid-single digits even after layering on the substantial net debt typical of a Platinum Equity carve-out. For a 7% gross-margin middleman with mixed earnings quality (OCF/NI ~0.33x historically) and an aggressive sponsor overhang, a discounted multiple is not a mispricing — it is the correct price for the risk.
The e2e synthesis flags 'Disconnected from Fundamentals,' which I read as the runaway-method warning: DCFs on distributors with thin margins are hyper-sensitive to small margin assumptions and will spit out wide fair-value ranges. I will not anchor on that. Anchoring instead on peer distributor multiples (TD SYNNEX, Arrow, Avnet typically 7-10x EBIT, ~0.15-0.20x sales), INGM at ~0.14x sales screens slightly cheap to peers. Deserved value, quality-adjusted for the earnings haircut and sponsor selling, is probably $30-34. That is a ~5-15% gap to today's $28.30 — real but not a fat pitch.
Margin of safety exists but is thin. You are paid a small discount to own a structurally challenged distributor whose bull case (Xvantage, cloud marketplace) is unproven and whose bear case (disintermediation) is live. Fair-to-modestly-cheap is the honest read.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Sustainability of 2025 FCF — is working capital release one-time or structural?
- Xvantage/cloud marketplace revenue mix and gross margin contribution in segment detail
- Remaining Platinum Equity stake and lockup/secondary schedule
- Net debt and interest coverage trajectory post-IPO
- Forward guidance on operating margin — any path above 2.0-2.5%?
Ingram Micro carries almost no narrative charge. Archetype is steady-compounder with minimal intensity and low cult coefficient, meaning there is no euphoric story bidding it up and no thematic axe currently cutting it down. The tape is genuinely neutral (regime +11, VIX 17), so there is no macro wind to amplify. The catch is the 1.79 beta - if the tape tilts risk-off, this name will get marked harder than its sleepy fundamentals warrant, because distributors get lumped with cyclicals and the float is thin on conviction holders. Analyst tone is lukewarm-positive: a Buy consensus that is really a 5/5 Buy/Hold split, target only 6% above spot, and zero revisions this month. That is the textbook profile of a name analysts are not fighting over - no upgrade cycle pulling it up, no downgrade wave pushing it down. The 'cloud disintermediation' bear narrative exists in the abstract but is not actively being pressed by the tape right now; no AI-disruption headlines are landing on INGM specifically. Net: pressure is close to zero in either direction, with a mild asymmetric risk that any risk-off shift hits this 1.79-beta name disproportionately given there is no story to defend it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any escalation of 'AI/cloud disintermediates distributors' headlines that could activate the dormant bear story
- Direction of analyst revisions over next 1-2 months - currently zero, watch for the first move
- VIX breakout above 20 or regime tilt to risk-off, which would punish the 1.79 beta disproportionately
- Xvantage marketplace traction commentary - the only credible bull catalyst to lift the narrative from minimal
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:06am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $54.5B | $50.8B | $48.0B | $48.0B | $52.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $50.3B | $47.1B | $44.5B | $44.5B | $49.1B |
| Gross Profit | $4.1B | $3.7B | $3.5B | $3.4B | $3.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.3B | $444.5M | $2.6B | $2.6B | $2.6B |
| Operating Income | $849.3M | $3.2B | $944.3M | $817.9M | $936.7M |
| Net Income | $475.2M | $2.4B | $352.7M | $264.2M | $327.9M |
| EBITDA | $1.2B | $3.4B | $1.2B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| EPS | $2.02 | $10.20 | $1.50 | $1.18 | $1.40 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:00am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.2B | $1.3B | $948.5M | $918.4M | $1.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $16.7B | $16.2B | $15.4B | $15.8B | $18.2B |
| Total Assets | $19.8B | $19.1B | $18.4B | $18.8B | $21.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $12.0B | $11.3B | $10.7B | $11.3B | $13.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.6B | $4.2B | $3.7B | $3.2B | $2.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $17.1B | $16.0B | $14.9B | $15.0B | $17.0B |
| Total Equity | $2.7B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $4.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $96.7M | $737.5M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:06am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$1.2B | -$361.1M | $58.8M | $333.8M | $916.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$126.3M | -$135.8M | -$201.5M | -$142.7M | -$130.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$1.3B | -$496.9M | -$142.7M | $191.1M | $785.4M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$29.3M | -$2.1M | -$3.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$36.8M | -$3.1M |
| Net Change in Cash | $288.2M | $90.1M | -$371.6M | -$30.1M | $946.3M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:00am (8d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$52.0B $51.9B – $52.0B
|
$56.5B $55.9B – $57.2B
|
$58.1B $56.3B – $59.1B
|
$59.4B $59.4B – $59.4B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.7B $1.7B – $1.7B
|
$1.8B $1.8B – $1.8B
|
$1.9B $1.8B – $1.9B
|
$1.9B $1.9B – $1.9B
|
| Net Income |
$679.0M $666.8M – $691.2M
|
$770.4M $747.9M – $792.8M
|
$863.8M $830.3M – $897.3M
|
$958.2M $814.5M – $1.1B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:06am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -6.7% | -5.5% | -0.1% | +9.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -10.1% | -4.0% | -2.9% | +1.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +282.6% | -70.9% | -13.4% | +14.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +403.9% | -85.3% | -25.1% | +24.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +184.9% | -65.2% | -7.8% | +5.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:05am (8d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | PLATINUM EQUITY, LLC | S-Sale | 5,167,069.00 | $29.03 | $150.0M |
| 2026-06-12 | Aragone Augusto | S-Sale | 50,000.00 | $29.30 | $1.5M |
| 2026-06-15 | Aragone Augusto | S-Sale | 10,000.00 | $30.00 | $300,044 |
| 2026-05-14 | ASHMORE CRAIG W | A-Award | 7,031.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Wienbar Sharon L | A-Award | 7,031.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Haussler Jakki L. | A-Award | 7,031.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | STONE HEISZ LESLIE | A-Award | 7,031.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | Alvaro Felicia | A-Award | 7,031.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-14 | MONIE ALAIN | A-Award | 7,031.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | PLATINUM EQUITY, LLC | S-Sale | 14,471,153.00 | $24.96 | $361.2M |
| 2026-03-30 | PLATINUM EQUITY, LLC | S-Sale | 1,348,314.00 | $21.36 | $28.8M |
| 2026-03-09 | PLATINUM EQUITY, LLC | S-Sale | 12,499,999.00 | $21.36 | $267.0M |
| 2026-03-04 | Hornstein Carolyn | A-Award | 8,407.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Hornstein Carolyn | F-InKind | 597.00 | $21.35 | $12,746 |
| 2026-03-04 | Aragone Augusto | A-Award | 25,222.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Aragone Augusto | F-InKind | 1,424.00 | $21.35 | $30,402 |
| 2026-03-04 | Sherman Scott D | A-Award | 25,222.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Sherman Scott D | F-InKind | 1,853.00 | $21.35 | $39,562 |
| 2026-03-04 | Zilis Michael | A-Award | 37,833.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-03 | Zilis Michael | F-InKind | 2,601.00 | $21.35 | $55,531 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 19, 2026 3:00am (8d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-12 | $0.08 | 2026-04-28 | 2026-05-12 | 2026-05-26 |
| 2026-03-10 | $0.08 | 2026-02-24 | 2026-03-10 | 2026-03-24 |
| 2025-11-10 | $0.08 | 2025-10-30 | 2025-11-10 | 2025-11-24 |
| 2025-08-19 | $0.08 | 2025-08-06 | 2025-08-19 | 2025-09-02 |
| 2025-05-20 | $0.08 | 2025-05-08 | 2025-05-20 | 2025-06-03 |
| 2025-03-11 | $0.07 | 2025-03-04 | 2025-03-11 | 2025-03-25 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw tape first: Ingram is a $52.5B revenue distributor doing 67bps net margins, with FY25 revenue +9.5% YoY ($47.98B → $52.56B) and net income +24% ($264M → $328M). The most recent quarter (Q1 FY26, $13.96B rev, $98.9M NI) is +13.7% YoY on revenue and shows margins holding at 70bps. FCF of $785M on a $6.56B market cap is an 12% FCF yield. EV/EBITDA at 7.9x and P/B at 1.22 are distributor-normal, not distressed. The 2022 anomaly ($2.39B NI on $50.8B rev) is almost certainly a one-time tax/deferred item — ignore it as a comp.
The synthesis call of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" and Market Forces' "melting ice cube" verdict are in direct contradiction with each other and I side against Market Forces. A melting ice cube doesn't grow revenue 9.5% YoY with accelerating quarterly cadence ($11.54B → $11.76B → $13.34B → $12.28B → $12.79B → $12.60B → $14.88B → $13.96B shows seasonality but a clear upward step). TD Synnex, the closest pure comp, trades at similar EV/sales (~0.15x) and similar EBITDA multiples — INGM is not anomalously cheap, it's distributor-cheap, which is the correct regime. The pre-flight note nailed this: 8-9x FCF is the right frame, not a reverse-DCF that spits out 39% implied growth (that output is mechanical garbage when applied to a sub-1%-margin volume business — small absolute FCF changes look like huge percentage moves).
The genuine concerns are not "structural decline" — they're capital structure and insider behavior. The balance sheet tile is missing total debt and total equity, which is a serious gap for a distributor where leverage and working-capital float are the entire game; ROA of 1.67% on $52B of revenue tells you this is a thin-spread financing business and debt levels matter enormously to equity value. More damning: the 5.17M-share sale on June 15 2026 plus the 14.47M-share sale on May 7 2026 — roughly 20M shares combined against a ~230M share count — is almost certainly PE sponsor (Platinum Equity) unwinding post-IPO. That's a known overhang, not new information, but it caps near-term upside and explains the depressed multiple as much as any fundamental concern. The contrarian read is that once the sponsor finishes distributing, the float normalizes, sell-side picks up coverage, and a re-rating from 0.10x sales to 0.13-0.15x (TD Synnex range) implies $37-42 fair value. The bear contrarian read is that sponsor selling continues for another 12-18 months and the stock dead-money grinds sideways while AI-era hyperscaler disintermediation slowly erodes the value-add layer Ingram sells into.
I dissent from the synthesis "Disconnected" verdict in spirit and strongly dissent from Market Forces' headwinds call. This is a properly-priced low-margin distributor with a sponsor overhang, not a value trap and not a hidden gem. Fair value on 9-10x FCF ($785M) is $7.1-7.9B equity, or $31-34/share — call it 10-20% upside from $28.30, plus a 1.5% dividend. That's not a fat pitch; it's a reasonable hold-or-starter for someone who wants distributor exposure and can tolerate 12 months of sponsor selling. The accelerating Q1 print (+13.7% revenue YoY, margins stable) is the single most underweighted data point in the prior models — if Q2 confirms, the re-rating thesis hardens. If Q2 shows margin compression back to 30-50bps like Q2 2025, the bear case on AI-era disintermediation gets real evidence and $24 becomes the floor.
GPT Critique
In analyzing Ingram Micro Holding Corporation, several key observations arise from the raw data. The company presents itself as a low-margin distributor with revenues of $52.56 billion in 2025 and a net income of $327.9 million, translating to a net margin of just 0.6%. The most recent quarterly figures show a revenue of $13.96 billion and net income of $98.9 million, maintaining a similar margin. These figures underscore Ingram's position as a volume-driven business with a focus on logistics efficiency. Interestingly, Ingram has shown a recent uptick in revenue growth, with a year-over-year increase of 9.5% in 2025. However, the operating cash flow and free cash flow figures, $916.1 million and $785.4 million respectively, suggest that despite low margins, the company is managing to generate substantial cash, which is crucial for a distributor reliant on working capital management.
Opus's analysis contends that Ingram is fairly valued with modest upside, pegging the fair value at $31-34 per share. I concur with this assessment, particularly in light of the company's stable FCF generation and revenue growth. However, I diverge from Opus in the interpretation of the "melting ice cube" narrative. While Opus dismisses this characterization due to the revenue growth, I believe this view should not be entirely disregarded. The structural challenges posed by direct-to-consumer and cloud-native supply chains, as highlighted in the bear story, represent genuine threats to Ingram's traditional distribution model. Although revenue growth is positive, it does not negate the long-term margin pressures and competitive threats from major cloud providers bypassing traditional distributors.
I also agree with Opus's point regarding the concerns over capital structure and insider behavior. The absence of total debt and equity figures is a notable oversight, as these metrics are critical in assessing the financial health of a company with such thin margins. The significant insider selling activity further compounds this issue, suggesting potential caution on the part of insiders regarding future prospects, which could contribute to the current discount in the stock's valuation.
A careful skeptic would argue that both Opus's and my analyses may underplay the potential impact of technological shifts and competitive pressures. They might contend that the narrative around cloud marketplaces and the potential for margin uplift could be overly optimistic, and that the structural decline of traditional distribution models might accelerate faster than anticipated, leading to prolonged margin erosion and a more significant devaluation of the business.