Business Description
Intel Corporation is a global leader specializing in the development, production, and distribution of advanced computing technologies and products. The company manages its diverse operations through various segments, including CCG, DCG, IOTG, Mobileye, NSG, PSG, and others. Its comprehensive product line features fundamental platform components such as central processing units (CPUs), chipsets, system-on-chip solutions, and multi-chip packages. Additionally, Intel supplies an array of non-platform and adjacent products, including accelerators, integrated boards and systems, connectivity products, graphics processors, and memory and storage solutions. Beyond core components, Intel provides high-performance computing solutions customized for specific industries like retail, industrial, and healthcare, as well as for embedded applications. Their automotive contributions support assisted and autonomous driving with advanced compute platforms, computer vision and machine learning-based sensing, mapping and localization tools, driving policy software, and active sensors. The company also offers platforms optimized for specific workloads, catering to cloud service providers, enterprise and government clients, and communications service providers. Intel's clientele comprises original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), original design manufacturers (ODMs), and cloud service providers. Demonstrating a dedication to cutting-edge research, Intel Corporation has a strategic alliance with MILA to leverage artificial intelligence for breakthroughs in drug discovery. Established in 1968, Intel Corporation is based in Santa Clara, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 23, 2026 3:05amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:00am (4d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.06
Total Equity: $114.28B
Shares: 4,856,000,000
Total Debt: $46.59B
Cash: $14.27B
EBITDA: $14.35B
Total Debt: $46.59B
Cash: $14.27B
Revenue: $52.85B
Shares: 4,856,000,000
Revenue: $52.85B
Revenue: $52.85B
Revenue: $52.85B
Total Equity: $114.28B
Tax Rate: 98.3%
Equity: $114.28B
Total Debt: $46.59B
Cash: $14.27B
Current Liabilities: $31.58B
Long-Term Debt: $44.09B
Total Debt: $46.59B
Total Equity: $114.28B
Shares: 4,856,000,000
Shares: 4,856,000,000
CapEx: -$14.65B
Shares: 4,856,000,000
Stock Price: $140.94
Net Income: -$267.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Intel's fundamentals have deteriorated severely across the five-year window. Revenue has fallen from $79.0B (2021) to $52.9B (2025), a one-third contraction. Gross margin collapsed from 55.4% to 34.8%, operating margin went from 24.6% to roughly breakeven (with a -22% trough in 2024), and net income swung from $19.9B of profit to a $18.8B loss in 2024 before a near-breakeven 2025. FCF has been negative four years running, cumulatively burning more than $44B since 2022. This is a business losing both scale and unit economics simultaneously.
Verify before trusting this (7)
- Foundry segment economics and capex runway - how much more cash must be invested before external foundry revenue contributes meaningfully
- 18A node yield and customer commitments (Microsoft, government, others) per recent 10-K and earnings calls
- Government/CHIPS Act funding receipts and any equity-linked strings attached
- Mobileye and Altera stake monetization plans and impact on share count
- Specifics of any preferred or convertible instruments issued to strategic partners that could drive further dilution
- Updated capex guidance vs. depreciation to gauge true normalized FCF
- Server CPU share trajectory vs. AMD and AI accelerator (Gaudi) traction
The price tag here is extraordinary for what the underlying business is currently delivering. A $708B market cap implies the market is paying for restored process leadership, recaptured server share, and a profitable foundry - none of which are in the financials today. The quality lens flags four consecutive years of FCF burn totaling north of $44B, a ~20-point gross margin collapse, and ~4.4% annual dilution. Paying ~$708B for a business actively bleeding cash and losing share requires heroic assumptions about 2027-2030 outcomes.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Foundry external customer revenue and any signed volume commitments at 18A
- Gross margin trajectory and whether FY guidance shows inflection or further compression
- FCF guide and CapEx envelope - is the $25B+/yr burn rate moderating
- Server CPU unit share trend vs AMD in latest quarter
- Any one-time charges or impairments masking underlying run-rate margins
The non-fundamental pressure on INTC is decisively positive right now. The fallen-angel narrative has flipped into an active 'American champion' story: a Trump announcement is being amplified by Cramer, the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index just printed a record high, and INTC itself tagged a 52-week high on AI-infrastructure and sovereign-AI headlines (Xeon 6 win, UMC deal buzz, peer M&A in Qualcomm-Modular). With beta 2.23 in a neutral-to-slightly-risk-on tape (VIX 16.8, S&P just 1.4% off highs), this name is a leveraged beneficiary of any semi-sector euphoria, and the geopolitical-subsidy angle gives it a story no other large-cap semi has.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Details and durability of the Trump/Intel announcement - subsidy size, equity stake, or order book
- Whether SOX holds its breakout or rolls over with megacap tech
- Pace of analyst target hikes - if revisions accelerate above $130 the squeeze extends
- Any 18A node execution update - the single biggest narrative-break risk
- VIX behavior; a spike above 20 would hit beta 2.23 hard
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:06am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $79.0B | $63.1B | $54.2B | $53.1B | $52.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $35.2B | $36.2B | $32.5B | $35.8B | $34.5B |
| Gross Profit | $43.8B | $26.9B | $21.7B | $17.3B | $18.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $24.4B | $24.5B | $21.7B | $29.0B | $18.4B |
| Operating Income | $19.5B | $2.3B | $93.0M | -$11.7B | -$23.0M |
| Net Income | $19.9B | $8.0B | $1.7B | -$18.8B | -$267.0M |
| EBITDA | $33.9B | $21.3B | $11.2B | $1.2B | $14.4B |
| EPS | $4.89 | $1.95 | $0.40 | $-4.38 | $-0.06 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:00am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.8B | $11.1B | $7.1B | $8.2B | $14.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $58.6B | $50.4B | $43.3B | $47.3B | $63.7B |
| Total Assets | $168.4B | $182.1B | $191.6B | $196.5B | $211.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $27.5B | $32.2B | $28.1B | $35.7B | $31.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $33.5B | $37.7B | $47.0B | $46.3B | $44.1B |
| Total Liabilities | $73.0B | $78.8B | $81.6B | $91.5B | $85.1B |
| Total Equity | $95.4B | $101.4B | $105.6B | $99.3B | $114.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $68.3B | $70.4B | $69.2B | $49.0B | $49.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:03am (4d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $29.5B | $15.4B | $11.5B | $8.3B | $9.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$20.3B | -$25.1B | -$25.8B | -$23.9B | -$14.6B |
| Free Cash Flow | $9.1B | -$9.6B | -$14.3B | -$15.7B | -$4.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$209.0M | $6.6B | -$13.0M | -$82.0M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.4B | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.0B | $6.3B | -$4.1B | $1.2B | $6.5B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:00am (4d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$65.1B $57.4B – $72.2B
|
$71.6B $71.4B – $71.9B
|
$82.6B $74.8B – $92.0B
|
$110.6B $100.1B – $123.2B
|
| EBITDA |
$16.5B $14.6B – $18.3B
|
$18.2B $18.1B – $18.2B
|
$20.9B $19.0B – $23.3B
|
$28.0B $25.4B – $31.3B
|
| Net Income |
$5.2B $4.9B – $11.6B
|
$7.5B $3.7B – $17.2B
|
$16.6B $14.6B – $19.1B
|
$27.5B $24.1B – $31.6B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:06am (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -20.2% | -14.0% | -2.1% | -0.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -38.7% | -19.2% | -20.1% | +5.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -88.0% | -96.0% | -12,657.0% | +99.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -59.7% | -78.9% | -1,210.5% | +98.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -37.1% | -47.2% | -89.3% | +1,093.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:06am (4d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | Zinsner David | M-Exempt | 37,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Zinsner David | F-InKind | 18,353.00 | $109.82 | $2.0M |
| 2026-06-01 | Zinsner David | M-Exempt | 37,015.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-30 | Katouzian Aliyar | A-Award | 87,276.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-30 | Katouzian Aliyar | A-Award | 32,729.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-30 | Katouzian Aliyar | A-Award | 32,729.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-29 | Chandrasekaran Nagasubramaniyan | S-Sale | 21,024.00 | $118.28 | $2.5M |
| 2026-05-30 | Bawa Aparna | A-Award | 27,274.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-30 | Bawa Aparna | A-Award | 27,274.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-15 | Katouzian Aliyar | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-05-13 | Bawa Aparna | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-05-13 | WEISLER DION J | A-Award | 2,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | Smith Stacy J | A-Award | 2,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | Smith Gregory D | A-Award | 2,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | Sanghi Steve | A-Award | 2,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | NOVICK BARBARA | A-Award | 2,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | NOVICK BARBARA | A-Award | 1,502.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | Meurice Eric | A-Award | 2,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | Henry Alyssa | A-Award | 2,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-13 | Goldsmith Andrea Jo | A-Award | 2,782.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 20, 2026 5:03pm (6d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024-08-07 | $0.13 | 2024-08-01 | 2024-08-07 | 2024-09-01 |
| 2024-05-06 | $0.13 | 2024-04-25 | 2024-05-07 | 2024-06-01 |
| 2024-02-06 | $0.13 | 2024-01-25 | 2024-02-07 | 2024-03-01 |
| 2023-11-06 | $0.13 | 2023-10-26 | 2023-11-07 | 2023-12-01 |
| 2023-08-04 | $0.13 | 2023-07-27 | 2023-08-07 | 2023-09-01 |
| 2023-05-04 | $0.13 | 2023-02-22 | 2023-05-07 | 2023-06-01 |
| 2023-02-06 | $0.37 | 2023-01-26 | 2023-02-07 | 2023-03-01 |
| 2022-11-04 | $0.37 | 2022-09-16 | 2022-11-07 | 2022-12-01 |
| 2022-08-04 | $0.37 | 2022-07-14 | 2022-08-07 | 2022-09-01 |
| 2022-05-05 | $0.37 | 2022-04-14 | 2022-05-07 | 2022-06-01 |
| 2022-02-04 | $0.37 | 2022-01-26 | 2022-02-07 | 2022-03-01 |
| 2021-11-04 | $0.35 | 2021-09-17 | 2021-11-07 | 2021-12-01 |
| 2021-08-05 | $0.35 | 2021-07-15 | 2021-08-07 | 2021-09-01 |
| 2021-05-06 | $0.35 | 2021-03-11 | 2021-05-07 | 2021-06-01 |
| 2021-02-04 | $0.35 | 2021-01-21 | 2021-02-07 | 2021-03-01 |
| 2020-11-05 | $0.33 | 2020-09-18 | 2020-11-07 | 2020-12-01 |
| 2020-08-06 | $0.33 | 2020-07-16 | 2020-08-07 | 2020-09-01 |
| 2020-05-06 | $0.33 | 2020-03-11 | 2020-05-07 | 2020-06-01 |
| 2020-02-06 | $0.33 | 2020-01-23 | 2020-02-07 | 2020-03-01 |
| 2019-11-06 | $0.32 | 2019-09-12 | 2019-11-07 | 2019-12-01 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Starting from the raw tape: Intel did $52.85B in 2025 revenue versus $79.02B in 2021 — a 33% top-line contraction over four years, with gross margin compressed from 55.5% to 34.8%. The quarterly cadence is flat-to-down ($12.67B → $13.67B → $13.58B), so the "trough is in" thesis rests on stability, not growth. Q3 2025's $4.06B net income is a one-off (likely Altera/Mobileye-related gain or tax item) — strip it and the TTM is solidly loss-making, with Q1 2026 swinging back to -$3.73B (-27.5% margin). FCF was -$4.95B on $14.65B capex against $9.70B operating cash flow; this is a company spending 28% of revenue on capex to defend a position it's already lost on leading-edge logic. At $140.94 and ~$708B market cap, EV/sales of ~3.9x and EV/EBITDA of 64.6x are being paid for a business with negative ROIC (-2.8%) and declining share in every segment that matters.
The synthesis verdict of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" is correct in direction but I'd go further on magnitude. The pre-flight note frames this as a 643% rally from $19 — meaning the market cap went from ~$80B to $708B on essentially zero fundamental improvement (revenue is still shrinking YoY, margins still negative). That's not a turnaround being priced; that's a CHIPS Act / sovereign-asset / 18A-works narrative being priced at near-certainty. The classification engine tagging this "pre_profit_growth" at 0.56 confidence is the weakest link in the stack — Intel is not pre-profit, it's post-profit. It earned $19.87B in 2021. This is a melted-down incumbent, and applying growth-company forbearance to its margins is exactly the analytical error the bulls are making. The narrative layer ("fallen-angel, unanchored, fragile") is the most honest read in the file.
The contrarian-to-the-bears case: 18A is reportedly on schedule for late 2025/2026 ramp, Panther Lake is a real product, and if foundry lands even one marquee external customer (rumors persist around government/defense workloads and a possible Apple or Qualcomm tile), the re-rating math changes because foundry revenue carries optionality the current multiple already assumes. Net insider buying is a mild positive, though the transaction list here is mostly awards and tax-withholding (F-InKind), not open-market conviction buys — I'd discount that signal heavily. The sovereign-backstop argument is real: the U.S. government literally cannot let Intel fail, which compresses left-tail risk and arguably justifies *some* premium. But "cannot fail" is not "worth $708B" — TSMC, which actually has process leadership and ~50%+ operating margins, trades at roughly $1.1T. Paying 64% of TSMC's market cap for the company TSMC is beating is the trade you have to defend.
Where the data is thin: total debt and equity are missing from the balance sheet block, which matters enormously for a capex-heavy turnaround — Intel carried ~$50B in debt last I checked, and EV/sales of 3.9x implies the model is using a debt figure the tile doesn't show. The Q3 2025 $4.06B NI spike needs a footnote (almost certainly a divestiture gain) before anyone uses TTM earnings for anything. Market Forces failed to run, and the momentum block has no earnings or FCF CAGR — both because the denominators flip signs. Anyone underwriting this at $141 should be modeling 2027 foundry revenue and 18A yield curves directly, not relying on backward metrics.
I dissent mildly from the synthesis on framing but agree on direction: this is not just "disconnected" — it's a narrative-driven priced-for-perfection turnaround where perfection means catching TSMC on process, winning external foundry customers, and stabilizing server share against AMD/ARM, all simultaneously, over 3-5 years. The base-rate for that triple is low. Fair value on a sober DCF — assume revenue recovers to $70B by 2028, 40% gross margin, 10% operating margin, 15x EBIT — gets you to roughly $350-400B market cap, or ~$70-80/share. To justify $141, you need to believe foundry becomes a $20B+ business at TSMC-like margins by 2029. Possible, not probable. The stock has already harvested most of
GPT Critique
Intel's recent financial performance paints a picture of a company struggling to regain its former glory amidst a challenging market environment. The most striking detail from the raw data is the dramatic decline in revenue from $79.02 billion in 2021 to $52.85 billion in 2025, a 33% contraction over four years. This is coupled with a collapse in gross margins from 55% to 35%, indicating significant operational inefficiencies and market pressures. Notably, the company has posted negative net income in most recent quarters, with a particularly stark loss of $3.73 billion in Q1 2026. The heavy capital expenditure of $14.65 billion in 2025, alongside negative free cash flow of $4.95 billion, underscores Intel's attempt to invest heavily in a turnaround strategy, yet without clear immediate returns. The company’s cash reserves of $14.27 billion offer some buffer, but the absence of total debt and equity figures is a critical omission for a full assessment of financial health.
Opus correctly identifies the disconnect between Intel’s current valuation and its financial fundamentals. I agree with Opus's assessment that Intel's valuation at $708 billion, which equates to an EV/sales ratio of 3.9x and an EV/EBITDA of 64.6x, is unjustifiable based on its negative ROIC of -2.8% and declining market share. The narrative that has driven a 643% stock price rally from $19 is speculative and not supported by tangible business improvements. However, where I diverge is in Opus’s emphasis on the narrative of a "fallen-angel" with fragile durability. While I agree that the narrative is precarious, I believe the geopolitical angle, particularly U.S. government support under the CHIPS Act, adds a layer of complexity and potential resilience to the story that Opus underplays.
I also concur with Opus's skepticism towards the pre-profit growth classification. Intel is better characterized as a post-profit incumbent attempting to claw back its market position. This classification error is significant because it misleads stakeholders into viewing Intel as a growth company, when it is fundamentally a turnaround play. Opus’s insight into the insider transactions, noting that they are mostly awards and not conviction buys, aligns with my view that insider activity should not be interpreted as a bullish signal.
A careful skeptic might argue that both my view and Opus's overlook the potential for Intel's massive investment in foundry services and advanced node technology to yield significant returns if successful. They could assert that the market's pricing reflects reasonable expectations for strategic government partnerships and subsidies, which could provide Intel with a substantial competitive edge. Moreover, skeptics might point out that past performance does not preclude future success, particularly in a rapidly evolving technological landscape where Intel's foundational capabilities could be leveraged effectively with new leadership.