For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -11 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 80 · Value -85 · Sentiment -36 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $395.71 vs $344.71 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
JPM NYSEJPMorgan Chase & Co. is a leading global financial services firm headquartered in New York City. It operates through four primary business segments: Consumer & Community Banking, which provides retail banking services including checking and savings accounts, mortgages, credit cards, and auto loans to individual consumers and small businesses; Corporate & Investment Bank, offering investment banking, market-making, prime brokerage, and treasury services to corporations, institutional investors, financial institutions, and governments; Commercial Banking, delivering lending, treasury, and investment banking solutions to mid-sized companies, nonprofits, and municipalities; and Asset & Wealth Management, managing investments for high-net-worth individuals, financial advisors, and institutional clients such as pensions, endowments, and sovereign wealth funds. With operations spanning over 100 countries, JPMorgan Chase & Co. plays a pivotal role in facilitating global financial transactions, capital markets access, and wealth preservation, serving millions of customers and clients across diverse sectors.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 20.02
Total Equity: $362.44B
Shares: 2,849,550,450
Total Debt: $64.78B
Cash: $343.34B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $64.78B
Cash: $343.34B
Revenue: $181.85B
Revenue: $181.85B
Revenue: $181.85B
Total Equity: $362.44B
Tax Rate: 21.4%
Equity: $362.44B
Total Debt: $64.78B
Cash: $343.34B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $64.78B
Total Equity: $362.44B
Shares: 2,849,550,450
Shares: 2,849,550,450
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 2,849,550,450
Stock Price: $344.71
Net Income: $57.05B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:33am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $121.7B | $128.6B | $155.0B | $169.4B | $181.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $41.6B | $45.5B | $51.1B | $56.3B | $60.0B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $48.3B | $37.7B | $49.6B | $58.5B | $57.0B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $15.39 | $12.10 | $16.25 | $19.79 | $20.05 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $15.36 | $12.09 | $16.23 | $19.75 | $20.02 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:11am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $740.8B | $567.2B | $624.2B | $469.3B | $343.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $3.7T | $3.7T | $3.9T | $4.0T | $4.4T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $3.4T | $3.4T | $3.5T | $3.7T | $4.1T |
| Total Equity | $294.1B | $292.3B | $327.9B | $344.8B | $362.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $272.3B | $296.5B | $332.9B | $376.2B | $416.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:33am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $78.1B | $107.1B | $13.0B | -$42.0B | -$147.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$9.9B | -$2.4B | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$54.9B | -$45.6B | -$64.9B | -$96.6B | -$108.1B |
| Dividends Paid | -$12.9B | -$13.6B | -$13.5B | -$14.8B | -$16.6B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$18.4B | -$3.2B | -$9.8B | -$18.8B | -$31.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | $213.2B | -$173.6B | $56.9B | -$154.8B | -$126.0B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:33am (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +5.7% | +20.5% | +9.3% | +7.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -22.1% | +31.5% | +18.0% | -2.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 6:58pm (31d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-06 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-06 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-06 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-06 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-03 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-04 | $1.40 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-06 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-04 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-05 | $1.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-04 | $1.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-04 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-05 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-05 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-05 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-05 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-05 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-05 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-05 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-05 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-05 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers before touching the model outputs: JPM printed $181.85B revenue and $57.05B net income in 2025, up from $169.44B/$58.47B in 2024 — revenue +7.3% YoY but net income actually *down* 2.4%. That's the tell the momentum block flags but the synthesis buries. The quarterly NI walk is more revealing: Q2'24 $18.15B → Q3'24 $12.90B → Q4'24 $14.01B → Q1'25 $14.64B → Q2'25 $14.99B → Q3'25 $14.39B → Q4'25 $13.03B → Q1'26 $16.49B. Strip out the Q2'24 outlier (Visa share exchange gain, ~$8B pretax) and the trend is a bank grinding sideways in the $13-15B quarterly range with a Q1'26 pop. ROE at 15.7% is good but not the mid-teens-forever number the multiple assumes, and ROA at 1.29% is fine-not-exceptional. At $344.71 and 2.71x book, you're paying a premium price for a business whose earnings are flat-to-down.
The prior models are internally inconsistent in a way worth naming. Synthesis says "Reasonable Premium." Market Forces says "Neutral" with a caution flag. The Narrative layer explicitly puts DCF fair value at ~$248 — a 28% downside from spot — and calls the $97 premium "narrative-driven." You cannot simultaneously hold "Reasonable Premium" and "39% premium to DCF is narrative-driven Dimon cachet." One of those is wrong. My read: the narrative layer is more honest. A 17.2x P/E on a globally systemic bank at what looks like peak-cycle earnings (2025 NII benefited from the rate structure that is now inverting as the Fed cuts) is not "reasonable" — it's the highest P/E JPM has traded at outside of crisis-depressed-E denominators in a decade. Peer BAC trades ~13x, WFC ~13x, C ~11x. The 30-40% multiple premium to peers is the Dimon tax plus index inclusion, and Dimon is 69.
The contrarian case that isn't getting enough weight: insider activity is uniformly awards and gifts, zero open-market buys — for a bank whose CEO famously bought $26M of stock in 2016 at $53 as a signal, the *absence* of insider conviction at $345 is itself a signal. Credit normalization is real: card charge-offs are climbing back toward pre-COVID norms, CRE office exposure is marked but not resolved, and reserve builds have been the swing factor in quarterly NI variance. The "fortress balance sheet" narrative is true but priced in — $343B cash and $362B equity don't earn a premium multiple; they earn book value. The operating cash flow of -$147.78B looks alarming but is a bank-accounting artifact (loan growth, trading assets) — not a red flag, just noise the models shouldn't weight. What *is* a red flag is that earnings growth has stalled while the multiple expanded: the stock is up substantially over 24 months on multiple expansion, not EPS growth.
Where the data is thin: no quarterly revenue figures at all (bank revenue reporting nuance — NII + noninterest income — the FMP feed is dropping it), so revenue trajectory is inferred only from annuals. The 2026-03-31 quarter being in the data suggests the file is either dated forward or mislabeled — worth flagging. The insider transactions are all coded "?" for insider identity, which is useless for signal extraction. I'd want to see the actual Q1'26 NII vs. Q4'25 to judge whether the $16.49B NI print is deposit repricing benefit or one-timer. On verdict: I dissent from "Reasonable Premium" and side with the narrative layer's implicit read. This is a great business at a demanding price with decelerating earnings, a founder-CEO succession overhang, and peer-relative multiple compression risk if credit normalizes even modestly. Fair value is closer to $260-280 (14-15x $19 forward EPS, still a peer premium for quality) than $345. Not a short — the quality is real and the dividend + buyback yield ~4.5% cushions — but new money at $345 is buying the Dimon put, not the earnings stream.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is not “flat earnings” so much as extraordinarily high but now clearly capped earnings power. JPM has taken revenue from $121.7B in 2021 to $181.9B in 2025, a near-50% jump in four years, while net income sits at $57.1B versus $48.3B in 2021 and $58.5B in 2024. That is a bank that re-rated from good to dominant during the post-2022 rate regime, but the last twelve to eighteen months show the ceiling: 2025 revenue still grew 7.3%, yet profit slipped 2.4%, which tells you incremental revenue is no longer dropping through cleanly. The quarterly cadence reinforces that. Excluding any unusual quarter, this is now a $14-16B-per-quarter earnings machine, not a business compounding earnings at 15-20%. At $916B market cap, investors are capitalizing that earnings stream at about 16-17x trailing earnings and 2.7x book for a bank earning 15.7% ROE and 1.29% ROA. Those are elite bank metrics, but they are not so extreme that a near-tech-style premium is self-evident. The balance sheet is powerful — $343B cash against $64.8B debt and $362.4B equity — yet for a bank, fortress liquidity is table stakes for resilience, not alone a reason to pay any price.
I agree with Opus’s core claim that the stock is expensive relative to its current earnings trajectory. Opus argues JPM is “a great business at a demanding price,” and that is exactly right. I also agree with the specific point that negative operating cash flow of -$147.8B is accounting noise for a bank, not an operating red flag. Where I’d sharpen the argument is this: the real issue is not whether earnings are “flat-to-down” in a literal sense, but whether the market is paying for persistence of unusually strong returns. A 15.7% ROE on a megabank deserves a premium to Bank of America, Wells, or Citi, but 2.7x book implies confidence that this level of excess return is durable through lower rates, higher capital requirements, and eventual credit normalization. That is a tougher proposition than the current price admits.
I also agree with Opus’s attack on the internal inconsistency of the prior models. The Delvantic AI Findings correctly point out that you cannot call a stock on roughly 17.2x earnings and about 39% above a DCF estimate “Reasonable Premium” while also admitting the premium is narrative-driven. That said, I disagree with Opus’s framing that this is mainly “the Dimon tax plus index inclusion.” Jamie Dimon matters, but reducing a $916B valuation to CEO mythology undersells the actual franchise. JPM earns its premium through real structural advantages: deposit scale, fee diversity, investment banking relevance, payments infrastructure, and superior crisis capture. The premium is not fictional. My disagreement is on magnitude: I don’t think the right answer is peer-like 14-15x earnings unless you assume a material earnings reset. JPM should trade above peers because it is better than peers.
Where I most clearly disagree with Opus is the fair value range of $260-280. That implies roughly 23-25% downside from $345 and effectively assumes the market should value JPM only modestly above ordinary large-bank multiples. I don’t buy that. On 2025 net income of $57.05B, today’s market cap implies a yield a bit above 6%, which is rich for a dominant, systemically advantaged franchise still distributing capital with only a 29% payout ratio. Even if earnings merely hold around the recent run-rate rather than grow, a valuation in the low-300s is easier to justify than Opus allows. Put differently, I agree the stock is not cheap; I disagree that it belongs below $280 absent an actual credit event, sharper NIM compression, or a regulatory shock. The lack of open-market insider buying is a weak signal here; the disclosed transactions are awards and gifts, and for a company this mature, insider non-buying at all-time highs is hardly dispositive.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are both still flattering JPM by assuming recent earnings are the right base. They would argue 2023-2025 was an unusually favorable period for large-bank spreads, crisis-driven deposit inflows, and capital-markets resilience, so even “fair value” based on $57B earnings may be too generous. They would also note the data quality issues Opus flagged matter: no quarterly revenue, a forward-dated 2026 quarter, and limited detail on reserve movements leave both bulls and bears overconfident. If normalized earnings are closer to the low-$50B area and capital rules tighten, even my more moderate valuation could prove too high; if JPM can sustain mid-teens ROE and keep taking share, Opus’s downside case will look too punitive.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has grown from 121.7B in 2021 to 181.9B in 2025 (roughly 10.6% CAGR) with net income rising from 48.3B to 57.1B, alongside a diluted share count reduction from 3.15B to 2.85B (-2.5% CAGR). Buybacks running 512% of SBC, with SBC only 2% of revenue, means shareholders are getting concentrated, not diluted. Under Dimon, JPM has consistently posted top-tier ROTCE relative to global peers, and the franchise spans leading positions in investment banking, commercial banking, asset and wealth management, and consumer banking.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- CET1 ratio, supplementary leverage ratio, and liquidity coverage ratio versus regulatory minima
- ROTCE and efficiency ratio versus BAC, C, WFC to confirm best-in-class positioning
- Net charge-off trends and allowance for credit losses coverage
- Deposit mix, uninsured deposit percentage, and NII sensitivity to rates
- Investment banking wallet share and AWM net new money flows
- CEO succession plan and Dimon's stated timeline
The e2e composite fair value pegs JPM at $248.27, while the stock trades at $344.71 — a ~39% premium to deserved value. Even generously adjusting deserved value upward for the Strong (80) quality grade, that gap is hard to close without assuming peak-cycle NIM, benign credit, and durable capital-markets strength all persisting. The bull narrative (fortress balance sheet, AI leverage, structural rate tailwind) is essentially the consensus and already embedded in the multiple. The earnings-quality haircut hint (Poor, -2) argues for a LOWER deserved value, not higher — pushing the gap wider rather than narrower.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward NIM guidance and deposit beta trajectory in next earnings
- Credit loss provisioning trend and reserve build/release cadence
- Basel III endgame capital rule finalization and impact on buyback capacity
- Investment banking and trading revenue sustainability vs 2024-2025 run-rate
- Any one-time gains (e.g., First Republic-related) inflating recent earnings base
The immediate pressure on JPM is negative but not severe. The tape is stressed (VIX at a 1-year high, S&P -3.9% from highs), and bank stocks specifically just sold off from record highs into the Fed meeting - JPM dropped 2.3% in that session. Beta of 0.98 means JPM takes roughly full market pain, and as a diversified bank it is doubly exposed: to the risk-off mood AND to shifting rate expectations, which just moved against banks (no hike delivered, and Dimon himself publicly warning the market is underpricing risk). The CEO telling the world he would not buy stocks or long Treasurys is an unusual self-inflicted sentiment headwind for his own name. Offsetting that, the narrative archetype is 'fortress/must-own defensive large-cap' with moderate durability, and the capital-return news (10% dividend hike, $50B buyback) is a genuine tailwind that gives long-only money a reason to defend the stock on dips. Analyst tone in the flow is constructive (undervalued framing, JPM itself resetting other names higher). Net: the tape and Dimon's own caution are pushing harder than the buyback narrative is pulling, so pressure leans down from recent highs - but this is a low-cult, moderate-intensity story on a low-beta blue chip, so the headwind is measured, not violent.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Fed meeting outcome and dot-plot - a dovish surprise would flip bank sentiment fast
- Whether VIX stays above 20 and the S&P drawdown deepens past 5%, which would accelerate multiple compression on premium names
- Credit quality commentary from peer banks and any uptick in charge-offs that would validate the bear narrative
- Follow-through on the $50B buyback pace - actual repurchase disclosures vs authorization
- Any further Dimon macro commentary that either walks back or doubles down on the bearish market view
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 30, 2026, JPM was $344.71. We expect it to be $336.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $265.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 30, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.