Business Description
JPMorgan Chase & Co. operates as a bank and financial holding company in the United States, rest of North America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Asia Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean. It operates in three segments: Consumer & Community Banking, Commercial & Investment Bank, and Asset & Wealth Management. The company offers deposit, investment and lending products, and cash management; mortgage origination and servicing activities; residential mortgages and home equity loans; and credit cards, payment solutions, travel services, merchant offers, lifestyle benefits, auto loans, and leases to consumers and small businesses through bank branches, ATMs, and digital and telephone banking. It also provides investment banking, market-making, financing, custody, and securities products and services; corporate strategy and structure advisory, equity and debt market capital-raising, and loan origination and syndication services; cash and derivative instruments, risk management solutions, prime brokerage, clearing, and research; and fund services, liquidity and trading services, and data solutions products for large corporations, financial institutions, merchants, start-ups, small and midsized companies, local governments, municipalities, nonprofits, and commercial real estate clients. In addition, the company offers multi-asset investment management solutions in equities, fixed income, alternatives, and money market funds to institutional clients and retail investors; retirement products and services, estate planning, lending, deposits, and investment management products to high-net-worth clients; and financial transaction processing. JPMorgan Chase & Co. was founded in 1799 and is headquartered in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 25, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 20.09
Total Equity: $362.44B
Shares: 2,793,700,000
Total Debt: $942.38B
Cash: $343.34B
EBITDA: $81.42B
Total Debt: $942.38B
Cash: $343.34B
Revenue: $279.75B
Revenue: $279.75B
Revenue: $279.75B
Total Equity: $362.44B
Tax Rate: 21.4%
Equity: $362.44B
Total Debt: $942.38B
Cash: $343.34B
Current Liabilities: $3,584.54B
Long-Term Debt: $433.97B
Total Debt: $942.38B
Total Equity: $362.44B
Shares: 2,793,700,000
Shares: 2,793,700,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 2,793,700,000
Stock Price: $333.45
Net Income: $57.05B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Revenue has more than doubled from $127B in 2021 to $280B in 2025, with operating margin holding in a 26-30% band even as the business scaled through a rate cycle and the First Republic absorption. Net income stepped from $48B to $57B and OCF/NI of 1.15x with accruals at -0.1% of assets indicates earnings are backed by cash, not accrual gymnastics; Beneish M at -2.33 is well clear of the manipulation threshold. The Altman Z distress flag is a model artifact - Z-score is calibrated for industrial firms and is structurally negative for deposit-taking banks, not a real solvency signal.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- CET1 ratio and SLR trend vs regulatory minimums to confirm capital fortress
- Loan loss reserve build/release and net charge-off trajectory in 2024-2025 10-K
- Net interest income sensitivity to rate cuts and deposit beta assumptions
- Whether insider sales are under Rule 10b5-1 plans (scheduled vs discretionary)
- Investment banking and trading revenue mix durability vs cyclical peak
- Operational risk and litigation reserves disclosure
The composite and signal-adjusted fair value both sit at $301.45 against a $333.45 price, implying the market is paying about a 10-11% premium to a fair-value estimate that already embeds JPM's fortress quality. That is not a screaming overvaluation, but it is the opposite of a margin of safety — you are buying at roughly 1.1x deserved value on a SIFI bank whose forward earnings face NIM normalization, deposit beta creep, and a normalizing credit cycle. Earnings quality is clean, so no haircut is warranted; the Fortress quality grade justifies a premium multiple but that premium is already in the print, not a reason to add another layer on top. The bull case (AI efficiency, share count shrinking, pricing power) is largely consensus and reflected in the price; the bear case (rate normalization, regulatory capital, credit normalization off cycle lows) is the asymmetric risk that is not. Net-net: a great business at a full-to-slightly-stretched price. Fair-value methods look sane (no runaway 5x outputs to discount), and the gap is modest enough that this is 'Rich' not 'Overvalued' — the honest verdict is that the market understands JPM well and you are not being offered an edge here.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward NIM guidance and deposit beta trajectory in next earnings call
- Credit reserve build/release cadence and net charge-off trends vs cycle averages
- Basel III endgame capital impact and how it constrains buyback capacity
- IB/markets revenue mix — how much of recent strength is cyclical vs structural
The macro backdrop is neutral (VIX 18.6, S&P 3.3% off highs, 10y at 4.41%) and JPM's beta of 1 means the tape itself is neither helping nor hurting much. What is doing the work is the news flow: every major bank cleared the Fed stress test, JPM raised its dividend to $1.65 from $1.50, and capital return guidance was reaffirmed. That is exactly the kind of catalyst that reinforces the active 'fortress balance sheet / steady compounder' narrative the market already assigns this name, and it lands during a calm-enough tape to be rewarded rather than fade. Narrative durability is high and intensity is moderate, so the stock is not euphoric or over-owned on a story that could crack; it is grinding higher on confirmation. Analyst tone is constructively Buy with a target ($339.75) basically at spot, meaning the sell side has not yet refreshed numbers post-stress-test, no negative revisions, and there is room for upward target drift. JPM also just raised its own S&P year-end target to 7,800, reinforcing it as the house view voice of the tape, which tends to feed reflexively into its own multiple. Headwinds exist (hawkish-Fed math debate, NIM compression chatter, premium to book) but are background noise this week, not the active pressure.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side target revisions actually tick up in the next 2-3 weeks post stress test
- Q3 earnings NIM trajectory and deposit beta commentary - the bear story's pressure point
- Any rotation out of money-center banks into regionals if curve steepens further
- VIX behavior and S&P drawdown extension - a break below recent regime would mute the tailwind
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $127.2B | $153.8B | $236.3B | $270.8B | $279.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | -$3.7B | $32.4B | $90.6B | $112.0B | $112.1B |
| Gross Profit | $130.9B | $121.4B | $145.7B | $158.8B | $167.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $71.3B | $75.2B | $84.1B | $83.7B | $95.0B |
| Operating Income | $59.6B | $46.2B | $61.6B | $75.1B | $72.6B |
| Net Income | $48.3B | $37.7B | $49.6B | $58.5B | $57.0B |
| EBITDA | $67.5B | $53.2B | $69.1B | $83.0B | $81.4B |
| EPS | $15.39 | $12.10 | $16.25 | $19.79 | $20.09 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $740.8B | $567.2B | $624.2B | $469.3B | $343.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.7T | $1.4T | $1.5T | $1.7T | $1.9T |
| Total Assets | $3.7T | $3.7T | $3.9T | $4.0T | $4.4T |
| Current Liabilities | $3.1T | $3.1T | $3.1T | $3.2T | $3.6T |
| Long-Term Debt | $301.0B | $295.9B | $391.8B | $401.4B | $434.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.4T | $3.4T | $3.5T | $3.7T | $4.1T |
| Total Equity | $294.1B | $292.3B | $327.9B | $344.8B | $362.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $272.3B | $296.5B | $332.9B | $376.2B | $416.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $78.1B | $107.1B | $13.0B | -$42.0B | $100.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Free Cash Flow | $78.1B | $107.1B | $13.0B | -$42.0B | $100.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$9.9B | -$2.4B | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$21.0B | -$10.6B | -$9.8B | -$28.7B | -$34.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | $213.2B | -$173.6B | $56.9B | -$154.8B | -$126.0B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$183.5B $181.7B – $185.2B
|
$196.9B $193.1B – $199.1B
|
$205.1B $202.6B – $209.4B
|
$215.2B $214.3B – $216.0B
|
| EBITDA |
$64.8B $64.2B – $65.4B
|
$69.6B $68.2B – $70.3B
|
$72.5B $71.6B – $74.0B
|
$76.0B $75.7B – $76.3B
|
| Net Income |
$56.5B $56.2B – $56.7B
|
$62.2B $61.0B – $63.4B
|
$65.3B $61.0B – $69.5B
|
$72.8B $68.0B – $77.5B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:06am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +20.9% | +53.6% | +14.6% | +3.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -7.3% | +20.0% | +9.0% | +5.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -22.5% | +33.5% | +21.9% | -3.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -22.1% | +31.5% | +18.0% | -2.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -21.2% | +29.9% | +20.1% | -1.9% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:05am (2d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-24 | Piepszak Jennifer | A-Award | 60,214.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-24 | Rohrbaugh Troy L | A-Award | 90,321.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-24 | Petno Douglas B | A-Award | 90,321.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-24 | Erdoes Mary E. | A-Award | 60,214.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-22 | Friedman Stacey | S-Sale | 5,467.00 | $330.73 | $1.8M |
| 2026-05-20 | Friedman Stacey | S-Sale | 5,468.00 | $300.27 | $1.6M |
| 2026-05-15 | Erdoes Mary E. | S-Sale | 6,648.00 | $298.36 | $2.0M |
| 2026-05-15 | Lake Marianne | S-Sale | 6,427.00 | $298.36 | $1.9M |
| 2026-05-14 | Petno Douglas B | G-Gift | 135,027.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-15 | Petno Douglas B | S-Sale | 5,659.00 | $300.05 | $1.7M |
| 2026-05-14 | Petno Douglas B | G-Gift | 135,027.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-15 | Beer Lori A | S-Sale | 3,165.00 | $300.05 | $949,658 |
| 2026-05-05 | Barnum Jeremy | S-Sale | 3,022.00 | $309.41 | $935,032 |
| 2026-05-05 | BACON ASHLEY | S-Sale | 4,070.00 | $309.42 | $1.3M |
| 2026-05-05 | Piepszak Jennifer | S-Sale | 4,919.00 | $309.42 | $1.5M |
| 2026-04-15 | Piepszak Jennifer | S-Sale | 9,136.00 | $306.56 | $2.8M |
| 2026-04-15 | Petno Douglas B | S-Sale | 5,660.00 | $306.58 | $1.7M |
| 2026-04-15 | Lake Marianne | S-Sale | 6,427.00 | $306.57 | $2.0M |
| 2026-04-15 | Erdoes Mary E. | S-Sale | 12,345.00 | $306.57 | $3.8M |
| 2026-04-15 | Beer Lori A | S-Sale | 3,166.00 | $306.59 | $970,660 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 25, 2026 3:00am (2d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-06 | $1.50 | 2026-05-18 | 2026-07-06 | 2026-07-31 |
| 2026-04-06 | $1.50 | 2026-03-17 | 2026-04-06 | 2026-04-30 |
| 2026-01-06 | $1.50 | 2025-12-09 | 2026-01-06 | 2026-01-31 |
| 2025-10-06 | $1.50 | 2025-09-16 | 2025-10-06 | 2025-10-31 |
| 2025-07-03 | $1.40 | 2025-05-19 | 2025-07-03 | 2025-07-31 |
| 2025-04-04 | $1.40 | 2025-03-18 | 2025-04-04 | 2025-04-30 |
| 2025-01-06 | $1.25 | 2024-12-09 | 2025-01-06 | 2025-01-31 |
| 2024-10-04 | $1.25 | 2024-09-17 | 2024-10-04 | 2024-10-31 |
| 2024-07-05 | $1.15 | 2024-05-20 | 2024-07-05 | 2024-07-31 |
| 2024-04-04 | $1.15 | 2024-03-19 | 2024-04-05 | 2024-04-30 |
| 2024-01-04 | $1.05 | 2023-12-12 | 2024-01-05 | 2024-01-31 |
| 2023-10-05 | $1.05 | 2023-09-19 | 2023-10-06 | 2023-10-31 |
| 2023-07-05 | $1.00 | 2023-05-15 | 2023-07-06 | 2023-07-31 |
| 2023-04-05 | $1.00 | 2023-03-21 | 2023-04-06 | 2023-04-30 |
| 2023-01-05 | $1.00 | 2022-12-13 | 2023-01-06 | 2023-01-31 |
| 2022-10-05 | $1.00 | 2022-09-20 | 2022-10-06 | 2022-10-31 |
| 2022-07-05 | $1.00 | 2022-05-17 | 2022-07-06 | 2022-07-31 |
| 2022-04-05 | $1.00 | 2022-03-15 | 2022-04-06 | 2022-04-30 |
| 2022-01-05 | $1.00 | 2021-12-14 | 2022-01-06 | 2022-01-31 |
| 2021-10-05 | $1.00 | 2021-09-21 | 2021-10-06 | 2021-10-31 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue has marched from $67.0B (Q4'24) to $73.7B (Q1'26) — call it ~10% over five quarters, decent but not exciting for a bank riding peak NII. Net income is noisier: $18.15B in Q2'24 was clearly a one-off (Visa share exchange gain, ~$8B pretax), so the "earnings down YoY" framing is misleading. Strip that and Q1'26's $16.49B at a 22.4% margin is actually the best clean quarter in the series, with margins expanding sequentially from 18.7% → 22.4%. That is not a decelerating franchise. Annual NI of $57.05B (2025) vs $58.47B (2024) again reflects the Visa comp, not deterioration. ROE of 16.3% on a $360B+ equity base is elite for a G-SIB.
The prior models are internally contradictory in ways that should embarrass them. The Market Forces module calls JPM a "late-cycle value trap... levering up aggressively into decelerating growth with deteriorating operational quality, unsustainable cash flows, and insiders fleeing" — none of which the numbers support. Q1'26 margins are *expanding*, OCF of $100.87B is robust (bank FCF is a near-meaningless construct since capex isn't the constraint — regulatory capital is), and the insider "selling" is ~40K shares of routine 10b5-1 disposals plus gifts, against ~2.7B shares outstanding. That's noise, not an exodus. Meanwhile the Synthesis module correctly flags the 38.2% implied FCF growth as a modeling artifact — yes, because FCF jumped from a depressed 2021/22 base, not because anyone expects it to compound. The 178.8% FCF CAGR is garbage-in. The Narrative layer's $301 DCF + $32 narrative premium is the most honest read in the file.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously is not "value trap" — it's duration risk on NII. JPM's 2024-2025 earnings power is heavily levered to the rate curve and to the deposit franchise's beta lag. If the Fed cuts 150bps and deposit costs are sticky on the way down (they were sticky on the way up too, so this cuts both ways), NIM compresses. Consensus 2026 EPS of ~$20-21 implies ~16.5x forward, which is *rich* for a bank — historically JPM trades 11-13x. The P/B of 2.48x is near a 20-year high; the franchise has never sustained >2.5x P/B for long without mean-reverting. Credit is also benign right now — card charge-offs at 3.3% are normalizing but not stressed. A real recession with CRE losses and consumer credit deterioration would compress both the multiple and the E. That's the bear case, and it's a multiple-compression story, not a "deteriorating quality" story.
My verdict: I dissent from Market Forces (wrong, and embarrassingly so on the facts) and side with the Narrative layer's framing. Fair value is roughly $295-310 on a normalized 12-13x mid-cycle EPS of ~$23-25, or ~1.9-2.1x book. At $333 you're paying ~10% above that for Dimon, scale, and the regulatory moat — defensible but not a bargain. The 1.85% dividend yield plus ~3% buyback gives you ~5% capital return, so total return at current prices is mid-single-digits unless the multiple holds, which requires NIM to hold, which requires the curve to cooperate. I would not chase here; I'd wait for a 10-15% pullback (~$285-300) on any credit scare or rate-cut-driven NII guide-down, which historically happens at least once a year in bank stocks. Quality is unquestioned; price is full.
GPT Critique
In reviewing the data for JPMorgan Chase & Co., I see a company with robust revenue growth and stable, impressive earnings margins. JPM's quarterly revenue has increased from $67.01 billion in Q4 2024 to $73.66 billion in Q1 2026, marking approximately a 10% growth over five quarters—a solid performance for a major diversified bank. However, the net income figures show volatility, largely influenced by non-recurring items like the Visa share exchange gain in Q2 2024. The most recent quarter shows a net income of $16.49 billion with a margin of 22.4%, an indicator of strong operational efficiency and profitability. The company's cash flow is robust with an operating cash flow of $100.87 billion, though the free cash flow metric appears inflated due to banking sector norms where capex isn't a significant constraint.
I align with Claude Opus in disputing the Market Forces module's characterization of JPM as a "late-cycle value trap." The current data contradicts this assertion; margins are expanding, and cash flows are strong. The notion of insider selling as a negative signal is unfounded, given the relatively small volume of shares sold against the total outstanding. I also share Opus's skepticism about the implied 38.2% FCF growth rate; this appears to be an artifact of the data rather than a realistic forecast.
Where I diverge from Opus is in the interpretation of JPM's valuation premium. Opus suggests that JPM is modestly overvalued at its current price of $333, proposing a fair value range of $295-310. I believe this underestimates the durability of JPM's competitive advantages and the premium that comes with it. The bank's scale, market position, and management under Jamie Dimon are worth more than a mere 10% premium to book. While Opus is cautious about JPM's reliance on net interest income and potential compression due to rate cuts, I see JPM's diversified revenue streams and technological investments as buffers against such risks.
A careful skeptic might argue that both my analysis and Opus's overlook the broader macroeconomic and regulatory risks that could impact JPM's performance. These include potential geopolitical tensions, regulatory changes, and the unpredictability of rate movements, which could all pressure JPM's margins and growth prospects more than currently anticipated.