Business Description
Kingsoft Cloud Holdings Limited provides cloud services to businesses and organizations primarily in China. The company’s product portfolio includes cloud products, such as infrastructure as a service (IaaS) infrastructure, platform as a service (PaaS) middleware, and software as a service (SaaS) applications that primarily consist of cloud computing, network, containers, database, big data, security, storage, and delivery solutions. It offers research and development services, as well as enterprise digital solutions and related services. The company also provides public cloud services to customers in various verticals, including video, e-commerce, intelligent mobility, artificial intelligence, and mobile internet; and enterprise cloud services to customers in financial services, public service, and healthcare businesses. Kingsoft Cloud Holdings Limited was incorporated in 2012 and is headquartered in Beijing, China.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 8:14pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -3.30
Total Equity: $9.32B
Shares: 273,804,334
Total Debt: $6.42B
Cash: $6.12B
EBITDA: $2.03B
Total Debt: $6.42B
Cash: $6.12B
Revenue: $9.56B
Shares: 273,804,334
Revenue: $9.56B
Revenue: $9.56B
Revenue: $9.56B
Total Equity: $9.32B
Tax Rate: 0.4%
Equity: $9.32B
Total Debt: $6.42B
Cash: $6.12B
Current Liabilities: $9.43B
Long-Term Debt: $3.03B
Total Debt: $6.42B
Total Equity: $9.32B
Shares: 273,804,334
Shares: 273,804,334
CapEx: -$4.74B
Shares: 273,804,334
Stock Price: $8.58
Net Income: -$936.25M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The headline numbers tell two contradictory stories. Story 1 (bull): $6.12B liquid cash against a $3.94B market cap means you're paying negative ~$2.2B for the operating business; revenue re-accelerated to $9.56B in 2025 (+23% YoY), gross margin expanded from 3.9% in 2021 to 15.7%, and operating margin compressed from -27% to -5.5% — a genuine multi-year inflection. Story 2 (bear): FCF burn ACCELERATED to -$941M in 2025 from -$3.05B in 2024 (still bad), the company carries net debt of $296M despite the cash pile (so the $6.12B is offset by ~$6.4B of debt — this isn't a fortress, it's a leveraged balance sheet), Altman Z of -0.3 sits in distress territory, and diluted shares grew from 230M to 273M (4.4% CAGR) while buybacks recover only 12.7% of SBC.
The critical reconciliation: the 'cash/mktcap 155%' headline is misleading because net cash is NEGATIVE. The $6.12B liquid cash is matched by roughly equivalent debt — this is a financed balance sheet, not a cash fortress. That changes the entire valuation framing. You are NOT buying the opco for free; you are buying a leveraged Chinese cloud reseller with a 26-quarter runway only if debt doesn't get called and refi stays available.
The insider tape shows essentially no directional activity — one 1.2M share transaction by Tian Kaiyan at $89K (implied $0.07/share, almost certainly an award/grant code, NOT an open-market buy at $13.74). No P codes visible. The 'no insider transactions' label is correct. Narrative-wise, the pipeline's $16-20 fair value hinges on 5% op margin by 2027 — plausible given the trajectory, but requires the commodity-cloud bear case to be wrong.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 6:47pm (13h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $9.1B | $8.2B | $7.0B | $7.8B | $9.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $8.7B | $7.8B | $6.2B | $6.4B | $8.1B |
| Gross Profit | $351.3M | $429.5M | $850.2M | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.1B | $2.7B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.0B |
| Operating Income | -$1.7B | -$2.2B | -$1.4B | -$825.7M | -$527.4M |
| Net Income | -$1.6B | -$2.7B | -$2.2B | -$2.0B | -$936.3M |
| EBITDA | -$668.4M | -$1.4B | -$1.1B | -$487.8M | $2.0B |
| EPS | $-6.90 | $-10.95 | $-9.15 | $-8.10 | $-3.30 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 6:47pm (13h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.2B | $3.4B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $6.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $12.4B | $9.0B | $6.1B | $6.8B | $11.0B |
| Total Assets | $21.1B | $17.3B | $15.1B | $17.6B | $26.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $7.5B | $6.7B | $6.8B | $9.2B | $9.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $100.0M | $1.7B | $3.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $9.6B | $7.7B | $7.8B | $12.1B | $17.4B |
| Total Equity | $10.6B | $8.8B | $6.9B | $5.2B | $9.3B |
| Retained Earnings | -$7.5B | -$10.1B | -$12.3B | -$14.3B | -$15.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 6:47pm (13h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$708.9M | $189.0M | -$169.1M | $628.4M | $3.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$735.4M | -$1.4B | -$2.0B | -$3.7B | -$4.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$1.4B | -$1.2B | -$2.1B | -$3.1B | -$941.3M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $150.3M | -$223.4M | -$5.5M | -$2.8M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$208.4M | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.0B | -$922.9M | -$1.0B | $240.6M | $3.4B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 6:47pm (13h ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$12.6B $11.0B – $14.0B
|
$15.7B $11.9B – $18.6B
|
$19.1B $16.6B – $21.3B
|
$18.6B $16.1B – $20.7B
|
| EBITDA |
-$617.1M -$685.9M – -$535.6M
|
-$767.6M -$911.4M – -$581.0M
|
-$935.9M -$1.0B – -$812.2M
|
-$909.2M -$1.0B – -$789.0M
|
| Net Income |
-$702.5M -$788.1M – -$616.8M
|
-$443.5M -$739.1M – -$147.8M
|
-$326.9M -$496.2M – -$157.6M
|
$5.0M $4.2M – $5.7M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 6:47pm (13h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -9.7% | -13.8% | +10.5% | +22.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +22.3% | +97.9% | +57.7% | +12.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -29.2% | +39.2% | +39.0% | +36.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -67.3% | +18.1% | +9.6% | +52.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -104.8% | +21.2% | +54.8% | +516.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-03-25 | Qu Heng | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Wang Hang | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Zou Tao | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Li Yi | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Liu Tao | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Liu Tao | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Liu Tao | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Qu Jingyuan | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Tian Kaiyan | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Tian Kaiyan | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Tian Kaiyan | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Tian Kaiyan | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Tian Kaiyan | 1,200,000.00 | $0.07 | $89,040 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Zhang Duo | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Yu Ming-to | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw trajectory is genuinely striking before any narrative overlay. Revenue went $7.05B (2023) → $7.79B (2024) → $9.56B (2025), with the most recent quarter at $2.70B versus $1.97B a year prior — that's 37% YoY acceleration in Q1 2026, not the 22.8% the momentum tile flags from older windows. Gross profit nearly doubled from $850M (2023) to $1.50B (2025), gross margin from 12% to 15.7%, and operating loss compressed from -$1.35B to -$527M. Net loss halved from -$1.97B to -$936M. Operating cash flow swung to a positive $3.80B in 2025 — that is not a distressed business. The catch: capex of -$4.74B drove FCF to -$941M, meaning KC is plowing everything plus more into AI/GPU infrastructure buildout. Cash of $6.12B is real but the burn rate matters: at -$941M FCF and accelerating capex, runway is maybe 3-4 years absent capital raises or capex moderation.
The synthesis verdict ("Disconnected from Fundamentals — priced as distressed") is directionally defensible but the underlying P/S claim is wrong-numbered. FMP's ps_ratio is 2.07x and ev_to_revenue is 2.11x — not the 0.4x the pre-flight and synthesis layers repeatedly cite. At $3.94B market cap on $9.56B revenue that's 0.41x in USD terms, but the canonical ratio uses ADR-adjusted share economics. Either way, the models are arguing past each other: market-forces flags "unsustainable debt-funded growth" and "zero insider confidence" as bearish, while synthesis calls it catastrophically cheap. Both can't be right, and the insider data is unreadable (ten "?" entries with 0 shares — that's a data failure, not a signal of absent insider buying). I'd discount the market-forces "zero insider confidence" claim entirely.
The contrarian case the models underweight: this is a Chinese VIE-structured cloud provider whose largest customer historically has been Xiaomi/Kingsoft group — related-party revenue concentration is a real overhang the data here doesn't disclose. The 15.7% gross margin is still thin for "cloud infrastructure" — AWS runs 60%+, even Alibaba Cloud is in the high-teens to low-20s. KC's margin expansion (12% → 15.7% over two years) is real but the asymptote may be 20%, not 40%. That caps terminal operating margin somewhere around 8-12%, not SaaS-like. Capex at $4.74B against $9.56B revenue (50% of sales) is GPU/AI buildout that either (a) generates the next leg of growth at premium pricing or (b) becomes stranded capacity if Chinese AI demand disappoints or US chip export controls bite harder. The bear case isn't "dying business" — it's "capital-intensive utility with structural margin ceiling and geopolitical tail risk."
I dissent from "disconnected from fundamentals" framing — the market isn't being irrational, it's pricing real risks the synthesis layer hand-waves: VIE structure, customer concentration, capex-driven dilution risk, and a margin profile that may never reach hyperscaler economics. That said, at 2x EV/revenue with 37% recent quarterly growth, OCF positive $3.8B, and loss curve bending, the stock is more interesting than the bearish components suggest. Fair value if you believe operating margin reaches 5% by 2027 on $13-14B revenue: ~$700M operating profit, slap a 20x multiple = $14B EV, roughly $18-20/share. If capex normalizes and AI infra monetizes, upside to $25. If margins stall at break-even and dilution comes, $8-10. The expected value skews modestly positive at $13.33 but with fat left tail. The "platform-monopoly" narrative archetype is wrong — KC is a #4 player in a market where #1-3 have structural advantages; calling it platform-monopoly inflates the bull case. This is a leveraged bet on China cloud capex cycle + AI buildout monetization, not a quality compounder.
GPT Critique
From my perspective on the raw data, Kingsoft Cloud Holdings Limited presents a complex picture of a company that is growing rapidly yet remains burdened by significant structural challenges. The revenue growth is a standout, with an impressive trajectory from $7.05B in 2023 to $9.56B in 2025, marking a robust growth rate. The recent quarterly revenue of $2.70B represents a substantial 37% year-over-year increase, contrary to the 22.8% flagged in the momentum tile, indicating acceleration rather than deceleration. However, the company is still grappling with persistent losses, albeit reduced, as seen with an improving net income margin from -56.1% to -12.7% over recent quarters. The cash flow statement reveals a positive operating cash flow of $3.80B for 2025, yet free cash flow remains negative due to high capital expenditures, suggesting an aggressive investment phase, likely in infrastructure. This positions Kingsoft Cloud as a high-revenue, high-burn entity with a precarious balance between growth and financial sustainability.
I agree with Opus on several points, particularly the observation that Kingsoft Cloud is not distressed in the traditional sense. The operating cash flow turning positive is a significant milestone, indicating operational improvements that are not typically characteristic of a distressed firm. Opus rightly critiques the synthesis verdict's assertion of a "0.4x P/S multiple," which seems to be an error or misinterpretation, as the ps_ratio from FMP is 2.07x. This discrepancy highlights the importance of accurate ratio interpretation in valuation. However, I diverge from Opus's framing on some key aspects. For instance, Opus describes the market's pricing as reflecting "real risks," such as the VIE structure and customer concentration. While these are valid concerns, I think the potential for a positive turnaround, driven by increased AI infrastructure investment, is underappreciated by the market. The narrative that Kingsoft Cloud could leverage these investments into future growth represents a substantial potential upside that is not fully priced in.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus's and my views are overly optimistic about the potential for margin improvements and growth sustainability. They could point to the thin gross margins, which remain considerably lower than industry leaders, and the massive capex as indicators that Kingsoft Cloud may not achieve the economies of scale required for substantial profitability. Furthermore, the geopolitical risks inherent in a Chinese VIE-structured company operating under an unpredictable regulatory environment add layers of uncertainty that could derail even the most promising financial trajectories.