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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for KKR & Co. Inc. (KKR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -32 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 18 · Value -73 · Sentiment -32 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $65.82 vs $102.81 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
KKR & Co. Inc.
KKR NYSEKKR & Co. Inc. is a global investment firm that provides alternative asset management, capital markets, and insurance solutions. Its core business spans private equity, credit, infrastructure, real estate, and liquid strategies, serving a wide range of institutional and individual clients through actively managed investment platforms. The firm also operates an insurance business that offers retirement, life insurance, and reinsurance solutions across individual and institutional markets. KKR & Co. Inc. plays a significant role in private markets by deploying capital, managing portfolios, and structuring investment and financing solutions for companies and assets across multiple sectors worldwide. Headquartered in New York, the company is recognized for its diversified platform that combines asset management expertise with insurance capabilities.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.34
Total Equity: $81.63B
Shares: 1,013,018,376
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $17.15B
EBITDA: $4.21B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $17.15B
Revenue: $19.21B
Revenue: $19.21B
Revenue: $19.21B
Total Equity: $81.63B
Tax Rate: 13.4%
Equity: $81.63B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $17.15B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $81.63B
Shares: 1,013,018,376
Shares: 1,013,018,376
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 1,013,018,376
Stock Price: $102.81
Net Income: $2.37B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 8:28pm (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $16.1B | $5.6B | $14.3B | $21.6B | $19.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $9.2B | $3.6B | $9.5B | $17.8B | $15.8B |
| Gross Profit | $6.9B | $2.0B | $4.9B | $3.8B | $3.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.9B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.0B |
| Operating Income | $5.0B | -$345.6M | $2.1B | $926.2M | $490.2M |
| Net Income | $4.7B | -$521.7M | $3.7B | $3.1B | $2.4B |
| EBITDA | $7.7B | $2.5B | $5.6B | $5.7B | $4.2B |
| EPS | $7.95 | $-0.79 | $4.24 | $3.47 | $2.51 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $7.42 | $-0.79 | $4.09 | $3.28 | $2.34 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:32am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $10.5B | $13.4B | $20.8B | $15.4B | $17.2B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | — | $275.3B | $317.3B | $360.1B | $410.1B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $36.9B | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | — | $220.0B | $258.9B | $298.1B | $328.5B |
| Total Equity | $58.2B | $55.4B | $58.4B | $62.0B | $81.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $7.7B | $6.7B | $9.8B | $12.3B | $13.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 8:28pm (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$7.2B | -$5.3B | -$1.5B | $6.6B | $477.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$473.8M | — | $0 | $0 | -$146.3M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $8.9B | $6.5B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $2.0B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$269.7M | -$346.7M | -$289.8M | $0 | -$3.4M |
| Net Change in Cash | $3.5B | $2.9B | $7.4B | -$5.4B | $1.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 8:28pm (14d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -65.4% | +157.4% | +51.1% | -11.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -70.9% | +142.2% | -21.0% | -10.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | -107.0% | +718.7% | -56.7% | -47.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -111.0% | +815.5% | -17.6% | -22.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -66.8% | +119.0% | +2.4% | -26.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:32am (17d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-15 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-17 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-17 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-11 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-12 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-14 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-04 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-12 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-10 | $0.18 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-15 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-16 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-16 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-19 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-16 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-10 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-12 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $0.16 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-17 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-12 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-13 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 09:01Even the bull case prices 49% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 72%. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($102.81) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +30% | 17.2% | $52.73 | -49% |
| Base — stabilizes | +20% | 15.0% | $35.60 | -65% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +10% | 12.7% | $23.47 | -77% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +13% | 15.0% | $28.93 | -72% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: KKR's TTM revenue is roughly $20.9B ($5.73+$4.32+$5.74+$5.53+... wait, four most recent quarters sum to $21.32B), with TTM net income around $3.16B. That's a ~15% net margin on the trailing basis — hardly the "collapsing margins" the Market Forces model claims. The 2026 Q1 dip to $4.32B/9.4% margin is a mark-to-market artifact typical of alt managers (unrealized carry swings), not operational deterioration. Annual revenue trajectory 2022→2025 ($5.57B → $14.32B → $21.64B → $19.21B) shows exactly the lumpiness you expect from a firm where GAAP revenue includes principal investment gains; using it for CAGR math is nearly meaningless. Book equity of $81.63B against a $92.3B market cap gives P/B of ~1.13 — that's not a bubble multiple for a franchise generating $2-3B in annual net income even in a soft year, implying mid-teens ROE on the fee-related earnings stream once you strip out the balance-sheet noise.
The synthesis verdict of $36.57 fair value (a 65% haircut) is almost certainly wrong, and I'll say so directly. A DCF built on GAAP operating cash flow of $478M for a firm like KKR is a category error — alt managers report OCF net of investment activity that belongs in "investing" for any other business. Blackstone, Apollo, Ares all trade at 20-30x fee-related earnings; KKR at ~$100 implies roughly 20-25x FRE which is in-line, not extreme. The Narrative Economics layer calling this "229% premium to DCF" is anchoring on a broken denominator. The market forces claim of "unprecedented insider selling" is also suspect — ten identical 67,214-share "J-Other" transactions on the same day with unknown filer looks like a single administrative entry (fund distribution, unit conversion, or 10b5-1 grant vesting) replicated, not ten insiders dumping.
Where the bears have a real point: the carry cycle. KKR's earnings quality genuinely depends on exit markets staying open, and 2022 (NI -$522M) shows how fast the P&L flips when marks turn. Recent YoY revenue -11.2% and earnings -22.9% are real, and they're happening while the S&P is near highs — that's a concerning divergence. The Global Atlantic insurance leg adds duration risk and credit exposure that's opaque in this data (no debt figure disclosed is itself a red flag for an insurance-owning entity — total liabilities must be enormous). If private credit spreads compress and LBO exit multiples normalize toward historical means, FRE growth stalls and realized carry evaporates simultaneously. The bear thesis weight of 78 on "embedded carry assumes exit market remains open" is the one line in the prior models worth taking seriously.
Contrarian read on the contrarians: everyone (synthesis, market forces, narrative) is piling on at $102 after a 32% drawdown from highs. That's often when the risk/reward inverts. Peers trade at similar or higher multiples on cleaner-adjusted earnings. The $31-37 fair value range would imply KKR is worth less than 1.0x book — that only happens if you believe the fee business is impaired AND Global Atlantic is under-reserved, neither of which is evidenced here. My independent read: KKR is fairly valued to modestly rich at $102, not catastrophically overvalued. Fair value band $85-110 depending on your carry realization assumptions over 2026-2028. I'd want to see it at $80 for a real margin of safety given cycle risk, but calling it a 70% short is analytical malpractice. I partially dissent from the synthesis: direction is closer to fairly-valued-to-slightly-rich, not deeply overvalued. Conviction is moderate — the carry cycle risk is real, but the models have overreacted to GAAP noise and misread the insider filing.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers do not support the most bearish machine read. KKR is not a “wounded franchise”; it is a high-variance alternative asset manager whose reported GAAP revenue and earnings are noisy because realizations and marks swamp the steadier fee engine. You can see that in the quarter-to-quarter swings: revenue moved from $3.11B with a $185.9M loss in 1Q25 to $5.09B and $510.1M of profit in 2Q25, then to $5.53B/$900.4M and $5.74B/$1.15B in the back half, before landing at $5.73B and $700.5M in the latest quarter. That is not a clean “collapse”; it is cyclical earnings power with a wide band. The annual series tells the same story. 2025 revenue fell to $19.21B from $21.64B in 2024, and net income fell to $2.37B from $3.08B, but both remain well above 2022 trough conditions, while recent quarterly revenue has re-accelerated sharply from early 2025 levels. The market is paying for normalized earnings capacity, not last year’s compressed operating line.
What stands out most is that the canonical valuation ratios look terrible only if you take them literally. A 43.9x P/E, 17.9x EV/EBITDA, 2.9% ROE, and 2.6% operating margin would describe a weak financial company if these were stable manufacturing-style metrics. They are not. KKR ended 2025 with $81.63B of equity and $17.15B of cash, and trades at just 1.28x book. For a scaled alternatives platform with embedded carry and insurance optionality, price-to-book is more informative than one-year P/E on depressed realizations. At a $92.3B market cap, investors are paying roughly $10.7B over book equity for the franchise. That premium is meaningful, but not absurd if the firm can compound fee-related earnings and monetize investments across cycles. The latest four quarters generated about $3.16B of net income, implying a trailing earnings yield around 3.4%; not cheap, but also not remotely consistent with the idea fair value is only $31. A stock at $31 would imply a market cap near $28B, or roughly 0.34x equity, which makes no sense for a profitable global manager with this scale and liquidity.
My read is that KKR deserves a premium, but not a heroic one. The business has become more resilient than classic private-equity managers because the earnings base is broader, yet the 2025 annual figures show exactly why the stock should not be treated as a simple secular compounder. Revenue was down 11% year over year, net income down 23%, operating income nearly halved to $490.2M from $926.2M, and operating cash flow was only $477.8M despite billions of accounting earnings. That weak cash conversion is the biggest yellow flag in the dataset. If you capitalize KKR on through-cycle distributable-type earnings, $102.81 is defensible; if you anchor on reported operating earnings and cash flow, it is rich. I land in the middle: the shares are not egregiously overvalued, but they already discount a fairly smooth recovery in exits, fundraising, and fee growth. A fair range is closer to the high $80s to low $90s than to either the machine’s $31 or an aggressive bull case well above $110.
The strongest case against this view is straightforward: nearly every “hard” quality metric here is poor. 2025 ROIC was just 0.66%, ROA 0.58%, net margin 12.3%, and operating margin 2.55%; recent annual earnings are below 2023 and far below what a 44x multiple should tolerate. Momentum is also soft, with recent revenue down 11.2% and earnings down 22.9% year over year. If you believe private-market exits remain clogged and fee rates compress as alternatives scale, then today’s 1.28x book is not modest but dangerous, because book for an alternative manager is not as sacrosanct as a bank’s. Add the odd cluster of July insider “other” transactions and a 0.73% dividend yield, and a skeptic can argue you are owning a cyclical, opaque financial at a growth-stock multiple. I weigh that bear case less heavily because the income statement is structurally distorted for this business model, and the balance-sheet/capital base is too strong to justify a distressed multiple.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of noisy GAAP revenue, but evidence on durability. If KKR can sustain quarterly net income around $800M-$1.0B while converting that into materially better operating cash flow than the $477.8M posted for full-year 2025, then the stock can justify triple digits and more. Conversely, if the next few quarters show revenue slipping back toward the $3B-$4B zone, margins returning to low teens or single digits, and annualized earnings drifting under $2.5B without a visible cash-flow bridge, then the “premium platform” thesis breaks and I would move clearly bearish. For now, the stock looks priced for competence and normalization, not for disaster.
Grok Reading
The numbers on KKR tell a story of a franchise whose reported scale is decoupling from economic returns. Annual revenue fell from $21.64B in 2024 to $19.21B in 2025 while net income dropped from $3.08B to $2.37B; operating income more than halved from $926M to $490M, leaving an operating margin of just 2.55%. Trailing twelve-month earnings power is deteriorating further—recent revenue and earnings growth sit at –11.2% and –22.9% respectively—yet the stock trades at 43.9× earnings and 5.4× sales. Return metrics are abysmal for a supposed compounder: ROE of 2.9%, ROIC of 0.7%, ROA of 0.6%. Operating cash flow of only $478M against $2.37B of reported net income signals that a large portion of “earnings” is mark-to-market or non-cash, not fee cash that can be distributed or reinvested. The $17B cash pile and near-zero reported leverage look comforting until one remembers that alternative-asset balance sheets are opaque and insurance float (the Global Atlantic piece) embeds duration and credit risk that does not appear in the simple debt-to-equity ratio of zero. At $102.81 the market is capitalizing a narrative of perpetual AUM compounding; the income statement is capitalizing something closer to a cyclical peak already rolling over.
Quarterly volatility reinforces the same picture. Revenue swung from $3.11B (Q1 2025, with a $186M loss) to $5.74B then back toward $4–5.7B, with net margins oscillating between –6% and 20%. That pattern is classic carry-realization noise, not the smooth fee-earnings trajectory a 44× multiple requires. Five-year earnings CAGR is already –20%, even as revenue CAGR prints a misleading +15.8% that is almost entirely a 2022 trough rebound. Book value of $81.6B supports a modest 1.28× P/B, which would be reasonable for a mature asset manager if ROE were mid-teens; at sub-3% ROE the multiple is still rich. Dividend yield of 0.73% offers no valuation floor.
The strongest counter-argument is that KKR is being valued as a secular alternatives platform, not on trailing GAAP. Believers will note that fee-related earnings and management fees on sticky AUM are understated in the volatile NI line, that insurance distribution creates a captive capital flywheel, and that private-market share gains versus public equities remain intact. They will point to the $92B market cap as cheap relative to the multi-trillion addressable pool of institutional capital still rotating into PE, credit and infrastructure, and will dismiss the $31–36 composite fair-value estimate as an artifact of applying industrial DCF math to a carry-heavy model. That case is coherent but requires uninterrupted exit markets, stable fee rates at scale, and 12–15% AUM growth for a decade—assumptions already strained by the observed revenue contraction and margin collapse. I weigh the hard income and cash-flow deterioration more heavily than the story because the story has already been fully paid for at 44×.
What would flip the view is a clear re-acceleration of fee-earning AUM growth above 12% with FRE margins expanding back toward mid-teens, accompanied by operating cash flow converting at least 70% of reported NI for two consecutive years, or a sustained drop in the shares toward the mid-$50s where the multiple would compress into the mid-20s on normalized earnings.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
KKR sits on $17.15B of liquid cash with net-cash of the same amount (18.6% of market cap) and is self-funding at $477.8M FCF. As one of the world's top-tier alternative asset managers, it enjoys long-duration fee streams from committed capital, and OCF/NI of 2.11x with modest accruals (0.7% of assets) suggests reported earnings are cash-backed. Altman Z of 0.27 flagging distress is a model artifact - Z-scores are unreliable for asset managers whose balance sheets carry large investment assets and consolidated fund liabilities. Revenue trajectory is lumpy ($16.1B to $5.6B to $14.3B to $21.6B to $19.2B) reflecting mark-to-market and realization-driven carry income rather than operational fragility. Management fees provide the durable base; performance income drives the swings. The core franchise - LP relationships, brand, deal flow - remains elite. However, diluted shares have grown from 637.8M (2021) to 1.01B (2025), a 12.3% CAGR, while buybacks recover only 27.2% of SBC. The business is compounding, but the equity base is compounding faster in places, which meaningfully dilutes per-share value creation. Insider J-Other transfers appear to be intra-entity movements among KKR holding entities and founders Kravis/Roberts, not open-market sales - the flagged '$6B of selling' is almost certainly reclassified structural transfers, not directional signal. That said, the absence of any P (open-market buys) is worth noting.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Segment breakdown of revenue/margin - how much of the GM compression is Global Atlantic insurance consolidation vs core asset management
- Fee-related earnings (FRE) trajectory and margin, which is the true durable profitability metric for an alt manager
- AUM and fee-paying AUM growth, dry powder, and fundraising pace
- Nature of the J-Other transfers (Form 4 footnotes) - confirm these are structural not economic sales by Kravis/Roberts
- SBC composition (equity awards vs partner unit conversions) and any planned de-dilution
- Consolidated fund debt vs parent recourse debt - to explain the Altman Z distress flag
The e2e composite pins fair value at $36.57 and the signal-adjusted read at $31.23, implying roughly -70% downside from $102.81. Even granting that anchored-PE methods understate platform businesses with long-dated carry and fee-related earnings that scale with AUM, the gap is too large to dismiss - the market is capitalizing KKR as if AUM growth in the mid-teens and carry realization continue through cycles. That is a coherent bull case, but it is already the base case in the price, not an unrecognized opportunity.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Fee-related earnings growth vs total earnings (isolate carry cyclicality)
- Net new AUM inflows by strategy and fundraising cadence
- Realized carry vs unrealized in recent quarters
- Buyback pace vs SBC to gauge net dilution trajectory
- Sensitivity of insurance/Global Atlantic spread income to rate/credit moves
The macro backdrop is nominally supportive - VIX 14.9, S&P at highs, a mild risk-on regime - which should be a tailwind for a beta-1.79 alt-asset manager that lives on animal spirits, deal flow, and carry realization. That is the one thing keeping this from being an outright Strong Headwind. But the tape is not landing here: KKR is down 11.2% recently against its own 15.8% long-term CAGR and has underperformed by 13.7pp over three years, telling you the narrative-intensity is fading even as broad risk assets sit near highs. That is a specific sentiment problem, not a market problem. The platform-monopoly story is still 'strong intensity, moderate durability, medium cult' - but with price at $102 versus a DCF anchor near $31, any wobble in the AUM-compounding thesis gets punished disproportionately, and the recent drawdown suggests marginal holders are starting to question the perpetual-growth assumption. 10y at 4.69% is a direct headwind to a levered, carry-dependent, long-duration cash flow story; financials were softer into Friday's close; and there is no fresh bullish catalyst in the news beyond a small Crowe advisory investment. Net: narrative fatigue plus rate pressure outweigh a friendly VIX for this specific name.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the recent 11% drawdown continues or bases - a lower low would confirm narrative breakdown
- Any Q2/Q3 print or capital-markets day that re-anchors AUM growth guidance
- Private credit spread behavior and LBO deal announcements - the visible plumbing behind the story
- Analyst target revisions - platform-monopoly names crack when sell-side starts trimming
- 10y yield direction - a break back under 4.25% would relieve real pressure on this name
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 10, 2026, KKR was $102.81. We expect it to be $91.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $75.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 10, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.