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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Linde plc (LIN) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-31): Designation Low · Gem Score -15 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 73 · Value -74 · Sentiment 42 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $290.02 vs $478.38 at analysis
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Linde plc
LIN NASDAQLinde plc is a global industrial gases and engineering company headquartered in Woking, United Kingdom. The company supplies atmospheric gases such as oxygen, nitrogen, argon, and rare gases, as well as process gases including hydrogen, carbon dioxide, helium, specialty gases, and acetylene for industrial, healthcare, and technology applications. Linde plc operates through an industrial gases business organized by geographic regions across the Americas, EMEA, and Asia-Pacific, and an engineering division that designs and constructs plants for air separation, hydrogen and synthesis gas, olefins, and natural gas processing. Its products and on-site gas solutions serve key sectors such as chemicals, manufacturing, metals, energy, electronics, food and beverage, and medical care, where reliable gas supply and advanced applications are critical to operations. As one of the largest players in its industry with a presence in over 100 countries, Linde plc plays a central role in supporting industrial production, infrastructure, and healthcare systems worldwide through its gases, related equipment, and engineering services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 14.61
Total Equity: $39.74B
Shares: 472,195,000
Total Debt: $22.48B
Cash: $5.06B
EBITDA: $12.69B
Total Debt: $22.48B
Cash: $5.06B
Revenue: $33.99B
Revenue: $33.99B
Revenue: $33.99B
Total Equity: $39.74B
Tax Rate: 22.4%
Equity: $39.74B
Total Debt: $22.48B
Cash: $5.06B
Current Liabilities: $15.20B
Long-Term Debt: $20.68B
Total Debt: $22.48B
Total Equity: $39.74B
Shares: 472,195,000
Shares: 472,195,000
CapEx: -$5.26B
Shares: 472,195,000
Stock Price: $478.38
Net Income: $6.90B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:27am (32d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $30.8B | $33.4B | $32.9B | $33.0B | $34.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $17.5B | $19.5B | $17.5B | $17.1B | $17.4B |
| Gross Profit | $13.3B | $13.9B | $15.4B | $15.9B | $16.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $8.3B | $8.5B | $7.3B | $7.2B | $7.7B |
| Operating Income | $5.0B | $5.4B | $8.0B | $8.6B | $8.9B |
| Net Income | $3.8B | $4.1B | $6.2B | $6.6B | $6.9B |
| EBITDA | $9.6B | $9.6B | $11.8B | $12.4B | $12.7B |
| EPS | $7.40 | $8.30 | $12.70 | $13.71 | $14.69 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $7.33 | $8.23 | $12.59 | $13.62 | $14.61 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:14am (30d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.8B | $5.4B | $4.7B | $4.9B | $5.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $10.2B | $13.0B | $12.6B | $12.9B | $13.3B |
| Total Assets | $81.6B | $79.7B | $80.8B | $80.1B | $86.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $13.6B | $16.5B | $15.7B | $14.5B | $15.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $11.3B | $12.2B | $13.4B | $15.3B | $20.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $36.2B | $38.3B | $39.7B | $40.7B | $47.1B |
| Total Equity | $45.4B | $41.4B | $41.1B | $39.5B | $39.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $18.7B | $20.5B | $8.8B | $12.6B | $16.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:27am (32d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $9.7B | $8.9B | $9.3B | $9.4B | $10.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.1B | -$3.2B | -$3.8B | -$4.5B | -$5.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $6.6B | $5.7B | $5.5B | $4.9B | $5.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$88.0M | -$110.0M | -$953.0M | -$317.0M | -$412.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $815.0M | $1.4B | $506.0M | $3.5B | $2.9B |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.2B | -$2.3B | -$2.5B | -$2.7B | -$2.8B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$4.6B | -$5.2B | -$4.0B | -$4.5B | -$4.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$931.0M | $2.6B | -$772.0M | $186.0M | $206.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:27am (32d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +8.3% | -1.5% | +0.5% | +3.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +5.0% | +10.4% | +3.3% | +4.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +7.7% | +49.5% | +7.6% | +3.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +8.4% | +49.5% | +5.9% | +5.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -0.5% | +23.7% | +4.9% | +2.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:14am (30d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-03 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-04 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-11 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-03 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-04 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-04 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-13 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-03 | $1.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-04 | $1.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-04 | $1.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-13 | $1.39 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-01 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-01 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-01 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-13 | $1.28 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw tape first: revenue growth is anemic — $30.79B (2021) to $33.99B (2025) is a 2.5% CAGR, and the most recent YoY is just 3% ($33.99B vs $33.01B). What Linde has done, impressively, is grind operating margin from 16.2% (2021) to 26.3% (2025) and net margin from 12.4% to 20.3%. That's the entire earnings story: NI nearly doubled from $3.83B to $6.90B on essentially flat revenue. The quarterly cadence confirms the pattern — Q1 2026 at $8.78B/21.1% margin is barely above Q2 2024's $8.27B/20.1%. This is a margin-expansion compounder, not a growth compounder, and margin expansion has mathematical limits.
At $478 and $221B market cap on $6.90B NI, we're at 32x trailing earnings, 19x EV/EBITDA, and 7.1x EV/revenue for a business growing revenue 2-3%. FCF actually declined at a -4% CAGR and 2025 FCF of $5.09B against a $221B cap is a 2.3% FCF yield — you're paying utility valuation for utility growth with equity-like risk. The 1.32% dividend yield and 40% payout ratio don't help; ROIC of 12.1% is respectable but not the 20%+ that would justify a 33x multiple. The synthesis composite fair value of ~$298 is directionally right; I'd argue the DCF underweights the terminal margin ceiling risk — if net margin plateaus at 21-22% (already there), and revenue grows 3%, earnings grow 3-5%, and a 20x multiple gets you to ~$345. So fair value probably sits in the $300-360 band, not $478.
Where I push back on the model chorus: everyone's calling this "overvalued but high quality" which is the consensus view and therefore already partially in the price. The contrarian case is that industrial gases duopolies (Linde + Air Liquide) have demonstrated 15+ years of pricing power through recessions, and the hydrogen/decarbonization capex cycle is real — Linde's $50B+ project backlog isn't in the trailing numbers yet. If green hydrogen ramps 2027-2030, today's flat revenue is the trough, not the trend. That's the bull case the synthesis undervalues. Counter to that: capex was $5.26B against $10.35B OCF — half of operating cash flow is going into the ground, and if those projects don't earn incremental ROIC above 12%, the FCF compression continues. The -4% FCF CAGR is the tell that the market is ignoring in favor of the reported EPS line.
I agree with the synthesis direction but not the magnitude — $298 feels too punitive for a business with this moat, contract duration, and demonstrated margin discipline through 2022's energy shock (op margin went UP from 16% to 26% while revenue was flat). The market-forces "premium-priced option on hydrogen timing" framing is the sharpest read in the file. Data thinness concerns: the Q1 2026 print is anomalously strong on margin (21.1%) and I'd want to see if that's sustainable or a one-quarter pricing/mix benefit; the current ratio of 0.88 is worth flagging but is normal for cash-generative industrials with revolver access. Insider activity isn't provided, which is a real gap for a mature-earner thesis where capital allocation discipline matters. Net: I'd fade this at $478, target re-entry $340-370 (roughly 22x forward earnings on ~$16.50 EPS), and acknowledge that in a low-rate environment with hydrogen tailwinds actually materializing, the multiple could sustain — but you're paying for that optionality at zero margin of safety today.
GPT Reading
Linde’s numbers read like a superb business that the market already knows is superb. What jumps out first is the unusual combination of almost no top-line growth and very strong profit architecture. Revenue went from $30.79B in 2021 to $33.99B in 2025, just a 2.5% annualized climb, and even over the most recent run-rate the business is only moving from $8.27B in 2024’s June quarter to $8.78B in 2026’s March quarter. That is not a growth stock revenue profile. Yet net income has compounded much faster, from $3.83B in 2021 to $6.90B in 2025, while operating income rose from $4.98B to $8.92B. Gross margin expanded from 43.0% in 2021 to 48.8% in 2025, operating margin from 16.2% to 26.3%, and net margin from 12.4% to 20.3%. This is a textbook pricing, mix, and efficiency story in a high-barrier business. The problem is that at $478, investors are paying 32.7x earnings, 19.1x EV/EBITDA, and 6.6x sales for a company whose recent revenue growth is 3% and whose FCF in 2025 was only $5.09B, implying an FCF yield around 2.3% on a $221B market cap.
The quality is real, but so is the valuation stretch. Quarterly profitability is consistently elite: net margins mostly sit around 20%-22%, with only the December 2025 quarter dipping to 17.5%, likely more noise than deterioration given the immediate rebound to 21.1% in March 2026. Annual revenue in 2022-2024 was basically flat at $33.36B, $32.85B, and $33.01B before reaching $33.99B in 2025, so the business is not scaling materially on volume. Instead, each incremental dollar of revenue is being monetized much better. That deserves a premium, but not any premium. With ROIC at 12.1% and ROE at 17.4%, Linde is excellent, yet those returns are not so extraordinary that 5.7x book and nearly 7.1x EV/revenue look obviously cheap for a capital-intensive company still spending $5.26B of capex a year. The market seems to be capitalizing Linde less as an industrial and more as a protected compounder with near-zero cyclicality. I think that’s too generous.
The other thing I don’t want to wave away is cash conversion versus accounting earnings. Net income of $6.90B against free cash flow of $5.09B is fine, not bad, but it is not the kind of surplus conversion that would justify a near-consumer-staples multiple on an industrial gas business. Operating cash flow was $10.35B, but capex consumed just over half of that. This is still an asset-heavy network business, not a software annuity. The balance sheet is healthy enough — $22.48B debt against $5.06B cash and $39.74B equity, with debt/equity at 0.57 — but the current ratio under 0.88 reinforces that Linde is optimized, not overcapitalized. At the current price, you are effectively underwriting continued margin expansion from already-high levels and treating end-market resilience as almost absolute. That is a demanding setup when revenue growth remains low single digits.
The best counterargument is straightforward and serious: Linde has earned the right to trade expensively because its earnings base is much safer than a normal industrial’s. Since 2022, revenue has barely moved while operating income surged from $5.37B to $8.92B, which suggests management has real pricing power and contract quality rather than just cyclical luck. If the company can keep growing earnings 5%-8% with low volatility, then a 30x-plus P/E may not be irrational in a lower-rate or defensive-quality market. The quarterly data also do not show any sign of a crack; revenue has stair-stepped from $8.11B in March 2025 to $8.78B in March 2026, and net income from $1.67B to $1.86B despite mixed macro conditions. A bull would also say the capex burden buys competitive insulation, and that hydrogen, electronics, healthcare, and on-site contracts create longer-duration growth than the raw reported sales CAGR suggests. I weigh those points less heavily because the current multiple already assumes that resilience and optionality. You don’t get paid for discovering Linde is a great business; everyone knows that already.
What would change my mind is either price or acceleration. If Linde can show several quarters of 6%-8% organic revenue growth while holding operating margins around 26%-27%, then today’s valuation would have more support because the story would no longer be “flat sales, better margins.” Likewise, if free cash flow moves decisively above $7B without a step-up in leverage, the equity starts to look less expensive on cash terms. Short of that, I would need a materially lower entry point — roughly the low-$400s to start getting interested and closer to $375-$400 to feel clearly compensated for the low-growth, high-expectation setup.
Grok Reading
Linde’s numbers describe a superb franchise that has already harvested most of the easy gains. Revenue has crawled from $30.8B in 2021 to $34.0B in 2025—a 1.7% CAGR—while net income nearly doubled from $3.83B to $6.90B on the back of relentless margin expansion: operating margin rose from roughly 16% to 26.3% and net margin now sits at 20.3%. The quarterly run-rate is steady but unspectacular ($8.11B → $8.78B over five quarters), confirming high-single-digit volume-plus-price momentum at best. Free cash flow of $5.09B against a $221B enterprise tells the real story: after $5.26B of sustaining-and-growth capex, the company converts only half its $10.35B operating cash flow into owner earnings, producing a 2.3% FCF yield. At 32.7× trailing earnings, 19.1× EV/EBITDA and 6.6× sales, the market is capitalizing that thin free-cash stream as if 20%-plus net margins and mid-single-digit EPS growth are contractual entitlements rather than the product of a multi-year cost and mix cycle that is already mature.
The balance sheet is serviceable—net debt roughly $17.4B, debt-to-equity 0.57, ROIC 12.1%—but the current ratio of 0.88 and the negative FCF CAGR (-4%) underline that this remains a capital-hungry industrial, not a software compounder. Pricing power and long-term on-site contracts are real, yet they have already been fully reflected in the 800 bp operating-margin lift since 2021. With revenue growth stuck near 3% year-on-year and no evidence of an accelerating hydrogen or semiconductor kicker in the reported figures, the 33× multiple embeds perfection: zero cyclical air-pocket, continued mix upgrade, and permanent scarcity of industrial-gas capacity. That is a thin margin of safety.
The strongest contrary case is quality and durability. Linde’s moat—dense pipeline networks, take-or-pay contracts, and a de-facto duopoly—has produced recession-resistant cash flows and a 17.4% ROE with only moderate leverage. Bulls will correctly note that DCF models using mid-cycle multiples undervalue the multi-decade contracted backlog and the optionality of clean-hydrogen projects; they will also point out that 40% payout and a rising dividend still leave ample reinvestment capacity. Those arguments justify a premium to the industrial average—perhaps 22–25× earnings—but they do not stretch to 33× when top-line growth is 2% and free-cash conversion is already capped by heavy maintenance and growth capex. The narrative premium of roughly 60% above the $298 composite fair value is therefore story, not cash flow.
I would reverse course only if the next two reported quarters show organic revenue growth re-accelerating above 6–7% sustained, or if FCF expands toward $7B+ while margins hold, proving the hydrogen/semiconductor thesis is converting into reported economics rather than slide-deck optionality. A material multiple compression toward 25× on flat earnings would also reset the risk-reward; until then the asymmetry is unfavorable.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Linde looks like a textbook mature compounder. Revenue crept from $30.8B (2021) to $34.0B (2025) - only ~2% CAGR - but operating margin expanded dramatically from 16.2% to 26.3% and gross margin from 43% to 48.8%, driving net income from $3.83B to $6.90B (~80% growth on flat-ish revenue). That is real operating leverage on a mature base, characteristic of the industrial-gas oligopoly structure. FCF has averaged ~$5.5B/yr and OCF/NI of 1.82x with accruals at -4.9% of assets confirms earnings are cash-backed; Beneish M of -2.62 and Altman Z of 3.79 show no manipulation signals and safe solvency.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted average interest cost against ~$5B FCF
- Capex breakdown between maintenance and growth (on-site project backlog) to reconcile falling FCF vs rising NI
- Working-capital changes 2023-2025 that may explain OCF-NI gap compression
- Segment/geographic concentration and whether Americas margin gains are sustainable or cyclical
- Contract structure (take-or-pay, pass-through) supporting margin durability
The e2e composite fair value sits at $270 and the signal-adjusted FV at $298, implying roughly -38% downside from $478. The DCF ($187) and EPV floor ($172) both scream expensive, and only the anchored-PE cross-check ($533) supports the current tape - and that method is essentially just capitalizing today's rich multiple, so it is not independent evidence of cheapness. Even generously weighting the anchored-PE and adding a quality premium for a genuine oligopolist with clean earnings, deserved value lands somewhere in the mid-$300s to low-$400s, not $478. Quality is Strong (73) and earnings are clean, so I lift the deserved value above the pure DCF/EPV floor - but a great business does not become cheap just because it is great. The bull case (perpetual pricing power, 30-year on-site contracts, buyback compounding) is already fully in the tape; the bear case (cyclical capex exposure, FCF drifting below net income, net leverage) is not discounted at all. Margin of safety is negative. This is a hold-if-you-own-it, not a buy-here name.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward capex guidance and on-site project backlog conversion - swings the DCF terminal
- FCF conversion trajectory vs reported EPS in the next two quarters
- Pricing vs volume split in the latest segment disclosures - is growth still price-led on flat volumes
- Net debt trajectory and buyback pace given the leverage flag
The tape is mildly constructive (regime +22, VIX 16) and Linde's 0.72 beta means macro crosswinds - higher rates, stretched market PE - land softly here versus higher-beta cyclicals. The active narrative is a moderate-intensity, durable steady-compounder story, and the last 72 hours reinforced it: record Q2 sales of $9.29B (beat by 3.6%), EPS up 11%, a record $8.1B sale-of-gas backlog, and a marquee $1B investment tied to a major U.S. semiconductor customer in Phoenix. That plugs the stock directly into the AI/semi capex narrative without requiring it to become a story stock. News flow is uniformly positive with no negative headlines in the window. Analyst tone implied by the coverage ('is the 12% upside still real?') is constructive but questioning valuation - which is a valuation lens issue, not a sentiment one. The main non-fundamental drag is the bear framing that the stock trades at a ~60% premium to DCF; that caps euphoric upside and makes the name vulnerable if the semi/hydrogen narrative cracks, but nothing in current flow is cracking it. Net: a real, ordinary tailwind - not a mania, just a well-liked defensive compounder catching a fresh narrative hook in a friendly tape.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether sell-side raises price targets post-Q2 or stays on 'priced in' - target revisions are the sentiment tell here
- Any crack in the hydrogen/energy-transition sub-narrative that would remove a leg of the premium
- Sector rotation into cyclicals/high-beta that could relatively de-rate low-beta compounders
- Follow-through on the $8.1B backlog - additional semi/AI-linked contract wins would extend the tailwind
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 3, 2026, LIN was $478.38. We expect it to be $455.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $380.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 3, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence NOTES
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
trailing_eps
flips down 25%
adjusted_pe
flips down 25%