For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Lowe's Companies Inc. (LOW) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -20 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 31 · Value -62 · Sentiment 4 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $198.31 vs $218.40 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Lowe's Companies Inc.
LOW NYSELowe's Companies Inc. is a leading home improvement retailer serving homeowners, renters, and professional contractors across the United States. The company offers a broad assortment of products for construction, maintenance, repair, remodeling, and home decorating, spanning categories such as appliances, building materials, lumber, tools, hardware, paint, flooring, kitchens and bath, electrical, lighting, lawn and garden, and seasonal and outdoor living. Its stores and digital platforms support both do-it-yourself customers and do-it-for-me projects, while also addressing the needs of professional trades and property managers. Lowe's provides installation services, project support, and online ordering with in-store pickup or delivery, integrating its physical footprint with e-commerce capabilities. Headquartered in Mooresville, North Carolina, Lowe's plays a significant role in the U.S. consumer discretionary and retail sectors by enabling residential investment, property upkeep, and renovation activity across diverse housing markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 11.85
Total Equity: -$9.92B
Shares: 560,000,000
Total Debt: $39.82B
Cash: $982.00M
EBITDA: $12.35B
Total Debt: $39.82B
Cash: $982.00M
Revenue: $86.29B
Revenue: $86.29B
Revenue: $86.29B
Total Equity: -$9.92B
Tax Rate: 23.9%
Equity: -$9.92B
Total Debt: $39.82B
Cash: $982.00M
Current Liabilities: $19.46B
Long-Term Debt: $39.82B
Total Debt: $39.82B
Total Equity: -$9.92B
Shares: 560,000,000
Shares: 560,000,000
CapEx: -$2.21B
Shares: 560,000,000
Stock Price: $219.94
Net Income: $6.65B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:45am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $96.3B | $97.1B | $86.4B | $83.7B | $86.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $64.2B | $64.8B | $57.5B | $55.8B | $57.4B |
| Gross Profit | $32.1B | $32.3B | $28.8B | $27.9B | $28.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $20.0B | $22.1B | $17.3B | $17.4B | $18.7B |
| Operating Income | $12.1B | $10.2B | $11.6B | $10.5B | $10.2B |
| Net Income | $8.4B | $6.4B | $7.7B | $7.0B | $6.7B |
| EBITDA | $14.0B | $12.1B | $13.5B | $12.4B | $12.3B |
| EPS | $12.07 | $10.20 | $13.23 | $12.25 | $11.87 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $12.04 | $10.17 | $13.20 | $12.23 | $11.85 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:40am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.1B | $1.3B | $921.0M | $1.8B | $982.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $20.1B | $21.4B | $19.1B | $20.4B | $21.0B |
| Total Assets | $44.6B | $43.7B | $41.8B | $43.1B | $54.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $19.7B | $19.5B | $15.6B | $18.8B | $19.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $24.3B | $33.3B | $35.8B | $35.3B | $39.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $49.5B | $58.0B | $56.8B | $57.3B | $64.1B |
| Total Equity | -$4.8B | -$14.3B | -$15.1B | -$14.2B | -$9.9B |
| Retained Earnings | -$5.1B | -$14.9B | -$15.6B | -$14.8B | -$10.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:45am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $10.1B | $8.6B | $8.1B | $9.6B | $9.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.9B | -$1.8B | -$2.0B | -$1.9B | -$2.2B |
| Free Cash Flow | $8.3B | $6.8B | $6.2B | $7.7B | $7.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$10.1B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $2.9B | $8.8B | $2.4B | -$545.0M | $4.4B |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.0B | -$2.4B | -$2.5B | -$2.6B | -$2.6B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$13.0B | -$14.1B | -$6.1B | -$4.1B | -$211.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$3.6B | $215.0M | -$427.0M | $840.0M | -$779.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:45am (17d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +0.8% | -11.0% | -3.1% | +3.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +0.6% | -10.6% | -3.4% | +3.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -16.0% | +13.8% | -9.4% | -3.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -23.8% | +20.0% | -10.0% | -4.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -13.1% | +11.0% | -7.7% | -0.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:40am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-22 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-22 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-21 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-22 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-23 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-23 | $1.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-22 | $1.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-23 | $1.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-24 | $1.15 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-23 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-23 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-24 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-25 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-25 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-24 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-18 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-19 | $1.05 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-19 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-18 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-19 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 09:04Even the bull case prices 10% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 44%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($218.40) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +8% | 9.9% | $197.19 | -10% |
| Base — stabilizes | +6% | 8.6% | $158.89 | -27% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 7.3% | $125.66 | -42% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +2% | 7.4% | $122.80 | -44% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: TTM revenue is roughly $88.4B (sum of last four quarters: 23.08+20.58+20.81+23.96), up modestly from $83.7B in FY25 but still below the $97B peak in FY23. TTM net income is around $6.65B, essentially flat with FY26 reported. The most recent quarter (May 2026) showed rev of $23.08B vs $20.93B prior-year Q — that's +10.3% YoY, a genuine acceleration, though partly a comp/timing artifact given the Q1 seasonal step-up. Net margin of 7.1% in that quarter is below the 7.8% prior-year Q1, so top-line strength isn't dropping to the bottom. Five-year revenue CAGR is negative and EPS has fallen from an $8.44B peak — this is a company grinding sideways, not compounding.
The balance sheet is the elephant. Negative $9.92B equity, $39.8B debt against $982M cash, current ratio barely above 1. This is buyback-engineered — LOW has retired roughly a third of its share count over the last decade — and it works fine as long as FCF ($7.65B) covers the ~$1.4B dividend and ~$1B interest with room for repurchases. But at 6x debt/EBITDA-ish leverage in a cyclical retailer facing a housing downturn, there's zero cushion for a real earnings hit. ROA of 12.3% flatters the picture because the denominator is compressed by the buybacks. This is not a "fortress" mature earner; it's a levered cash-return vehicle.
On the model stack: the synthesis verdict of $141-$181 fair value strikes me as too punitive. A DCF at $142 essentially assumes LOW re-rates to ~12x earnings on flat cash flows — plausible in a recession but not the base case. Home Depot trades at ~24x forward; LOW at 18.4x is already carrying the "second-place" discount the pre-flight model correctly identifies. The market-forces "value trap sub-$180" call is directionally reasonable but the "structural earnings impairment masked by working capital" framing is overstated — FCF CAGR of +11.3% versus earnings CAGR of -7.2% reflects inventory discipline and lower capex intensity, not accounting sleight of hand. Op cash flow of $9.86B on $6.65B NI is a healthy 1.48x conversion. Where I agree with the bears: the narrative layer nailed it that you're paying peak-cycle multiples on trough-adjacent earnings, and the Q1 margin compression (7.1% vs 7.8%) is a real yellow flag on pricing power.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: if 30-year mortgage rates break below 6% in the next 12 months, existing home turnover — the single biggest driver of home improvement demand — snaps back and LOW's operating leverage on a fixed store base is enormous. FY22 showed $12.09B operating income on $96B revenue (12.6% op margin) versus $10.15B on $86B today (11.8%). A return to prior-cycle revenue with modest margin recovery gets you to ~$9B net income and, at 18x, a $160B+ market cap — roughly $290/share. That's the bull-case optionality the DCF models understate. Insider activity is uninformative (five small awards, no open-market buys or sales), so no signal there. The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag looks wrong to me — the sequential comparison is contaminated by seasonality; YoY Q1 was +10.3%.
My verdict: I partially dissent from the synthesis. Fair value of $141 is too low; it prices in a recession that hasn't happened. But $220 is also demanding — you're paying 18.5x on earnings that have declined for three consecutive fiscal years, with a balance sheet offering no downside protection and a housing cycle that historically overshoots on the way down. Fair value in a normalized band is $175-$195, so the stock is 10-20% overvalued, not 35%. This is a "wait for the pullback" not an "avoid at all costs." I'd want sub-$185 to build a position, and I'd upgrade sharply if mortgage rates break lower or if the pro-contractor mix shows sustained 200+ bps margin expansion. Until then, HD is the better vehicle for the same thesis at a deserved premium.
GPT Reading
At $219.94, Lowe’s is being valued like a resilient compounder when the actual income statement looks more like a high-quality cyclical flatliner. Annual revenue is still below where it was four years ago: $86.29B in FY2026 versus $96.25B in FY2022 and $97.06B in FY2023. Net income has also stepped down from $8.44B in FY2022 and $7.73B in FY2024 to $6.65B in FY2026. The market can forgive a cyclical dip if margins are structurally improving, but that argument is weak here: gross margin was 33.3%-33.5% in both FY2024 and FY2026, while operating margin fell from 13.4% to 11.8%. Quarterly numbers show some stabilization in sales, with the latest quarter up to $23.08B from $20.93B a year earlier, but net income slipped from $1.64B to $1.63B, so the “recovery” is showing up in revenue before it shows up in earnings power. Paying 18.4x earnings and about 16x free cash flow for a business with roughly zero multi-year revenue growth and declining EPS quality does not strike me as attractive.
What stands out most is that Lowe’s remains a very good business but not an obviously growing one, and the balance sheet amplifies that distinction. Free cash flow of $7.65B is solid, and operating cash flow of $9.86B on $6.65B of net income suggests cash conversion remains healthy. But the capital structure is aggressive: $39.82B of debt, just $982M of cash, and negative equity of $9.92B. Negative equity is not automatically alarming for a buyback-heavy retailer, but it does remove balance-sheet flexibility at exactly the point where macro-sensitive demand is not robust. If housing-related demand remains sluggish, Lowe’s doesn’t have the luxury of simply “waiting it out” from a fortress balance sheet. That matters because this is not a software company with recurring revenue; it is a cyclical retailer whose earnings are ultimately tied to turnover, renovation activity, and consumer project confidence.
I also don’t buy the strongest bearish framing that this is a broken business or value trap. The quarterly cadence does not support structural collapse. Revenue in the latest four quarters totaled roughly $88.4B versus about $83.2B in the prior four, and margins, while below prior peaks, are still healthy for big-box retail. A 7.7% annual net margin and 11.8% operating margin remain strong economics, and the dividend payout ratio of 39.6% leaves room for ongoing shareholder returns. The P/S of 1.42x and EV/EBITDA of 13.0x are not absurd for a category leader with durable scale, and the market is right to assign Lowe’s a quality premium to ordinary retailers. If housing activity reaccelerates even modestly, earnings could rebound faster than trailing annual figures imply because this model has real operating leverage.
Still, the smarter bull case leans too heavily on “cyclical trough” without enough evidence that trough earnings are actually trough earnings. FY2026 revenue improved to $86.29B from $83.67B, yet operating income still declined to $10.15B from $10.47B, meaning the company is selling more but keeping less. That is not a great setup for multiple expansion. If this were at 14x earnings or under $190, I’d be more willing to underwrite a normalization story. At $220, investors are already capitalizing a decent rebound while accepting leverage, negative equity, and a business that has not demonstrated sustained top-line growth since the pandemic unwind. For me, that leaves too little margin of safety.
What would change my mind is straightforward: either valuation or proof of earnings recovery. If Lowe’s can post two or three consecutive quarters of both positive sales growth and meaningful EBIT leverage—something like revenue holding above $22B-$24B seasonally with net margin back toward 8.5%-9.5%—then the case for “temporary earnings compression” gets stronger. Alternatively, if the stock fell into roughly the $175-$190 range without a fundamental break, the risk/reward would improve materially because the current free cash flow base could justify that level. Absent one of those two developments, I think the shares are priced for a better business than the current numbers show.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a post-peak home-improvement retailer grinding through normalization, not a growth story. Annual revenue collapsed from the $96–97B pandemic highs of FY2022–23 into the mid-$80s and has only just stabilized: FY2026 came in at $86.29B (+3.1% y/y) after FY2025’s $83.67B trough. Net income has eroded more steadily—from $8.44B to $6.65B—producing a –7.2% earnings CAGR even as free-cash-flow held up at $7.65B on $9.86B of operating cash. That FCF strength is real and funds a 2.2% dividend at a comfortable 40% payout, but it is being generated against a balance sheet that shows only $982M cash, $39.8B of debt, and negative equity of –$9.92B after years of aggressive buybacks. Quarterly progression is equally uninspiring: the latest print of $23.08B revenue and 7.1% net margin sits below the $23.96B/10% peak of the prior summer quarter and shows no operating-leverage inflection. At 18.4× trailing earnings, 13.0× EV/EBITDA and a 6.2% FCF yield, the market is already capitalizing a tidy mid-cycle recovery that the income statement has not yet delivered.
Gross margin has held a tight 33.5% band and ROA remains a respectable 12.3%, confirming the mature-earner archetype, yet the recent revenue “recovery” is still 11% below the 2023 peak and earnings are still declining year-on-year. The negative equity and thin current ratio (1.08) leave zero balance-sheet cushion if housing starts or big-ticket remodel demand softens further. In short, the cash-flow engine is intact, but it is powering a leveraged, zero-growth retailer whose multiple assumes the worst of the housing cycle is already behind it.
The strongest contrary case is that 18× earnings and 13× EBITDA are not outrageous for a high-ROIC retailer with durable Pro and services mix, especially if the next two housing seasons re-accelerate. Bulls can correctly note that FCF has compounded at 11% even while reported earnings fell, that the dividend is well-covered, and that a simple re-rating back toward Home Depot’s historical premium plus modest volume recovery could justify prices nearer $240–250. They would also argue that negative equity is an accounting artifact of buybacks, not economic distress, and that Lowe’s still generates mid-teens returns on tangible capital. I weigh this less heavily because the same FCF is already fully priced: a 6% free-cash-flow yield on a business with –0.1% revenue CAGR and visible macro headwinds is compensation for risk, not a margin of safety. The 54% premium to the ~$142 DCF anchor is precisely the housing-recovery narrative that has yet to appear in the top line.
I would reverse to a neutral or constructive stance only on two concrete prints: (1) two consecutive quarters of mid-single-digit comparable-sales growth driven by Pro ticket and services mix, lifting operating margin back above 12.5%, or (2) a clear upturn in housing starts/NAHB sentiment that pushes forward FY revenue guidance above $90B with stable margins. Until then the risk-reward is skewed lower.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Lowe's throws off durable free cash flow (7.65B in the most recent year, and never below 6.18B across the five-year window) on stable gross margins pinned at 33.2-33.5% and operating margins in a tight 10.5-13.4% band. Earnings quality looks solid: OCF/NI of 1.29x, negative accruals (-4.4% of assets), and an Altman Z of 3.12 all point to real cash conversion behind reported profits. The Beneish M flag at 7.25 is worth noting but is inconsistent with the clean accrual and cash-conversion picture, and is more plausibly an artifact of buyback-driven balance-sheet shrinkage than manipulation. Capital return is the standout: diluted shares fell from 699M to 560M in four years (-5.4% CAGR), with buyback-to-SBC at 3319x, so per-share value is being concentrated aggressively while SBC stays trivial at 0.3% of revenue. The soft spot is the top line and the balance sheet. Revenue peaked at 97.06B in 2023 and has since drifted to 86.29B - roughly 11% lower - with a modest bounce in the latest year. Net debt of 38.47B against only 1.35B of liquid cash means the balance sheet is a constraint; the buyback is being funded partly with leverage, which works while FCF holds but leaves less margin for error if a housing-cycle downturn compresses same-store sales further.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Composition and maturity ladder of the 38B+ debt stack - fixed vs floating, near-term maturities
- Same-store sales trajectory and Pro vs DIY mix in latest 10-K to gauge whether revenue is stabilizing
- Whether buyback pace is being funded from FCF alone or continued debt issuance
- Drivers of the Beneish M flag - likely receivables/gross-margin index moves tied to buyback-shrunk denominators
- Any goodwill or lease-related off-balance-sheet obligations that would worsen the effective leverage picture
The valuation stack is internally consistent and points the same direction: DCF $191.65, EPV floor $160.60, composite $181.30, signal-adjusted $141.63. Against a $218.40 price, that's roughly 17% above the composite and 35% above the signal-adjusted mark. None of these methods look like a runaway; the EPV floor at $160 is the anchor and it says the steady-state earnings power alone does not justify today's quote. You are paying for growth and mix-shift (pro, services, installation) that has to actually show up.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Pro segment revenue growth and mix trajectory in the next print
- Comp sales guidance and any signs of stabilization in DIY
- FCF conversion and buyback pace vs guided range
- Housing turnover and mortgage-rate sensitivity commentary on the call
- Any one-time items inflating recent EBIT margins
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 15, S&P near highs), which is a gentle positive, but LOW's 0.85 beta means it neither benefits much from euphoria nor gets punished hard in stress. The active narrative is a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability steady-compounder story with low cult coefficient - there is no mania here to ride and no crash to fear. Analyst tone leans optimistic (ABR = Buy) and recent price action was strong (+2.84% single session, positive momentum tag), giving a modest tailwind.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Housing starts and existing-home-sales prints - a further rollover would activate the bear narrative
- HD earnings/tape as a read-through - HD sentiment tends to drag LOW
- Any downgrade or target cut that would crack the Buy consensus
- 10y yield break above 4.75% which would pressure the whole housing complex
- Pro-contractor mix commentary at next print - the linchpin of the bull story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 7, 2026, LOW was $218.40. We expect it to be $204.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $170.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 7, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.