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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Stride Inc. (LRN) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-08): Designation Gem · Gem Score +50 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 59 · Value 44 · Sentiment 0 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $153.35 vs $84.65 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Stride Inc.
LRN NYSEStride Inc. is a technology-based education company that provides online learning solutions for students, schools, districts, employers, government agencies, and consumers. Its platform delivers proprietary and third-party curriculum, software systems, instructional support, and educational services designed to help manage enrollment, track student progress, and personalize learning. The company serves the K-12 market through virtual and blended school programs, district partnerships, and supplemental learning offerings, while also operating career learning and adult education services. These include job-focused training, professional skills development, and certification-oriented programs in areas such as healthcare, technology, and business. Stride Inc. plays a significant role in digital education by connecting general academic instruction with career preparation across primary, secondary, and postsecondary learning segments.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.14
Total Equity: $1.63B
Shares: 47,332,855
Total Debt: $474.45M
Cash: $754.50M
EBITDA: $577.33M
Total Debt: $474.45M
Cash: $754.50M
Revenue: $2.52B
Revenue: $2.52B
Revenue: $2.52B
Total Equity: $1.63B
Tax Rate: 23.3%
Equity: $1.63B
Total Debt: $474.45M
Cash: $754.50M
Current Liabilities: $288.85M
Long-Term Debt: $474.45M
Total Debt: $474.45M
Total Equity: $1.63B
Shares: 47,332,855
Shares: 47,332,855
CapEx: -$587,000
Shares: 47,332,855
Stock Price: $84.65
Net Income: $338.19M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:00am (33d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.0B | $2.4B | $2.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B |
| Gross Profit | $596.5M | $647.1M | $763.6M | $943.9M | $950.6M |
| Operating Expenses | $439.8M | $481.6M | $514.0M | $583.8M | $499.8M |
| Operating Income | $156.6M | $165.5M | $249.6M | $360.1M | $450.8M |
| Net Income | $107.1M | $126.9M | $204.2M | $287.9M | $338.2M |
| EBITDA | $254.5M | $275.9M | $359.3M | $474.8M | $577.3M |
| EPS | $2.58 | $3.00 | $4.79 | $6.69 | $7.92 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.52 | $2.97 | $4.69 | $5.95 | $7.14 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:00am (33d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $389.4M | $410.8M | $500.6M | $782.5M | $754.5M |
| Total Current Assets | $950.5M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $1.7B |
| Total Assets | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $302.1M | $309.1M | $244.3M | $302.9M | $288.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $440.3M | $434.3M | $441.1M | $460.9M | $474.5M |
| Total Liabilities | $831.0M | $813.4M | $744.4M | $814.3M | $803.2M |
| Total Equity | $812.6M | $947.3M | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.6B |
| Retained Earnings | $227.5M | $354.3M | $558.5M | $846.5M | $1.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:19am (33d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $206.9M | $203.2M | $278.8M | $432.8M | $433.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$9.7M | -$4.3M | -$2.3M | -$1.8M | $-587,000 |
| Free Cash Flow | $197.1M | $198.8M | $276.5M | $431.0M | $433.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | -$188.7M |
| Net Change in Cash | $2.8M | $21.4M | $89.8M | $281.9M | -$28.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:00am (33d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +8.9% | +11.0% | +17.9% | +4.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +8.5% | +18.0% | +23.6% | +0.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | +5.7% | +50.8% | +44.3% | +25.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +18.4% | +60.9% | +41.0% | +17.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +8.4% | +30.2% | +32.1% | +21.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 5, 2026 1:00am (33d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998-12-10 | $0.99 | — | — | — |
| 1998-09-10 | $0.99 | — | — | — |
| 1998-06-10 | $0.97 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-18 02:41| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($84.65) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +7% | 15.4% | $140.25 | +66% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 13.4% | $114.34 | +35% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 11.4% | $91.49 | +8% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +17% | 14.8% | $182.14 | +115% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -0% | 12.0% | $88.23 | +4% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-05 01:25The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers before touching the model outputs: FY26 revenue of $2.52B is +4.7% YoY, a sharp deceleration from FY25's +18.2% and FY24's +11%. But operating income went $156.6M → $165.5M → $249.6M → $360.1M → $450.8M over five years — that's a ~30% operating income CAGR against 11% revenue CAGR, i.e., real operating leverage, not accounting fog. FY26 FCF of $433.2M on essentially zero capex ($587K — this is genuinely asset-light) means FCF yield on the $3.52B cap is 12.3%. Net cash position of $280M ($754.5M cash vs $474.5M debt), current ratio of 5.94, ROIC of 25.6%. At 11.9x earnings and 5.6x EV/EBITDA, this is priced like a business in terminal decline.
The quarterly cadence is where the bear case earns its keep. Sequential revenue: $551M → $587M → $613M → $654M → $621M → $631M → $630M → $636M. The FY26 quarters are essentially flat sequentially and Q4'26 ($636M) is *below* Q4'25 ($654M) — the first meaningful YoY quarterly decline. Net income is also lumpy: Q1 margins (7-11%) versus Q3 margins (14-16%) suggest seasonality, but Q4'26 NI of $81.4M is well below Q4'25's $99.3M despite comparable revenue. That's the margin-degradation-at-the-margin signal the Thesis Evaluation bear flagged. Insider activity is uninformative — F-InKind is tax withholding on vested RSUs, not selling; A-Awards are grants. The "No Insider Transactions" tag is basically correct in signal terms.
Now the model reactions. The Synthesis fair value of $134-136 (+60% upside) is aggressive and I don't fully trust it — it likely extrapolates the 28.7% earnings CAGR into a future that the Q4 print says is already bending. The Thesis Evaluation (-19, bearish tilt) and Market Forces (neutral) are more honest about the deceleration. The Narrative layer's "fragile — resolves in 12-24 months" is the right frame: this stock is a bet on whether the FY26 flatline is a plateau or the top of a rollover. The Pre-Flight "traditional mature earner" classification is correct and it matters — you don't pay growth multiples for something growing 4.7% with decelerating quarterlies, but you also don't price a debt-free 25% ROIC business at 8x FCF unless you believe revenue actively shrinks. A contrarian bear would note that charter school enrollment peaked at ~3.7M students in 2022-23 and state-level virtual charter caps + district recapture programs are real policy headwinds — this isn't cyclical, it's structural, and margin expansion from 7.9% (Q4'25) to 12.8% (Q4'26) while revenue goes flat looks suspiciously like cost-cutting harvest, not operating leverage on growth.
Committing: I dissent partially from the Synthesis $134 fair value — that number requires believing the growth algorithm continues, which the quarterly trajectory contradicts. But I dissent more strongly from the market's implicit terminal-decline pricing. At 8.1x FCF with net cash, LRN prices in ~3-4% perpetual revenue decline with margin compression. That's too dark given FY26 still grew 4.7%, Career Learning is a genuine mix-shift lever, and the balance sheet allows aggressive buybacks (share count reduction alone could deliver mid-single-digit EPS growth against flat revenue). My fair value anchor is $105-115 — a 10-12x multiple on ~$10 of normalized EPS, discounting the growth-story premium but rewarding the cash generation and clean balance sheet. That's ~25-35% upside, not 60%. The key monitorable is FY27 Q1 enrollment disclosure (September print) — if sequential revenue prints below $620M, the bear thesis is confirmed and fair value drops to $75; if it prints $640M+, the re-rating case gets legs toward $120. Position sizing should reflect that binary.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is how little the current valuation asks you to believe. Stride is already through the “was pandemic demand fake?” stress test and the raw numbers say the business did not break. Revenue went from $1.69B in 2022 to $2.52B in 2026, a 49% increase in four years, while net income more than tripled from $107.1M to $338.2M. That is not a melting-ice-cube profile. Even the supposedly mature latest year was still growth: revenue up 4.6% to $2.52B, operating income up 25% to $450.8M, and net income up 17.5% to $338.2M. The quarterly sequence is also steadier than the bear case implies: over the last four quarters revenue stayed in a narrow $620.9M-$636.1M range after the seasonal June quarter, and each quarter is above the comparable prior-year quarter. This is a company comping against normalization and still putting up positive growth.
The second thing that stands out is the extraordinary cash economics. Free cash flow was $433.2M on $2.52B of revenue, above reported net income and achieved with de minimis capex of just $0.6M. Some businesses deserve skepticism when capex is tiny, but in an asset-light education-services model, that mostly means earnings convert. At a $3.52B market cap, the stock is around 8.1x trailing FCF and 10.4x trailing earnings; on enterprise value, with $754.5M cash against $474.5M debt, EV is only about $3.24B, or 7.2x EBIT and 1.3x revenue. For a business generating 20.7% ROE, 25.6% ROIC, 17.9% operating margin, and carrying a current ratio near 6x, that is plainly cheap. The market is acting as though 2026 earnings are near peak, but the last eight quarters do not show a business straining to hold margins together. Net margin improved from 10.0% in FY24 to 11.9% in FY25 to 13.4% in FY26, and quarterly net income in the last four quarters totaled $338.2M versus $287.9M the year before.
I also think the “mature earner” label is directionally right but incomplete, because it risks making investors miss that this is not merely a static cash cow. If Stride were just harvesting a declining base, you would expect revenue erosion offset by cost discipline. Instead, gross profit in 2026 was $950.6M versus $943.9M in 2025 despite only modest top-line growth, and operating leverage was real enough to add more than $90M of operating income in one year. The balance sheet gives management room to keep returning capital or make bolt-ons without stressing the story; net cash is roughly $280M. Even the 3.5% dividend yield is unusual for a company with double-digit EPS growth and this level of cash generation. At $84.65, the stock looks priced for low-single-digit decline or imminent margin compression, yet the actual reported business is still expanding and highly profitable.
The best argument against this view is that the market may be correctly discounting quality-of-growth risk rather than current earnings power. Revenue growth has clearly decelerated: from 2024 to 2025 revenue grew 18%, then only 4.6% in 2026, and quarterly growth is no longer explosive. The June 2026 quarter actually declined year over year from $653.6M to $636.1M, and the quarterly margin pattern is lumpy enough to suggest some seasonality and perhaps finite room for further margin gains. If the core K-12 enrollment base is structurally shrinking and recent profit gains came from mix, funding, or expense restraint rather than durable demand, then 11.9x earnings may be a fair multiple, not a bargain. The tiny capex line also flatters FCF versus companies that must reinvest more heavily, so an earnings or EBIT lens is safer than taking FCF at face value. And while insider activity shown here is non-informative rather than overtly negative, there is no obvious signal of management buying aggressively into the weakness.
What would change my mind is pretty specific: if Stride posts two consecutive quarters of year-over-year revenue decline outside normal seasonality while net margin falls back toward the 8%-10% range, that would validate the runoff thesis and make the current multiple less attractive than it appears. I would also turn more cautious if FY2027 operating cash flow slips materially below $350M, because the whole undervaluation case rests on earnings translating into cash at something close to recent levels. Conversely, if revenue can still grow 4%-6% and net income stays above $300M, I think the market cannot justify keeping this at roughly 10x earnings and 8x FCF for long.
Grok Reading
Stride’s numbers describe a cash machine that the market insists on treating like a melting ice cube. Fiscal 2026 delivered $2.52B of revenue, $338M of net income, and essentially $433M of free cash flow on negligible capex—an FCF conversion that leaves almost nothing on the table. Over five years revenue has compounded at roughly 11%, earnings at nearly 29%, and the balance sheet sits in net cash ($755M cash against $475M debt) with a current ratio near 6x. Operating margin has expanded from the high single digits to 17.9% and ROIC prints 25.6%. At $84.65 the stock trades at 11.9x earnings, 5.6x EV/EBITDA and a free-cash-flow yield above 12%. Those are harvest multiples for a business that is still growing, still expanding margins, and returning capital (3.5% dividend yield). The June quarter revenue dip to $636M from $654M a year earlier is real, but the full-year line still advanced 4.6% and sequential quarters have stabilized in a tight $621–636M band; this is deceleration, not collapse.
What stands out is the gulf between the cash-flow reality and the narrative discount. The market is clearly pricing a multi-year enrollment runoff in virtual K-12—the “fallen angel” story after the pandemic spike—yet the P&L refuses to cooperate with that script. Net income is up 17% year-over-year, margins are at cycle highs, and Career Learning appears to be offsetting any soft spots in the core charter franchise. Prior models that spit out a composite fair value near $134–136 while simultaneously labeling the name “fair value” are simply inconsistent with their own math; a 60% gap to DCF is not fair value, it is a narrative overhang. The 11x multiple embeds an assumption of permanent low-to-mid single-digit decline that the trailing five-year record and the latest annual print do not support.
The strongest counter-case is enrollment math and the quality of the recent margin gains. A smart bear points to the June-quarter year-over-year revenue drop, the decelerating quarterly trend flagged by the secondary signals, and the thesis engine’s heavy weight on “charter enrollment in structural 5–7 year decline.” If public districts continue reclaiming share and Career Learning fails to scale as a genuine second engine, the 4–5% growth residual evaporates and the stock becomes a pure runoff vehicle—exactly what 12x earnings already assumes. Margin expansion could also prove hollow: if it is being bought with lower-quality mix, thinner instructional support, or deferred investment, the 18% operating margin is a peak rather than a plateau and will mean-revert just as growth disappears. That combination—flat-to-down revenue plus margin compression—would justify the current multiple or worse, and the fragile “pandemic-normalization” narrative would become self-fulfilling.
I would flip to neutral or bearish on two concrete triggers: two consecutive quarters of outright revenue decline exceeding 3–4% year-over-year accompanied by falling Career Learning contribution, or operating margin rolling over below 15% while enrollment KPIs (when next disclosed) confirm multi-year structural share loss rather than a post-COVID digestion. Until those show up, the 12% FCF yield, net-cash balance sheet, and still-positive earnings trajectory make $84.65 an undervaluation relative to both the cash the business throws off today and any reasonable steady-state multiple in the mid-teens.
Qwen Reading local experiment · off-panel
The number that should make any analyst pause is the latest comparable quarter: $636.1M in revenue for the June 2026 quarter versus $653.6M a year earlier. That is a 2.7% decline, and it sits in the context of a full-year 2026 revenue growth rate of just 4.6%, down from 18.1% in 2025. The 11.1% five-year revenue CAGR that the momentum table reports is a rearview-mirror statistic that includes the pandemic-era enrollment surge; the forward trajectory is flat-to-negative. The valuation synthesis model spits out a $132.63 fair value implying 57% upside, but that DCF is almost certainly extrapolating growth rates that the last two quarters have already contradicted. I don't buy the $132 number. What I do buy is the cash flow: $433.2M in free cash flow on a $3.56B market cap is an 8.2% FCF yield, generated with a capex line of $587K. This is a business that converts 17.2% of revenue into cash it can deploy, and it does so with $754.5M in cash against $474.5M in debt. The current ratio of 5.94 and debt-to-equity of 0.29 mean there is zero financial fragility. At 11.8x trailing earnings with a 3.5% dividend yield, the downside is cushioned by a balance sheet that could fund several years of buybacks even if revenue went to zero tomorrow.
What the models get wrong, in my view, is treating the margin expansion as a one-time pandemic artifact. Net margin went from 6.3% in fiscal 2022 to 13.4% in fiscal 2026, and operating margin from roughly 9.3% to 17.9%. That is not a blip; that is four consecutive years of structural improvement in a business with essentially no capex burden. The quarterly margins are noisy—7.9% in June 2025, 15.8% in December 2025, 12.8% in June 2026—but the annual trend is unambiguous. The market's "fallen angel" narrative, as the narrative layer describes it, assumes that once enrollment normalizes, the cost structure that was built for a 20% growth business will drag margins back down. I disagree. Stride's cost base is largely fixed (teacher salaries, platform maintenance), and the revenue per student in online programs is structurally higher than in-seat instruction. Even at flat revenue, the operating leverage is still working in management's favor. The 28.7% earnings CAGR is not a fluke; it is the arithmetic of a fixed-cost business whose revenue floor is higher than its cost floor.
The strongest case against my read is the one the bear narrative makes, and I take it seriously: the September 2025 quarter grew 12.7% year-over-year while the June 2026 quarter shrank 2.7%, and that inconsistency suggests the revenue base is lumpy, contract-driven, and vulnerable to district budget cycles. If a handful of large district contracts roll off or get renegotiated downward, the "flat revenue" assumption I'm relying on becomes "declining revenue," and the margin expansion story inverts because fixed costs don't flex. The insider transaction data, while technically all "F-InKind" and "G-Gift" entries rather than open-market sales, shows zero open-market purchases by insiders over the past eight months. In a stock that has halved from $171, the absence of insider buying is a mild negative signal—people who know the district pipeline are not piling in. The macro headwinds flag and the "decelerating" revenue confidence rating reinforce the concern that the 4.6% growth year is the new normal, not a transition year.
What would change my mind in either direction. On the bear side: if the next two quarterly prints show revenue below $620M (a further 3-4% YoY decline) and net margin compresses below 10%, the operating leverage thesis is broken and 11.8x P/E becomes the floor, not the ceiling. A single quarter of district contract losses visible in the revenue line would confirm the structural decline narrative. On the bull side: if management announces a meaningful buyback program funded from the $754M cash pile—say, a $200M authorization at current prices—that would compress the share count by roughly 7-8% and push the FCF yield above 9%, which is a different valuation conversation entirely. A revenue print above $660M in the next quarter (re-acceleration) would also invalidate the "flat revenue" base case and justify a re-rating toward 14-15x earnings.
I am not calling this a 57% upside trade. I am calling it a cash-flow business trading at a utility multiple with a fortress balance sheet, where the revenue risk is real but the downside is bounded by $280M of net cash and an 8% FCF yield. The market has already done the work of stripping the growth premium; what remains is whether the earnings base holds. I think it holds, but I am not table-pounding on it.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The trajectory is genuinely impressive: revenue grew from $1.69B (FY22) to $2.52B (FY26), a ~10% CAGR, while operating margin expanded from 9.3% to 17.9% and net income nearly tripled from $107M to $338M. FCF followed suit, more than doubling from $197M to $433M, and the balance sheet holds $958M liquid cash against modest debt for $484M net cash. Earnings quality is high — OCF/NI of 1.54x, accruals -4.9% of assets, Beneish M -2.43, Altman Z 5.66 all corroborate that reported profits are backed by cash. The blemish is dilution discipline: diluted shares rose from 42.4M to 48.4M (roughly 2.8% CAGR), and although buybacks at 128% of SBC suggest some effort to offset, the share count still climbed materially over the window, muting per-share compounding. Insider tape shows only awards and tax-withholding (F-InKind) — no open-market buys or sells to read as directional signal. Durability is inferred rather than proven here: Stride's virtual/charter-school revenue depends heavily on state authorizations and per-pupil funding regimes not visible in this data. But on the numbers alone, this is a solidly healthy, cash-generative, margin-expanding business with no forensic red flags.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- State/geographic concentration of enrollment and per-pupil funding exposure in the 10-K
- Nature of the FY25 share-count jump (42.7M -> 48.4M) — acquisition, convertible dilution, or option-related?
- Terms of any convertible or preferred instruments that could explain diluted-share growth outpacing SBC
- Buyback authorization and pace vs continuing SBC to assess whether dilution is being structurally offset
- Regulatory posture on virtual charter schools in key states (renewal risk, cap changes)
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $134.38 (signal-adjusted $136.15) implying ~60% upside, but the DCF at $160.94 is doing the heavy lifting and almost certainly assumes growth persistence the bear case disputes. The more disciplined anchor is the EPV floor at $81.25 - essentially where the stock trades today. That framing is telling: at $84.65, the market is paying roughly zero for future growth, giving you the current earnings power of a strong business (quality score 59, OCF/NI 1.54x, $484M net cash) essentially at a no-growth price. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted. The gap between EPV ($81) and DCF ($161) is the entire debate - if enrollment holds and margins stick, you get a substantial re-rate; if the bear thesis on post-pandemic reversion is right, you own it near floor. Net cash of ~$484M is about $11-12/share, so enterprise value implies you are paying ~$73 for the operating business - roughly 8-9x recent earnings power for a business whose op margin nearly doubled while revenue grew 50%. That is not a screaming bargain, but it is not full price either. I would call this modestly cheap, not deep value - the setup is asymmetric because EPV provides a real floor.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Q/Q enrollment trend in K-12 general education vs career learning mix
- Operating margin sustainability guidance for next FY
- SBC net of true buyback (actual share count change)
- Any one-time items inflating the recent margin step-up
- Customer acquisition cost trend as public schools compete back
None surfaced.
None surfaced.
The world has settled on virtual/blended K-12 as a permanent option rather than an emergency substitute, which locks in a real addressable base but strips the scarcity Stride enjoyed in 2020-2022. The competitive set has shifted from 'nothing' to district-operated virtual academies and state-run platforms, so incremental enrollment must now be won rather than absorbed. Simultaneously, state budgets face a higher-rate, macro-headwind environment, making per-pupil funding formulas and charter renewals the binding variable on revenue. Against that, the labor market's premium on credentialed skills supports career/adult learning demand. Net: a structurally legitimate but no longer privileged position in a growing, increasingly contested market — earnings power should compound off cost leverage even if volume growth stays mid-single-digit.
When we made this prediction on Sep 5, 2026, LRN was $84.65. We expect it to be $110.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $72.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.
Post-Report Due Diligence UNSETTLED
Evidence for a closer look, not a verdict — no score or designation on this page has been changed by it. Items marked material are ones where a conclusion above moves to the other side of the price.
adjusted_earnings
flips down 10%
shares
flips up 10%
cost_of_capital
flips up 25%