Business Description
Life Time Group Holdings, Inc. (LTH) delivers extensive health, fitness, and well-being experiences to its individual clientele throughout the United States and Canada. The company's primary business involves the design, construction, and operation of upscale, resort-inspired centers, which integrate facilities for sports, athletics, professional fitness, family recreation, and spa services. These establishments are predominantly situated in urban and suburban areas within major metropolitan regions. Inside these comprehensive centers, members can access fully equipped exercise areas, private locker rooms, a variety of group fitness studios, both indoor and outdoor swimming pools, on-site dining options such as bistros and LifeCafe, and athletic courts for tennis and basketball. Additional amenities include LifeSpa services and dedicated childcare along with Kids Academy educational programs. Furthermore, Life Time extends its reach digitally through Life Time Digital, offering live-streamed workout sessions, remote personal training tailored to individual goals, nutritional and weight management guidance, and a rich library of expert-curated health and wellness content. This platform also facilitates access to Apple Fitness+ for additional content and health metric monitoring. The company is also involved in media endeavors, organizing athletic events, and providing related support services. By December 31, 2021, Life Time managed 151 locations spanning 29 U.S. states and one Canadian province. Of these, 63 were company-owned (including ground leases), while 88 were operated under lease agreements. Founded in 1992, the entity was formerly known as LTF Holdings, Inc. It adopted the name Life Time Group Holdings, Inc. on June 21, 2021, and its main office is located in Chanhassen, Minnesota.
Business History
Generated: Jun 18, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.71
Total Equity: $3.13B
Shares: 225,495,000
Total Debt: $4.15B
Cash: $232.17M
EBITDA: $789.85M
Total Debt: $4.15B
Cash: $232.17M
Revenue: $3.00B
Revenue: $3.00B
Revenue: $3.00B
Total Equity: $3.13B
Tax Rate: 24.3%
Equity: $3.13B
Total Debt: $4.15B
Cash: $232.17M
Current Liabilities: $609.51M
Long-Term Debt: $4.04B
Total Debt: $4.15B
Total Equity: $3.13B
Shares: 225,495,000
Shares: 225,495,000
CapEx: -$891.48M
Shares: 225,495,000
Stock Price: $41.01
Net Income: $373.67M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.3B | $1.8B | $2.2B | $2.6B | $3.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $844.1M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Gross Profit | $474.0M | $754.3M | $1.0B | $1.2B | $1.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $969.1M | $643.7M | $807.0M | $871.1M | $945.4M |
| Operating Income | -$495.2M | $110.6M | $225.2M | $357.5M | $481.3M |
| Net Income | -$579.4M | -$1.8M | $76.1M | $156.2M | $373.7M |
| EBITDA | -$260.1M | $339.8M | $470.0M | $631.5M | $789.8M |
| EPS | $-3.00 | $-0.01 | $0.39 | $0.77 | $1.71 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $31.6M | $25.5M | $30.0M | $10.9M | $232.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $131.5M | $131.0M | $174.5M | $171.0M | $385.8M |
| Total Assets | $6.3B | $6.6B | $7.0B | $7.2B | $8.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $406.3M | $457.4M | $557.2M | $520.1M | $609.5M |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $4.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.8B | $4.5B | $5.7B |
| Total Equity | $2.1B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $3.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$651.1M | -$652.9M | -$576.8M | -$420.6M | -$46.9M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$20.0M | $201.0M | $463.0M | $575.1M | $870.5M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$328.9M | -$591.2M | -$693.9M | -$524.5M | -$891.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$348.9M | -$390.2M | -$230.9M | $50.6M | -$21.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$9.5M | $351.9M | -$5.7M | $0 | $227.4M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.6M | -$6.1M | $4.5M | -$2.1M | $204.3M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.0B $3.0B – $3.0B
|
$3.3B $3.3B – $3.3B
|
$3.7B $3.7B – $3.8B
|
$4.1B $4.1B – $4.1B
|
| EBITDA |
$422.3M $418.5M – $426.7M
|
$470.7M $469.3M – $472.1M
|
$524.9M $517.9M – $533.4M
|
$584.3M $583.6M – $585.0M
|
| Net Income |
$307.1M $304.0M – $310.2M
|
$345.7M $315.9M – $354.6M
|
$399.1M $337.0M – $416.2M
|
$421.5M $401.0M – $442.0M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +38.3% | +21.6% | +18.2% | +14.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +59.2% | +36.8% | +19.0% | +16.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +122.3% | +103.6% | +58.7% | +34.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +99.7% | +4,342.2% | +105.4% | +139.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | +230.7% | +38.3% | +34.4% | +25.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-24 | Singh Ritadhwaja Jebens | M-Exempt | 67,751.00 | $13.65 | $924,801 |
| 2026-06-24 | Singh Ritadhwaja Jebens | S-Sale | 67,751.00 | $38.65 | $2.6M |
| 2026-06-24 | Singh Ritadhwaja Jebens | M-Exempt | 67,751.00 | $13.65 | $924,801 |
| 2026-06-10 | Almendares Jimena | S-Sale | 40,589.00 | $33.59 | $1.4M |
| 2026-06-04 | DANHAKL JOHN G | S-Sale | 2,208,580.00 | $28.60 | $63.2M |
| 2026-06-04 | Galashan John Kristofer | S-Sale | 2,208,580.00 | $28.60 | $63.2M |
| 2026-06-04 | Green LTF Holdings II LP | S-Sale | 2,168,305.00 | $28.60 | $62.0M |
| 2026-06-04 | Green LTF Holdings II LP | S-Sale | 36,602.00 | $28.60 | $1.0M |
| 2026-06-04 | Green LTF Holdings II LP | S-Sale | 3,673.00 | $28.60 | $105,048 |
| 2026-06-04 | Partners Group Private Equity Fund, LLC | S-Sale | 329,921.00 | $28.60 | $9.4M |
| 2026-05-21 | Partners Group Private Equity Fund, LLC | S-Sale | 449,960.00 | $32.51 | $14.6M |
| 2026-05-21 | Green LTF Holdings II LP | S-Sale | 2,951,282.00 | $32.51 | $95.9M |
| 2026-05-21 | Green LTF Holdings II LP | S-Sale | 49,819.00 | $32.51 | $1.6M |
| 2026-05-21 | Green LTF Holdings II LP | S-Sale | 4,999.00 | $32.51 | $162,517 |
| 2026-05-21 | Galashan John Kristofer | S-Sale | 3,006,100.00 | $32.51 | $97.7M |
| 2026-05-21 | DANHAKL JOHN G | S-Sale | 3,006,100.00 | $32.51 | $97.7M |
| 2026-05-20 | Wagner Rachael A. | A-Award | 5,429.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-20 | Wagner Rachael A. | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-05-07 | Partners Group Private Equity Fund, LLC | S-Sale | 747,178.00 | $31.46 | $23.5M |
| 2026-05-07 | Green LTF Holdings II LP | S-Sale | 4,900,722.00 | $31.46 | $154.2M |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw quarterly trajectory tells a cleaner story than the synthesis lets on, but it also contains a yellow flag the models underweight. Revenue went $667.8M → $706M → $761.5M → $782.6M → $745.1M → $788.7M — that's roughly 18% YoY in the latest print (Q1 2026 vs Q1 2025: $788.7M vs $706M = +11.7%, not the 14.3% claimed; either way, decelerating from the high-teens 2024 pace). Net margins have stair-stepped from 5.6% (Q4 2024) to a 16.5% peak in Q4 2025, then back to 11.2% in Q1 2026. That margin volatility — 700bps quarter-to-quarter — is not a "steady compounder" pattern; it suggests either tax/one-time items or genuine operating leverage that's lumpy. The annual NI doubling from $156M to $374M is real, but a chunk of that gap is likely below-the-line.
The balance sheet and cash flow data are where I part ways with the bullish framing. Operating CF of $870M against capex of $891M produces FCF of -$21M — the company is reinvesting every dollar it earns into new clubs. That's fine for a growth-real-estate hybrid, but the pre-flight note calling capex "$89M in 2025" is off by an order of magnitude (it's $891M); the synthesis was working from bad data. Current ratio of 0.63 plus a missing total debt figure on a real-estate-heavy operator is a meaningful gap — Life Time historically carries $1.7–2B+ in debt and lease obligations. EV/EBITDA of 13.1x is reasonable for a real REIT-adjacent operator, but EV/Revenue of 4.1x on a business with -$21M FCF is what a contrarian seizes on: you're paying a premium multiple for accounting earnings that haven't translated to distributable cash.
The insider activity is the loudest signal in the file and the models dramatically underplay it. Eight sales in three weeks totaling north of 10.4 million shares — at $34.59, that's roughly $360M of insider selling between May 21 and June 10, 2026. That's not 10b5-1 trim; that's a coordinated exit, almost certainly the Bahram Akradi/LGP/TPG sponsor block continuing to monetize. Even if mechanical, the supply overhang on a $7.7B market cap is material — sponsors selling 5%+ of shares outstanding in three weeks caps near-term upside regardless of fundamentals. The "Unusual Selling Activity" tag in secondary signals is the only model output that registers this, and even it doesn't quantify it.
A contrarian would argue: the 16.5% Q4 net margin was the cycle peak, Q1 2026's 11.2% is the truer run-rate, the FCF deficit means equity holders are funding growth that benefits debt holders first, and sponsor selling is telling you who the marginal seller is for the next year. The bull counter — that same-club maturation drops capex/revenue and unlocks $300–400M of annual FCF by 2027–2028 — is plausible but unproven; LTH has been "about to inflect to positive FCF" for three years running. I dissent mildly from the "High Conviction Required" synthesis, which is really a non-verdict. At 19.9x earnings and 4.1x EV/sales with FCF still negative and sponsors dumping, the risk/reward is asymmetric to the downside near-term. Fair value on a normalized 13% net margin and $3.4B 2026 revenue is ~$440M NI, and a 17–18x multiple (appropriate for decelerating mid-teens growth with leverage) gets you to $7.5–8B market cap — essentially today's price. There's no margin of safety, and there is an identifiable forced seller. Wait for the overhang to clear or for a sub-$28 print that gives you a real entry.
GPT Critique
Upon reviewing the data for Life Time Group Holdings, Inc., the narrative that emerges is of a company experiencing robust growth in revenue but accompanied by significant volatility in net margins and a concerning cash flow situation. Revenue has seen a commendable increase from $1.32B in 2021 to $3B in 2025, indicating a strong growth trajectory. However, the quarterly fluctuations in net margins, particularly the drop from 16.5% in Q4 2025 to 11.2% in Q1 2026, suggest underlying volatility that may not align with the steady-compounder archetype the market narrative suggests.
I agree with Claude Opus’s identification of the cash flow issues. The negative free cash flow of -$21M in 2025, despite a high operating cash flow of $870.5M, highlights the aggressive capital expenditure strategy, which reached $891.5M. This strategy, while potentially setting up future growth, currently leaves the company without positive distributable cash flows. Opus rightly points out that the capex was vastly underestimated in the pre-flight note, reaffirming the need to correctly weigh the impact of substantial reinvestment on financial health.
Opus and I diverge slightly on the insider selling activity. While Opus emphasizes the significant volume of shares sold by insiders, totaling over 10 million shares, as a potential overhang, I see this more as a neutral indicator, given the context of a maturing business strategy where early investors might be looking to exit. However, it's undoubtedly a factor that could cap short-term price appreciation.
Where I strongly align with Opus is in the risk assessment associated with the company's valuation metrics. The EV/Revenue ratio of 4.1x and a P/E ratio of 19.9x, juxtaposed against the negative FCF and substantial insider selling, suggest a high valuation that might not be justifiable without clear evidence of future cash flow inflection. The market is indeed pricing Life Time Group as a premium growth story, yet the lack of a safety margin in its current valuation prompts caution.
A careful skeptic might argue that the ongoing capital investments are a strategic move that could bear significant fruit, with a potential shift towards positive free cash flow as new clubs mature and the initial capital intensity decreases. They may also argue that the market has already priced in the insider sales, and the focus should remain on operational performance and market expansion.