Business Description
lululemon athletica inc., together with its subsidiaries, designs, distributes, and retails athletic apparel and accessories for women and men. It operates in two segments, Company-Operated Stores and Direct to Consumer. The company offers pants, shorts, tops, and jackets for healthy lifestyle and athletic activities, such as yoga, running, and training, as well as other sweaty pursuits. It also provides fitness-related accessories and footwear. The company sells its products through a chain of company-operated stores; outlets and warehouse sales; interactive workout platform; a network of wholesale accounts, such as yoga studios, health clubs, and fitness centers; temporary locations; and license and supply arrangements, as well as directly to consumer through mobile apps and lululemon.com e-commerce website. As of January 30, 2022, it operated 574 company-operated stores under the lululemon brand in the United States, Canada, the People's Republic of China, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, New Zealand, Germany, South Korea, Singapore, France, Malaysia, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. lululemon athletica inc. was founded in 1998 and is based in Vancouver, Canada.
Business History
Generated: Jun 3, 2026 8:27pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:43pm (23d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 13.27
Total Equity: $4.96B
Shares: 119,068,000
Total Debt: $298.72M
Cash: $1.81B
EBITDA: $2.74B
Total Debt: $298.72M
Cash: $1.81B
Revenue: $11.10B
Revenue: $11.10B
Revenue: $11.10B
Total Equity: $4.96B
Tax Rate: 29.5%
Equity: $4.96B
Total Debt: $298.72M
Cash: $1.81B
Current Liabilities: $1.89B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $298.72M
Total Equity: $4.96B
Shares: 119,068,000
Shares: 119,068,000
CapEx: -$680.80M
Shares: 119,068,000
Stock Price: $126.03
Net Income: $1.58B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The forensic mechanics are clean: $1.81B cash, $1.51B net cash, Altman Z of 5.85, Beneish M of -2.73, OCF/NI of 1.26x, accruals -5.4% of assets — there is no accounting game here, and the buyback engine (buyback/SBC ratio 1,178%, diluted shares 130.3M→119.1M, a -2.2% CAGR) is genuinely concentrating per-share value with SBC at a trivial 0.6% of revenue. That alone separates LULU from 95% of consumer-discretionary 'growth' names. The dilution-trap angle simply isn't here.
The real problem is in the trajectory line nobody on the bull side wants to look at: revenue growth has decelerated from +29.6% (FY23) → +18.6% → +10.1% → +4.8% (FY26), and FY26 saw op margin collapse from 23.7% to 19.9%, net income drop ~13%, and FCF nearly halve from $1.58B to $921.7M. That is not noise — that is a $660M FCF swing in a single year on a $15B market cap, meaning trailing FCF yield just went from ~10% to ~6%. The pipeline's 'disconnected from fundamentals / undervalued' read is backward-looking; on FY26 numbers LULU trades at ~16x FCF and ~9.5x EBIT, which is fair-to-cheap for a brand with this balance sheet but not the deep bargain the synthesis implies.
Insider tape, read directly, is NOT 'net buying' — it's one real open-market purchase (Maestrini, $494K at $150) versus one small sale and a wall of F-InKind tax-withholding events that aren't directional. The upstream 'net insider buying' label is wrong. One CFO/exec buying ~$500K mid-decline is a mild positive, not a cluster.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:31pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.3B | $8.1B | $9.6B | $10.6B | $11.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.6B | $3.6B | $4.0B | $4.3B | $4.8B |
| Gross Profit | $3.6B | $4.5B | $5.6B | $6.3B | $6.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.3B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.1B |
| Operating Income | $1.3B | $1.3B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.2B |
| Net Income | $975.3M | $854.8M | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.6B |
| EBITDA | $1.6B | $2.0B | $2.6B | $3.0B | $2.7B |
| EPS | $7.52 | $6.70 | $12.23 | $14.67 | $13.27 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:24pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.3B | $1.2B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $1.8B |
| Total Current Assets | $2.6B | $3.2B | $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.3B |
| Total Assets | $4.9B | $5.6B | $7.1B | $7.6B | $8.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $2.2B | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.5B |
| Total Equity | $2.7B | $3.1B | $4.2B | $4.3B | $5.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.5B | $2.9B | $3.9B | $4.1B | $4.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:31pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.4B | $966.5M | $2.3B | $2.3B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$394.5M | -$638.7M | -$651.9M | -$689.2M | -$680.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | $994.6M | $327.8M | $1.6B | $1.6B | $921.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$154.1M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$812.6M | -$444.0M | -$558.7M | -$1.6B | -$1.2B |
| Net Change in Cash | $109.4M | -$105.0M | $1.1B | -$259.6M | -$177.1M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:24pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$11.5B $11.3B – $11.6B
|
$12.0B $11.8B – $12.2B
|
$12.6B $12.6B – $12.6B
|
$13.4B $13.0B – $13.6B
|
| EBITDA |
$2.9B $2.9B – $2.9B
|
$3.0B $3.0B – $3.1B
|
$3.2B $3.2B – $3.2B
|
$3.4B $3.3B – $3.4B
|
| Net Income |
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.5B
|
$1.5B $1.4B – $1.7B
|
$1.6B $1.4B – $2.1B
|
$1.9B $1.8B – $1.9B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:31pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +29.6% | +18.6% | +10.1% | +4.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +24.5% | +24.9% | +11.8% | +0.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | -0.4% | +60.5% | +17.5% | -11.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -12.4% | +81.4% | +17.1% | -13.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +26.2% | +28.2% | +14.1% | -7.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 3, 2026 8:30pm (23d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | Bergh Charles V | P-Purchase | 4,275.00 | $117.05 | $500,384 |
| 2026-06-09 | Bracey Esi Eggleston | A-Award | 247.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-08 | NEUBURGER NICOLE | F-InKind | 55.00 | $117.55 | $6,465 |
| 2026-06-08 | FRANK MEGHAN | F-InKind | 28.00 | $117.55 | $3,291 |
| 2026-04-28 | Bracey Esi Eggleston | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-04-08 | NEUBURGER NICOLE | S-Sale | 622.00 | $161.00 | $100,142 |
| 2026-04-01 | MAESTRINI ANDRE | P-Purchase | 3,275.00 | $151.02 | $494,591 |
| 2026-03-31 | FRANK MEGHAN | F-InKind | 400.00 | $153.10 | $61,240 |
| 2026-03-31 | NEUBURGER NICOLE | F-InKind | 369.00 | $153.10 | $56,494 |
| 2026-03-31 | MAESTRINI ANDRE | F-InKind | 357.00 | $153.10 | $54,657 |
| 2026-03-30 | MAESTRINI ANDRE | M-Exempt | 4,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-30 | MAESTRINI ANDRE | F-InKind | 2,206.00 | $145.83 | $321,701 |
| 2026-03-30 | MAESTRINI ANDRE | F-InKind | 224.00 | $145.83 | $32,666 |
| 2026-03-30 | MAESTRINI ANDRE | M-Exempt | 4,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-30 | NEUBURGER NICOLE | M-Exempt | 3,754.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-30 | NEUBURGER NICOLE | F-InKind | 1,979.00 | $145.83 | $288,598 |
| 2026-03-30 | NEUBURGER NICOLE | F-InKind | 201.00 | $145.83 | $29,312 |
| 2026-03-30 | NEUBURGER NICOLE | M-Exempt | 3,754.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-30 | FRANK MEGHAN | M-Exempt | 3,754.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-30 | FRANK MEGHAN | F-InKind | 1,977.00 | $145.83 | $288,306 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly cadence first: Q4 (Feb-ending) revenue went from $3.61B → $3.64B, a paltry 0.8% YoY for the seasonally critical quarter, while Q4 net income collapsed from $748M to $587M — a 22% drop and a 460bp margin contraction (20.7% → 16.1%). That is not "maturing premium brand," that is operating deleverage in the highest-volume quarter when fixed costs should be most absorbed. The three preceding quarters (Q1-Q3 FY26) ran 4-7% YoY revenue growth with margins 12-15% versus 14-17% prior year. Full-year FY26: revenue $11.10B (+4.8%), but NI $1.58B vs $1.81B (-12.7%) and operating income $2.21B vs $2.51B (-12%). FCF is the loudest alarm — $922M trailing, down from a multi-year run-rate that supported the -25% FCF CAGR figure. Capex $681M against $1.60B OCF means reinvestment intensity is rising while returns are falling.
The synthesis verdict ("Disconnected from Fundamentals" in the bullish direction) is defensible but glosses over the direction of second derivatives. Yes, 9.5x TTM P/E and 5.5x EV/EBITDA for a business still generating 19.9% operating margins and 22.6% ROIC is statistically cheap — this is mid-cycle industrial multiples on a brand that just printed 56.6% gross margins. But the bull case in the synthesis assumes margins stabilize; the Q4 print suggests they haven't. The Pre-Flight note's "high-growth-maturing" framing is closer to right than the rule-based "mature_earner" tag — a true mature earner doesn't see earnings drop 13% on +5% revenue. That's a margin story unfolding in real time, and it argues against the synthesis's confident dismissal of the bear case. The Market Forces "neutral" read is actually the most honest of the bunch.
A contrarian would press harder. First, the China/international thesis that supposedly bails out the multiple is unverifiable from this file — we have no segment breakdown. Second, gross margin held at 56.6% but operating margin compressed from 23.7% to 19.9% — that's SG&A deleverage, classic signature of a brand spending to defend share against Alo, Vuori, and Nike's resurgence. Third, the insider data is essentially noise (a 3,275 share purchase against routine F-InKind tax withholdings) — calling this "Net Insider Buying" as a positive signal is generous. Fourth, the balance sheet tile is missing total debt and equity entirely, which makes ROE/ROIC verification impossible — and the anomaly flags correctly note the canonical TTM ratios don't tie to the annual row. Fifth, with apparel-retail comps historically trading 8-12x P/E when growth stalls (think Under Armour, Gap), 9.5x isn't a bargain — it's appropriate pricing for a brand that may have peaked.
I dissent partially from the synthesis. At $126 and a $15B cap, the math works if FY27 FCF stabilizes near $900M-$1B (15-17x FCF) and revenue holds mid-single-digits — that's a reasonable scenario, not a heroic one. But the synthesis's "disconnected, market is too pessimistic" framing underweights that Q4 margin compression is a fresh wound, not an old scar, and that brand-premium businesses re-rate violently downward once the "platform" narrative cracks (see Nike from $170 to $60). Fair value on a sober DCF with 4% revenue growth fading to 3%, op margins re-stabilizing at 19%, and a 10% discount rate lands me around $140-$155 — modest upside, not the 50%+ implied by the synthesis. The asymmetry is okay but not screaming, and the catalyst path requires evidence margins have bottomed, which we don't have yet. Starter position defensible; backing up the truck is not. The right trade is to wait one more quarter to see if Q1 FY27 margins stabilize sequentially — if they do, re-rate to $150+ is plausible; if they compress further, $100 is in play.
GPT Critique
Lululemon's recent financial performance reveals some concerning trends that merit close attention. Revenue growth has notably decelerated, with the most recent fiscal year ending in 2026 showing only a 4.8% increase to $11.10 billion, compared to prior years' double-digit growth rates. More troubling is the significant drop in net income, falling 12.7% year-over-year to $1.58 billion, and a corresponding decline in operating income. This suggests that the company is struggling to maintain its profitability amidst rising costs, as evidenced by a sharp decline in Q4 net income and margin compression from 20.7% to 16.1%. The free cash flow has also plummeted, reinforcing concerns about the company's financial flexibility and ability to sustain its growth investments.
Opus argues that Lululemon is "mildly undervalued" with a fair value range of $140-$155, citing the company's current valuation metrics such as a TTM P/E of 9.5x as statistically cheap. I agree that these multiples appear attractive for a brand with historically high margins and a strong ROIC of 22.6%. However, I diverge from Opus's optimistic fair value estimation due to the severity of the recent margin compression. The Q4 performance should not be viewed as a mere blip but as indicative of potentially deeper issues in cost management and competitive pressures that might not stabilize quickly. Opus also highlights insider buying as a positive signal, which I find unconvincing given the small scale of the transactions relative to the company's size, diminishing its relevance as a bullish indicator.
I also agree with Opus's skepticism about the "disconnected from fundamentals" thesis proposed by the synthesis. The synthesis posits that the market is overly pessimistic about Lululemon's future prospects, suggesting that the company's fundamentals remain strong. However, the recent earnings decline and margin compression suggest that the market's caution may be warranted. Opus correctly notes that the synthesis underplays the risk of further margin erosion and the potential for a significant re-rating if the company's premium brand status falters.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are too focused on short-term margin fluctuations and not enough on Lululemon's long-term strategic initiatives, such as international expansion and product diversification, which could eventually offset current headwinds. They might also contend that the market narrative is overly bearish, discounting the brand's significant consumer loyalty and potential in untapped markets.