For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for McDonald's Corporation (MCD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +9 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 79 · Value -48 · Sentiment -36 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $223,377,128.86 vs $265.23 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
McDonald's Corporation
MCD NYSEMcDonald's Corporation operates and franchises McDonald's restaurants worldwide, serving as a global leader in the quick-service restaurant industry. The company offers a core menu of hamburgers, cheeseburgers, chicken sandwiches, fries, breakfast items, shakes, desserts, soft drinks, coffee, and beverages, alongside limited-time promotions to keep offerings fresh. It generates revenue primarily through franchise royalties and rent from about 61% of its systemwide sales, complemented by company-operated restaurants. McDonald's organizes its business into three key segments: U.S., International Operated Markets, and International Developmental Licensed Markets and Corporate, enabling tailored strategies across diverse geographies. Franchise structures include conventional franchises, developmental licenses, and affiliates, supporting extensive global reach. Founded in 1955 and headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, McDonald's Corporation plays a pivotal role in the consumer services sector, providing convenient, affordable dining options to millions daily and maintaining a strong presence in both mature and emerging markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 11.95
Total Equity: -$1.79B
Shares: 716
Total Debt: $39.97B
Cash: $774.00M
EBITDA: $12.85B
Total Debt: $39.97B
Cash: $774.00M
Revenue: $26.89B
Revenue: $26.89B
Revenue: $26.89B
Total Equity: -$1.79B
Tax Rate: 21.4%
Equity: -$1.79B
Total Debt: $39.97B
Cash: $774.00M
Current Liabilities: $4.36B
Long-Term Debt: $39.97B
Total Debt: $39.97B
Total Equity: -$1.79B
Shares: 716
Shares: 716
CapEx: -$3.37B
Shares: 716
Stock Price: $265.23
Net Income: $8.56B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 29, 2026 9:04pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $23.2B | $23.2B | $25.5B | $25.9B | $26.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $12.9B | $13.8B | $13.8B | $14.2B | $14.5B |
| Operating Income | $10.4B | $9.4B | $11.6B | $11.7B | $12.4B |
| Net Income | $7.5B | $6.2B | $8.5B | $8.2B | $8.6B |
| EBITDA | $10.7B | $9.7B | $12.0B | $12.2B | $12.9B |
| EPS | $10.11 | $8.39 | $11.63 | $11.45 | $12.00 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $10.04 | $8.33 | $11.56 | $11.39 | $11.95 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.7B | $2.6B | $4.6B | $1.1B | $774.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $7.1B | $5.4B | $8.0B | $4.6B | $4.2B |
| Total Assets | $53.9B | $50.4B | $56.1B | $55.2B | $59.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $4.0B | $3.8B | $6.9B | $3.9B | $4.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $35.6B | $35.9B | $37.2B | $38.4B | $40.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $58.5B | $56.4B | $60.9B | $59.0B | $61.3B |
| Total Equity | -$4.6B | -$6.0B | -$4.7B | -$3.8B | -$1.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $57.5B | $59.5B | $63.5B | $66.8B | $70.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 29, 2026 9:04pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $9.1B | $7.4B | $9.6B | $9.4B | $10.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.0B | -$1.9B | -$2.4B | -$2.8B | -$3.4B |
| Free Cash Flow | $7.1B | $5.5B | $7.3B | $6.7B | $7.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.1B | $1.2B | $2.8B | -$397.0M | -$78.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$3.9B | -$4.2B | -$4.5B | -$4.9B | -$5.1B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$845.5M | -$3.9B | -$3.1B | -$2.8B | -$2.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.3B | -$2.1B | $2.0B | -$3.5B | -$311.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 29, 2026 9:04pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -0.2% | +10.0% | +1.7% | +3.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -9.5% | +24.3% | +0.6% | +5.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -18.1% | +37.1% | -2.9% | +4.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -8.8% | +23.5% | +1.1% | +5.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-02 | $1.86 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-03 | $1.86 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $1.86 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $1.77 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $1.77 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $1.77 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $1.77 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $1.67 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $1.67 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $1.67 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $1.67 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $1.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-02 | $1.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-28 | $1.52 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $1.52 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $1.38 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-03 | $1.38 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-28 | $1.38 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-30 | $1.38 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $1.29 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw print first: Q1 2026 revenue of $6.52B is down 7.0% sequentially from Q4 2025's $7.01B, though up 9.4% year-over-year vs Q1 2025's $5.96B — so the deceleration narrative in the secondary signals is a seasonal artifact more than a fundamental crack. Full-year 2025 revenue of $26.89B grew 3.7% over 2024, net income $8.56B up 4.1%, operating margin 46.1%, net margin 31.9%. This is textbook mature-earner economics: FCF of $7.19B against a $188B market cap is a 3.8% FCF yield, plus 2.77% dividend yield with a 60% payout — the total shareholder return math works out to maybe 6-7% at current growth, which is exactly where a defensive royalty compounder should clear. Negative book equity (-$1.79B) is a feature, not a bug — it reflects decades of buybacks funded by the $40B debt stack against $10.5B in OCF (4x coverage, fine for a franchise annuity).
The synthesis verdict claiming "undervalued" with a fair value of $158 (or worse, the nonsensical $134M composite) is garbage output — likely a DCF model that either didn't handle the negative equity or applied a punitive terminal growth assumption to a business with 46% operating margins and 40,900 locations of embedded optionality. A no-growth DCF on $7.2B FCF at a 7% discount rate alone gets you $103B enterprise value; add 2% perpetual growth and you're at $144B; the actual EV is ~$227B, implying the market prices in ~3% perpetual growth, which given 2.7% historical revenue CAGR and pricing power is neither cheap nor egregious. The synthesis and thesis-evaluation models are contradicting each other — synthesis screams undervalued, thesis-eval scores 0/100 (perfectly balanced), and market-forces calls it neutral/fair. I side with the latter two. The EV/EBITDA of 3.05 in the canonical metrics is almost certainly wrong (real figure is ~17-18x); trust nothing from that data block that looks anomalous.
The contrarian bear case worth taking seriously isn't GLP-1s (overrated — MCD's value menu customer isn't the Ozempic demographic in meaningful proportions yet) but rather franchisee margin compression. If system-wide same-store sales stall and franchisees push back on royalty rates or reinvestment requirements, MCD's 46% operating margin — which is unusually high because franchisees eat the labor and commodity inflation — could face its first structural test in a decade. The 2024 E. coli event and the value-menu wars with Wendy's/Burger King suggest the pricing-power narrative is fraying at the edges. Recent revenue YoY of 3.7% is real but roughly two-thirds price, one-third traffic-negative in the US per prior disclosures — that's not a healthy mix. The 22% drawdown from highs reflects legitimate concern, not overreaction.
My read: fairly valued, not undervalued. Intrinsic value sits in the $240-275 range on a 2% growth, 7.5% discount rate, 32% FCF margin framework — call it $255 midpoint. At $265 you're paying roughly fair for a bond-substitute with a 2.77% yield and low-single-digit growth. The synthesis model's $158 target is mathematically indefensible for a business generating $7.2B in FCF; ignore it. The narrative layer nailed it — this is "expensive, justified, but fully priced," a defensive royalty compound that will return 6-8% annually through dividend + buyback + modest growth, which is fine but not a table-pound. I dissent from the synthesis "undervalued" call and align with market-forces "neutral." No edge here for a growth-oriented investor; income investors already own it. Wait for either (a) a print showing US comps re-accelerating above 3%, or (b) a drawdown into the $230s that pushes the FCF yield above 4.5% and the dividend yield toward 3.2%.
GPT Reading
What stands out is how little operating drama there is in the actual numbers, and how much of the debate comes down to what multiple a nearly perfect franchise annuity deserves. McDonald’s grew revenue from $23.2B in 2021 to $26.9B in 2025, only about 3-4% annually, but translated that into operating income growth from $10.36B to $12.39B and net income from $7.55B to $8.56B. That is the story: modest top-line expansion, very high incremental profitability, and unusual resilience in net margins that have sat around 31-32% for eight straight quarters. Quarterly revenue has climbed from $6.49B in 2024’s June quarter to $6.84B in 2025’s June quarter and from $6.87B to $7.08B in the September quarter, but the latest March quarter at $6.52B versus $5.96B a year earlier is still only a 9% gain off an easier base. This is not a growth stock in disguise; it is a cash extraction machine.
The market cap of $188.5B against 2025 net income of $8.56B implies about 22x earnings, which is neither cheap nor absurd for this quality level. On free cash flow, though, the picture is tighter: $7.19B of FCF means the stock trades around 26x FCF, or roughly a 3.8% FCF yield, before considering the balance sheet. And the balance sheet matters. Debt is $39.97B, cash is only $774M, current ratio is under 1.0, and equity is negative $1.79B. Negative equity alone is not a red flag for a franchisor that has aggressively repurchased stock, but it does mean you should not kid yourself that this is a fortress balance sheet in the conventional sense. The business model is fortress-like; the capital structure is optimized and leaves less room for error than the brand halo suggests. A company with 2.7% revenue CAGR, 0.6% earnings CAGR, and slightly negative FCF CAGR over the period should not be called undervalued simply because a model spits out a nonsense fair value. The canonical EV multiples provided are clearly broken; they are incompatible with a $188B market cap and nearly $40B of debt. If you ignore that bad data and use the income and cash flow statements, McDonald’s looks fully priced to mildly expensive.
What keeps me from being outright bearish is the consistency of the franchise economics. A 46.1% operating margin on nearly $27B of revenue is exceptional, and operating cash flow of $10.55B against net income of $8.56B shows accounting earnings are backed by cash. The dividend yield of 2.77% with a 59.7% payout ratio is sustainable enough, and there is still some room for annual increases. If you are paying 22x earnings for a business with this brand strength, global scale, and royalty-heavy mix, you are buying durability and lower cyclicality, not growth. That can be rational. But at $265, the market already seems to understand exactly what this is. I don’t see a wide gap between price and intrinsic value; I see a quality company priced as a quality company.
The strongest pushback to my view is that I may be underestimating how valuable stability is in a market that repeatedly reprices consumer businesses downward at the first sign of demand wobble. McDonald’s annual revenue rose every year from 2022 through 2025, operating income rose from $9.37B to $12.39B over that span, and net income recovered from $6.18B in 2022 to $8.56B in 2025. Even with only 3.7% recent revenue growth and 4.1% recent earnings growth, those gains are being earned at 30%+ net margins and supported by a global franchise network that can absorb inflation better than most restaurant concepts. A bull would argue that a 22x P/E for a dominant global franchisor with sticky demand, pricing power, and ongoing capital returns is actually modest, especially if rates fall and “bond proxy” equities rerate. That is fair. I weigh it differently because the current valuation already assumes the annuity persists, while the financial leverage and low growth leave little room for multiple expansion unless growth surprises to the upside.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If McDonald’s can show a clean reacceleration to 5%+ annual revenue growth while holding operating margin near 46% and pushing free cash flow sustainably above $8.5B, then $265 would start to look more like a reasonable entry than a hold-your-nose quality premium. Conversely, if quarterly revenue stalls around the $6.5B-$7.0B range while net income margins slip below 30% or FCF drops under $6.5B, the market will likely stop treating it as a near-bond substitute and a low-$220s to low-$240s stock would make more sense.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a fortress cash-return machine whose growth engine has stalled. McDonald’s put up $26.89B of revenue and $8.56B of net income in 2025, only a 3.7% and 4.1% step-up from 2024, and the multi-year picture is weaker still: revenue CAGR 2.7%, earnings CAGR 0.6%, free-cash-flow CAGR –0.5%. Quarterly net margins remain elite at 30–33% and the full-year operating margin of 46.1% confirms the franchise-and-rent model still converts superbly; operating cash flow of $10.55B and FCF of $7.19B after $3.37B of capex are the actual product. Yet that FCF is no longer compounding. The balance sheet is the familiar leveraged buyback skeleton—$40B of debt, $774M of cash, negative equity of $1.79B—which is sustainable given the cash generation but leaves equity holders entirely dependent on capital returns rather than enterprise growth. At $265 the stock trades at 22.2× trailing earnings and a ~3.8% FCF yield with a 2.77% dividend (60% payout). That is a full price for low-single-digit growth. The reported EV/EBITDA of 3.05 and zero P/S are simply broken data and should be discarded; they cannot reconcile with an $188B market cap plus net debt.
The Valuation Synthesis stamp of “undervalued” with a nine-digit composite fair value and a +59-million-percent upside is a unit-error artifact, not a signal. It directly contradicts the narrative layer’s more coherent DCF anchor near $158 (implying a ~68% premium at today’s price) and the Market Forces view that the shares are roughly fair for 2–3% growth. Recent quarterly revenue (Q1 2026 $6.52B versus Q1 2025 $5.96B) looks decent on the surface, yet the secondary flag of decelerating quarterly trend and essentially flat absolute earnings since 2023 are the binding constraints. Thesis score of zero is the honest summary: the royalty/real-estate moat is real, but the market is already paying for it.
The strongest contrary case is pure quality scarcity. A 46% operating margin, 14.4% ROA, and a 40,900-store franchise system that truly does push food-cost and labor inflation down to operators give McDonald’s a defensive cash-flow profile few consumer names can match. A skeptical reader would note that 22× for a multi-decade dividend aristocrat after a 22% drawdown from the highs is not demanding if the alternative is lower-quality paper, that 2025 did deliver absolute growth in both sales and profit, and that digital/loyalty rails plus pricing power have historically protected the multiple through cycles. I discount that argument because the reported growth rates have already compressed to bond-like levels while FCF is drifting sideways; paying 22× and a sub-4% FCF yield leaves no margin of safety if same-store sales or franchisee economics soften further under the flagged macro headwinds.
I would turn constructive only if the next two quarters re-accelerate revenue growth sustainably above 5% with FCF turning decisively positive on a trailing basis and net margins holding above 31%, or if the shares retrace toward the $200–220 zone where FCF yield approaches 5% and the maturity is properly discounted.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The business shows textbook mature-earner traits: revenue grew from 23.22B in 2021 to 26.89B in 2025 (roughly 3.7% CAGR), with operating margins consistently in the 40-46% range and 2025 at 46.1% - a level almost no operating business achieves outside of the franchise/royalty model MCD runs. Net income rose from 7.55B to 8.56B and FCF from 7.10B to 7.19B, both remarkably steady. Earnings quality is clean: OCF/NI of 1.18x, negative accruals (-2.6% of assets), and an Altman Z of 4.63 firmly in the safe zone. Capital return discipline is exemplary. Diluted share count fell from 751.8M to 716M over five years, and buyback spend runs at ~1549% of SBC - management is aggressively concentrating per-share value while SBC is a trivial 0.6% of revenue. The one genuine constraint is the balance sheet: net debt of ~39.2B against only 774M of liquid cash. This is not a fortress balance sheet in the Apple/Google sense - it is a deliberately leveraged capital structure supported by extraordinarily predictable royalty-like cash flows. The franchise model, global brand, and real-estate-backed economics give MCD durability that few businesses match. Nothing in the mechanical checks flashes red.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted average interest rate on the ~39B net debt
- Franchised vs company-operated store mix and any shifts in refranchising strategy
- Same-store sales trends by geography (US vs IOM vs IDL segments)
- Any off-balance-sheet lease obligations or guarantees to franchisees
- Trend in franchisee health / franchisee margins as a leading indicator
The e2e composite FV of $134M and signal-adjusted FV of $158M are obviously broken outputs (total-dollar figures mistakenly compared to a per-share price, producing a nonsense 59,729,213% upside) - ignore them. The only usable e2e input is the anchored PE fair value of $338, which implies ~27% upside, but that method simply capitalizes current EPS at a premium multiple and effectively assumes the current earnings power and multiple persist. Cross-checking: MCD trades near a ~25x forward P/E on a business growing systemwide sales in the mid-single digits with decelerating comps, on $39B net debt, and with a ~2.4% dividend yield - that is a full, quality-adjusted price, not a discount. Deserved value for a Fortress-quality, royalty-like compounder with modest growth is probably in the $220-260 range; at $265 the market is already paying for the quality. The bear framing (paying a premium for the Golden Arches narrative while unit economics soften) is the more honest read on the gap. This is not a shorting case - it is simply not a bargain. I would want a real drawdown before this becomes interesting on valuation alone.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Global comparable sales trajectory and traffic vs check-mix in next print
- Franchisee cash-on-cash returns and any royalty-rate/rent concessions
- Interest expense trajectory on the $39B net debt as maturities roll
- Buyback pace vs FCF and whether leverage creeps further
The tape is nascent risk-on with the Dow at a record, but with a 0.42 beta MCD barely participates in that lift - defensives get left behind when oil slides and cyclicals rally. So the market tailwind lands soft on this name. Working against it: the immediate news flow is squarely negative into Tuesday's print - 'budget-conscious consumers remain under stress,' Tyson cutting guidance on beef costs, a lettuce-illness overhang on restaurant traffic, and headlines explicitly flagging the stock could 'extend its slide' post-earnings. That is a specific, dated pressure on this ticker. The durable 'real estate and royalty machine' narrative is intact but only moderate intensity and low cult - it defends the multiple, it does not push the stock higher. Analyst tone reads cautious-neutral heading into the print. Net: a low-beta defensive with a stable but tired story, pinned by consumer-stress headlines and a binary earnings catalyst in 24 hours. Slight headwind bias, but not decisive - hence Balanced leaning soft.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Tuesday's Q2 print - US comps, guidance tone on the value-menu consumer, and any franchisee margin commentary
- Post-print analyst revisions - target cuts would confirm the narrative crack, holds/raises would flip sentiment
- Beef and commodity commentary echoing Tyson's warning
- Whether defensives start catching a bid if the risk-on rally broadens or stalls
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, MCD was $265.23. We expect it to be $275.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $225.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.