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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for MakeMyTrip Limited (MMYT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -15 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 56 · Value -73 · Sentiment 39 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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MakeMyTrip Limited
MMYT NASDAQMakeMyTrip Limited is an online travel services provider focused on facilitating a broad range of travel-related bookings and experiences. The company offers air ticketing, hotel reservations, and curated holiday packages, complemented by rail and bus ticketing, car hire, and inter-city car rental services. Travelers can also access activities and experiences, as well as ancillary services such as travel insurance, visa assistance, and foreign currency exchange through its digital platforms. MakeMyTrip Limited serves customers primarily through its MakeMyTrip, Goibibo, and redBus brands, enabling users to research, plan, and book trips via websites and mobile applications across India and select international markets. The company operates in multiple countries, including the United States, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, Peru, Colombia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia, giving it a diversified geographic footprint in the global travel ecosystem. Incorporated in 2000 and headquartered in Gurugram, India, MakeMyTrip Limited plays a significant role in the digital distribution of travel services and solutions for both domestic and outbound travelers.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
MakeMyTrip Limited is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 8 annual reports, the latest filed 2025-06-16, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.83
Total Equity: $1.21B
Shares: 114,538,183
Total Debt: $236.04M
Cash: $508.90M
EBITDA: $147.01M
Total Debt: $236.04M
Cash: $508.90M
Revenue: $978.34M
Revenue: $978.34M
Revenue: $978.34M
Total Equity: $1.21B
Tax Rate: 17.8%
Equity: $1.21B
Total Debt: $236.04M
Cash: $508.90M
Current Liabilities: $576.61M
Long-Term Debt: $13.90M
Total Debt: $236.04M
Total Equity: $1.21B
Shares: 114,538,183
Shares: 114,538,183
CapEx: -$4.47M
Shares: 114,538,183
Stock Price: $60.42
Net Income: $95.10M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:14am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $163.4M | $303.9M | $593.0M | $782.5M | $978.3M |
| Cost of Revenue | $22.2M | $58.8M | $177.6M | $215.1M | $274.3M |
| Gross Profit | $141.2M | $245.2M | $415.5M | $567.4M | $704.0M |
| Operating Expenses | $208.9M | $275.5M | $391.9M | $502.2M | $584.1M |
| Operating Income | -$67.7M | -$30.4M | $23.6M | $65.2M | $119.9M |
| Net Income | -$55.6M | -$45.4M | -$11.3M | $216.8M | $95.1M |
| EBITDA | -$34.7M | $-870,000 | $51.0M | $92.5M | $147.0M |
| EPS | $-0.52 | $-0.42 | $-0.10 | $1.95 | $0.84 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-0.52 | $-0.42 | $-0.10 | $1.74 | $0.83 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:14am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $295.1M | $213.3M | $284.0M | $327.1M | $508.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $501.2M | $591.4M | $671.9M | $857.3M | $1.1B |
| Total Assets | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $194.2M | $191.2M | $453.7M | $297.6M | $576.6M |
| Long-Term Debt | $201.6M | $213.8M | $15.7M | $216.8M | $13.9M |
| Total Liabilities | $417.8M | $426.3M | $483.8M | $543.7M | $620.3M |
| Total Equity | $891.2M | $896.5M | $876.1M | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.2B | -$1.2B | -$1.2B | -$1.0B | -$929.9M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:14am (8d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $64.5M | $6.0M | $32.1M | $125.7M | $185.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | $-642,000 | -$3.1M | -$7.5M | -$5.9M | -$4.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $63.9M | $2.9M | $24.6M | $119.8M | $180.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | -$1.5M | -$6.5M | -$10.4M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $-314,000 | $690,000 | $1.4M | $1.1M | -$1.5M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $165.1M | -$81.2M | $72.6M | $43.9M | $188.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 15, 2026 11:14am (8d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +86.0% | +95.1% | +32.0% | +25.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +73.6% | +69.5% | +36.6% | +24.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +55.1% | +177.7% | +176.3% | +83.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +18.4% | +75.1% | +2,015.0% | -56.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +97.5% | +5,962.1% | +81.3% | +59.0% |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-15OTA economics in India are dominated by contact-center load (cancellations, refunds, reschedules, visa and multi-language queries) and performance marketing; conversational AI compresses both, and MMYT's operating margin has only just crossed 12% — the delivery-cost line is where AI cash shows up first.
If general assistants (Google/Gemini, ChatGPT-style agents) become the trip-planning surface, MMYT loses the discovery step it currently buys with marketing spend and either pays a new toll or gets reduced to a commodity fulfilment API with a compressible take rate.
Whether agentic travel traffic arrives through MMYT's own apps or through third-party assistants — observable in direct/app-share of bookings, marketing spend as % of gross bookings, and whether MMYT signs agent-side distribution deals on favourable terms.
Contracted long-tail Indian supply — tens of thousands of unbranded hotels, thousands of small bus operators on redBus, rail and domestic air integrations — plus local payments, refund handling and brand trust for high-ticket prepaid transactions.
AI Lens thesis
The need to move around India is physical and untouched; AI reaches MMYT through three channels — (1) cost: support, fraud, content, ops and ad-buying all get cheaper, and with 72% gross margin and 12% operating margin the flow-through to profit is mechanically large; (2) demand quality: better personalization and dynamic packaging lift hotel attach, the high-margin unit, versus thin air ticketing; (3) intermediation: if planning migrates to assistants, the OTA's paid-discovery function is disintermediated even though its supply-aggregation and settlement function survives. MMYT's defence is not software — it is contracted fragmented Indian inventory, UPI-era payments, and the willingness to own the mess when a booking fails. The realistic outcome is a leaner, higher-margin execution layer with a somewhat lower take rate, unless it also captures the agent interface.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside AI-run support and vernacular voice agents can profitably serve tier-2/3 first-time travelers whose ticket sizes previously didn't cover human service cost — expanding the addressable base rather than just cutting cost.
Downside India-specific: ONDC/beckn open travel rails plus cheap agent software let airlines, hotel chains and bus operators reach demand without an aggregator, attacking take rate from the supply side rather than the demand side.
Outcome range spread 47 · unresolved
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:19The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw trajectory is genuinely impressive on the top line: revenue from $163M (FY21) → $304M → $593M → $783M → $978M is a 5-year 56% CAGR, and gross margin has expanded from 86% (COVID low mix) to a still-fat 72% at scale. Operating income inflected from -$68M to +$120M — that's the story a platform bull tells. But the earnings line tells a different story: FY24 net income of $217M dropped to $95M in FY25 despite revenue rising 25%. That's a deferred tax asset unwind from FY24 flattering optics — GAAP NI in FY25 ($95M on $978M rev = 9.7% net margin) is the honest number, and it's below the FY24 print because FY24 was inflated, not because the business decayed. Operating margin actually expanded from 8.3% to 12.3% YoY. So the "-56% earnings YoY" secondary signal is a tax artifact, not operational deterioration — the synthesis and pre-flight both under-weight this.
That said, 72x P/E, 44x EV/EBITDA, and 6.7x EV/revenue on a 12% operating-margin business is a lot to swallow regardless of the tax noise. Even generously assuming operating margin scales to 20% at maturity (Booking runs ~30%, but MMYT's Indian mix is lower-take-rate hotel + air), applying that to a $1.5B revenue run-rate two years out gets you $300M in operating income. Slap a 25x multiple on that (still generous for an Indian OTA with FX and regulatory overhang) and you get ~$7.5B EV vs current ~$5.4B EV ($5.68B mcap - $273M net cash). That's ~35% upside on a 2-year forward at aggressive assumptions — not a screaming buy at $60, but not the -40% mispricing the synthesis claims either. The synthesis fair value of $28-36 looks too punitive; it appears to be anchoring on trailing GAAP earnings that were understated by tax normalization.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: MMYT's take rate is structurally lower than Western OTAs because Indian hotel inventory is more fragmented and air is dominated by low-cost carriers with thin commissions. The FCF of $181M on $978M rev (18.5% FCF margin) looks great but includes float working-capital benefits that reverse in slower-growth periods. Booking trades at ~20x P/E with 30%+ operating margins and dominant global network effects; giving MMYT 3.5x Booking's multiple requires believing India-specific growth persists at 25%+ for 5+ more years without competitive compression from Agoda, Booking direct, or a well-funded domestic disruptor. The insider "awards" (all grants dated 2026-07-01, no opens/sells) tell you nothing about conviction — that's routine RSU vesting, not a signal. The "no insider transactions" tag is right to dismiss this.
Where I land: I partial-dissent from the synthesis. The models correctly identify MMYT as expensive but overshoot on how expensive — a $28 fair value implies the market is 50% wrong on a company compounding revenue at 28% with expanding operating margins and net cash. I think fair value is closer to $45-50 (roughly 45-50x normalized earnings decaying to 30x in three years as growth moderates), meaning $60 is ~20-25% overvalued, not 40%+. The market narrative layer is directionally right — this is anchored storytelling with strong intensity — but the "platform-monopoly" archetype overstates MMYT's moat; it's more accurately a scale-advantaged local leader with real but bounded defensibility. I would not short this (revenue momentum is real, balance sheet is clean with $509M cash vs $236M debt, FCF conversion is genuine) but I would not buy at $60 either. Wait for a print-driven drawdown to the high $40s where the growth-adjusted math actually works. If FY26 revenue prints below 20% growth or operating margin fails to hold 12%, the multiple compression could be violent — 72x P/E has no floor when growth disappoints.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that the business itself has become real faster than the stock has become cheap. Revenue has gone from $163.4M in FY2021 to $978.3M in FY2025, a 6x recovery-and-growth arc, while operating income improved from -$67.7M to +$119.9M. Free cash flow of $180.8M in FY2025 is especially important because capex is trivial at $4.5M; this is an asset-light platform model with genuine cash conversion once volumes scale. The balance sheet is also clean: $508.9M of cash against $236.0M of debt, so the company is in a net cash position of roughly $273M. If I adjust the $5.68B market cap for that net cash, enterprise value is about $5.41B, or 5.5x FY2025 revenue and 29.9x FY2025 free cash flow. For a dominant OTA tied to Indian travel digitization, those are not absurd “bubble” numbers.
But the earnings multiple is giving a distorted picture. The 72.8x P/E looks expensive, yet FY2024 net income of $216.8M was clearly flattered by something below the operating line because operating income that year was only $65.2M; then FY2025 net income fell to $95.1M even as operating income nearly doubled to $119.9M. So the right way to read the business is through operating profit and cash flow, not the headline earnings whipsaw. On that basis, FY2025 operating margin was 12.3% and FCF margin 18.5%, both materially better than the 2023 and 2022 levels. Gross margin at 72.0% says this is a high-take-rate, high-value distribution business, and ROIC above 10% is respectable given the recent normalization period. The market is paying up for a company that has crossed from recovery into scaled profitability, not just for a story.
That said, I still think the current price bakes in a lot of victory. At $60.42, investors are paying 7.1x sales, 44.4x EV/EBITDA, 5.7x book, and roughly 30x free cash flow on a business whose latest annual revenue growth was 25%, not 40%+, and whose operating margin is good but not yet elite. For an OTA, the question is not whether travel in India grows; it almost certainly does. The question is how much of that growth accrues to MMYT shareholders after competition, marketing intensity, supplier bargaining power, and inevitable fare volatility. A 12% operating margin leaves room for improvement, but it also leaves room for disappointment. I don’t see enough evidence in the numbers here to justify treating MMYT as a structurally untouchable platform deserving a sustained premium multiple far above mature global travel peers. My base case is that the business is high quality, but the stock is closer to fully valued than materially mispriced.
The best case against my view is straightforward: I may be anchoring too hard on mature OTA valuation frameworks when MMYT is still early in its local market monetization curve. If revenue can compound at even 20-25% for several more years while operating margins move from 12.3% toward the high teens, today’s 5.5x EV/revenue and ~30x FCF could compress quickly into a reasonable entry point. The net cash balance, high gross margins, and tiny capex needs create a lot of operating leverage. If FY2025 free cash flow of $180.8M is the floor rather than the peak, the stock could deserve a premium to blunt DCF outputs that treat it like a standard OTA. The strongest bull argument is not “India is exciting”; it is that MMYT has already proven it can turn growth into cash and may only be in the first inning of margin scaling.
What would change my mind is evidence that FY2025 was not just a good year but the start of a steeper earnings ramp. If the next annual print shows revenue above roughly $1.18B to $1.22B, operating margin sustainably above 15%, and free cash flow comfortably over $230M, then the current price would look much easier to defend and I’d likely move bullish even in the mid-$60s. On the other hand, if revenue growth slips into the mid-teens while operating income stalls around $120M and free cash flow fails to grow from the current $180.8M, then the stock deserves a sharper de-rating, likely into the mid-$40s where the valuation better matches a solid but not exceptional OTA.
Grok Reading
MakeMyTrip’s five-year revenue arc is the cleanest part of the story: $163M to $978M, a 28% CAGR, with the latest year still printing 25% growth to $978M. Gross margin sits at a rich 72%, and operating income nearly doubled from $65M to $120M even as the top line scaled, which is real operating leverage finally showing up after years of losses. Free cash flow of $181M on only $4.5M of capex is high-quality and almost fully converts from the $185M operating cash flow; the balance sheet is net cash ($509M cash versus $236M debt) with a debt-to-equity of 0.20. That is a genuine franchise improvement, not accounting noise.
The contradiction sits in the earnings quality and the multiple. Net income collapsed from $217M in FY2024 to $95M in FY2025 (−56% YoY) even while operating profit rose, which means the prior-year bottom line was inflated by items below the operating line that did not repeat. Trailing P/E of 73x, EV/EBITDA of 44x, and EV/revenue of 6.7x are being applied to a business that just delivered a 9.7% net margin and a modest 7.9% ROE. At $5.68B of market cap against ~$95M of normalized net income and ~$181M of FCF, the market is paying roughly 60x earnings and a 3.2% FCF yield for a mid-teens-to-20s growth OTA. That is a platform-monopoly multiple on a still-commoditizing travel intermediary. The valuation synthesis fair value near $36 is directionally right; even giving the India growth story a generous premium, $60 embeds far more margin and volume acceleration than the FY2025 run-rate supports.
The strongest case against calling this overvalued is the trajectory, not the snapshot. Revenue has compounded through the cycle, operating margin has marched from deeply negative to 12.3%, and FCF CAGR is extreme because the company has crossed the profitability threshold. India’s structural offline-to-online travel shift and middle-class expansion are real tailwinds that mature Western OTAs no longer enjoy, and a net-cash balance sheet plus negligible capex means almost every incremental dollar of gross profit can drop to FCF. If FY2026–27 simply hold 20%+ revenue growth and push operating margin toward the mid-teens, the earnings base can grow into a high-30s or low-40s multiple without a price collapse. A smart bull would also note that the 60% drawdown from highs has already punished the margin volatility, so some of the disappointment is in the price.
I still weigh the bear side more heavily because ROIC of 10.5% and ROE under 8% do not justify 44x EV/EBITDA in a competitive OTA market where Booking and Expedia remain latent threats and pricing power is not structural. Narrative intensity around “India TAM” is doing more work than the cash flows. I would flip toward fairly valued or modestly undervalued if the next two reported years show net income sustained above $180–200M with operating margins holding or expanding past 14%, or if the stock revisits the mid-$30s while growth remains intact. A sharp deceleration in revenue growth below 15% or another unexplained NI collapse would confirm the overvaluation more forcefully.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue has compounded from $163M (FY21) to $978M (FY25) - roughly 6x in four years - while operating margin flipped from -41.4% to +12.3% and FCF scaled from $63.9M to $180.8M. Gross margin has settled in the low-70s (72% in FY25), consistent with an OTA marketplace mix rather than pure agency economics. The balance sheet is comfortable: $508.9M liquid cash, $272.9M net cash, Altman Z of 5.86 (safe zone), and the business now self-funds capex and growth. Earnings-quality checks are clean - Beneish M -2.34, accruals -3.1% of assets - so the reported profits look real rather than manufactured. Dilution is modest (diluted share CAGR 1.8%, SBC 3.7% of revenue) and share count actually ticked down from 118.2M to 114.5M in FY25, hinting at some offset to SBC. The one wobble in the trajectory is FY24 net income of $216.8M dropping to $95.1M in FY25 despite revenue growth and higher FCF - almost certainly a deferred-tax-asset or one-off benefit in FY24, but worth confirming. Insider tape shows only routine equity awards to Kalra, Magow, Kabra - no open-market buys or sells to read into. What I cannot see from this data: competitive position vs. domestic Indian rivals and global aggregators, take-rate durability, supplier concentration, and the composition of that FY24 tax/one-off. The business STATE, however, is clearly one of a scaling, cash-generative platform that has crossed the profitability inflection convincingly.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Composition of FY24 net income - specifically whether a deferred tax asset recognition drove the $216.8M figure
- Take-rate trend by segment (air, hotels, holidays) to see whether GM compression is mix or price
- Supplier and customer concentration disclosures
- Whether the FY25 share count decline reflects an active buyback program or share forfeitures/expirations
- Any convertible notes or preferred equity in the capital structure that could dilute later
- Segment-level operating margins to test whether the 12.3% consolidated OpM is durable
The e2e composite pins fair value at $27.82 and the signal-adjusted number at $35.97 - both well below the $60.42 print, implying roughly 40% downside on the base case. The EPV floor of $8.18 is a runaway low (it capitalizes current earnings with no growth on a platform still scaling, so I discount it heavily), but even leaning on the more generous DCF of $31.39 the stock is trading ~90% above deserved value. Earnings quality is clean, which means I do not haircut further - but it also means the headline multiple is the real multiple, and it is stretched.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward take-rate and gross margin trajectory - has commoditization started biting?
- India domestic travel volume growth guidance from management commentary
- Segment mix shift (hotels vs air vs bus) and margin per segment
- Any one-off tax benefits or FX gains inflating recent net income
- Competitive share data vs Booking/Agoda in India
The macro backdrop is a modest tailwind: VIX at 14.3, S&P near highs, and a 10-day established risk-on regime. MMYT's beta of 1 means it neither amplifies nor mutes the tape, but as an India-exposed consumer-cyclical growth name it tends to catch a bid when global risk appetite is on. Higher US rates and a stretched market PE are a background drag on any premium-multiple story stock, but nothing acute here. The active narrative is the dominant force. MMYT is trading as the 'platform-monopoly' winner of Indian online travel - strong intensity, moderate durability, low cult. That story is running the price at a 68% premium to a plausible fair value, which is exactly the kind of setup that keeps momentum self-reinforcing while the tape is calm and breaks hard the moment the story cracks. Momentum confirms it: 28% CAGR, positive 3-year relative, healthy cash trajectory - the tape is rewarding the narrative. Net: sentiment is a real but not decisive tailwind. Nothing in the flow is actively pressing the stock down; the risk is asymmetric rather than immediate.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any sell-side downgrade or target cut that would crack the platform-monopoly framing
- Booking/Expedia India push or a domestic upstart gaining share - narrative-breaking headlines
- Quarterly take-rate and ancillary attach metrics - the pillars of the margin-expansion story
- VIX break above 18 or a risk-off rotation out of emerging-market consumer names
- INR/USD moves and Indian macro prints that feed the India-TAM story
The need to move around India is physical and untouched; AI reaches MMYT through three channels — (1) cost: support, fraud, content, ops and ad-buying all get cheaper, and with 72% gross margin and 12% operating margin the flow-through to profit is mechanically large; (2) demand quality: better personalization and dynamic packaging lift hotel attach, the high-margin unit, versus thin air ticketing; (3) intermediation: if planning migrates to assistants, the OTA's paid-discovery function is disintermediated even though its supply-aggregation and settlement function survives. MMYT's defence is not software — it is contracted fragmented Indian inventory, UPI-era payments, and the willingness to own the mess when a booking fails. The realistic outcome is a leaner, higher-margin execution layer with a somewhat lower take rate, unless it also captures the agent interface.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Agentic/API booking partnerships announced
- Marketing spend % of gross bookings
- Take rate per transaction by segment
- Operating margin path above 15%
- Headcount per million bookings
- Promotional/discount intensity
- App vs assistant-referred booking mix
- Direct traffic share of gross bookings
India's travel market is the structural story: rising middle-class incomes, cheap mobile data, and low online-booking penetration keep the addressable pool expanding for years even as the global travel-services cycle cools off its post-pandemic surge. That is why MMYT can grow 25% while the category prints 13%. The offsetting force is that the OTA layer is the most contestable part of the value chain — suppliers want direct relationships, super-apps and payment wallets want the booking, and global OTAs will spend to enter. So the volume tailwind is durable while the take-rate is not guaranteed. Add a macro-headwind backdrop with elevated long rates that pressures discretionary and outbound spend at the margin. Net read: the business direction is up, the slope moderates from ~25% toward the high-teens, and the durable question is monetization per booking rather than bookings themselves.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for MMYT — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.