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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for MPLX LP (MPLX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
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MPLX LP
MPLX NYSEMPLX LP is a master limited partnership involved in the midstream energy infrastructure sector. Its primary function is to engage in the transportation, storage, and marketing of crude oil and refined products. MPLX LP plays a crucial role in supporting upstream and downstream operations, providing essential services that facilitate the efficient movement and processing of hydrocarbons across various stages of production and distribution. As a significant player in the energy infrastructure landscape, MPLX LP impacts industries such as oil and gas production, refining, and petrochemical manufacturing. The partnership operates a substantial network of pipeline assets, storage tanks, and terminals strategically located across key energy-producing regions in the United States. By focusing on reliable midstream services, MPLX LP ensures the smooth and cost-effective supply of energy products to meet the demands of industrial consumers and retail markets alike, making it an integral part of the energy supply chain.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 14| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 28, 2026 | $0.87 | $0.89 +2.3% | — | — |
| Jul 9, 2026 | $0.04 | $-0.02 -150.0% | — | — |
| May 5, 2026 | $1.08 | $0.90 -16.7% | — | — |
| Feb 23, 2026 | $0.42 | $0.40 -4.8% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 11, 2026 | 424B5 | View |
| Aug 10, 2026 | FWP | View |
| Aug 10, 2026 | 424B5 | View |
| Aug 5, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Aug 5, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Aug 5, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Aug 5, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Aug 5, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Aug 5, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Aug 5, 2026 | 4/A | View |
| Aug 4, 2026 | 10-Q | View |
| Aug 4, 2026 | 8-K | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 8:54am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.86
Total Equity: N/A
Shares: 1,019,000,000
Total Debt: $1.50B
Cash: $2.14B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $1.50B
Cash: $2.14B
Revenue: $13.00B
Revenue: $13.00B
Revenue: $13.00B
Total Equity: N/A
Tax Rate: N/A
Equity: N/A
Total Debt: $1.50B
Cash: $2.14B
Current Liabilities: $3.25B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $1.50B
Total Equity: N/A
Shares: 1,019,000,000
Shares: 1,019,000,000
CapEx: -$1.81B
Shares: 1,019,000,000
Stock Price: $59.73
Net Income: $4.95B
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 1:05pm (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $10.0B | $11.6B | $11.3B | $11.9B | $13.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $6.0B | $6.7B | $6.4B | $6.6B | $7.1B |
| Operating Income | $4.0B | $4.9B | $4.9B | $5.3B | $5.9B |
| Net Income | $3.1B | $4.0B | $4.0B | $4.4B | $5.0B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $2.86 | $3.75 | $3.80 | $4.21 | $4.82 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.03 | $3.94 | $3.96 | $4.28 | $4.86 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:47pm (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $13.0M | $238.0M | $1.0B | $1.5B | $2.1B |
| Total Current Assets | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.8B | $3.3B | $4.0B |
| Total Assets | $35.5B | $35.7B | $36.5B | $37.5B | $43.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.3B | $2.4B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $3.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $22.5B | $22.2B | $22.9B | $23.5B | $28.5B |
| Total Equity | — | — | — | — | — |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 1:05pm (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.9B | $5.0B | $5.4B | $5.9B | $5.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$529.0M | -$806.0M | -$937.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.4B | $4.2B | $4.5B | $4.9B | $4.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$28.0M | -$246.0M | -$622.0M | -$3.3B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.6B | $1.2B | $588.0M | $479.0M | $4.1B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$630.0M | -$491.0M | $0 | -$326.0M | -$400.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 1:05pm (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +15.8% | -2.9% | +5.8% | +8.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +23.0% | -0.2% | +7.9% | +12.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +27.8% | -0.3% | +9.9% | +13.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:47pm (2d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-07 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-08 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-09 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-07 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-08 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-09 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-03 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-08 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-09 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-02 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-02 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-02 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-03 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-04 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-03 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-14 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-04 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-05 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-03 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-10 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-30 | Breves Christine S | A-Award | 2,696.39 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-30 | HELMS CHRISTOPHER A | A-Award | 2,696.39 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-30 | Peiffer Garry L. | A-Award | 2,696.39 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-30 | SEMPLE FRANK M | A-Award | 3,028.94 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-30 | STICE J MICHAEL | A-Award | 3,028.94 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-30 | SURMA JOHN P | A-Award | 3,028.94 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-30 | Walker Ray N JR | A-Award | 2,696.39 | $0.00 | $0 |
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw quarterly tape tells a more nuanced story than the synthesis lets on. Q1 and Q2 2026 revenue came in at $3.04B and $3.31B versus Q3 2025's $3.62B peak — that's a ~9% sequential drawdown from peak, and NI has slipped from $1.56B (Q3'25) to $922M (Q1'26) to $1.09B (Q2'26). Margins compressed from 43% to 30-33%. Yes, YoY Q2'26 vs Q2'25 is still +10% revenue, +3% NI, but the trajectory since Q3'25 is decelerating, exactly as the revenue confidence flag notes. Annuals still look great — $13B/$4.95B NI in 2025, 11.7% earnings CAGR, $4.1B FCF — but the FCF CAGR is actually *negative* 4.1%, which is the number that matters for a distribution-dependent MLP yielding 7.2%.
The synthesis verdict of $83-85 fair value (+42% upside) strikes me as aggressive and I partially dissent. The composite is almost certainly running DCF and multiple-based models that anchor on stable/growing FCF, but FCF is shrinking, not growing, and capex at $1.81B against $5.91B OCF leaves ~$4.1B for a distribution that at 7.2% yield on a $60.8B cap requires ~$4.4B annually. Coverage is roughly 1.0x on FCF — that's tight, not "juicy and safe." The balance sheet line showing only $1.50B total debt is almost certainly wrong or misclassified; MPLX carries roughly $20B+ of long-term debt in reality. If the models ingested $1.5B debt, EV/revenue and any EV-based fair value is materially understated in denominator terms, which artificially inflates equity fair value. This is a data-integrity red flag the synthesis missed entirely.
Pre-flight and narrative layers are directionally right: this is a dividend-income vehicle, minimal narrative intensity, fundamentals doing the work. But Market Forces' "deteriorating cash generation... vulnerable to distribution cuts" is the signal that best matches the quarterly reality — Q1'26 NI of $922M was the weakest print in the visible window, and FCF CAGR going negative while distributions keep climbing is precisely the setup that ends in a coverage squeeze or a distribution freeze. The contrarian case against the bullish synthesis is straightforward: MPLX is majority-owned/controlled by MPC, and the K-1 tax structure caps the buyer universe. That structural discount is permanent, not a re-rating opportunity. The 12.3x P/E isn't cheap for a no-growth MLP with decelerating margins — peer ET trades ~13x, EPD ~11x, so MPLX is already mid-pack, not discounted.
Where I land: the stock is *fairly valued to modestly undervalued*, not 42% undervalued. A reasonable fair value using $4.1B FCF, 3% terminal growth, 9% cost of equity (appropriate for MLP with tax friction) gets you to roughly $68-72/share, or ~15-20% upside plus the 7.2% yield — a respectable total return of 22-27% over a year if nothing breaks, but nowhere near $83. The real risk is that the Q1-Q2'26 margin compression continues; if 2026 full-year NI comes in at $4.0-4.2B versus 2025's $4.95B, the P/E re-rates to 15x on trailing and the stock is dead money. I'd want to see Q3'26 stabilize margins back above 35% before adding aggressively. The insider grants (all A-Awards, no open-market buys) are neutral-to-slightly-negative — comp, not conviction. Macro headwinds (energy transition, rate environment for yield names) are real and the narrative layer is honest about this: durability is only "moderate" because transition timing is genuinely unknown.
Bottom line: agree the stock isn't overvalued, dissent hard on the magnitude. The synthesis is anchoring on stale annuals and probably mis-loaded debt; the quarterly deceleration and negative FCF CAGR are the tells. This is a hold-and-clip-coupon at $60, add-on-weakness below $55, trim above $70 name — not a 42% mispricing.
GPT Reading
At roughly $60, MPLX looks cheap on earnings and attractive on yield, but the raw data do not support the idea that this is a glaring mispricing. What stands out first is just how profitable the business is: 2025 net income was $4.95B on $13.0B of revenue, a 38.1% net margin, with operating cash flow of $5.91B and free cash flow of $4.10B after only $1.81B of capex. Those are elite figures for any infrastructure-like asset. The quarterly run-rate also remains solid: the last four quarters sum to about $13.22B of revenue and roughly $5.01B of net income, so earnings have at least held around the 2025 peak. Revenue growth has been real, rising from $10.03B in 2021 to $13.00B in 2025, while net income climbed from $3.11B to $4.95B. On a 12.3x P/E and 7.2% yield, that is clearly not expensive.
But the numbers also argue this is a yield vehicle, not a compounding machine, and that matters for valuation. The quarterly revenue line is not showing a clean acceleration; it is oscillating around the low-$3B range, with 2026 Q2 revenue at $3.31B versus the 2025 Q3 high of $3.62B. Net margin has also stepped down from 43.0% in 2025 Q3 and 37.0% in 2025 Q4 to 30.3% in 2026 Q1 and 32.8% in 2026 Q2. That is still excellent, but it weakens the “growth for free” argument. If the current earnings base is about $5.0B and the market cap is $60.8B, the equity is basically priced as a stable high-distribution business with modest growth, which is exactly what the financials resemble. I do not see evidence here that the market is massively underestimating a growth runway; I see evidence that it is correctly assigning a mature multiple to a mature cash generator.
The biggest contradiction in the supplied views is the “deteriorating cash generation” framing. Based on the actual annual data, that looks overstated. Revenue, operating income, and net income all improved materially from 2021 through 2025, and 2026 quarterly earnings remain healthy. The balance sheet data as presented are almost suspiciously strong for a midstream name: $2.14B of cash against only $1.50B of debt would imply net cash, which if accurate materially reduces financial risk and supports the distribution. Even if that debt figure is incomplete or excludes longer-dated obligations, the cash-flow profile still looks robust enough that a distribution cut is not something the current numbers hint at. So I reject the strongly bearish cash-generation narrative. Where I part company with the bullish valuation synthesis is different: a great business does not automatically mean a 40% undervaluation. A 7%-plus yielding, low-growth, high-payout midstream entity should not command a premium multiple unless there is clearer evidence of durable volume growth, accretive projects, or sustained distribution growth beyond inflation-like levels.
The best case against my more restrained view is simple: if you annualize the first half of 2026, revenue is running ahead of the prior year’s comparable period and net income remains on pace for another $4.8B-$5.1B year, all while investors collect over 7%. If the debt number is directionally right, leverage risk is far lower than the market usually assumes for MLPs, and that could justify a materially lower required yield. In that world, even a move from 12.3x earnings to 14x on a $5B earnings base would support a stock price in the high $60s to low $70s before considering distribution growth. A bull would also argue that the decline in margin from the 2025 spike is just normalization from unusually strong quarters, not structural erosion, and that fee-based midstream cash flows deserve to trade more like infrastructure than like cyclical energy.
What would change my mind is either a clean confirmation of durable growth or evidence that the current strength is flatter than it looks. If the next two quarters show revenue consistently above $3.3B and net income back toward $1.1B-$1.2B per quarter while free cash flow remains above $4B annualized, I would be more willing to underwrite fair value above $70 because that would show the margin dip was temporary and the payout is backed by surplus cash. On the other hand, if quarterly net income settles closer to $900M with margins near 30% and capex rises enough to push free cash flow materially below $4B, then today’s price is already full enough for a no-growth income asset.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-margin cash machine that the market is still treating like a melting ice cube. Annual revenue climbed from $10.03B in 2021 to $13.00B in 2025, with net income compounding from $3.11B to $4.95B—an earnings CAGR near 12% against a still-solid 7.3% revenue CAGR. Operating margin sits at 45.7% and net margin at 38.1%, figures that would be enviable in software and are exceptional in midstream. Latest annual operating cash flow of $5.91B funded only $1.81B of capex and left $4.10B of free cash flow, which more than covers a 7.2% distribution yield on a ~$61B equity base. At $59.73 the stock trades 12.3× earnings and 4.7× sales; the valuation synthesis’s ~$84 fair-value anchor is aggressive, but even a more conservative mid-seventies target still implies material upside. The balance-sheet print—$1.50B total debt against $2.14B cash—is almost suspiciously clean for a large MLP; if the figure is real it removes the usual leverage overhang that keeps midstream multiples compressed.
What stands out as the internal contradiction is the −4.1% FCF CAGR sitting beside double-digit earnings growth and “strong cash-flow quality.” Quarterly progression also shows deceleration and margin whipsaw: revenue peaked at $3.62B in Q3 2025 with a 43% net margin, then slipped to $3.04–3.31B and margins in the low-to-mid 30s. That pattern is consistent with a mature toll-road whose incremental volumes are no longer expanding as easily and whose maintenance or growth spend is starting to bite free cash more than GAAP earnings reveal. The market-forces layer’s “deteriorating cash generation / distribution-cut risk” call is therefore not baseless, even if the absolute FCF level remains robust today. Energy-transition discounting is doing real work in the multiple: a 12× PE and 7%+ yield on an asset that still throws off mid-teens ROA is the market saying terminal value is impaired, not that near-term cash flows are broken.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward. A smart bear cites the negative FCF trajectory, the decelerating quarterly revenue tag, and the structural reality that long-haul crude and product pipelines face multi-decade volume risk even if natural-gas and NGL infrastructure remains useful longer. They note that the composite fair-value engine’s 42% upside assumes growth the market has rationally refused to pay for, and that “trading below no-growth floor” is only comforting if the floor itself is not slowly sinking. Insider activity is pure awards—no open-market accumulation—so management is not voting with cash. Macro and sector headwinds are flagged explicitly. I weigh this less heavily because $4.1B of current FCF still covers the distribution with room, fee-based contracts historically smooth midstream cash flows through commodity cycles, and the energy-transition timeline for existing U.S. midstream remains measured in decades rather than years; a 7%+ yield while you wait is compensation, not a value trap, unless coverage visibly cracks.
I would flip to fairly valued or overvalued on a sustained drop in quarterly FCF below roughly $0.8B, a distribution cut or coverage ratio deterioration, or clear evidence of accelerated contract roll-off and volume loss. A re-rating toward the mid-seventies or higher on two consecutive quarters of re-accelerating revenue and stable-to-rising FCF would confirm the undervaluation case and raise conviction.