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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for M&T Bank Corporation (MTB) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-04): Designation Watch · Gem Score -9 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 16 · Value -25 · Sentiment -3 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $254.65 vs $240.41 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
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M&T Bank Corporation
MTB NYSEM&T Bank Corporation is a U.S. bank holding company headquartered in Buffalo, New York. It provides a broad range of retail and commercial banking services, along with trust, wealth management, and investment services through its principal banking subsidiaries. The company serves consumers, small businesses, middle-market companies, and institutional clients with products such as deposit accounts, lending solutions, treasury management, payments, mortgages, fiduciary services, and corporate trust capabilities. Its business is organized around Commercial Bank, Retail Bank, and Institutional Services and Wealth Management, reflecting a diversified regional banking model with a strong presence across the eastern United States. M&T Bank Corporation plays an important role in local and regional financial markets by supporting everyday banking needs and more specialized services for businesses and institutions.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 17.00
Total Equity: $29.18B
Shares: 167,705,882
Total Debt: $13.06B
Cash: $18.77B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $13.06B
Cash: $18.77B
Revenue: $9.63B
Revenue: $9.63B
Revenue: $9.63B
Total Equity: $29.18B
Tax Rate: 22.8%
Equity: $29.18B
Total Debt: $13.06B
Cash: $18.77B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $10.91B
Total Debt: $13.06B
Total Equity: $29.18B
Shares: 167,705,882
Shares: 167,705,882
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 167,705,882
Stock Price: $240.41
Net Income: $2.85B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 3:43am (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.0B | $8.0B | $9.4B | $9.2B | $9.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $2.2B | $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $3.5B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.7B | $2.6B | $2.9B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $13.81 | $11.59 | $15.85 | $14.71 | $17.10 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $13.80 | $11.53 | $15.79 | $14.64 | $17.00 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 1:30am (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $18.8B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $155.1B | $200.7B | $208.3B | $208.1B | $213.5B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.5B | $4.0B | $8.2B | $12.6B | $10.9B |
| Total Liabilities | $137.2B | $175.4B | $181.3B | $179.1B | $184.3B |
| Total Equity | $17.9B | $25.3B | $27.0B | $29.0B | $29.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $14.6B | $15.8B | $17.5B | $19.1B | $20.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 3:43am (9d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.7B | $4.6B | $3.9B | $3.6B | $3.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$149.0M | -$214.0M | -$256.0M | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.6B | $4.4B | $3.6B | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | $394.0M | $0 | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$843.6M | $91.3M | $4.2B | $4.5B | -$1.8B |
| Dividends Paid | -$580.3M | -$784.1M | -$868.0M | -$895.0M | -$899.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | -$1.8B | -$594.0M | -$396.0M | -$2.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | — | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 3:43am (9d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +34.4% | +17.3% | -1.8% | +4.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +7.2% | +37.6% | -5.6% | +10.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 1:30am (9d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $1.35 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $1.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $1.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $1.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $1.35 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-01 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-03 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-25 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-29 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $1.10 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-02 02:11A +1σ run of quarters pays +28%; a −1σ run costs 2%. Ratio 12.6:1 (μ 6.6%, σ 4.2% floored by sector, 8 pairs).
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($240.41) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +6% | 35.0% | $293.65 | +22% |
| Base — stabilizes | +4% | 31.3% | $248.43 | +3% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 26.6% | $200.83 | -16% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +5% | 31.3% | $258.65 | +8% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +11% | 31.3% | $308.91 | +28% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | +2% | 31.3% | $234.96 | -2% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-26 05:00The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a coherent but unspectacular story that the models are collectively over-processing. Revenue is essentially flat: $442M in Q2 2026 vs $394M in Q3 2024 is only ~12% cumulative over seven quarters, and the "revenue CAGR of 1.2%" masks that annual revenue moved from $9.23B (2024) to $9.63B (2025) — a 4.3% print, decent for a regional bank in a rate-normalization environment. Net income is where the real work is happening: $2.85B in 2025 vs $2.59B in 2024 (+10%), and the trailing four quarters annualize to roughly $3.03B, implying forward P/E closer to 11.5x on $34.8B market cap, not the stated 14.1x. That's cheap-ish, not cheap. ROE at 9.77% is mediocre for a bank asking for a premium multiple — JPM does 17%, USB and PNC do 11-13%.
The margin figures (185% net margin) are a data artifact — that "revenue" line is clearly net interest income after provisions or some FMP quirk, not total revenue including fee income, which would be ~$2.4B/quarter. Every downstream model that took ps_ratio 4.19 or "net_margin 29.6%" at face value is working from mislabeled inputs. This matters: the synthesis verdict of $241.96 fair value vs $240.41 spot is suspiciously precise (0.6% gap) for a valuation built on partially garbled line items. I'd treat that convergence as false precision, not signal. The Market Forces model's "value trap with deteriorating cash generation" claim is the more interesting contrarian read — operating CF at $3.0B against $2.85B NI is fine coverage, but there's no capex or FCF disclosed to verify the -9.3% FCF CAGR, which for a bank is a nearly meaningless metric anyway (banks don't have capex in the industrial sense).
The contrarian case worth taking seriously isn't the Market Forces "value trap" framing — it's the CRE exposure and NIM compression risk that the narrative model correctly identifies but underweights. M&T has meaningful Mid-Atlantic and Northeast commercial real estate exposure, and the 10.2% earnings YoY is flattered by provision releases and reserve normalization rather than organic loan growth. If Fed cuts continue into 2026, NIM compresses another 15-25bps and provision expense normalizes to through-cycle levels, that $3B NI run-rate could easily revert to $2.5B, pushing P/E back to 14x on lower earnings — meaning the stock is fairly valued for a good scenario and 15-20% overvalued for a bad one. Insider activity is unambiguously bearish direction (six sales, one small award, zero open-market buys), though the sizes are trivial and this is normal comp-driven behavior for a mature bank. Don't over-read it, but don't ignore it either.
Where I land: I partially agree with the synthesis but dissent on the confidence. This isn't "slight upside to $241.96" — the composite fair value has too much precision for inputs this noisy. My read is fairly valued in a range of $220-$255 depending on how you handicap 2026 credit and NIM. At $240 you're paying ~11.5x forward earnings for a 10% ROE bank with 2.5% dividend and a durable but unexciting franchise — that's neither a bargain nor a trap, it's a hold-your-nose-and-clip-coupons name. The Buffett-adjacent narrative is accurate but doesn't create upside; it just prevents the discount you'd need to make this interesting. I'd want $210 or lower for a starter, or wait for CRE stress to actually surface and create a real dislocation. The synthesis is directionally right that there's no obvious mispricing; it's wrong to frame that as "upside." Fair value is fair value.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the quarterly “revenue” series is clearly not economic revenue in the same sense as the annual figures. You cannot reconcile $418M-$442M quarterly revenue with $9.63B annual revenue, and you certainly cannot accept 159%-187% quarterly net margins at face value for a bank. So I discount those quarterly revenue and margin figures heavily and instead anchor on the annual data and the balance sheet. On that basis, M&T looks like exactly what it is supposed to be: a profitable, conservatively levered regional bank earning $2.85B on $29.18B of equity, or about 9.8% ROE, with $18.77B of cash against $13.06B of debt and a modest 31.5% payout ratio. Revenue has risen from $5.96B in 2021 to $9.63B in 2025, but that flatters the story because 2023 revenue of $9.40B still sits close to 2025; the business is no longer in a strong expansion phase. This is a mature earnings franchise, but one whose current valuation already assumes durability rather than growth.
At $240.41, the stock trades at 14.1x earnings and 1.38x book. For a bank earning sub-10% ROE, that is not cheap. A rough framing is that banks deserving premiums to book usually either earn materially above their cost of equity, have obvious runway to improve returns, or possess unusually clean balance-sheet optionality. The data here only partially support that. ROA of 1.34% is solid, and net margin near 29.6% is healthy, but the growth profile is sleepy: annual revenue growth from 2024 to 2025 was just 4.3%, earnings growth 10.0%, and the multi-year CAGRs cited are low single digit. Paying 1.38x book for a bank compounding book value at a high-single-digit to low-double-digit rate is basically paying up for “quality” without getting much asymmetry. I can get to fair value around current price if I assume M&T sustains roughly $2.8B-$3.0B of earnings and keeps credit clean, but I struggle to justify meaningful upside absent an ROE step-up toward 11%-12%.
The contradiction I see is that some of the model output treats the shares as nearly exactly fair while also invoking “value trap,” “earnings quality issues,” and “deteriorating cash generation.” The value-trap language feels overstated from the actual numbers provided. Operating cash flow of $3.00B against $2.85B of net income does not scream low-quality earnings; for a bank, generic FCF metrics are often noisy or unhelpful anyway. The more real issue is not earnings quality but valuation discipline. This is not a broken bank, and it is not obviously mispriced. It is a competent franchise with decent profitability, modest growth, and a valuation that leaves little room for disappointment if rates normalize unfavorably or if credit costs rise. The recent insider activity is mostly small sales and award-related transactions, which I read as noise rather than a signal.
The best counterargument is straightforward: M&T’s premium is deserved because the bank has shown resilience through cycles, annual net income has climbed from $1.86B in 2021 to $2.85B in 2025, and recent earnings momentum is actually better than the long-term CAGR suggests. If the latest quarterly net income figures of $759M, $664M, and $818M are directionally right, then annualized earnings power may now be closer to $3.0B-$3.2B than the trailing $2.85B, which would bring the effective P/E down into the 11x-12x range. In that case, 1.38x book would not look demanding for a conservative, high-quality regional bank with a sticky deposit base and a still-low payout ratio that supports future capital return. That is a legitimate bull case, and it is why I am not outright bearish at this level.
What would change my mind is specific evidence that returns are structurally moving higher without balance-sheet stress. If M&T can sustain quarterly earnings above $800M while lifting ROE from 9.8% to 11%+ and still keep book value growing, then today’s price would look more attractive and I’d be willing to underwrite upside beyond $260. Conversely, if revenue remains stuck around the current annual run rate while provisions or funding costs push earnings back toward $2.5B-$2.6B, the stock should not hold 1.38x book and would look more like a $210-$225 name. Given the data in hand, my read is simple: good bank, fine price, limited edge.
Grok Reading
The annual numbers, not the quarterly feed, are what matter here. M&T’s reported quarterly “revenue” of roughly $400–442M against net income of $584–818M produces nonsensical 150–185% margins and is clearly a truncated or mis-tagged line (likely a single fee or NII fragment). The real franchise is a ~$9.6B revenue bank that earned $2.85B in 2025, up from $2.59B in 2024 and $2.74B in 2023, on a balance sheet with $18.8B cash, only $13.1B of debt, and $29.2B of equity. Operating cash flow of $3.0B fully covers the earnings print. That is a mature, capital-generative regional bank, not a growth story: revenue CAGR is 1.2%, earnings CAGR 2%, and the trailing ROE sits at 9.8% with ROA of 1.34%. At $240.41 the stock clears 14.1× earnings, 1.38× book and a 2.5% dividend on a conservative 31.5% payout. For a sub-10% ROE lender those multiples already embed a quality premium; they do not embed much growth.
What stands out is the tension between recent momentum and the longer trajectory. Trailing twelve-month earnings are up ~10% year-on-year and 2025 net income reclaimed the 2023 peak, yet the multi-year top line has been essentially flat since the rate-hike spike ($9.40B in 2023 → $9.23B → $9.63B). Secondary signals flag decelerating quarterly revenue and macro headwinds; the FCF CAGR of –9.3% sits awkwardly beside a “strong cash-flow quality” tag and a clean $3B operating-cash number, suggesting definitional noise rather than outright cash deterioration. Insider activity is small-scale selling and routine award/withholding noise—neutral, not a tell. The valuation synthesis that pins fair value at $240–242 is directionally right: the stock is priced as a stable cash machine, and the narrative layer correctly notes that almost none of the price is story premium.
The strongest case against a “fairly valued / hold” read is that 14× earnings and 1.38× book are too rich for a 10% ROE regional facing NIM compression and CRE seasoning. A skeptic would cite the 1.2% revenue CAGR, the Market Forces “value-trap” flag, decelerating top-line confidence, and the reality that peer regionals with similar Rust-Belt/Mid-Atlantic footprints rarely sustain mid-teens multiples once the Fed is cutting. If forward ROE drifts to 8–9% under lower rates, the stock belongs closer to 1.0–1.1× book—implying $175–200 and 15–25% downside. I weigh that risk but do not let it dominate: deposit franchise quality, a low 0.45 debt-to-equity ratio, a payout ratio that leaves ample capital, and the 2025 earnings recovery argue the market is already discounting moderate compression. The composite models that see only +0.6% upside are therefore closer to truth than a deep-value or deep-value-trap call.
I would flip to a clear undervalued stance if the next two quarters show net interest margin holding within 10–15 bp of current levels while loan growth re-accelerates above 4% and ROE prints sustainably above 11%, or if the stock were to trade down through $210 (roughly 12× and 1.15× book) without a credit event. I would flip bearish on a 2026 full-year NI print below ~$2.5B, a tangible common equity ratio breach that forces the payout higher, or CRE charge-offs that push the efficiency and credit metrics outside the historical band that has justified the quiet-quality multiple.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
M&T is a mature regional bank running steady operations: revenue grew from $5.96B in 2021 to $9.63B in 2025, net income from $1.86B to $2.85B, and FCF averaging $3-4B annually with OCF/NI of 1.53x — indicative of high-quality, cash-backed earnings. Accruals at -0.6% of assets are clean, and the reported $18.77B liquid cash position gives a very comfortable operating buffer. Revenue and earnings have essentially plateaued over the last three years ($9.40B, $9.23B, $9.63B; NI $2.74B, $2.59B, $2.85B), consistent with a mature earner rather than a compounder.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- CET1 ratio, Tier 1 capital, and regulatory capital trend versus peers
- Net interest margin trajectory and deposit beta through the recent rate cycle
- Loan book composition and CRE (especially office) exposure and reserves
- Non-performing loan trend, charge-offs, and allowance coverage
- Buyback authorization/pace vs. SBC to confirm the 2025 share count decline is sustained
- Uninsured deposit mix and deposit concentration post-2023 regional-bank stress
The composite fair value of $239.56 and signal-adjusted $241.96 sit essentially on top of the $240.41 price — a 1% gap that is noise, not opportunity. The single anchored-PE method drives the entire read, and it corroborates rather than contradicts the tape: the market has correctly appraised M&T as a competent, mature regional bank with flat revenue and net income over three years, priced at a modest premium to book that its underwriting record earns but its per-share stagnation caps. There is no dislocation here in either direction. Earnings quality is good, so no haircut is warranted, but the ~5.6% annual diluted share growth since 2021 means the aggregate franchise value has to be divided across a widening base — already reflected in the flat per-share economics the market is paying for. To call this cheap you would need to assume a re-rating catalyst (rate normalization tailwind, buyback resumption, or an M&A pause) that is not visible in the numbers. To call it rich you would need CRE stress or deposit flight to actually show up in the credit book, which so far it has not. Neither is priced in aggressively.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Net interest margin trajectory and deposit beta in the next quarterly release
- CRE and office-loan reserve build vs charge-off run rate
- Whether buybacks resume or share count keeps drifting up from M&A
- Guidance on fee income and expense trajectory into 2025
MTB is a quiet-quality regional bank with essentially no active narrative pushing it in either direction. The bull and bear stories exist but neither is intense or dominant, so the tape is driven mostly by macro cross-currents and sector positioning rather than stock-specific pressure. With beta of 0.57, even the mildly risk-on regime barely moves the needle here. The 10y at 4.7% and a normalizing curve (0.46) are a modest ambient headwind for regional bank NIMs and CRE anxiety, but nothing has crystallized into an active de-rating story. Momentum is quietly positive with low revenue volatility, which matches the boring-compounder archetype and gives the name a small drift-tailwind rather than any real thrust. Net pressure is close to neutral: no mania to fade, no panic to lean into, just a low-beta name being priced by DCF math while the market debates rates and CRE in the background.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any fresh CRE loss-content headlines across regional banks that could pull MTB into a sector selloff
- Direction of 10y yields and curve shape - a steepening bull-flattener would flip sentiment on regionals
- Analyst target revisions and consensus dispersion around next earnings
- Deposit beta commentary in the next print - the pivot that could wake up the bear narrative
Rates are the whole story for this business model. With the 10y at 4.7 and a modestly positive curve, spread income is supported but no longer expanding fast; the earnings tailwind now comes from credit and cost discipline rather than repricing. The regional banking category is consolidating, and scale players plus faster-growing Sunbelt franchises are capturing the loan growth. M&T's conservatism is a survival asset and a growth liability at the same time — it means fewer credit surprises and less participation in the expansion. Nothing here suggests structural obsolescence; deposits, treasury management and corporate trust remain durable, defensible franchises. The realistic shape is a low-growth, high-durability earnings stream that lags its own category.
When we made this prediction on Aug 26, 2026, MTB was $241.59. We expect it to be $242.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $205.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 26, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.