For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. (MUFG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 16 · Value 5 · Sentiment 14 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $43.87 vs $22.79 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc.
MUFG NYSEMitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. Sponsored ADR represents an interest in Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc., a Japanese bank holding and financial services company headquartered in Tokyo. The group provides a broad spectrum of financial services, including commercial and retail banking, corporate and investment banking, trust banking, securities brokerage, asset management, leasing, and consumer finance. It serves individuals, small and medium-sized enterprises, large corporations, financial institutions, and public-sector entities. The company operates through diversified business segments such as retail and commercial banking, corporate banking, global banking, trust assets, and credit card and consumer finance operations. Its offerings span deposits, lending, payment and settlement services, foreign exchange, trade finance, project and structured finance, as well as investment products like mutual funds and structured notes. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. Sponsored ADR allows international investors to gain exposure to one of Japan’s largest and most globally connected financial groups, which plays a central role in capital intermediation, cross-border financing, and investment services across Asia, the Americas, and Europe.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.35
Total Equity: $130.58B
Shares: 11,430,860,883
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $566.31B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $566.31B
Revenue: $75.19B
Revenue: $75.19B
Revenue: $75.19B
Total Equity: $130.58B
Tax Rate: 18.8%
Equity: $130.58B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $566.31B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $130.58B
Shares: 11,430,860,883
Shares: 11,430,860,883
CapEx: -$1.90B
Shares: 11,430,860,883
Stock Price: $22.79
Net Income: $10.96B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 1:24am (15d ago)| Metric | 2024 | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $63.2B | $68.7B | $68.7B | $68.7B | $75.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $18.6B | $20.6B | $20.6B | $20.6B | $23.0B |
| Operating Income | $11.7B | $9.9B | $9.9B | $9.9B | $15.0B |
| Net Income | $8.4B | $8.0B | $8.0B | $8.0B | $11.0B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $1.05 | $1.01 | $1.01 | $1.05 | $1.35 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.05 | $1.01 | $1.01 | $1.04 | $1.35 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:12am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $696.2B | $714.6B | $689.4B | $684.9B | $566.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $2.3T | $2.4T | $2.5T | $2.5T | $2.7T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $2.2T | $2.3T | $2.4T | $2.4T | $2.5T |
| Total Equity | $102.1B | $103.2B | $115.8B | $120.6B | $130.6B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:13am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $5.7B | $13.2B | -$9.3B | $6.4B | -$21.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$645.2M | -$729.2M | -$712.5M | -$825.4M | -$1.9B |
| Free Cash Flow | $5.1B | $12.5B | -$10.1B | $5.6B | -$23.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$5.1B | $21.1B | -$4.9B | -$119.6B | -$1.6B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$993.3M | -$2.8B | -$2.5B | -$2.6B | -$3.1B |
| Net Change in Cash | $48.8B | $18.4B | -$25.2B | -$5.1B | -$118.6B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 8, 2026 1:24am (15d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +8.6% | +0.0% | +0.0% | +9.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -15.0% | +0.0% | +0.0% | +51.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -4.6% | +0.0% | +0.0% | +36.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 13, 2026 12:13am (10d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-03-31 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-30 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2020-03-30 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2007-09-26 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2006-09-27 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2006-03-28 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2005-09-27 | $0.02 | — | — | — |
| 2005-03-28 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2004-03-26 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2003-03-26 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2002-09-25 | $0.05 | — | — | — |
| 2002-03-26 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-13MUFG's cost base is dominated by personnel and premises across retail branches, trust operations and back-office reconciliation in a country with an absolute labor shortage; AI substitutes for workers MUFG structurally cannot hire, so automation lands as permanent overhead-ratio reduction rather than a politically fraught layoff fight.
AI compresses exactly the fee businesses where MUFG's edge is thinnest — retail brokerage, wealth advisory, and standardized SME underwriting — while agentic wallets and platform players (PayPay, Rakuten, SBI-type ecosystems) can sit between the customer and the bank rails, turning MUFG into a low-margin balance-sheet utility for its consumer book.
Whether AI-driven efficiency shows up as a durably lower expense-to-revenue ratio rather than being spent on IT modernization and compliance; the observable is the group overhead ratio and headcount-per-revenue trend across several years alongside flat-to-down premises costs.
A banking license with deposit-insurance backing, ~decades-deep corporate keiretsu lending relationships, yen clearing and settlement position, and a low-cost sticky retail deposit base — none of which cheap software creates.
AI Lens thesis
Banking's underlying need (safekeeping, credit, payments, risk transfer) is essentially AI-proof, and the monetized unit — spread on deposits and fees for bearing risk — survives cheap intelligence intact; so AI reaches MUFG mainly through the cost side, where a legacy Japanese megabank carries unusual amounts of automatable clerical, branch and compliance labor, and through the retail interface, where AI assistants and platform wallets can disintermediate the customer relationship without touching the balance sheet. Because Japan's megabank structure is a three-player oligopoly with almost no deposit-switching culture, cost savings are more likely to stick as margin than be competed away, which is the opposite of the US regional-bank case. The dominant swing factor in the earnings line over five years is still BOJ rate normalization, not AI — which is precisely why AI is best read as a quiet, cumulative expansion of through-cycle ROE rather than as a thesis of its own.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Japan's labor scarcity means AI-driven automation avoids the severance and union costs that cap efficiency gains elsewhere; branch consolidation plus agentic back-office processing could compound into a multi-hundred-basis-point overhead improvement that the market treats as unattainable for a legacy Japanese bank.
Downside Cheap AI makes fraud, deepfake-authorized transfers and synthetic-identity credit applications dramatically cheaper to run at scale against a retail bank with millions of elderly customers accustomed to phone and branch authorization — a loss and remediation-cost channel that grows with intelligence, not one that shrinks.
Outcome range spread 37
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw numbers on their own terms: MUFG earned $10.96B on $75.19B revenue in FY2026 (ending March), a 14.6% net margin, with 8.4% ROE and 3.78% dividend yield. Revenue grew 9.5% YoY and earnings 36.5% YoY off the FY2024 base of $63.2B/$8.42B — genuine, not statistical. At $22.79 and $249B market cap, we're at 16.9x trailing earnings and 1.99x book on $130.58B equity. For a Japanese megabank finally seeing BOJ rate normalization after two decades of ZIRP/NIRP, that's not obviously cheap and not obviously dear — it's a fair multiple on earnings that may or may not be sustainable at this run-rate. The negative operating cash flow (-$21B) is a nothing-burger for a bank (loan book growth, trading assets, deposit flows dominate — GAAP OCF is not meaningful for banks), and the synthesis model's DCF-based $43.87 fair value is essentially uninterpretable for a levered financial institution where free cash flow is not the right framework. I'd throw that number out entirely.
The synthesis verdict claiming +95.9% upside is the weakest link in the chain and I dissent from it hard. You cannot DCF a bank on operating cash flow — you need dividend discount, residual income, or P/B-vs-ROE frameworks. On the right framework: 8.4% ROE at 2.0x P/B implies the market demands ~4.2% earnings yield on book, roughly consistent with a 10% cost of equity discounting no book value growth — that's fair, not a 50% discount. Justified P/B for an 8-9% ROE bank with a 5% cost of equity (Japanese risk-free is still ~1.5%) is roughly 1.5-2.0x. MUFG sits at 1.99x. The "50% undervalued" narrative is a modeling artifact. Market Forces is directionally more honest calling out potential earnings-quality issues — the 36.5% earnings YoY partly reflects one-time gains on equity cross-holdings and yen translation effects that won't repeat linearly.
The contrarian case cuts both ways. Bull contrarian: if BOJ policy rate reaches 1.0-1.5% (from 0.5%), MUFG's NIM expansion on ~$2T of yen deposits is enormous operating leverage — every 25bp of sustained NIM is billions in pretax. The stock has already re-rated from ~$7 pre-normalization to $22.79 (a triple), and the market may still be under-pricing sustained rate policy. Bear contrarian: Japanese banks have head-faked on rate normalization multiple times (2006-07 was the last), demographic loan demand is structurally weak, and the 2.0x P/B is already at the top of the historical range — the easy money in the re-rating trade has been made. Insider activity is uninformative (conversions and routine returns, nothing directional). The "insufficient quarterly data" flag is real — we're looking at what appears to be four identical quarterly snapshots of the FY2025 annual, not actual quarterly progression, so trajectory confidence should be lower than the models suggest.
My read: fairly valued to modestly undervalued, but nowhere near the synthesis's $44 fair value. A defensible fair value range is $24-28 based on 2.1-2.4x P/B if you believe ROE sustains at 9-10% through the rate cycle, giving 5-20% upside plus the 3.8% dividend — a reasonable total-return holding, not a screaming buy. The synthesis model's methodology is broken for banks and I'd formally dissent; the Market Forces "value trap" framing is too harsh given real NIM tailwinds; the Narrative layer's observation that the discount is "structural, not story-driven" is the most honest read in the file. The pre-flight "mature earner" classification is correct and the 16.9x P/E is doing exactly what it should for a mid-single-digit growth bank with a 3.8% yield. This is a "clip the coupon plus modest capital appreciation" holding, not a mispricing to exploit. If you own it for the dividend and BOJ optionality, fine; if you're buying on a claimed 96% upside, you've been mis-sold by a DCF that shouldn't have been run.
GPT Reading
The raw numbers say MUFG is a decent bank, not a screaming bargain. Revenue rose from $63.20B to $68.66B and then to $75.19B in the latest year, while net income moved from $8.42B to $8.03B to $10.96B. That last step matters: earnings growth of roughly 36% on 9.5% revenue growth implies better spreads, better mix, or nonrecurring gains rather than a clean volume-led compounding story. Operating income improved sharply to $14.99B from $9.92B, lifting operating margin to about 20%, and the dividend yield near 3.8% is respectable. But against a $249B market cap, this is still only an 8.4% ROE business on $130.58B of equity. Paying about 2.0x book for a bank earning sub-9% on equity is the core issue here; that multiple only makes sense if returns are about to step materially higher and stay there.
That is why I do not buy the near-doubling fair value output. On the provided figures, MUFG trades at 16.9x earnings, 3.46x sales, and almost 2x book. For a diversified bank in a structurally low-growth home market, those are not distressed multiples. The cash flow statement is also a warning against simplistic screen-based cheapness: operating cash flow was -$21.09B and free cash flow -$22.99B. Yes, bank cash flow statements are often poor valuation tools because balance-sheet movements swamp economics, but that is precisely why a DCF-like framework can hallucinate upside if it treats bank line items mechanically. The negative EV/revenue anomaly further tells you parts of the data plumbing are not robust enough to support heroic precision. When the accounting lens is noisy, I fall back to book value and returns on equity, and those point to a business priced for meaningful improvement already.
The real story is that MUFG is being valued as a high-quality policy-normalization beneficiary, not as a neglected value stock. If BOJ normalization and a steeper rate environment sustainably lift net interest income, then 2026 may be the first year of a better earnings regime rather than a peak. But the current price already embeds that possibility. At $22.79 and $249.44B market cap, investors are not paying a crisis multiple for a misunderstood balance sheet; they are paying up for one of the cleaner ways to express higher Japanese rates plus a stable dividend. That can work, but it is different from saying the stock is worth $44 today. To justify 2x book cleanly, I would want to see ROE move convincingly into the low teens, not 8.4%.
The best argument against my view is straightforward: earnings are inflecting harder than the static valuation ratios suggest. Net income of $10.96B versus $8.03B a year earlier is a big jump, revenue hit a new high at $75.19B, and if that earnings base is durable then the effective forward P/E may be much lower than 16.9x. A bull would also argue that Japanese banks have operated under an abnormal rate regime for years, so backward-looking ROE understates normalized profitability. On that framing, 2x book may reflect hidden earning power finally surfacing, and the 3.8% dividend pays you while you wait. I take that seriously, but I weigh it less heavily because I do not yet have evidence here that the earnings step-up is both recurring and sufficient to re-rate a megabank toward premium-bank returns for multiple years.
What would change my mind is not another theoretical valuation synthesis but proof in the next few reporting periods that the higher earnings base is sticky. If MUFG can hold or grow revenue above $75B, keep net income running above roughly $11B, and push ROE from 8.4% toward 10.5%-12% without relying on one-offs, then 2x book becomes easier to defend and I would move more constructive even above $22.79. Conversely, if earnings slip back toward the prior $8B-$8.5B range or margins retreat from the recent 20% level, the stock looks plainly rich for a mature bank and a retreat toward the mid-to-high teens would be more appropriate.
Grok Reading
The numbers do not support a deep-value story. MUFG just printed $75.19B in revenue and $10.96B in net income for the year ended March 2026, up sharply from the $63–69B revenue and ~$8B net income run-rate of the prior periods, with a recent earnings jump of roughly 36% year-on-year and a 16.8% earnings CAGR against only 4.7% revenue CAGR. That mix already flags earnings leverage and possibly one-off items rather than a durable top-line franchise expansion. At $22.79 and a $249B market cap the stock clears a 16.9x P/E, almost 2.0x book on $130.6B of equity, and a 3.5x sales multiple while delivering an 8.4% ROE and a wafer-thin 0.41% ROA. For a diversified megabank, paying two times book for high-single-digit ROE is the opposite of cheap: residual-income math with a mid-to-high single-digit cost of equity would justify something closer to 0.8–1.1x book, not 2x. Operating cash flow of –$21.1B and free cash flow of –$23.0B in the same year that net income hit a record further undercut the quality of the print; bank cash-flow statements are noisy, but a double-digit-billion cash burn alongside “record” profits is not a clean signal. The negative EV/revenue print is an accounting artifact of the enormous $566B cash pile, not evidence of mispricing.
I therefore discount the valuation synthesis that pins fair value near $44 (implying nearly 100% upside). That output collides with the ROE/P/B relationship, the mediocre ROA, and the cash-flow gap, and it appears to treat normalized NIM expansion and hidden asset value as already earned rather than contingent. The market-forces layer calling this a value trap with earnings-quality risk is the more coherent read of the same tape: profits are up, but the franchise is still a low-return Japanese balance-sheet utility facing demographic drag, an oversupplied domestic loan market, and only gradual BOJ normalization. A 3.8% dividend yield is real income, not a catalyst for multiple expansion.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward. Bulls will cite the earnings inflection, the 19.9% operating margin and 14.6% net margin, the fortress deposit base, and the still-unwound cross-shareholding and real-estate latent gains that Japanese bank investors have arbitraged for decades. They will argue that 16.9x earnings and ~2x book are reasonable if ROE can grind toward 10–12% as net interest margins reprice and that the stock remains a macro call on sustained positive Japanese rates and a stable yen. That case is coherent if—and only if—the recent $11B net-income run-rate is the new floor rather than a peak flattered by securities gains or credit releases. I weigh it lower because the current multiple already embeds a material ROE improvement that has not yet shown up in returns on equity or assets, and because negative operating cash flow gives no confirmation that accrual earnings are converting.
I would flip toward a clear undervalued stance if the next two semi-annual prints hold net income above ~$10B while ROE sustains above 10% and operating cash flow turns structurally positive, or if management monetizes cross-shareholdings fast enough to lift tangible book and capital return without shrinking the earning asset base. I would turn decisively more negative on a reversion of net income toward the $8B level, further FCF deterioration, or any BOJ pause that caps NIM expansion while the stock still sits near 2x book.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
MUFG is a mature megabank with revenue rising from 63.2B in 2024 to 75.19B in 2026 and net income improving from 8.42B to 10.96B, with operating margin expanding to 19.9%. Reported liquid cash of 566B is 227% of market cap, which is normal for a deposit-taking institution and does not indicate a fortress in the operating sense - it reflects customer deposits and reserves, not free capital. The forensic module flags need heavy translation for a bank. Altman Z of 0.11 is meaningless for a diversified bank (the model is calibrated for industrials); OCF/NI of 0.01x and FCF swings from +12.47B to -22.99B reflect loan book and trading book movements rather than earnings quality problems. The 250.6% diluted share CAGR is almost certainly a data artifact from an ADR ratio change or Japanese share-count reporting convention, not real dilution - insider tape shows only routine J/C code conversions at zero cost (typical executive compensation mechanics) and a large D-Return to issuer (414.4K sh, 88.4M) which is share retirement, the opposite of dilution. Insider behavior is neutral to mildly positive: no open-market P or S transactions, and the issuer took shares back. Profitability trajectory is genuinely improving. This is a durable, systemically important institution, but without segment detail, loan-book quality data, and capital ratios, I cannot upgrade further.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether the 75.6M to 11.68B share count jump is an ADR ratio change or reporting reclassification versus real dilution
- CET1 capital ratio, leverage ratio, and NPL ratio from the latest disclosure
- Nature of the 414.4K share D-Return to issuer transaction - buyback program or forfeiture
- Loan book composition and exposure to Japanese real estate and overseas (Morgan Stanley stake, US regional banks)
- Interest rate sensitivity given the BoJ policy normalization backdrop
- Whether the -22.99B FCF in 2026 reflects loan growth, securities purchases, or something more concerning
The e2e composite pegs fair value at $43.87 (signal-adjusted $44.65) versus a $22.76 price, implying ~96% upside. I don't believe that gap. The EPV floor of $60 and composite are being flattered by DCF/EPV templates that mis-handle bank capital structure and by an anchored-PE of $27.65 that itself only implies ~21% upside. Japanese megabanks structurally trade at 0.8-1.0x book with low-teens ROEs; a defensible deserved price is closer to the anchored-PE zone ($27-32), not $44+. Against that skeptical deserved value, $22.76 still screens as a modest discount - perhaps 15-30% below fair - not a deep-value dislocation. The earnings-quality haircut (-2, multiple red flags) argues for trimming deserved value further, though some of those flags are the same bank-template artifacts the quality lens flagged. Net: the price embeds continued NIM sluggishness and tepid loan growth, and if Japanese rate normalization sticks, that discount closes. It's cheap enough to own, not cheap enough to pound the table.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest NIM trajectory and sensitivity disclosures to BoJ rate moves
- Cross-shareholding mark-to-market and unrealized gains footnote
- Buyback pace and capital return guidance
- Loan growth by segment (domestic vs overseas/Morgan Stanley stake contribution)
- Any one-off gains inflating recent EPS
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 14.6, S&P near highs) but with a 4.7% 10y and stretched market PE creating a background rate headwind. With beta 0.32, almost none of that market chop lands on MUFG - it is largely insulated from both the risk-on lift and the rates drag. What matters more here is the narrative frame: post-bubble-cynicism at minimal intensity means there is no euphoric story to unwind and no active de-rating story either. The market is simply not paying attention, which for a Japanese megabank is closer to a slow tailwind than a headwind. Recent news flow is quietly constructive: Zacks tagging MUFG as a top foreign-bank pick and a momentum pick within 48 hours, plus a durable higher-for-longer rates thesis that plays into Japanese normalization. Offsetting that, the August 3 earnings drew a 3% negative reaction, so analyst tone is warmer than tape reaction on the print. Net: a low-beta name catching mild positive analyst attention in a calm tape, with no narrative fragility - a modest tailwind, not a decisive one.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether BoJ rate path commentary shifts - a hawkish surprise would materially amplify the normalization tailwind
- Analyst target revisions following the Aug 3 earnings - are estimates coming down or holding?
- Yen direction: sharp yen strength would hurt USD-denominated ADR sentiment even without fundamental change
- Whether foreign-bank rotation flows persist beyond the Zacks-style coverage
Banking's underlying need (safekeeping, credit, payments, risk transfer) is essentially AI-proof, and the monetized unit — spread on deposits and fees for bearing risk — survives cheap intelligence intact; so AI reaches MUFG mainly through the cost side, where a legacy Japanese megabank carries unusual amounts of automatable clerical, branch and compliance labor, and through the retail interface, where AI assistants and platform wallets can disintermediate the customer relationship without touching the balance sheet. Because Japan's megabank structure is a three-player oligopoly with almost no deposit-switching culture, cost savings are more likely to stick as margin than be competed away, which is the opposite of the US regional-bank case. The dominant swing factor in the earnings line over five years is still BOJ rate normalization, not AI — which is precisely why AI is best read as a quiet, cumulative expansion of through-cycle ROE rather than as a thesis of its own.
None surfaced.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Group overhead ratio trajectory
- Personnel and premises expense absolute yen
- IT expense as share of total costs
- Regulatory capital and buffer trend
- AML/compliance remediation charges
- Credit cost normalization vs guidance
- Deposit cost vs policy rate pass-through
- Deposit market share among megabanks
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 13, 2026, MUFG was $22.76. We expect it to be $25.20 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $20.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 13, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.