Business Description
McEwen Mining Inc. (MUX) is primarily engaged in the discovery, development, extraction, and sale of gold and silver deposits across the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina. The company also conducts exploration for copper reserves. Its portfolio includes full ownership of several key assets: the Gold Bar mine in Eureka County, Nevada; the Black Fox gold mine located in Ontario, Canada; the El Gallo Project and the Fenix silver-gold project, both situated in Sinaloa, Mexico; and the Los Azules copper deposit in San Juan, Argentina. McEwen Mining also possesses a broad array of exploration properties spanning Nevada, Canada, Mexico, and Argentina. Furthermore, the company holds a 49% stake in the San José mine, which is located in Argentina. Initially incorporated in 1979, the enterprise was formerly recognized as US Gold Corporation before adopting the name McEwen Mining Inc. in January 2012. Its corporate headquarters are located in Toronto, Canada.
Business History
Generated: Jun 16, 2026 3:06amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:58am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.64
Total Equity: $546.24M
Shares: 54,046,000
Total Debt: $127.09M
Cash: $51.02M
EBITDA: $45.03M
Total Debt: $127.09M
Cash: $51.02M
Revenue: $197.55M
Revenue: $197.55M
Revenue: $197.55M
Total Equity: $546.24M
Tax Rate: -395.5%
Equity: $546.24M
Total Debt: $127.09M
Cash: $51.02M
Current Liabilities: $63.81M
Long-Term Debt: $126.17M
Total Debt: $127.09M
Total Equity: $546.24M
Shares: 54,046,000
Shares: 54,046,000
CapEx: -$44.64M
Shares: 54,046,000
Stock Price: $18.00
Net Income: $34.43M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 8:21am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $136.5M | $110.4M | $166.2M | $174.5M | $197.6M |
| Cost of Revenue | $143.0M | $111.0M | $148.5M | $143.5M | $175.8M |
| Gross Profit | -$6.5M | $-544,000 | $17.8M | $30.9M | $21.7M |
| Operating Expenses | $57.8M | $94.9M | $179.8M | $81.5M | $34.7M |
| Operating Income | -$64.3M | -$95.4M | -$162.1M | -$50.6M | -$12.9M |
| Net Income | -$56.7M | -$81.1M | $55.3M | -$43.7M | $34.4M |
| EBITDA | -$32.7M | -$78.7M | -$73.9M | $18.2M | $45.0M |
| EPS | $-1.25 | $-1.71 | $1.16 | $-0.86 | $0.64 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 8:21am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $56.8M | $39.8M | $23.0M | $13.7M | $51.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $85.0M | $81.7M | $52.7M | $41.2M | $107.9M |
| Total Assets | $534.7M | $528.7M | $659.5M | $664.6M | $820.2M |
| Current Liabilities | $52.4M | $84.2M | $30.0M | $47.7M | $63.8M |
| Long-Term Debt | $47.7M | $54.0M | $39.7M | $40.0M | $126.2M |
| Total Liabilities | $144.7M | $172.4M | $157.1M | $169.6M | $274.0M |
| Total Equity | $375.2M | $322.8M | $502.4M | $495.0M | $546.2M |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.2B | -$1.3B | -$1.3B | -$1.3B | -$1.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 8:21am (2d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$20.2M | -$56.6M | -$39.6M | $29.5M | $6.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$34.9M | -$24.2M | -$26.1M | -$43.1M | -$44.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$55.1M | -$80.8M | -$65.7M | -$13.6M | -$37.8M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$39.7M | -$12.9M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $36.2M | -$17.1M | -$16.1M | -$10.0M | $37.8M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:58am (just now)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$395.2M $326.2M – $456.4M
|
$567.7M $468.6M – $655.6M
|
$315.3M $260.3M – $364.2M
|
$354.4M $292.6M – $409.3M
|
| EBITDA |
-$84.1M -$97.1M – -$69.4M
|
-$120.8M -$139.5M – -$99.7M
|
-$67.1M -$77.5M – -$55.4M
|
-$75.4M -$87.1M – -$62.3M
|
| Net Income |
$149.8M $112.2M – $174.4M
|
$249.4M $195.3M – $303.5M
|
$111.7M $86.3M – $134.1M
|
$689.2M $532.8M – $828.0M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 8:21am (2d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -19.1% | +50.5% | +5.0% | +13.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +91.6% | +3,368.4% | +74.0% | -29.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -48.5% | -69.8% | +68.8% | +74.4% |
| Net Income Growth | -43.0% | +168.2% | -179.0% | +178.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -140.9% | +6.0% | +124.7% | +146.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-05 | Kaszas Stephen Douglas | P-Purchase | 1,000.00 | $18.36 | $18,360 |
| 2026-03-19 | Shaver William M | A-Award | 4,440.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Shaver William M | A-Award | 479.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Makori Michelle | A-Award | 239.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Ing Perry | A-Award | 1,890.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Florek John Casimir | A-Award | 479.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Diges Carmen L | A-Award | 1,140.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Darveau-Garneau Nicolas | A-Award | 479.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-19 | Asterbadi Dalia Nadine | A-Award | 479.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Diges Carmen L | M-Exempt | 3,370.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Diges Carmen L | M-Exempt | 1,470.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Diges Carmen L | M-Exempt | 1,300.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Diges Carmen L | M-Exempt | 533.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Ball Ian J | M-Exempt | 310.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Ball Ian J | M-Exempt | 160.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Chan Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 275.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Chan Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 588.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Chan Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 1,266.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Chan Jeffrey | M-Exempt | 533.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2025-12-20 | Ing Perry | M-Exempt | 372.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 24, 2026 8:21am (2d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019-03-07 | $0.01 | 2019-02-21 | 2019-03-08 | 2019-03-15 |
| 2018-08-24 | $0.01 | 2018-08-13 | 2018-08-27 | 2018-09-04 |
| 2018-02-01 | $0.01 | 2018-01-17 | 2018-02-02 | 2018-02-14 |
| 2017-08-10 | $0.01 | 2017-08-02 | 2017-08-14 | 2017-08-17 |
| 2017-02-01 | $0.01 | 2017-01-18 | 2017-02-03 | 2017-02-14 |
| 2016-08-22 | $0.01 | 2016-08-10 | 2016-08-24 | 2016-08-29 |
| 2016-02-01 | $0.01 | 2016-01-14 | 2016-02-03 | 2016-02-12 |
| 2015-07-29 | $0.01 | 2015-06-19 | 2015-07-31 | 2015-08-17 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a more interesting story than the synthesis admits. Quarterly revenue went from $33.5M in Q4'24 to $74.0M in Q1'26 — a 121% ramp in five quarters — while net margin went from -24.6% to +45.1%. That's not gentle reacceleration; that's a step-change, almost certainly driven by gold ripping from ~$2,000 to north of $3,000/oz combined with Gold Bar/Los Azules-area production coming online. Annual 2025 revenue of $197.6M with NI of $34.4M masks the fact that the exit-rate run-rate is closer to $280M+ with materially higher operating leverage. The "mature_earner" classification is wrong; the "pre-profit-platform" tag is also wrong. This is a small-cap gold producer at the inflection of a commodity super-cycle, full stop.
That said, the Market Forces module's "operationally failing" verdict is overcooked and the synthesis's "high conviction required" is properly cautious but for partially wrong reasons. The genuine problems: operating income was still -$12.9M for full-year 2025 despite the revenue surge, meaning the $34.4M NI is heavily flattered by below-the-line items (equity-method gains from the San José stake, possibly deferred tax benefits, FX). Operating CF of $6.9M against $44.6M capex means -$37.8M FCF — the business does not self-fund at current metals prices, let alone weaker ones. Cash of $51M is thin against that burn rate. The TTM P/E of 16x and EV/EBITDA of 35x are essentially meaningless backward-looking artifacts; on a forward exit-rate basis (annualize Q1'26: ~$133M NI, but discount aggressively for non-cash items, call it $70-90M of real earnings power) you get a forward P/E closer to 13-17x — not cheap for a high-cost producer levered to gold, not expensive if gold holds.
The contrarian argument cuts both ways and the models miss the more dangerous direction. The obvious bear case (high-cost producer, jurisdictional risk in Argentina/Mexico, capex hole, insider awards outweighing the single 1,000-share purchase) is well-articulated. The non-obvious bear case: this revenue/margin trajectory is almost entirely gold-price beta. If gold mean-reverts 20% — perfectly plausible if real rates normalize or the Fed cuts less than priced — Q1'26's 45% net margin compresses violently because cash costs are sticky. MUX's beta to gold is probably 2-3x, meaning a 20% gold drawdown could be a 50% equity drawdown. The 52-week range of $8.95-$29.70 already demonstrates this. The contrarian bull case the models also miss: Los Azules (copper) is a genuinely strategic asset in a copper-deficit world, and if McEwen monetizes it via a major partnership, that single transaction could exceed the current market cap. Neither tail is priced.
I dissent from the synthesis's hedged "high conviction required" framing — that's not a verdict, it's a deferral. I also dissent from Market Forces' "avoid completely" — that ignores the documented inflection. The honest read: at $20.10 and 5.5x EV/revenue on trailing numbers but ~3x on forward run-rate, MUX is fairly valued assuming gold stays $2,900+, undervalued if gold runs to $3,500 and Los Azules gets a partner, and a 40-60% drawdown candidate if gold corrects 15%+. Insider data is genuinely neutral-to-slightly-negative (awards are routine; the single 1,000-share purchase is a token). The data is not stale but the TTM ratios are useless given the Q4'25/Q1'26 discontinuity — anyone citing 16x P/E or 35x EV/EBITDA is anchoring on a regime that no longer exists. This is a tactical commodity-beta vehicle, not an investment; sizing should reflect that you're really expressing a view on gold, not on McEwen's operating excellence (which the -$12.9M annual operating loss confirms is mediocre).
GPT Critique
In reviewing McEwen Mining Inc.'s latest financial data, several elements stand out. The company's recent revenue trajectory is indeed impressive, with quarterly revenue nearly doubling from $35.7M in Q1'25 to $74.0M in Q1'26, suggesting significant operational improvements or favorable external conditions such as a rise in gold prices. However, despite this revenue growth, the company struggles with negative free cash flow, as evidenced by a $37.8M FCF drain in 2025. This highlights the capital-intensive nature of their operations and the reliance on external financing or cash reserves to sustain activities, which is concerning given their $51M cash position. The operating margin remains negative, at -6.54%, indicating that core operations are not yet profitable without reliance on non-operational gains. Such metrics suggest that while top-line growth is strong, financial health remains precarious.
I find myself in agreement with Opus's assertion that McEwen Mining is not a straightforward investment. Opus correctly identifies the revenue surge as largely attributable to a favorable commodity price environment, particularly with gold prices rising dramatically. This aligns with the observed price volatility of MUX, which tracks closely with gold price movements. Additionally, Opus highlights the company's continued negative operating income despite revenue growth, suggesting that profitability improvements are not as robust as they might appear superficially. I concur with the assessment that this points to a business model heavily reliant on external market conditions rather than internal operational excellence.
However, I diverge from Opus's conclusion on the valuation being fair at $20.10, contingent on gold maintaining a price above $2,900. While Opus provides a solid analysis of the potential for increased valuation should gold prices surge or McEwen successfully partner on the Los Azules project, I view the current price as over-optimistic given the operational inefficiencies and fiscal vulnerabilities. The high operating leverage and the company's inability to self-fund through free cash flow make it a risky bet if gold prices falter. The lack of debt might provide some flexibility, but the thin cash reserves against a backdrop of high capex needs suggests potential liquidity issues should market conditions tighten.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating the strategic value of McEwen's asset portfolio, particularly the Los Azules copper project. If McEwen secures a strategic partnership or sale, the narrative could shift significantly, unlocking substantial shareholder value. Conversely, skeptics could emphasize the geopolitical risks in jurisdictions like Mexico and Argentina, where permitting and operational challenges could derail even the most promising growth stories.