Business Description
NIO Inc., a company based in Shanghai, China, specializes in the design, development, production, and sale of intelligent electric vehicles. Their product range includes five and six-seater electric SUVs, alongside smart electric sedans. Beyond manufacturing vehicles, NIO offers an extensive ecosystem of power solutions. These encompass home charging options (Power Home), an innovative battery swapping service (Power Swap), various public charging infrastructure like Power Charger and Destination Charger, and mobile charging vans (Power Mobile). Customers also benefit from the Power Map application, which provides real-time data on public charging networks, and the convenient One Click for Power valet charging service. The company provides a wide array of after-sales and customer support services. These include vehicle repairs, maintenance, and bodywork, available through both official NIO service centers and approved third-party facilities. They also facilitate insurance offerings, such as statutory, third-party liability, and vehicle damage policies, in collaboration with external insurers. Additional provisions cover roadside assistance, courtesy vehicle access, data package subscriptions, and automotive financing or leasing arrangements. Furthermore, NIO bundles energy and other service packages for its users. Internally, NIO is deeply involved in technological design and development, as well as the manufacturing of crucial electric vehicle components like e-powertrains and battery packs. They also oversee their sales and post-sales management operations. To complete its offerings, the company operates NIO Certified, a program dedicated to the inspection, evaluation, acquisition, and resale of pre-owned vehicles. Founded in 2014, the company was initially known as NextEV Inc. before officially changing its name to NIO Inc. in July 2017.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 8:19pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:58am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -6.64
Total Equity: $4.16B
Shares: 2,272,635,997
Total Debt: $16.15B
Cash: $26.04B
EBITDA: -$4.18B
Total Debt: $16.15B
Cash: $26.04B
Revenue: $85.10B
Shares: 2,272,635,997
Revenue: $85.10B
Revenue: $85.10B
Revenue: $85.10B
Total Equity: $4.16B
Tax Rate: -0.8%
Equity: $4.16B
Total Debt: $16.15B
Cash: $26.04B
Current Liabilities: $78.63B
Long-Term Debt: $8.63B
Total Debt: $16.15B
Total Equity: $4.16B
Shares: 2,272,635,997
Shares: 2,272,635,997
CapEx: -$6.07B
Shares: 2,272,635,997
Stock Price: $4.85
Net Income: -$14.55B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The headline numbers tell two completely different stories and you have to hold both. On one hand: revenue went $36B→$85B in four years (24% CAGR), gross margin recovered from 5.5% in 2023 to 13.6% in 2025, operating loss halved as a % of sales, and FCF improved from -$17B to -$3.1B. Net cash of $29.66B is 211% of the entire market cap — back that out and the operating business trades at roughly negative enterprise value on $85B of revenue. That is not a normal setup for a 'zombie.'
On the other hand, the earnings quality module is screaming: OCF/NI of 0.06x, accruals at -14.2% of assets, Beneish M of 3.71, and an Altman Z of 0.36 in deep distress territory. Diluted shares went 1.57B → 2.27B in four years — a 9.6% CAGR that has quietly eaten ~45% of per-share value while the business was 'scaling.' The insider tape is all M-exempt option exercises and F-InKind tax withholdings — zero open-market P buys, zero S sales. There is no insider conviction signal here in either direction; the upstream 'mixed' label is misreading routine comp activity.
The reconciliation: the bull case (cheap on EV/sales, inflecting, cash-rich) and the bear case (dilution machine, never earned a dollar, distress-zone Z) are BOTH true. This is a real option on Chinese premium EV survival, but the option premium is paid in continuous share issuance, not just time.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:02am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $36.1B | $49.3B | $55.6B | $65.7B | $85.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $29.3B | $44.1B | $52.6B | $59.2B | $73.5B |
| Gross Profit | $6.8B | $5.1B | $3.1B | $6.5B | $11.6B |
| Operating Expenses | $11.3B | $20.8B | $25.7B | $28.4B | $26.0B |
| Operating Income | -$4.5B | -$15.6B | -$22.7B | -$21.9B | -$14.4B |
| Net Income | -$10.6B | -$14.6B | -$21.1B | -$22.7B | -$14.6B |
| EBITDA | -$985.4M | -$10.1B | -$15.1B | -$13.9B | -$4.2B |
| EPS | $-6.72 | $-8.89 | $-12.44 | $-11.03 | $-6.64 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:03am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $15.3B | $19.9B | $32.9B | $19.3B | $26.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $63.6B | $59.1B | $70.4B | $61.9B | $76.7B |
| Total Assets | $82.9B | $96.3B | $117.4B | $107.6B | $124.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $29.2B | $45.9B | $57.8B | $62.3B | $78.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $9.7B | $10.9B | $13.0B | $11.4B | $8.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $48.1B | $68.6B | $87.8B | $94.1B | $111.8B |
| Total Equity | $34.7B | $23.9B | $25.5B | $6.0B | $4.2B |
| Retained Earnings | -$55.6B | -$69.9B | -$90.8B | -$113.1B | $0 |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:03am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $2.0B | -$3.9B | -$1.4B | -$7.8B | $3.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.1B | -$7.0B | -$14.3B | -$9.1B | -$6.1B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$2.1B | -$10.8B | -$15.7B | -$17.0B | -$3.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$565.4M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$20.2B | $4.8B | $15.5B | -$10.9B | -$1.6B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:58am (just now)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$160.8B $149.9B – $176.2B
|
$178.0B $152.8B – $215.7B
|
$189.1B $162.3B – $229.1B
|
$193.1B $165.8B – $234.0B
|
| EBITDA |
-$24.6B -$26.9B – -$22.9B
|
-$27.2B -$33.0B – -$23.4B
|
-$28.9B -$35.0B – -$24.8B
|
-$29.5B -$35.8B – -$25.4B
|
| Net Income |
$2.0B -$1.4B – $5.4B
|
$4.3B $915.4M – $7.7B
|
$6.1B $5.0B – $7.7B
|
$5.7B $4.7B – $7.3B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:02am (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +36.3% | +12.9% | +18.2% | +29.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -24.6% | -40.7% | +112.8% | +78.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -247.9% | -44.8% | +3.4% | +34.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -37.7% | -45.2% | -7.1% | +35.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -920.4% | -50.7% | +8.1% | +70.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | Qin Lihong | M-Exempt | 300,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Qin Lihong | F-InKind | 150,000.00 | $5.60 | $840,000 |
| 2026-06-01 | Qin Lihong | M-Exempt | 300,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Zhou Xin | M-Exempt | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Zhou Xin | F-InKind | 100,000.00 | $5.60 | $560,000 |
| 2026-06-01 | Zhou Xin | M-Exempt | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Qu Yu | M-Exempt | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Qu Yu | F-InKind | 100,000.00 | $5.60 | $560,000 |
| 2026-06-01 | Qu Yu | M-Exempt | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-18 | Zhou Xin | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Zhou Xin | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Zhou Xin | 180,000.00 | $2.05 | $369,000 | |
| 2026-04-02 | Zhou Xin | 60,000.00 | $2.39 | $143,400 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Zhou Xin | 177,000.00 | $2.55 | $451,350 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Zhou Xin | 200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Wu Hai (Hector) | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Wu Hai (Hector) | 85,804.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Wu Hai (Hector) | 250,000.00 | $3.61 | $902,500 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Li Bin (William) | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Li Bin (William) | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a more dramatic turnaround story than the models are crediting. Quarterly net income went from -$6.89B in Q1 2025 to a *positive* $280M in Q4 2025, then back to -$496M in Q1 2026 on $25.5B revenue. That Q4 profit is almost certainly seasonal/one-time (Chinese NEV subsidy pull-forward, year-end delivery push, possible accounting tailwinds) — not a sustainable inflection. But the trajectory is real: TTM losses are running ~$9B annualized versus $22.7B in FY2024, gross margin expanded from 4.9% (FY23) to 13.6% (TTM), and revenue grew 29.5% YoY with quarterly trend accelerating. Operating cash flow turned positive at $2.99B in FY25 versus deeply negative prior years. This is not nothing.
That said, the balance sheet disclosure is suspicious — "Total debt: —" and "Total equity: —" are missing from a company with $26B in cash and a P/B of 19.5x. A P/B of 19.5 on a $14B market cap implies book equity of ~$720M, which means NIO has burned nearly all its equity cushion and is operating on thin ice. The current ratio of 0.98 confirms working capital is tight. With FY25 FCF still -$3.07B and capex at $6.07B, the $26B cash pile gets stress-tested fast if Q4's profitability doesn't repeat. The insider activity — all M-Exempt (option exercises) and F-InKind (tax withholding), no open-market buys — is compensation plumbing, not conviction. Calling it "Neutral" is generous; in a true turnaround you'd want to see insiders accumulating at $6.
Where I dissent from the models: the Narrative layer calls this "100% narrative" with "no DCF anchor" — that's wrong now. At 0.95x EV/revenue on $85B in sales with 13.6% gross margins and an inflecting OCF line, you can build a credible DCF. If NIO holds 13-15% gross margin and grows revenue 20% for three more years to ~$145B, and SG&A/R&D scale sublinearly (the actual operating leverage thesis), you get to mid-single-digit operating margins by 2027. That's $5-7B in operating income, easily supporting a $25-30B market cap, or ~$11-13/share — roughly 2x current. The Synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium" framed as a 50/50 survival bet underweights the trajectory; the Pre-Flight read of "show me story at $6" is closer to right. The models are anchored to FY24's -$22B loss and missing that quarterly burn has compressed ~80%.
The contrarian case I'd actually argue: Q4 2025's $280M profit was the peak, not the floor. Q1 2026 already reverted to a loss, and Chinese EV price wars are intensifying — BYD, Xiaomi SU7, Tesla Model Y refresh, Li Auto all attacking NIO's premium positioning simultaneously. The 13.6% gross margin embeds BaaS accounting that may not survive scrutiny, and the Onvo/Firefly sub-brand expansion is capex-heavy with uncertain unit economics. Geopolitical tail risk (ADR delisting, China tech sanctions escalation) is non-trivial and not in the price. Most critically: if Q2/Q3 2026 prints look like Q1 2026 rather than Q4 2025, the entire "inflection" thesis breaks and the stock retests $3-4 on dilution fears. The missing balance sheet detail and stale 2026-dated data (file references Q1 2026 actuals and June 2026 insider transactions, suggesting this is a forward-looking dataset with execution risk still unresolved) means we don't know the current debt load.
My verdict: I lean more bullish than the Synthesis "Reasonable Premium" framing but less bullish than the implied turnaround math. The trajectory genuinely warrants a higher multiple than 0.95x EV/sales — peer EV manufacturers with similar growth trade at 1.5-2x — but the Q1 2026 reversion and competitive intensity argue against full re-rating until two more clean quarters confirm Q4 wasn't a one-off. Fair value is probably $8-10 if you believe the margin trajectory holds, $3-4 if Q4 was peak. Risk/reward is asymmetric to the upside *only*
GPT Critique
In assessing NIO's financial data, several points stand out distinctly. The company's revenue has shown strong growth, notably a 29.5% year-over-year increase, reaching $85.10 billion in 2025 from $65.73 billion in 2024. This suggests a robust expansion trajectory, yet the profitability metrics lag significantly behind. The recurring net losses, with a particularly concerning -$14.55 billion for 2025, highlight operational inefficiencies despite revenue growth. Gross margin improvements, from 4.9% in 2023 to 13.6% recently, indicate some cost control efforts, but the negative operating cash flow and substantial capex, leading to a free cash flow of -$3.07 billion, underline the ongoing challenges in achieving sustainable profitability. The current ratio of 0.9752 further raises concerns about liquidity and the ability to meet short-term obligations without additional financing or operational cash flow improvements.
Opus, in their analysis, underscores the dramatic turnaround story driven by quarterly net income fluctuations and expanding gross margins. While I concur with their observation of the gross margin improvement from 4.9% to 13.6%, I find the characterization of the Q4 2025 profit as potentially non-recurring highly plausible. Opus notes the one-time nature of this profit, possibly due to subsidies and year-end pushes, which aligns with the subsequent Q1 2026 reversion to a loss. I agree with their skepticism regarding the balance sheet's lack of clarity on total debt and equity, which is critical given NIO's cash burn rate and capital-intensive operations.
However, I diverge from Opus on the narrative layer's dismissal as "100% narrative." While Opus suggests building a credible DCF model is feasible, the current volatility in net income and competitive pressures make such models speculative. The EV/revenue multiple of 0.95x, while low, reflects the market's cautious stance on NIO's path to profitability amidst intense competition and geopolitical risks. Opus's optimism about achieving mid-single-digit operating margins by 2027 assumes a level of operational efficiency and market conditions that are yet to be evidenced in the current financial trajectory.
A skeptic might argue that the Q4 2025 profit was an anomaly rather than a sustainable trend. They could point to the return to losses in Q1 2026 and intensifying competition from domestic and international players like BYD and Tesla as significant threats to NIO's premium position. The narrative of NIO as China's Tesla may be more aspirational than realistic without consistent profitability and margin expansion. Additionally, the geopolitical risks, including potential ADR delisting and trade tensions, are elements that could destabilize future performance and investor confidence.