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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Northrop Grumman Corporation (NOC) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -11 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 55 · Value -65 · Sentiment 30 (timing only, not weighted)
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Northrop Grumman Corporation
NOC NYSENorthrop Grumman Corporation is an American aerospace, defense, and security company that provides advanced technology solutions to government and commercial customers worldwide. The company focuses on solving complex challenges across space, aeronautics, defense, and cyberspace, with most of its business concentrated on serving the U.S. Department of Defense and intelligence community, as well as allied international governments. Northrop Grumman operates through four primary business sectors: Aeronautics Systems, Defense Systems, Mission Systems, and Space Systems, each delivering specialized platforms, sensors, and software-driven capabilities. Its portfolio includes stealth and uncrewed aircraft, strategic missile and weapons systems, missile warning and tracking, radars and mission electronics, satellites and spacecraft, solid rocket propulsion, cyber and C4ISR solutions, and long-term sustainment and modernization services. Headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia, Northrop Grumman plays a significant role in global security infrastructure, supporting critical missions across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains for customers in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and other regions.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 29.08
Total Equity: $16.67B
Shares: 143,800,000
Total Debt: $15.70B
Cash: $4.40B
EBITDA: $5.98B
Total Debt: $15.70B
Cash: $4.40B
Revenue: $41.95B
Revenue: $41.95B
Revenue: $41.95B
Total Equity: $16.67B
Tax Rate: 17.5%
Equity: $16.67B
Total Debt: $15.70B
Cash: $4.40B
Current Liabilities: $13.88B
Long-Term Debt: $15.16B
Total Debt: $15.70B
Total Equity: $16.67B
Shares: 143,800,000
Shares: 143,800,000
CapEx: -$1.45B
Shares: 143,800,000
Stock Price: $577.57
Net Income: $4.18B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:43am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $35.7B | $36.6B | $39.3B | $41.0B | $42.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $32.0B | $33.0B | $36.8B | $36.7B | $37.7B |
| Operating Income | $5.7B | $3.6B | $2.5B | $4.4B | $4.5B |
| Net Income | $7.0B | $4.9B | $2.1B | $4.2B | $4.2B |
| EBITDA | $6.9B | $4.9B | $3.9B | $5.7B | $6.0B |
| EPS | $43.70 | $31.61 | $13.57 | $28.39 | $29.14 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $43.54 | $31.47 | $13.53 | $28.34 | $29.08 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.5B | $2.6B | $3.1B | $4.4B | $4.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $12.4B | $12.5B | $13.7B | $14.3B | $15.3B |
| Total Assets | $42.6B | $43.8B | $46.5B | $49.4B | $51.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $9.5B | $11.6B | $11.9B | $14.1B | $13.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | $12.8B | $11.8B | $13.8B | $14.7B | $15.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $29.7B | $28.4B | $31.7B | $34.1B | $34.7B |
| Total Equity | $12.9B | $15.3B | $14.8B | $15.3B | $16.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $12.9B | $15.3B | $14.8B | $15.3B | $16.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:43am (12d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.6B | $2.9B | $3.9B | $4.4B | $4.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.4B | -$1.4B | -$1.8B | -$1.8B | -$1.5B |
| Free Cash Flow | $2.2B | $1.5B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $3.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$2.2B | $0 | $945.0M | $2.5B | -$502.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$983.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B | -$1.3B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$3.7B | -$1.5B | -$1.5B | -$2.5B | -$1.6B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.4B | -$953.0M | $532.0M | $1.2B | $50.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:43am (12d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +2.6% | +7.3% | +4.4% | +2.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -36.3% | -29.5% | +72.3% | +3.2% |
| Net Income Growth | -30.1% | -58.0% | +103.0% | +0.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | -28.3% | -21.6% | +48.1% | +4.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:21am (12d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $2.47 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-23 | $2.31 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $2.31 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $2.31 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $2.31 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $2.06 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $2.06 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $2.06 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-24 | $2.06 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-23 | $1.87 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-24 | $1.87 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-25 | $1.87 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-26 | $1.87 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-24 | $1.73 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-25 | $1.73 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-26 | $1.73 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $1.73 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-25 | $1.57 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-26 | $1.57 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-27 | $1.57 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
AI Lens 4th lens · how AI reaches this business · 5-yr
2026-08-11AI-assisted design, modeling and test compression lands hardest on fixed-price development — B-21 and Sentinel — where every avoided rework hour is Northrop's own margin rather than a reimbursable cost, and where prior charges show how expensive engineering error has been.
Software-defined, AI-native entrants (autonomy stacks, attritable systems, commercial space) compress the capital and time required to field credible defense capability, and DoD acquisition reform is actively routing budget toward them — visible already in the 7.7pp growth gap versus the industry.
Whether Northrop owns the autonomy and battle-management layer running on its own platforms or becomes the metal-and-sensor supplier under someone else's stack; watch CCA/mission-autonomy awards, MOSA data-rights terms, and whether Mission Systems content per platform rises or flattens.
Palmdale-scale low-observable tooling, nuclear-certified processes, solid rocket motor capacity, decades of classified signature and flight-test data, and a cleared workforce with program-of-record incumbency — none of which cheap software reproduces.
AI Lens thesis
AI reaches Northrop through three distinct channels, not one: it raises demand (counter-autonomy, EW, sensor fusion, space-based tracking all get more valuable as machine intelligence proliferates on both sides), it changes the internal cost structure of a ~100k-person engineering organization, and it lowers the barrier to becoming a defense contractor at all. The first is a genuine tailwind for Mission and Space Systems. The second is ambiguous because the monetized unit on cost-plus work is substantially reimbursed labor — productivity that shrinks hours also shrinks the fee base, so AI savings only become profit on fixed-price and internal overhead. The third is the real structural risk: not that anyone builds a stealth bomber, but that the value inside a weapons system migrates from the airframe to the autonomy software, where incumbency and clearances matter far less than shipping speed.
What the market may be underestimating
Upside Fixed-price development risk is currently priced as a permanent hazard; AI-driven digital engineering and test-campaign compression could structurally reduce overrun frequency, converting the most feared part of the portfolio into a margin recovery story.
Downside On cost-plus contracts, AI productivity is anti-revenue — fewer reimbursable engineering hours means a smaller cost base to earn fee on, so the government captures the efficiency and Northrop books lower sales at similar margin.
Outcome range spread 42
Claude Reading
Starting from the raw numbers: NOC did $41.95B in 2025 revenue, up just 2.3% from $41.03B in 2024 and 3.3% CAGR since 2021's $35.67B — this is a low-single-digit topline compounder, full stop. But note 2021 net income was $7.01B versus 2025's $4.18B; earnings are actually down 40% over five years despite revenue up 18%. The "42.6% earnings CAGR" figure is arithmetic garbage driven by the depressed 2023 base ($2.06B post-charges); the real story is margin compression from ~20% NI margin in 2021 to ~10% today. Recent quarters: TTM revenue is roughly $42.9B ($10.88+9.88+11.71+10.42), essentially flat, with net margins bouncing between 8.9% and 12.2% — normal defense lumpiness, no acceleration.
Balance sheet is fine but not fortress: $15.7B debt vs $4.4B cash and $16.7B equity gives D/E of 0.94 and net debt/EBITDA around 2x. ROE of 25% looks great until you realize it's leverage-flattered — ROA is 8.1% and ROIC 13.3%, which for a business with 95%+ government revenue and no reinvestment optionality is decent but not premium. FCF of $3.31B against an $82B market cap is a 4.0% FCF yield; the 1.63% dividend plus buybacks consume most of it. Insider activity is entirely A-Awards (stock grants) — zero open-market buying, which for a mature defense prime near 52-week levels is not a signal either way but certainly not a vote of confidence.
The synthesis verdict of "overvalued, fair value $422" I largely agree with, though the framework is sloppier than it needs to be. At $577 you're paying 19.9x trailing earnings and ~25x FCF for a business growing revenue 2-3% with structurally capped margins (fixed-price DoD contracts, B-21 EAC risk, GBSD execution). The thesis-eval line — "market pricing 18.6% FCF growth for five years" — is the right frame. That's absurd for a company whose 5-year revenue CAGR is 3.3% and whose earnings peaked in 2021. The narrative layer's diagnosis is also right: the ~37% premium over DCF is a geopolitical/supercycle bid, not fundamentals. Where I'd push back on the models: the Market Forces "Neutral" and Pre-Flight's "fair value" reads are too soft — they're anchoring to the peer multiple (LMT, GD, RTX all trade rich) rather than to NOC's own cash generation. Peer overvaluation isn't a defense.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: B-21 is the one genuine call option. If Northrop executes and the LRIP transitions to a real production ramp of 100+ airframes at recovering margins, 2028-2030 FCF could plausibly step to $5-6B, which reframes today's price as ~14-16x forward FCF — reasonable. Sentinel/GBSD is sole-source and worth $140B+ lifetime. And the political reality is that defense budgets don't get cut in an era of simultaneous China/Russia/Middle East pressure; the "debt ceiling hammer" bear case has been wrong for 15 years running. Counter to the contrarian: B-21 is fixed-price in early lots, and Northrop already took a ~$1.6B charge on it in 2023. That is exactly the "bomber program curse" showing up on schedule. Fixed-price development contracts have destroyed value at every prime for 40 years and there's no reason to believe this time is different. Where the data is thin: no gross margin disclosure, no segment-level backlog conversion timing, and the 2026 quarters look suspiciously labeled (June 2026 with $10.88B revenue already reported? — treat as calendar/labeling artifact but worth flagging).
Net: I agree with the synthesis dissent from market pricing but think $422 is slightly too punitive — it ignores the real B-21/GBSD optionality. My fair value lands $460-490 (roughly 17x normalized $28-30 EPS, or 20x $3.5B normalized FCF plus modest program option value), meaning ~15-20% downside from $577, not 27%. This isn't a short — quality is real, backlog is real, and geopolitical tailwinds provide floor. But paying 20x earnings and 25x FCF for 3% revenue growth with fixed-price execution risk on the largest program is a bad risk/reward. Wait for either a B-21 milestone that de-risks margins or a pullback to the low $500s / high $400s. The insider grants aren't hiding anything, but they aren't buying either.
GPT Reading
What stands out is how ordinary the operating story looks relative to the valuation being asked. Northrop is doing what a good defense prime should do: revenue has climbed from $35.7B in 2021 to $42.0B in 2025, and the last four quarters sum to about $42.9B, so the top line is stable-to-slowly growing rather than surging. But the growth rate embedded in the stock feels richer than the business. Quarterly revenue was $10.88B in June 2026 versus $10.35B a year earlier, only 5.1% growth, and March 2026 was $9.88B versus $9.47B, up 4.3%. Net income is even flatter: the last four quarters total about $4.50B, only modestly above 2025’s $4.18B. Against that, investors are paying nearly 20x earnings, 2.0x sales, and 15.7x EV/EBITDA for a contractor generating roughly 10% net margins and 3%-5% organic growth. That’s not absurd for a pristine compounder; it is demanding for a government-dependent industrial with visible program risk.
The more important point is that the profit recovery since the 2023 dip has already happened, yet the earnings power still does not scream upside from $577. On annual numbers, operating income recovered from $2.54B in 2023 to $4.37B in 2024 and $4.51B in 2025, but 2025 operating profit still sits well below the $5.65B earned in 2021 despite $6.3B more revenue. That tells you mix and execution matter more than headline sales growth. The quarterly margin pattern reinforces it: 12.2%, 8.9%, and 10.1% net margins over the last three quarters are respectable but not evidence of a new plateau. There are also pockets of lumpiness investors should not wave away, such as the 5.1% margin in 1Q25. This is a business that can throw off cash—$4.76B operating cash flow and $3.31B free cash flow in 2025—but at the current $82.1B market cap, that is roughly a 4.0% FCF yield. For a mature defense contractor with net debt of about $11.3B, that is not cheap.
I also think the balance sheet and capital intensity argue against paying a premium multiple. Debt of $15.7B against $4.4B of cash is manageable, and equity of $16.7B means leverage is not alarming, but it is enough to matter when growth is modest and programs can move around margins. Capex of $1.45B is not trivial either; this is not a capital-light software-like defense name. Return metrics look good on the surface—25.1% ROE and 13.3% ROIC—but ROE is flattered by leverage and buybacks, while ROIC is solid rather than exceptional for the multiple. The dividend yield at 1.6% does little to compensate for valuation risk. If I underwrite Northrop on normalized earnings around $4.3B-$4.6B and free cash flow around $3.3B-$4.0B, I do not get to a price in the high $500s unless I assume a prolonged step-up in growth or a structurally safer margin profile than the recent record shows.
The best pushback is straightforward: this is not a generic industrial, it is an unusually strategic asset base with scarce franchises. If major programs ramp cleanly, today’s earnings can understate future power. Revenue has held above $10B in five of the last six quarters, 2026 first-half revenue is running ahead of 2025 first-half, and 2026 first-half net income of about $1.97B is already well above the depressed $1.65B in 2025 first-half. On that lens, the weak 1Q25 looks like noise, 2023 looks like an aberration, and the market is right to capitalize future cash flows off a cleaner normalized base. A 19.9x P/E is not outrageous for a prime contractor with mission-critical platforms, sticky U.S. government demand, and decent cash conversion. I weigh that less heavily because even after normalization the numbers still look like a good business, not a fast-growing one: 2025 revenue rose just 2.2% over 2024, 2026 quarterly comparisons are mid-single-digit at best, and free cash flow has not exploded enough to justify a scarcity premium of this size.
What would change my mind is evidence that Northrop is actually entering a higher earnings regime rather than just cycling past prior charges. Specifically, I’d want to see at least two consecutive quarters with revenue above $11.0B and net margins sustained above 11%, or annualized free cash flow moving credibly toward $4.5B-$5.0B without a balance-sheet stretch. That would support a thesis that current valuation is discounting real operating improvement rather than narrative. Conversely, if revenue remains around $42B-$44B and net income stays parked near $4.2B-$4.6B, then a high-teens multiple is more appropriate, which points to a value closer to the high $400s than the high $500s.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a mature defense prime growing like one. Annual revenue crawled from $41.03B in 2024 to $41.95B in 2025, a 2.2% lift that sits inside a 3.3% multi-year CAGR; the last eight quarters oscillate between roughly $9.5B and $11.7B with no clear acceleration. Net income has stabilized near $4.17–4.18B after the 2023 trough of $2.06B, so the headline 42.6% earnings CAGR is almost entirely base-effect recovery, not operating leverage—recent earnings YoY is 0.2%. Operating margin sits at 10.75% and net margin at ~10%, with quarterly margins mostly in the 9–12% band once the Q1 2025 5.1% anomaly is set aside. Free cash flow of $3.31B on $4.76B operating cash flow is high quality and funds the modest 1.63% dividend at a 31% payout, but at an $82B enterprise the stock trades near 25x that FCF and 20x earnings. ROE of 25% looks attractive until leverage (debt/equity 0.94, net debt ~$11.3B) and a current ratio of 1.10 are factored in; ROIC of 13.3% is solid for the sector, not exceptional. The story the data tell is steady cash conversion on low-single-digit top-line growth, not a growth compounder.
That profile collides with the price. A PE of 19.9x, EV/EBITDA of 15.7x and PS of 2.0x on a business whose revenue confidence is already flagged as decelerating implies the market is capitalizing multi-year FCF growth in the high teens—growth the company has never delivered on an organic basis. The 2023 margin collapse and subsequent rebound explain why some screens look cheap on trailing recovery math; they do not justify paying a scarcity premium for a contractor whose backlog conversion still has to clear fixed-price B-21 risk and whatever budget ceiling politics deliver in 2026–28. Insider activity is pure award noise; it adds nothing. Against the prior models’ ~$423 composite fair value, the $578 print embeds roughly a 37% narrative premium for geopolitical permanence—exactly the split the narrative layer flags.
The strongest contrary case is real and specific. B-21 production through the 2030s and the GBSD sole-source franchise (cited as $100B+ over three decades) are multi-decade, high-barrier cash engines that pure DCF models systematically underweight because they sit outside five-year explicit periods. A smart opponent would also note that 2023 was distorted by charges, so normalized earnings power is closer to the current $4.2B run-rate with upside if margins grind toward the old 12%+ zone, and that defense primes have historically re-rated when NATO and Indo-Pacific budgets move from pledges to appropriations. ROE above 25% and FCF conversion above 75% of net income are not the marks of a deteriorating franchise. I weigh those points as genuine franchise quality, not as a warrant for 25x FCF: the same franchises still carry classic fixed-price transition risk, revenue is still 95%+ government, and the company has shown 3% top-line growth through the entire post-Ukraine spending surge. Quality at a premium is not the same as mispriced upside.
What flips the verdict is concrete: sustained quarterly revenue growth above 6–7% YoY for three consecutive prints, B-21 moving cleanly through fixed-price lot pricing without further charge announcements, or FY2026–27 FCF clearing $4.0B+ while the multiple holds. A material multiple compression toward 15–16x earnings on stable earnings would also re-open the long side. Until one of those arrives, the stock is priced for a supercycle the income statement has not yet earned.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Northrop is a classic mature defense earner: revenue compounded from $35.7B in 2021 to $42.0B in 2025 (roughly 4% CAGR), with FCF rebuilding from a $1.47B trough in 2022 to $3.31B in 2025. Earnings quality checks are clean - OCF/NI at 1.04x, accruals at 1.4% of assets, and Altman Z of 3.01 in the safe zone. The business self-funds capex and returns capital, with buybacks running 21x SBC and diluted share count falling from 160.9M to 143.8M (a -2.8% CAGR), meaningfully concentrating per-share value. Operating margin dipped to 6.5% in 2023 (B-21 EAC charges are the likely culprit but I can't confirm from this data) before recovering to 10.8% in 2025 - a genuine wobble, now largely healed. Balance sheet is the one soft spot: net debt of roughly $11.3B against $4.4B cash means the company runs with leverage, not a cushion, though FCF coverage is comfortable. Insider tape is entirely routine director awards and small tax-withholding sales - no directional signal. Overall this reads as a durable, well-run prime contractor operating in a structurally supported end market.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Root cause and residual exposure of the 2023 operating margin collapse (likely B-21 EAC charges) - is this contained or recurring?
- Fixed-price development program mix and remaining loss reserves per the 10-K risk disclosures
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants underlying the $11.3B net debt position
- Customer concentration - percent of revenue from US DoD and top programs
- Pension/OPEB accounting contribution to GAAP operating income and margin optics
The composite fair value lands at $426.88 and the signal-adjusted FV at $422.44, implying about -27% downside from $579.44. The DCF ($355.81) and EPV floor ($306.96) both sit well below price; only the anchored-PE cross-check ($688.92) argues for upside, and it is the outlier — a multiple-based method that essentially extrapolates the current defense-cycle multiple rather than deserved economics. Weighting the cash-based methods, deserved value sits in the $400s, not near $580.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- forward FCF conversion trajectory post-2023 margin dip
- B-21 program margin ramp and cost accounting assumptions
- backlog book-to-bill and multi-year contract mix
- any FY guidance revisions on segment margins
- capital return pace vs net debt trajectory
The dominant force on NOC is a strong, durable platform-monopoly narrative: irreplaceable prime, stealth/space/networks, and a geopolitical backdrop that the market treats as a structural reset rather than a cycle. Intensity is strong, durability is durable, cult is low - meaning this is a sober institutional bid, not a meme, which is exactly the kind of narrative that persists. That is a real tailwind pressing on the tape regardless of whether the price is deserved. The macro overlay is mildly supportive: risk-on at +47, VIX 15.5, S&P near highs. NOC's beta near zero means the tape barely moves it either way, but a calm tape lets the defense narrative breathe without rotation risk. Higher rates and a 26 market PE are a background headwind for long-duration equity, but defense primes with visible multi-year backlogs are among the least rate-sensitive industrials. News flow is quiet on NOC specifically - the peripheral items (Joby/Resonant, Rocket Lab defense launch demand, GE strength) actually reinforce the broader 'defense and aerospace bid' framing without creating direct competitive pressure on Northrop's core franchises. The main non-fundamental risk is that the bear framing (37% premium is pure geopolitical sentiment) is a live, articulate counter-narrative - any peace headline or budget-cut rhetoric could re-rate this quickly. Net: steady tailwind, not euphoric, with a fragile ceiling.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any peace-negotiation or ceasefire headlines (Ukraine, Middle East, Taiwan) that could crack the supercycle story
- FY defense budget rhetoric and any signs of domestic fiscal retrenchment
- Analyst target revisions - watch for the first prime downgrade citing valuation vs geopolitics
- Rotation out of defense into cyclicals if risk-on accelerates further
AI reaches Northrop through three distinct channels, not one: it raises demand (counter-autonomy, EW, sensor fusion, space-based tracking all get more valuable as machine intelligence proliferates on both sides), it changes the internal cost structure of a ~100k-person engineering organization, and it lowers the barrier to becoming a defense contractor at all. The first is a genuine tailwind for Mission and Space Systems. The second is ambiguous because the monetized unit on cost-plus work is substantially reimbursed labor — productivity that shrinks hours also shrinks the fee base, so AI savings only become profit on fixed-price and internal overhead. The third is the real structural risk: not that anyone builds a stealth bomber, but that the value inside a weapons system migrates from the airframe to the autonomy software, where incumbency and clearances matter far less than shipping speed.
Verify before trusting this (8)
- Budget split: exquisite vs attritable
- Quantity cuts to legacy platform lines
- NOC content on autonomous programs
- Competitive losses to AI-native firms
- Share of new-start programs won
- Acquisition reform rules on non-traditionals
- Fixed-price charge frequency
- Nuclear certification milestones
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 14, 2026, NOC was $541.82. We expect it to be $519.56 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $470.00. This is an early model (v0.3.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 14, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.