For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Northern Trust Corporation (NTRS) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score -11 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 47 · Value -50 · Sentiment -12 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $158.50 vs $186.82 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Northern Trust Corporation
NTRS NASDAQNorthern Trust Corporation is a financial holding company that provides a broad range of asset servicing, asset management, and banking solutions to institutional and individual clients globally. The company focuses on servicing corporate and public retirement plans, foundations, endowments, fund managers, insurance companies, and sovereign wealth funds through its Asset Servicing segment, which offers custody, fund administration, brokerage, and related banking services. Northern Trust Corporation also operates a Wealth Management segment that delivers trust and fiduciary services, investment management, custody, financial consulting, estate administration, family business advisory, and private and business banking to high-net-worth individuals, families, and family offices. Headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, Northern Trust Corporation plays a significant role in global financial markets as a custodian and fiduciary for large pools of capital, emphasizing risk management, operational efficiency, and tailored solutions for complex institutional and wealth management needs. Founded in 1889 in the United States, it is recognized today for its specialized capabilities in servicing sophisticated investors and wealthy clients worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 8.74
Total Equity: $12.96B
Shares: 198,729,977
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.87B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.87B
Revenue: $8.09B
Revenue: $8.09B
Revenue: $8.09B
Total Equity: $12.96B
Tax Rate: 25.8%
Equity: $12.96B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.87B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $12.96B
Shares: 198,729,977
Shares: 198,729,977
CapEx: -$74.00M
Shares: 198,729,977
Stock Price: $186.66
Net Income: $1.74B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 4:39am (42d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $6.5B | $6.8B | $6.8B | $8.3B | $8.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $2.6B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $3.0B | $3.1B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $2.0B | $1.7B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $7.16 | $6.16 | $5.09 | $9.80 | $8.78 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $7.14 | $6.14 | $5.08 | $9.77 | $8.74 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 4:00am (42d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.1B | $4.7B | $4.8B | $4.7B | $5.9B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $183.9B | $155.0B | $150.8B | $155.5B | $177.1B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $171.9B | $143.8B | $138.9B | $142.7B | $164.2B |
| Total Equity | $12.0B | $11.3B | $11.9B | $12.8B | $13.0B |
| Retained Earnings | $13.1B | $13.8B | $14.2B | $15.6B | $16.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 4:39am (42d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.4B | $2.4B | $2.6B | -$486.0M | $5.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$95.5M | -$128.6M | -$116.5M | -$101.5M | -$74.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.3B | $2.3B | $2.5B | -$587.5M | $5.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $2.0B | $0 | $0 | $499.8M |
| Dividends Paid | -$583.3M | -$750.2M | -$621.5M | -$602.3M | -$591.6M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$267.6M | -$35.4M | -$347.5M | -$937.8M | -$1.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.3B | $1.6B | $137.3M | -$114.3M | $1.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 26, 2026 4:39am (42d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.6% | +0.2% | +22.4% | -2.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -13.5% | -17.1% | +83.4% | -14.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 25, 2026 7:43am (43d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-04 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-05 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-06 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-05 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-05 | $0.80 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-06 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-06 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-06 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-07 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-07 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-07 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-07 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-08 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-08 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-08 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-09 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-10 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-09 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-26 05:02The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly cadence first: NTRS printed $1.21B → $1.23B → $1.27B → $1.34B → $1.35B across 2025Q1-2026Q2, with net income climbing from $392M to $792M. That $792M Q2'26 print at a 58.7% net margin is an eye-popping number for a custody bank — normal NTRS net margins run 32-39%. Either there's a one-time gain (visa/mastercard-style, litigation recovery, tax benefit, security gain) or the pre-flight model missed something material. The $525M Q1'26 print at 39.2% margin was already at the high end of normal. Absent that Q2 anomaly, run-rate NI is closer to $1.9-2.0B annualized, giving a normalized P/E of ~17-18x on $34B market cap — not screamingly cheap for a business whose 5-year revenue CAGR is a pedestrian 5.8% (not the 9.3% shown, which is inflated by the 2025 boost). The "annual 2025 revenue $8.09B" vs summed quarterly of ~$8.19B is close enough; the Q4 reporting convention showing $4.38B is clearly a cumulative/YTD artifact, not a real quarter — models that took it at face value made a mistake.
The prior models are directionally reasonable but internally contradictory. Synthesis says fully_priced at $164.87 fair value (-11.8%); Market Forces calls it structurally disadvantaged losing to State Street/BNY on scale and missing alternatives; Narrative layer calls it a "steady compounder" with fundamentals anchoring price. These don't fully reconcile — if NTRS is genuinely losing custody share to scale competitors and missing alts (a real concern; AUC/A growth has trailed peers), then "steady compounder" is wrong and fair value should be well below $165, not modestly below. Meanwhile the momentum signal shows recent revenue YoY of -2.5% and earnings YoY of -14.5%, which flatly contradicts the accelerating quarterly trajectory I see in the raw data. That signal appears to be comparing the annual 2025 ($8.09B, $1.74B NI) to 2024 ($8.29B, $2.03B NI) — technically correct but backward-looking; the 2026 quarterly run-rate is clearly reaccelerating, driven by NII benefit from the rate environment and market-value-linked custody fees riding equity highs.
The contrarian case cuts both ways here. Bull contrarian: normalized earnings power at ~$8/share plus rate-sensitive optionality on NII, 13.4% ROE with zero net debt, $5.5B FCF against $34B market cap = ~16% FCF yield if you trust the cash flow statement (which for a bank you shouldn't fully — bank OCF includes deposit growth). Bear contrarian: ROA of 0.98% is thin, and the P/B of 2.86x is expensive for a bank generating only 13% ROE — that's a rich multiple justified only by fee-income stability, which the Market Forces model correctly notes is under structural pressure from BlackRock/Aladdin, State Street Alpha, and fee compression across the industry. Insider activity is trivial (255-share purchase, 1,120-share gift) — noise, not signal, despite the "net insider buying" flag.
I partially agree with the synthesis fully_priced verdict but think the fair value is directionally too high given the structural concerns and the likely one-time nature of the Q2'26 margin spike. Strip out the anomalous quarter and NTRS is a 13% ROE bank at 2.86x book — historically that mix trades at 1.8-2.2x book, implying $115-145/share, not $165. That said, the rate environment tailwind is real and could persist through 2026-2027, and custody banks command a modest premium for balance-sheet strength. My fair value range: $150-170, centered around $160. At $186.66 that's 10-16% overvalued, which is close to synthesis but I have lower conviction on the upside case and higher conviction on the downside cap given Market Forces' structural read. This isn't a short — it's a "trim if you own it, don't chase" name. The Q2'26 print needs forensic examination before anyone underwrites forward earnings power at those levels; if that $792M was a securities gain or tax benefit, the "recovery" narrative collapses immediately.
GPT Reading
Northern Trust screens like a quality franchise, but the raw numbers say the stock is already charging you for that quality and then some. The first thing that jumps out is how odd the revenue line is: quarterly revenue runs around $1.20B-$1.35B most quarters, yet Q4 prints at $4.78B in 2024 and $4.38B in 2025. Whatever the accounting presentation, that makes simple trend-reading dangerous, and it is exactly why I don’t want to lean on the headline 9.3% revenue CAGR or the 4.6x sales multiple as if this were a clean SaaS-like stream. On an annual basis, revenue actually fell from $8.29B in 2024 to $8.09B in 2025, while net income dropped from $2.03B to $1.74B, a 14% earnings decline. That is not a growth profile that naturally deserves 21.4x earnings and 2.86x book for a custody/asset-servicing bank with a 13.4% ROE.
The more favorable interpretation is that 2026 is stabilizing, but even there the market looks ahead of the evidence. First-half 2026 revenue of $2.69B versus $2.44B in first-half 2025 is up about 10%, and net income of $1.32B versus $813M is up roughly 63%, which is genuinely strong. But the magnitude of the earnings jump is flattered by exceptionally high quarterly margins of 39.2% and 58.7%; for this company, those are not normal through-cycle economics. The latest quarter’s $792.2M of net income on $1.35B of revenue implies a near-59% net margin, which is so far above the company’s 2025 full-year margin of 21.5% and 2024’s 24.5% that I treat it as non-repeatable unless proven otherwise. If I annualize first-half 2026 net income, I get about $2.64B; against a $34.15B market cap, that is roughly 12.9x earnings. That sounds cheaper than the reported 21x P/E, but only if you believe this first-half profitability level is sustainable. I don’t.
The balance sheet and cash generation are the best parts of the story, but here too I think investors should be careful. Cash of $5.87B and a stated debt-to-equity ratio of zero are attractive, and $5.46B of free cash flow on just $74M of capex makes the business look like a cash machine. Yet for a financial institution, reported operating and free cash flow are often much less economically informative than for an industrial or software company because working capital and client-related balances can swamp underlying earning power. I put much more weight on equity and ROE, and on those terms Northern Trust is good, not exceptional: $12.96B of equity supports $1.74B of 2025 earnings, and the 13.4% ROE does not justify almost 3x book in a business facing fee pressure, mix shifts, and rate sensitivity. At $186.66, the market is paying a premium as if the company has both superior durability and better growth than the underlying annual results show.
The best argument against my caution is straightforward: the business may be in the middle of an earnings step-up that the annual statements haven’t caught yet. If first-half 2026 is not a one-off but a new run-rate, then the stock is not expensive at all. A company with no apparent debt, modest payout at 34.1%, some insider buying, and a trajectory from $392M, $421M, $458M, $466M, $526M to $792M in sequential quarterly net income deserves more credit than a backward-looking 2025 multiple suggests. You could also argue that premium-to-book is the right way to value a custody and wealth franchise with sticky assets and low credit risk, and that 2.86x book is tolerable if ROE is heading from 13%-14% toward the high teens. I weigh that differently because the revenue base has not shown commensurate acceleration, and when profits outrun revenue by this much in financials, the first suspects are mix, reserve, tax, mark-to-market, or other cyclical/episodic factors rather than a clean structural margin reset.
What would change my mind is simple: I want to see the income statement normalize at a higher level without relying on anomalous margins. If the next two quarters can hold revenue at or above roughly $1.35B per quarter and net income above $500M-$550M with net margins in the 35%-40% range, then a full-year earnings power above $2.2B starts to look credible and the current price becomes easier to defend. I’d also become more constructive if ROE moves sustainably above 15% without book-value erosion. Conversely, if revenue slips back toward the $1.20B-$1.25B range or margins retrace toward the low-30s, the stock should not be near $187; in that scenario, a valuation closer to 1.9x-2.2x book or about $155-$170 looks more appropriate.
Grok Reading
Northern Trust’s 2025 annuals show a business that stepped backward after a strong 2024: revenue slipped from $8.29B to $8.09B and net income fell from $2.03B to $1.74B, compressing the trailing ROE to 13.4% on $12.96B of equity. That still produces a clean 21.5% net margin and an enormous $5.46B free-cash-flow print against only $74M of capex, underscoring the capital-light custody-and-wealth fee engine once deposits and securities are stripped out. The 2026 quarters, however, are the real story in the tape: $1.34B and $1.35B of revenue with net income of $525M then $792M (39% and 59% margins) imply a run-rate that would annualize well above the $1.74B 2025 base if sustained. Those spikes are almost certainly net-interest-income and securities-related rather than fee-share gains; the sequential revenue glide from $1.21B to $1.35B over five clean quarters is only mid-single-digit, and the reported recent revenue YoY of –2.5% plus “low revenue confidence / decelerating” flag confirm that core fee growth remains pedestrian. At $186.66 the stock clears 21× trailing earnings and 2.86× book—rich for a 9% revenue CAGR that is already fading and for a franchise the market-forces layer correctly tags as scale-disadvantaged versus larger custodians.
The valuation synthesis fair-value band of roughly $165–$178 therefore looks directionally right; the current price embeds both the 2026 NII rebound and a durable mid-teens ROE that the 2023–2025 path has not consistently delivered. Debt-to-equity at zero and $5.87B of cash give genuine fortress quality, and the 1.8% yield on a 34% payout leaves ample room for buybacks funded by that $5B-plus FCF. Yet earnings CAGR of 25% is an artifact of the 2023 trough ($1.11B) rather than a structural acceleration, and the insider “buying” is trivial (255 shares). The narrative layer is correctly minimal: this is priced as a steady compounder, not a growth story, so any failure of the 2026 margin surge to stick leaves the multiple unsupported.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward: annualize the first-half 2026 net income near $2.6B, apply a still-premium but lower 16–17×, and the stock is suddenly 10–15% undervalued while the balance sheet and sticky $15T+ AUC franchise justify the scarcity premium. A bull would also note that FCF conversion far exceeds reported NI, so economic earnings power is understated, and that rising-rate or higher-for-longer regimes structurally lift NII for a custody bank with a large non-interest-bearing deposit base. I weigh that less heavily because the 58.7% quarterly margin is an outlier unlikely to be the new run-rate, the multi-year revenue line is flat-to-down, and competitive share loss to larger global custodians plus fee pressure from passive flows remain unrefuted by the numbers.
I would flip to constructive on two clean prints of quarterly revenue above $1.45B with net margins holding 35%+ (proving fee growth, not just NII), or a forward PE compressing below 16× on confirmed $2.2B+ earnings power without multiple expansion assumptions.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
NTRS is a mature trust/custody franchise generating $8.09B revenue (2025) with net income of $1.74B and reported FCF of $5.46B in the latest year. Cash of $5.87B against effectively zero net debt gives it a fortress liquidity position for a bank of this footprint, and OCF/NI of 1.6x plus negative accruals (-0.4% of assets) indicate earnings are backed by cash rather than aggressive accrual buildup. The Altman Z of 0.3 flag is a false positive here: Z-score is not meaningful for banks/trust institutions whose balance sheets are dominated by client deposits and custody-related assets.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment mix between custody/asset servicing vs wealth management and sensitivity to net interest income
- Driver of the 2024 negative FCF (deposit flow, securities portfolio, or working capital timing)
- Regulatory capital ratios (CET1, LCR) since Z-score is not meaningful for a trust bank
- AUC/AUA growth trend and pricing pressure in custody
- Any unrealized securities losses in AOCI that could constrain capital returns
The e2e synthesis lands at a composite FV of $177.52 (DCF $173.46, anchored P/E $185.65) with a signal-adjusted FV of $164.87, implying roughly -6% to -12% versus today's $186.82. Both independent methods sit below the price and they corroborate each other tightly, so I trust the read: the market is paying a small premium for a high-quality trust bank whose earnings quality is clean but whose growth is structurally modest. The Strong quality grade justifies pricing toward the top of the fair range, not above it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Fee-rate trend on custody/asset servicing - any compression accelerates the bear case
- NII sensitivity disclosures and deposit beta as rates normalize
- Buyback pace and capital return guidance - key to per-share compounding
- Alternatives and non-US institutional AUM growth - the only real upside lever vs the base case
NTRS carries no live narrative pressure in either direction. The archetype is steady-compounder with minimal intensity and low cult coefficient, meaning the market is not currently repricing this name on story. The tape is mildly risk-on (+28), which normally favors a 1.26-beta financial, but the regime is only one day old and NTRS has just cooled -2.5% off its longer 9.3% trend, suggesting it is not participating in whatever risk appetite exists. News flow is inert: team hires and generic dividend-income roundups, nothing that moves sentiment. There is no analyst revision wave, no thematic bid, and no thematic seller. This is a name the market is simply not talking about. The macro backdrop is the only real force in the picture. A 4.7% ten-year and a 25.7 market PE press on all equities, and for an asset-servicing / wealth franchise the rate level cuts both ways: supportive for NII, but a drag on AUM-linked fees if multiples wobble and a headwind for the sector's relative appeal versus Treasuries themselves (the very news items pitch dividend stocks against multi-year-high yields). Net: a small macro headwind, a small regime tailwind, no narrative push. Pressure is close to neutral, leaning very slightly negative because the stock is fading on a day the tape is up.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the risk-on regime persists past a few sessions and financials start participating
- Any analyst target revisions post next AUC/AUM print
- Direction of the 10y - a move back under 4.3% would meaningfully lift wealth/custody sentiment
- Fund-flow data showing active-to-passive pressure accelerating or stabilizing
The world is moving toward more assets under administration (a volume tailwind) at ever-lower basis points (a price headwind), and Northern Trust sits on the wrong side of that scissor for revenue growth while on the right side for stickiness. Institutional custody is an oligopoly where scale sets price; NTRS is the smallest of the major trust banks and therefore the price-taker, which is why it lags a category compounding at ~6%. Offsetting this: the franchise is genuinely hard to displace — operational, regulatory and fiduciary switching costs mean fintech disintermediation hits the periphery (payments, reporting tools), not the record of ownership. Higher-for-longer rates are a real, if temporary, earnings subsidy; the macro backdrop (10y 4.7%, positive curve) currently helps NII and hurts nothing structural. The honest read is a durable, slow-compounding utility of institutional finance whose growth is set by market levels and cost discipline rather than by share gains.
When we made this prediction on Aug 26, 2026, NTRS was $187.18. We expect it to be $187.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $158.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 26, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.