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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for NVR, Inc. (NVR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-11): Designation Watch · Cairn score +4 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 83 · Value -60 · Sentiment -51 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $5,932.53 vs $6,207.46 at analysis
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price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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NVR, Inc. is a U.S. homebuilding and mortgage banking company headquartered in Reston, Virginia. Through its Ryan Homes, NVHomes, and Heartland Homes brands, the company designs and builds newly constructed single-family homes, townhomes, and selected condominiums in targeted metropolitan markets across the eastern United States. Its homebuilding operations are complemented by mortgage origination, title, and settlement services that support the homebuying process. NVR focuses on for-sale residential housing and operates through two main business segments: Homebuilding and Mortgage Banking. The company serves individual homebuyers seeking new homes in planned communities, while its integrated service model helps streamline financing and closing activities within its core markets.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 11| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 23, 2026 | $89.98 | $83.96 -6.7% | — | — |
| Jul 9, 2026 | $0.04 | $-0.02 -150.0% | — | — |
| Apr 22, 2026 | $79.20 | $67.76 -14.4% | — | — |
| Mar 4, 2026 | $0.06 | $0.15 +150.0% | — | — |
| Jan 28, 2026 | $105.90 | $121.54 +14.8% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 11, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Aug 5, 2026 | 10-Q | View |
| Jul 31, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 23, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Jun 26, 2026 | 11-K | View |
| May 29, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 18, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 18, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 18, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 18, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 18, 2026 | 4 | View |
| May 18, 2026 | 4 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 436.55
Total Equity: $3.86B
Shares: 3,069,103
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.96B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.96B
Revenue: $10.32B
Revenue: $10.32B
Revenue: $10.32B
Total Equity: $3.86B
Tax Rate: 24.0%
Equity: $3.86B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.96B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $3.86B
Shares: 3,069,103
Shares: 3,069,103
CapEx: -$24.51M
Shares: 3,069,103
Stock Price: $6,207
Net Income: $1.34B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:33pm (7d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $9.0B | $10.5B | $9.5B | $10.5B | $10.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $345.37 | $525.20 | $491.52 | $540.88 | $462.00 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $320.48 | $491.82 | $463.31 | $506.69 | $436.55 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:13pm (7d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.6B | $2.6B | $3.2B | $2.7B | $2.0B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $5.8B | $5.7B | $6.6B | $6.4B | $5.9B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $2.8B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.0B |
| Total Equity | $3.0B | $3.5B | $4.4B | $4.2B | $3.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $10.0B | $11.8B | $13.4B | $15.0B | $16.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:33pm (7d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.2B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$17.9M | -$18.4M | -$24.9M | -$29.2M | -$24.5M |
| Free Cash Flow | $1.2B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $0 | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.5B | -$1.5B | -$1.1B | -$2.1B | -$1.8B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$172.8M | -$62.5M | $640.9M | -$550.8M | -$707.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:33pm (7d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +17.6% | -9.6% | +10.6% | -1.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +39.5% | -7.8% | +5.7% | -20.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:13pm (7d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1990-02-23 | $0.17 | — | — | — |
| 1989-10-26 | $0.23 | — | — | — |
| 1989-07-26 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 1989-04-19 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 1989-02-16 | $0.19 | — | — | — |
| 1988-11-08 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 1988-07-26 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 1988-03-25 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 1987-12-24 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:24pm (7d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-30 | Martinez Melquiades R. | G-Gift | 29.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The trajectory here is uglier than the "mature_earner" label lets on. Q1 2026 revenue of $1.88B is down 22% sequentially from Q4 2025's $2.71B and down 22% YoY from Q1 2025's $2.40B — and net margin compressed to 10.5%, the lowest print in the file, versus 16.1% in Q4 2024. This isn't a modest cyclical shading; it's a 570bp margin collapse over five quarters alongside accelerating revenue declines. Annual NI has gone $1.73B (2022) → $1.59B → $1.68B → $1.34B (2025), a 22% decline from peak, and the Q1 2026 run-rate (~$800M annualized NI if the quarter is representative) would mark another ~40% down leg. The 14.2x trailing P/E is on earnings that are actively rerating lower — forward P/E on a $800M-$1.0B NI scenario is 17-20x, not cheap for a builder in a downcycle.
I agree directionally with the synthesis "fully_priced" and Market Forces "value trap" reads, and I think they're actually being too generous. The composite fair value of $5,932 assumes some normalization; if you take Q1 2026 as the new baseline rather than an anomaly, fair value on trough earnings at a cycle-appropriate 12x is closer to $4,500-$5,000. The pre-flight note that the stock is "down 28% from 52-week highs" is doing a lot of work — that's still a stock trading at 4.9x book and 1.85x sales in a sector where peers (DHI, LEN, PHM) trade at 1.0-1.4x book during downcycles. The zero-debt fortress narrative is real and I won't dismiss it — $1.96B cash, no debt, 34.7% ROE trailing — but ROE is a lagging metric on a business where the earnings denominator is falling fast. The narrative layer nails it: this is "cyclical compounder riding a cyclical narrative" and the premium is fragile.
The contrarian case worth engaging: NVR's land-option model means it can shrink capital employed faster than owned-land peers in a downturn, protecting ROE and enabling aggressive buybacks at trough. The company has historically retired 3-5% of shares annually, and at $6,200 with $1.96B cash they can keep compounding per-share value even through a volume trough. If mortgage rates drop 150bps in 2026-2027 (not implausible), the operating leverage cuts both ways and 2028 EPS could exceed 2024 peak. That's the bull case for patient capital — but Market Forces is right that it's 3-4 years away, and you're paying peak-cycle multiples on trough earnings to wait. The insider data is uninformative (all awards and one small option exercise, no open-market buys signaling conviction at these levels — notable absence given the drawdown).
Where I flag the models: the "Low Revenue Confidence" and "decelerating" tags understate the severity — this isn't deceleration, it's a step-function break in Q1 2026 that deserves its own investigation (seasonality? one-time? mix?). The DCF anchor of $5,932 likely uses smoothed historicals that don't reflect the Q1 print. I dissent modestly from the synthesis by being more bearish: fair value is closer to $5,000-$5,300 than $5,932, and the -20% signal-adjusted gap to $4,964 is probably right for the wrong reason (methods disagreeing masks that the recent-quarter reality is worse than the annuals show). No reason to own this above $5,500; better homebuilder entries exist at deeper book-value discounts. Wait for either a Q2 print that confirms Q1 was noise, or a re-rating to sub-$5,000 that prices in the trough properly.
GPT Reading
What jumps out is not that NVR is “broken,” but that earnings power has clearly stepped down while the stock still trades like a premium compounder. Revenue barely changed from $10.52B in 2024 to $10.32B in 2025, down 1.9%, but net income fell much harder, from $1.68B to $1.34B, a 20% drop. That is the key fact. Net margin compressed from roughly 16.0% in 2024 to 13.0% in 2025, and the quarterly trend shows the same story: 2024 quarters were running 15.3%-16.1% net margins, while 2025 ran 12.5%-13.4%, and 2026 Q1 slipped to 10.5% on $1.88B of revenue versus $2.40B a year earlier. This is not a mild cyclical wobble; it is a material earnings reset driven by lower volume and weaker profitability at the same time. A 14.2x trailing P/E for a cyclical builder is not expensive in isolation, but it is not obviously cheap either when the “E” is still declining and the latest quarter annualizes well below the last twelve months.
The bull case for NVR’s quality is real. Zero debt, $1.96B of cash, just $24.5M of capex, and $1.10B of free cash flow on $1.34B of net income is excellent. ROE of 34.7% and ROA of 22.9% are elite, even allowing for buybacks and an asset-light land model. This is exactly why NVR deserves a premium to average homebuilders: it can survive a downturn without balance-sheet strain and continue compounding through repurchases. But the market already knows this. At a $16.62B market cap, investors are paying about 1.85x sales and 4.93x book for a business whose five-year revenue CAGR is only 4.2% and whose earnings CAGR is negative 8.3%. The quality is undeniable; the argument is with the price being asked for that quality while the cycle deteriorates.
The most important contradiction in the data is between the “fortress” narrative and the current operating trajectory. A fortress balance sheet protects downside, but it does not immunize earnings. If 2026 Q1’s $198.4M net income were anywhere close to a new run rate, annual earnings would be under $800M, which would make the stock look much more like a 20x+ cyclical at today’s price. I would not extrapolate one quarter mechanically, but the direction matters: revenue down 21.7% year over year in Q1 and margin down 200 basis points suggests affordability pressure is now hitting harder than the premium valuation acknowledges. NVR can absolutely emerge stronger than peers, yet being the best house in a weakening neighborhood does not mean the house is cheap.
The best case against my view is straightforward: NVR has repeatedly earned a premium because it is not a normal builder. The company’s capital-light model, huge cash balance, and strong cash conversion mean book value understates economic value, so a near-5x P/B is less alarming than it looks. Trailing earnings of $1.34B against a $16.62B market cap may be only 12%-13% below prior-cycle highs, not a collapse, and if mortgage rates stabilize and seasonal demand improves, margins could recover from the 10.5% Q1 trough back toward 13%-14%. On that view, the stock at $6,200 is paying a fair mid-teens multiple for normalized earnings power around $1.2B-$1.4B, plus the option on aggressive buybacks given nearly $2B of cash and no debt. I weigh that argument less heavily because the numbers in front of us show continued sequential and year-over-year erosion, not stabilization, and cyclicals rarely bottom at premium multiples before estimates stop falling.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2026 Q1 was an air pocket rather than a new base. Specifically, I would want to see revenue back above $2.3B in a coming quarter and net margin recovering to at least 12.5%-13.0%, which would imply the earnings reset is manageable rather than ongoing. For the full year, if NVR can hold net income near $1.2B despite the weak start and continue generating around $1B of FCF, then today’s price is defensible. Conversely, if quarterly earnings remain around $200M-$250M and revenue keeps tracking below the 2025 pace, the stock is still too expensive even after its drawdown.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality compounder whose earnings power is rolling over in real time. Annual revenue slipped from $10.52B in 2024 to $10.32B in 2025 while net income fell harder, from $1.68B to $1.34B; the trailing net margin compressed to 13.0% from the mid-teens that characterized 2022–2024. The most recent quarter is the clearest warning shot: Q1 2026 revenue of $1.88B and a 10.5% net margin sit well below the $2.40–2.85B and 12.5–16.1% range of the prior eight quarters. Earnings CAGR of –8.3% and FCF CAGR of –13.7% confirm the direction of travel is down, not sideways. Against that backdrop the stock still trades at 14.2× trailing earnings and 4.9× book for a $16.6B equity value. Free-cash-flow generation remains excellent—$1.10B FCF on only $24.5M of capex—but that cash flow is itself shrinking, so the 6.6% FCF yield is a trailing snapshot, not a forward run-rate.
What stands out is the balance-sheet fortress sitting beside deteriorating operating leverage. Zero debt, $1.96B of cash and a 34.7% ROE are genuine differentiators; the asset-light land-option model and mortgage banking adjacency have historically let NVR protect returns better than land-heavy peers. Yet those structural advantages have not prevented a roughly 300 bp margin squeeze or a 20% year-over-year drop in recent quarterly earnings. The valuation synthesis that places fair value near $5,000–5,900 therefore looks directionally correct: at $6,207 the market is still embedding a recovery in volumes and a partial restoration of 15%+ margins that the latest print does not support. Revenue confidence is low and the quarterly trend is decelerating; treating 14× as “cheap” on a declining earnings base is the classic late-cycle mistake.
The strongest counter-argument is that NVR is precisely the homebuilder you want to own through an affordability trough. A clean balance sheet, sector-leading ROE, near-perfect FCF conversion and a historically mid-range multiple mean the company can buy back stock, wait out high mortgage rates and emerge with share. The stock is already 28% off its highs, housing supply remains structurally tight, and any sustained move in the 10-year yield lower would re-rate both volumes and the multiple simultaneously. In that framing, paying a modest premium for the highest-quality operator is rational, and the DCF haircut to $4,964 over-weights near-term cyclical noise. I weigh this less heavily because the margin compression is already visible in the reported numbers, not merely forecasted, and because the narrative premium for “supply shortage” is itself fragile once unemployment or home-price momentum turns.
I would reverse the overvalued call if two consecutive quarters show revenue back above $2.5B with net margins stabilizing at 13% or better, or if the 30-year mortgage rate settles sustainably below 6% while NVR’s order backlog begins expanding again. Until those prints appear, the risk-reward at $6,200 remains skewed to the downside.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · four lenses
NVR runs the rare land-option homebuilder model: $1.96B liquid cash equal to net cash (no net debt), Altman Z of 10.69 deep in the safe zone, and $1.10B of FCF in 2025 on top of a five-year run of positive FCF ($1.22B, $1.85B, $1.47B, $1.35B, $1.10B). The business is fully self-funding and does not need external capital. Earnings quality is clean: accruals only 1.5% of assets, OCF/NI 0.94x, no mechanical red flags. Per-share value has been aggressively concentrated. Diluted shares went from 3.9M in 2021 to 3.1M in 2025, a roughly -5.6% CAGR, with buybacks running ~21x SBC and SBC only 0.7% of revenue - among the most disciplined capital returners in the market. Revenue is roughly flat around $10B through a tough housing cycle and net income of $1.34B-$1.73B has held up, showing durability rather than growth heroics. The 2025 slippage is worth flagging but not alarming: net income fell from $1.68B to $1.34B and FCF stepped down from $1.85B (2022) to $1.10B, consistent with a softer housing backdrop, not deterioration in the operating model. Insider tape shows only routine awards and one small option exercise; no open-market P/S signal either way.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Actual gross and operating margin trend by year (raw table shows 0s) to confirm operating leverage durability
- Land-option vs owned-lot mix in the 10-K to verify the capital-light model is intact
- Order backlog, cancellation rates, and ASP trends to gauge whether 2025 softness continues
- Buyback authorization remaining and pace vs 2025 FCF
- Any customer/geographic concentration in the homebuilding segment
At $6,207 the price sits above every serious anchor: composite FV $5,933 (-4%), signal-adjusted FV $4,964 (-20%), DCF $6,188 (essentially at price), and anchored P/E $5,421 (-13%). The DCF is the most generous read and only just matches spot; every method that leans on multiples or cyclical normalization comes in lower. So the market is paying a full peak-cycle multiple for a homebuilder whose 2025 earnings and FCF already stepped down.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Order backlog and cancellation rates in the next 10-Q
- Gross margin trajectory as older, lower-cost lots roll off
- Pace of buyback vs current share price
- Any guidance on 2026 community count and ASPs
The broad tape is neutral-to-mildly-constructive (VIX 16, S&P near highs), so this is not a risk-off mauling. But NVR sits in exactly the wrong narrative slot: cyclical-late-stage, fragile durability, low cult. With the 10y at 4.68% and mortgage rates sticky above 6%, the affordability story is the dominant press on the whole homebuilder cohort, and NVR's low beta (0.9) does not shield it because the pressure is sector-specific, not market-wide. The stock is down 18.4% over six months versus a +4.9% S&P, which is the tape telling you the 'supply shortage forever' narrative is cracking. Recent news flow is ambivalent-to-negative: 'Buy, Sell, or Hold' framings after a soft Q2 and 'fair value debate back in focus' pieces are exactly the kind of coverage that shows up when a premium multiple starts getting questioned. Buybacks are the one active counter-narrative supporting the name, but they are a floor, not a story. Net: modest but persistent headwind, driven by narrative erosion and rate stickiness rather than a market-wide shock.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the 10y breaks back below 4.25% - would materially relieve the sector narrative
- New-home order trends in the next print - the pivot indicator for whether the demand-destruction bear thesis is confirming
- Sell-side target revisions post-Q2 - watch for whether the 'best-in-class premium' language survives or gets trimmed
- Mortgage rate direction and any Fed guidance shift that would rekindle the supply-shortage narrative
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.