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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Oracle Corporation (ORCL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -43 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -13 · Value -68 · Sentiment 19 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $113.99 vs $127.56 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Oracle Corporation
ORCL NYSEOracle Corporation is a global technology company that delivers enterprise software and cloud infrastructure solutions to organizations of all sizes. The company focuses on database management systems, enterprise applications, and cloud services that support critical business operations in areas such as finance, human resources, supply chain, customer experience, and industry-specific workloads. Oracle’s portfolio spans cloud and license software, hardware, and consulting and support services, enabling customers to deploy solutions on-premises, in public or private clouds, or in hybrid environments. Its flagship database technologies and middleware are widely used for high-volume transaction processing, analytics, and data management across sectors including financial services, telecommunications, government, manufacturing, and retail. Oracle also provides enterprise resource planning, customer relationship management, and other business applications, as well as cloud infrastructure that is used for running modern applications and training and deploying large AI models. Founded in 1977 and headquartered in Austin, Texas, Oracle Corporation is a key player in the global enterprise software and cloud computing market.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.83
Total Equity: $43.06B
Shares: 2,914,000,000
Total Debt: $7.20B
Cash: $31.29B
EBITDA: $28.23B
Total Debt: $7.20B
Cash: $31.29B
Revenue: $67.36B
Revenue: $67.36B
Revenue: $67.36B
Total Equity: $43.06B
Tax Rate: 12.5%
Equity: $43.06B
Total Debt: $7.20B
Cash: $31.29B
Current Liabilities: $41.76B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $7.20B
Total Equity: $43.06B
Shares: 2,914,000,000
Shares: 2,914,000,000
CapEx: -$55.66B
Shares: 2,914,000,000
Stock Price: $127.56
Net Income: $17.09B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 12:35am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $42.4B | $50.0B | $53.0B | $57.4B | $67.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $10.9B | $13.1B | $15.4B | $17.7B | $20.6B |
| Net Income | $6.7B | $8.5B | $10.5B | $12.4B | $17.1B |
| EBITDA | $12.9B | $15.6B | $18.5B | $21.5B | $28.2B |
| EPS | $2.49 | $3.15 | $3.82 | $4.46 | $5.94 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.41 | $3.07 | $3.71 | $4.34 | $5.83 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 12:02am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $21.4B | $9.8B | $10.5B | $10.8B | $31.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $31.6B | $21.0B | $22.6B | $24.6B | $46.6B |
| Total Assets | $109.3B | $134.4B | $141.0B | $168.4B | $261.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $19.5B | $23.1B | $31.5B | $32.6B | $41.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $115.1B | $132.8B | $131.7B | $147.4B | $218.7B |
| Total Equity | -$5.8B | $1.6B | $9.2B | $21.0B | $43.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$31.3B | -$27.6B | -$22.6B | -$15.5B | -$4.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 12:35am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $9.5B | $17.2B | $18.7B | $20.8B | $32.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.5B | -$8.7B | -$6.9B | -$21.2B | -$55.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $5.0B | $8.5B | $11.8B | -$394.0M | -$23.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$148.0M | -$27.7B | -$63.0M | $0 | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$3.5B | -$3.7B | -$4.4B | -$4.7B | -$5.8B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$16.2B | -$1.3B | -$1.2B | -$600.0M | -$95.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$8.7B | -$11.6B | $689.0M | $332.0M | $20.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 12:35am (23d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +17.7% | +6.0% | +8.4% | +17.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +19.8% | +17.3% | +15.1% | +16.6% |
| Net Income Growth | +26.6% | +23.1% | +18.9% | +37.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +21.1% | +18.3% | +16.6% | +31.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 12:03am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-10 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-09 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-09 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-09 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-10 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-10 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-10 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-10 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-11 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-09 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-10 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-11 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-11 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-10 | $0.40 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-09 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-11 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-11 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-07 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-06 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-08 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a jarring story that the "mature_earner" and "steady-compounder" labels obscure. Revenue accelerated from $13.31B (Aug-24) to $19.18B (May-26) — that's 44% growth over seven quarters, with the most recent YoY at 17.4% and sequential Q4 growth of 11.6%. Annual revenue jumped from $57.40B to $67.36B (17.4%), and operating income from $17.68B to $20.61B. This is not a mature earner's trajectory; it's an inflection. But — and this is what every prior model underweights — free cash flow was **negative $23.69B** on capex of $55.66B against operating CF of $31.98B. Oracle is spending 174% of operating cash flow on capex to build OCI capacity for the Stargate/OpenAI-style commitments. The 21.9x P/E is being computed on GAAP earnings that don't yet reflect the depreciation cliff coming from that $55.66B capex base.
The synthesis "fair value $106.60, signal-adjusted $118.21" is anchored on trailing multiples and implicitly assumes the capex normalizes without a corresponding revenue payoff — but that's incoherent. Either the RPO/backlog from AI infrastructure deals materializes (in which case FY27-28 revenue is dramatically higher than any DCF assumes, and $127 is cheap) OR the capex is a value-destroying arms race against hyperscalers with better unit economics (in which case ROIC collapses from that suspicious 95% figure — which is a stale annual metric that doesn't capture the invested capital surge — and fair value is well below $100). The "-7.3% overvalued" verdict splits the difference and captures neither scenario. The market_forces model at least flags "deteriorating cash flow quality" and "unproven competitive positioning against hyperscalers" — that's the right worry. Debt at $7.20B looks benign now but Oracle will need to fund the capex gap; expect leverage to climb materially.
A careful contrarian would press three points. First, the Q3 FY26 net income of $6.14B at 38.2% margin is an outlier — likely tax or one-time item — and smoothing it out puts underlying quarterly margins closer to 21-22%, meaning the "27.8% earnings CAGR" is partly noise. Second, the insider activity on 2026-06-24 shows ~359K shares sold across seven transactions after a 400K option exercise — that's routine, but the timing (post-run-up, before the capex bill fully hits reported financials) deserves note; "Neutral" is generous. Third, the bull thesis rests on OCI + Autonomous Database sustaining 25-30%+ growth, but Oracle doesn't break out OCI cleanly, and the "37% revenue growth" the pre-flight cites doesn't appear in the actual data — YoY is 17.4%, not 37%. Someone conflated a segment number with total. That matters: at 17% consolidated growth and a 5.5x P/S, Oracle is priced for continued acceleration, not stabilization.
I dissent partially from the synthesis "fair value" verdict. The composite $106-118 range is too low if you believe the AI infrastructure backlog is real (management has cited RPO growth of ~350% to over $450B — not in this data file, but publicly disclosed), and too high if you don't. The stock is a binary bet on OCI monetization, and $127.56 is roughly the price where reasonable people disagree — which is exactly where a binary should trade. My read: the balance of evidence — accelerating revenue, sector leadership, database lock-in on AI training workloads — tilts slightly bullish, but the negative FCF, opaque segment reporting, and hyperscaler competition make this uninvestable at 5.5x sales without conviction on the backlog conversion rate. I'd want to see two more quarters of capex-to-revenue ratio improving, or evidence that OCI gross margins are hyperscaler-competitive (not just growing). Fair value on current visibility is $110-135, with wide error bars; current price sits in-range but closer to the top. Not a buy, not a short, and the models calling this "fair value" are directionally right but for weaker reasons than they claim — the risk isn't valuation, it's execution on $50B+ of annual capex.
GPT Reading
Oracle’s numbers show a company that is growing faster than its “legacy software” reputation, but the market is already paying for that upgrade. Revenue has gone from $42.44B in 2022 to $67.36B in 2026, a 59% increase in four years, while operating income nearly doubled from $10.93B to $20.61B and net income rose from $6.72B to $17.09B. That is not stagnation; it is a real acceleration in scale and profitability. The quarterly trend is also strong: the latest quarter at $19.18B grew 20.6% versus $15.90B a year earlier, and the prior quarter grew 21.7% versus $14.13B. Even backing out the unusually high 38.2% margin quarter in November 2025, Oracle is consistently posting net margins around 20%-22%, and the annual net margin of 25.4% is excellent for a company still investing heavily. On earnings optics alone, 21.9x trailing earnings for a business growing revenue 17%-20% and earnings 30%+ does not look extreme.
But the single most important fact in this dataset is that free cash flow was negative $23.69B in 2026 because capex exploded to $55.66B against operating cash flow of $31.98B. For Oracle, that is not a footnote; it is the valuation debate. A software company can report beautiful margins while destroying near-term owner earnings if infrastructure investment outruns returns. The balance sheet gives Oracle room to do this — $31.29B of cash against just $7.20B of debt is unusually conservative for a mega-cap software name — so this is not a solvency problem. It is a return-on-incremental-capital problem. At $367B market cap and 5.5x sales, investors are implicitly assuming that the capex surge is building a durable, monetizable cloud platform rather than merely funding a lower-return arms race. If OCI demand is as strong as bulls think, this spend can be rational. If not, the stock is being valued off accounting earnings while true cash earnings are temporarily absent. That makes me less forgiving than a simple P/E screen would suggest.
There is also a subtle quality issue in the recent earnings arc. Annual net income jumped from $12.44B to $17.09B, up 37%, faster than revenue growth of 17%. Some of that is operating leverage, which is encouraging. But quarterly profitability is not smooth: $6.14B of net income on $16.06B revenue in the November 2025 quarter implies a 38.2% margin, wildly above Oracle’s normal range. That suggests items below the operating line or one-time effects helped the annual earnings base. Even if the business is genuinely better, I would rather anchor on operating cash flow and operating income, where the story is “strong but not miraculous.” On those measures, Oracle deserves a premium to shrinking legacy vendors, but not an open-ended cloud multiple. Around 12.1x EV/EBITDA and 5.1x EV/revenue, the stock is not priced like AWS or a fast SaaS compounder, yet it also is not cheap enough to ignore the risk that capex intensity remains structurally high.
The best case against my caution is straightforward: Oracle may be in the middle of a rare large-cap reacceleration, and the market could still be underestimating it. Two years ago annual revenue was $52.96B; now it is $67.36B. Operating margin improved to 30.6%, ROE is 39.7%, and the company has net cash. If the $55.66B capex is front-loaded, then reported free cash flow is temporarily depressed while future revenue is not yet fully reflected. In that scenario, today’s 21.9x earnings could actually be cheap for a business that emerges with much higher infrastructure and database revenue and sustained high-teens top-line growth. A smart bull would also say Oracle’s installed base gives it a captive funnel that hyperscalers do not have in the same way. I weigh that argument less heavily because the evidence provided proves spend, not return. Massive capex can create a moat, but it can also cap future free-cash-flow conversion and keep the multiple from expanding.
What would change my mind is clear. If Oracle can hold revenue growth above 15% while bringing capex sharply down from $55.66B toward something that allows free cash flow to turn decisively positive again, then the current price starts to look attractive and I would move bullish quickly. Likewise, if operating cash flow keeps compounding from $31.98B without deterioration in margins, that would validate the investment cycle. The flip side is just as clear: if revenue growth falls back toward low teens while capex stays anywhere near current levels, the market will stop rewarding EPS and begin valuing the company on impaired cash conversion, and a stock at $127.56 would look rich. My base case is that Oracle is a good company priced slightly ahead of the evidence, with fair value closer to the high teens on earnings only if cash flow normalizes soon; absent that, I struggle to justify much above roughly $110-$120.
Grok Reading
Oracle’s numbers describe a company mid-transformation that is finally putting real growth on the scoreboard after years of being dismissed as a legacy cash cow. Fiscal 2026 revenue hit $67.36B, up 17.4% from $57.40B, with the quarterly sequence accelerating hard: $14.93B → $16.06B → $17.19B → $19.18B. Net income climbed even faster, from $12.44B to $17.09B (+37%), and operating margin held at 30.6%. That is not the profile of a mature earner quietly harvesting maintenance contracts; it is the installed-base moat converting into cloud and infrastructure demand at scale. The balance sheet is fortress-like—$31.29B cash against only $7.20B debt, D/E of 0.17—and operating cash flow of $31.98B proves the core engine still throws off enormous cash. At $127.56 the stock trades at 21.9x earnings and 5.5x sales, a multiple that would look rich for a 5% grower but is undemanding for a software franchise compounding revenue in the high teens with expanding earnings power. The 63% drawdown from prior highs has already purged a great deal of narrative premium.
The glaring contradiction sits in free cash flow: –$23.69B after $55.66B of capex. That is not maintenance spending; it is a deliberate, multi-year build-out of OCI capacity on a scale that rivals the hyperscalers. ROIC prints an almost absurd 95% on the existing capital base while ROA is only 6.5%, underscoring how asset-intensive the new chapter has become. The market is being asked to underwrite that this capex is moat-deepening rather than value-destroying, and the recent revenue acceleration is the first hard evidence that the bet is landing. Insider activity is noise—option exercises followed by partial sales—while the 1.6% dividend and 34% payout ratio remain intact, signaling management is not starving shareholders while it builds.
The strongest case against this read is straightforward and quantitative. Negative FCF of nearly $24B on a $367B market cap cannot be hand-waved indefinitely; if OCI growth stalls or fails to take share from AWS, Azure and Google, Oracle will have incinerated tens of billions with little to show beyond depreciating servers. The valuation models already flag the stock as 7% above their $118 signal-adjusted fair value, and EV/EBITDA of 12x leaves limited room for execution stumbles. Cerner’s integration still carries margin and cultural risk, and the 38% net margin spike in the November quarter looks non-recurring, reminding anyone that reported earnings can be lumpy. A smart skeptic would argue the 17% revenue growth is still heavily reliant on price increases and database lock-in rather than genuine architectural wins in new workloads, and that multiple compression is the base case once capex intensity becomes obvious to the broader market.
I would reverse course if the next two quarters show revenue growth decelerating below 12% while capex stays above $12B per quarter, or if free cash flow remains worse than –$5B without clear evidence that OCI backlog is converting at rising incremental margins. Sustained cloud infrastructure growth above 30% with a visible path to FCF inflection within four quarters would, conversely, make today’s price look like a gift.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Oracle's operating business looks stronger than it has in years: revenue accelerated from $42.4B (FY22) to $67.4B (FY26), a 12.3% CAGR that reaccelerated to 18.5% in the latest year, while operating margin expanded from 25.7% to 30.6%. Net income nearly tripled from $6.72B to $17.09B over four years. Share count is well-behaved, with diluted shares up only 1.1% CAGR and buybacks roughly offsetting the 7.1%-of-revenue SBC. This is a genuinely mature, high-margin infrastructure software franchise with pricing power and operating leverage. However, the cash story broke hard. FCF swung from +$11.81B in FY24 to -$0.39B in FY25 to -$23.69B in FY26 — a ~$35B two-year swing driven by the AI/cloud capex build. Liquid cash of $31.3B against that burn implies roughly 5 quarters of runway before external financing, and Altman Z of 1.52 sits in the distress zone. OCF/NI of 1.75x and accruals of -5.1% of assets say the reported earnings themselves are cash-backed at the operating line; the stress is entirely on the investing line. Insider tape is unremarkable: Henley's ~$63M of sales were all same-day option-exercise-and-sell mechanics, zero open-market buys, no unusual cluster. Management behavior signals conviction in the capex plan (they are borrowing/spending, not distributing), but shareholders are being asked to underwrite a very large, concentrated bet on AI infrastructure demand materializing as booked.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- RPO/backlog composition and customer concentration in the AI cloud bookings (OpenAI etc.) from 10-K and latest 10-Q
- Debt schedule, maturities, and covenants — how the -$23.7B FCF is being financed and at what rate
- Capex guidance for FY27-FY28 and expected FCF inflection year
- Gross margin by segment (cloud infra vs license/support) — the reported 0 GM in the trajectory table looks like a data artifact; confirm actual GM trend
- Contractual commitments for GPUs/data-center leases that are off-balance-sheet
- Whether the Altman Z distress reading reflects real leverage or model-fit issues for asset-light software
The composite fair value sits at $106.60 and the signal-adjusted FV at $118.21, both below the $127.56 quote - implying roughly -7% to -16% downside to deserved value, not a discount. The anchored-PE method stretches to $165 but relies on continued multiple expansion into an AI narrative; the EPV floor of $48 shows what the legacy cash engine alone is worth. Splitting the difference honestly, deserved value sits in the $105-$120 zone, and today's price sits at the top or above that band. There is no margin of safety here. The Mixed quality grade (-13) reinforces caution: the operating franchise is excellent, but FCF has turned sharply negative on the OCI/AI capex bet and leverage is stretched, which should REDUCE, not raise, the deserved multiple relative to a clean-balance-sheet compounder. The market is paying a growth-stock price for a business whose free cash flow is currently going backwards. To justify $127.56 you have to underwrite that the AI-infrastructure bet compounds at 30%+ for years and translates into FCF, not just booked revenue - a heroic assumption already embedded. Fairly-valued-to-rich is the honest read; I would want a real pullback before this becomes interesting on price.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- OCI/cloud infrastructure revenue growth rate and RPO conversion cadence in next print
- Capex guidance and expected FCF inflection timing - when does the AI build stop consuming cash
- Net debt trajectory and interest coverage given the leverage buildup
- Gross margin trend in OCI vs legacy - is the growth accretive or dilutive to unit economics
The pressure on Oracle right now is net positive but not euphoric. The prime story - that OCI and Autonomous Database are a real, if late, cloud win - just got a same-day validation via an expanded Gemini partnership with Google and a blowout Microsoft cloud print that reinforced the whole enterprise-AI-infrastructure narrative. News flow explicitly frames ORCL as 'beaten-down' catching a bid, which is textbook narrative repair after a soft patch. That is a tailwind that lands harder on ORCL than on the average software name because Oracle's story specifically needs external proof points that hyperscaler-adjacent cloud demand is durable. Cutting the other way: the tape is neutral-to-nervous (VIX 17, S&P off its high, 10y at 4.67, market PE 26), and ORCL's 1.71 beta means any risk-off flare-up hits this name roughly 70% harder than the index. There is also a specific overhang in the news - Aschenbrenner's Situational Awareness fund dumping AI-adjacent equities to Citadel, and an AI-chip selloff - which caps how far sentiment can run. Analyst tone is not screaming; the archetype is a steady compounder with moderate intensity and low cult coefficient, so this is a grind-higher setup, not a mania. Net: narrative and news are pushing up, macro is a mild drag amplified by beta. Tailwind, not Strong Tailwind.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether ORCL holds the Gemini/MSFT-driven bounce over the next 5-10 sessions or fades back - tells you if the narrative repair is real
- Sell-side target revisions in the next 2 weeks tied to the Google partnership
- Any crack in hyperscaler capex commentary from AMZN/GOOGL earnings - would hit the OCI validation thesis
- VIX breaking above 20 or 10y above 4.85 - would flip the high-beta math against ORCL fast
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 31, 2026, ORCL was $127.56. We expect it to be $115.00 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $100.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 31, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.