Business Description
Oracle Corporation, a global technology giant, provides a comprehensive suite of enterprise information technology solutions worldwide. A core part of its portfolio comprises cloud-based software-as-a-service (SaaS) applications, including the Oracle Fusion Cloud suite covering enterprise resource planning (ERP), enterprise performance management (EPM), supply chain and manufacturing management (SCM), and human capital management (HCM). This also extends to specialized offerings like Oracle Advertising, the NetSuite application suite, and Oracle Fusion solutions for Sales, Service, and Marketing. Beyond these, Oracle develops cloud solutions tailored for various specific industries, alongside traditional application licenses and comprehensive license support services. Furthermore, the company's robust cloud and licensing business is underpinned by its infrastructure technologies. These include the flagship Oracle Database, the widely adopted Java programming language, and various middleware components such as development tools. Its advanced cloud infrastructure provides compute, storage, and networking capabilities, complemented by innovative services like the Oracle Autonomous Database, MySQL HeatWave, Internet-of-Things (IoT) platforms, digital assistants, and blockchain technology. Oracle also offers a range of hardware products and associated software. This encompasses Oracle engineered systems, enterprise servers, storage solutions, and specialized hardware for particular industries. Additionally, it provides virtualization software, operating systems, management software, and related hardware support. Complementing its product lines, Oracle delivers expert consulting and dedicated customer services. The company employs a direct sales model, reaching businesses across diverse sectors, government bodies, and educational institutions globally, while also leveraging an extensive network of indirect channels. Established in 1977, Oracle Corporation maintains its corporate headquarters in Austin, Texas.
Business History
Generated: May 13, 2026 11:09amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:07am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 5.94
Total Equity: $42.51B
Shares: 2,915,000,000
Total Debt: $156.19B
Cash: $31.29B
EBITDA: $32.14B
Total Debt: $156.19B
Cash: $31.29B
Revenue: $67.36B
Revenue: $67.36B
Revenue: $67.36B
Total Equity: $42.51B
Tax Rate: 12.6%
Equity: $42.51B
Total Debt: $156.19B
Cash: $31.29B
Current Liabilities: $41.76B
Long-Term Debt: $148.99B
Total Debt: $156.19B
Total Equity: $42.51B
Shares: 2,915,000,000
Shares: 2,915,000,000
CapEx: -$55.66B
Shares: 2,915,000,000
Stock Price: $148.68
Net Income: $17.09B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Operationally Oracle still looks like a high-quality mature software franchise: revenue compounded from $42.4B (2022) to $67.4B (2026), operating margin expanded from 25.7% to 30.8%, and net income nearly tripled from $6.72B to $17.09B. Diluted share count grew only ~1.1%/yr and buybacks exceeded SBC (126%), so per-share value is not being eroded by dilution. Accruals are clean (-5.1% of assets), OCF/NI was 1.75x historically, and Beneish M of -2.52 shows no manipulation flags - reported earnings appear real. The problem is the capital structure and cash burn driving the AI/OCI buildout. FCF collapsed from +$11.8B (2024) to -$394M (2025) to -$23.7B (2026), gross margin compressed from 79% to 65% as lower-margin cloud infra scales, and net debt sits at -$124B against only $31.9B liquid cash. Altman Z of 1.76 is in the distress zone, and the module flags ~5 quarters of runway at the current burn - meaning Oracle is structurally dependent on continued debt issuance or a rapid FCF reversal as OCI capacity monetizes. Insider tape is non-directional (awards/exercises only, no open-market P/S), so no signal there. The business quality verdict hinges on whether the AI capex actually earns its cost of capital; today the financials show a great legacy franchise being levered hard into a capital-intensive bet.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- RPO/backlog composition and customer concentration in OCI - how much is one or two hyperscaler-class customers?
- Capex guidance for FY27-28 and expected FCF inflection timing as OCI capacity comes online.
- Debt maturity ladder, weighted coupon, and covenants given $124B net debt position.
- Contractual minimum revenue from OCI capacity deals (Stargate-type) and pricing/duration terms.
- Whether the OCF/NI 1.75x reflects deferred revenue tailwinds that may not repeat as growth mix shifts.
Oracle trades at $152.38 for a $453B market cap, but the equity story now rests almost entirely on OCI/AI infrastructure earning a real return on a balance sheet carrying $124B net debt and -$23.7B FCF. A traditional DCF or FCF-yield anchor on the current cash profile is essentially negative; the bull fair value requires you to capitalize a future OCI run-rate that has not yet shown up in cash. That is the definition of 'high conviction required' - the e2e synthesis flagged the same. On legacy software alone (durable margins, sticky database, growing SaaS), a deserved value in the $115-135 range is defensible at ~22-25x quality earnings. Layering in a credit-for-OCI-success scenario gets you to roughly $140-160 deserved - i.e., today's price already pays for execution. Earnings quality is good, which I respect, but it does not offset that FCF has inverted and gross margin is compressing. Net: this is a fairly-to-richly priced stock where the upside case is already in the tape and the downside (capex doesn't earn its cost of capital, debt gets re-rated) is not discounted at all. I would want a clear discount to deserved before paying up.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- OCI/cloud infrastructure revenue run-rate, gross margin, and backlog conversion cadence
- Capex guide for FY26/27 and timeline to FCF crossover
- Net debt trajectory and any incremental debt issuance or rating actions
- RPO growth and disclosed contracted OCI commitments (quality of the backlog)
- Segment margin disclosure separating legacy software from OCI
The macro tape is neutral-with-a-tilt-lower (VIX ~19, S&P -3% off highs, 10y at 4.4%), which on a 1.66-beta name would normally amplify pressure. But Oracle's narrative archetype is steady-compounder with durable, low-intensity story risk, so the high beta here overstates the real sensitivity - ORCL trades more like a defensive mega-cap software name than a high-beta cyclical, and the tape is not actively de-rating this cohort. Net macro pressure on this specific name is mild.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether AI-infra capex narrative cracks (would remove the quiet tailwind)
- Next OCI growth print and RPO disclosure - the proof point analysts are revising on
- 10y yield breaking above 4.6% (would pressure software multiples broadly)
- Any softening in target revisions trend (currently 16/mo at $260 avg)
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:03am (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $42.4B | $50.0B | $53.0B | $57.4B | $67.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $8.9B | $13.6B | $15.1B | $16.9B | $23.4B |
| Gross Profit | $33.6B | $36.4B | $37.8B | $40.5B | $43.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $22.6B | $23.3B | $22.5B | $22.8B | $23.1B |
| Operating Income | $10.9B | $13.1B | $15.4B | $17.7B | $20.8B |
| Net Income | $6.7B | $8.5B | $10.5B | $12.4B | $17.1B |
| EBITDA | $13.5B | $18.7B | $21.4B | $23.9B | $32.1B |
| EPS | $2.49 | $3.15 | $3.81 | $4.46 | $5.94 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:00am (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $21.4B | $9.8B | $10.5B | $10.8B | $31.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $31.6B | $21.0B | $22.6B | $24.6B | $46.6B |
| Total Assets | $109.3B | $134.4B | $141.0B | $168.4B | $261.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $19.5B | $23.1B | $31.5B | $32.6B | $41.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $72.1B | $86.4B | $76.3B | $85.3B | $149.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $115.1B | $132.8B | $131.7B | $147.4B | $218.7B |
| Total Equity | -$6.2B | $1.1B | $8.7B | $20.5B | $42.5B |
| Retained Earnings | -$31.3B | -$27.6B | -$22.6B | -$15.5B | -$4.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:04am (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $9.5B | $17.2B | $18.7B | $20.8B | $32.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.5B | -$8.7B | -$6.9B | -$21.2B | -$55.7B |
| Free Cash Flow | $5.0B | $8.5B | $11.8B | -$394.0M | -$23.7B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$148.0M | -$27.7B | -$63.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$17.3B | -$2.5B | -$3.2B | -$1.5B | -$206.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$8.7B | -$11.6B | $689.0M | $332.0M | $20.5B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 4:31am (2h ago)| Metric | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$130.0B $94.0B – $142.1B
|
$179.0B $178.2B – $179.8B
|
$218.5B $176.6B – $231.9B
|
$257.1B $207.9B – $272.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$51.8B $37.5B – $56.6B
|
$71.3B $71.0B – $71.6B
|
$87.0B $70.4B – $92.4B
|
$102.4B $82.8B – $108.7B
|
| Net Income |
$28.1B $24.6B – $35.6B
|
$41.3B $30.8B – $52.9B
|
$57.7B $43.3B – $62.3B
|
$69.8B $52.4B – $75.4B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 23, 2026 3:03am (4d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +17.7% | +6.0% | +8.4% | +17.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +8.4% | +3.9% | +7.0% | +8.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | +19.8% | +17.3% | +15.1% | +17.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +26.6% | +23.1% | +18.9% | +37.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | +38.5% | +14.2% | +11.8% | +34.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:26am (3h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | M-Exempt | 400,000.00 | $40.93 | $16.4M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 74,969.00 | $156.06 | $11.7M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 78,559.00 | $157.02 | $12.3M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 45,872.00 | $157.89 | $7.2M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 16,802.00 | $159.07 | $2.7M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 62,582.00 | $160.08 | $10.0M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 48,353.00 | $160.86 | $7.8M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 16,809.00 | $162.18 | $2.7M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 15,122.00 | $163.00 | $2.5M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 26,603.00 | $164.00 | $4.4M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 13,529.00 | $164.91 | $2.2M |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | S-Sale | 800.00 | $165.57 | $132,456 |
| 2026-06-24 | HENLEY JEFFREY | M-Exempt | 400,000.00 | $40.93 | $16.4M |
| 2026-05-31 | RUSCKOWSKI STEPHEN H | A-Award | 1,550.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-31 | MOORMAN CHARLES W | M-Exempt | 2,114.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-31 | MOORMAN CHARLES W | A-Award | 1,550.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-31 | MOORMAN CHARLES W | M-Exempt | 2,114.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-31 | Mihaljevic Tomislav | A-Award | 1,550.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-31 | Fairhead Rona Alison | M-Exempt | 2,114.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-31 | Fairhead Rona Alison | F-InKind | 58.00 | $225.78 | $13,095 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 6:26pm (4d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-10 | $0.50 | 2026-06-10 | 2026-07-10 | 2026-07-24 |
| 2026-04-09 | $0.50 | 2026-03-10 | 2026-04-09 | 2026-04-24 |
| 2026-01-09 | $0.50 | 2025-12-10 | 2026-01-09 | 2026-01-23 |
| 2025-10-09 | $0.50 | 2025-09-09 | 2025-10-09 | 2025-10-23 |
| 2025-07-10 | $0.50 | 2025-06-11 | 2025-07-10 | 2025-07-24 |
| 2025-04-10 | $0.50 | 2025-03-10 | 2025-04-10 | 2025-04-23 |
| 2025-01-10 | $0.40 | 2024-12-09 | 2025-01-10 | 2025-01-23 |
| 2024-10-10 | $0.40 | 2024-09-09 | 2024-10-10 | 2024-10-24 |
| 2024-07-11 | $0.40 | 2024-06-11 | 2024-07-11 | 2024-07-25 |
| 2024-04-09 | $0.40 | 2024-03-11 | 2024-04-10 | 2024-04-24 |
| 2024-01-10 | $0.40 | 2023-12-11 | 2024-01-11 | 2024-01-25 |
| 2023-10-11 | $0.40 | 2023-09-11 | 2023-10-12 | 2023-10-26 |
| 2023-07-11 | $0.40 | 2023-06-12 | 2023-07-12 | 2023-07-26 |
| 2023-04-10 | $0.40 | 2023-03-09 | 2023-04-11 | 2023-04-24 |
| 2023-01-09 | $0.32 | 2022-12-12 | 2023-01-10 | 2023-01-24 |
| 2022-10-11 | $0.32 | 2022-09-12 | 2022-10-12 | 2022-10-25 |
| 2022-07-11 | $0.32 | 2022-06-13 | 2022-07-12 | 2022-07-26 |
| 2022-04-07 | $0.32 | 2022-03-10 | 2022-04-08 | 2022-04-21 |
| 2022-01-06 | $0.32 | 2021-12-09 | 2022-01-07 | 2022-01-19 |
| 2021-10-08 | $0.32 | 2021-09-13 | 2021-10-12 | 2021-10-26 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly cadence first: revenue went $13.31B → $14.06B → $14.13B → $15.90B → $14.93B → $16.06B → $17.19B → $19.18B. That's genuine acceleration — the most recent YoY is 17.4% and sequential Q4 growth of 11.6% is the strongest in years. Annual revenue compounded from $42.4B (FY22) to $67.4B (FY26), a 12.2% CAGR, and operating income nearly doubled from $10.9B to $20.8B over the same window. So the top-line and operating leverage story is real, not narrative. But then look at the cash flow line that no one is emphasizing enough: capex of **$55.66B** against operating cash flow of $31.98B produced **negative $23.7B of free cash flow**. Capex went from ~$7B to ~$56B in two years. Oracle is not a "mature earner" by any reasonable definition right now — it's a capital-intensive infrastructure buildout funded by debt, masquerading as a software company at 10.6x sales and 16.8x book.
The prior models are internally contradictory and I think the classification engine is simply wrong. "Mature Earner" with 0.83 confidence is indefensible when FCF flipped from strongly positive to -$24B and capex is 83% of revenue growth. The Market Forces module calls it a "value trap" while the Narrative layer calls it a "durable steady-compounder" and Synthesis says "high conviction required" — these can't all be right. Market Forces is closest to the contrarian read but overstates the case: revenue acceleration isn't "acquisition-driven" anymore (Cerner closed in 2022; the 17% YoY in the latest quarter is organic OCI/RPO-driven). The Pre-Flight thesis that the market is pricing Oracle as a "failed cloud pivot" is also wrong — at 29.5x TTM P/E and ~7.5x P/S the market is pricing Oracle as a *winning* AI-infrastructure platform, not a failed one. Pre-2023 Oracle traded at 15–18x earnings; the current multiple bakes in the OCI/RPO backlog story explicitly.
The contrarian case I'd actually press: hyperscaler capex doesn't earn software-like ROIC. AWS, Azure, and GCP run cloud infra at 30-35% operating margins after years of scale; Oracle is committing $55B/year against a $67B revenue base, and the marginal returns on GPU-stuffed data centers serving a single customer concentration (the OpenAI/Stargate-type deals) are unproven. ROIC at 8.0% is already well below cost of capital for a company levering up this aggressively, and the Q2 (Nov 2025) net income spike to $6.14B at 38.2% margin is almost certainly a one-time tax or investment gain — strip that and the earnings CAGR looks more like 15%, not 27.8%. The 22% margin in Q4 is normal-course; the synthesis models appear to be anchoring on the inflated TTM earnings figure. Insider data is uninformative (all routine awards/exemptions, no open-market buying or selling of size disclosed).
I dissent from the synthesis "High Conviction Required" framing — that's a non-verdict. The honest read: Oracle has genuine revenue acceleration and a real RPO backlog, but it's being valued as if the cloud capex will earn 25%+ incremental margins when the evidence suggests sub-cost-of-capital returns on the marginal dollar. At $175 and ~$503B market cap, you're paying 7.5x sales for a business burning $24B of FCF with deteriorating ROIC. Fair value on a normalized basis — assume 13% revenue growth, margins stabilize at 30% operating, capex eventually normalizes to $25–30B (still elevated) — gets me to roughly $130–145 on a DCF with a 9% discount rate. The bull case ($210+) requires OCI to hit AWS-like scale economics, which is a 3–5 year proof, not a current fact. I'd be a buyer in the $130s, a holder in the $150s, and a fader at $175+. The risk is asymmetric to the downside if even one quarter of RPO conversion disappoints, because the multiple has no cushion.
GPT Critique
Oracle's recent financials paint a picture of a company undergoing significant transformation, reflected in its aggressive capital expenditure and robust revenue growth. The company increased its revenues from $42.44 billion in 2022 to $67.36 billion in 2026, indicating a healthy CAGR of 12.2%. This trajectory is underscored by quarterly revenue growth, which accelerated from $13.31 billion in August 2024 to $19.18 billion by May 2026. However, the standout figure is the massive increase in capital expenditures, which ballooned from $6.87 billion to a staggering $55.66 billion over the same period. This heavy investment has resulted in a free cash flow deficit of $23.69 billion, raising questions about the sustainability and returns of such outlays. The PE ratio of 29.5 suggests that the market is optimistic about Oracle's future, potentially banking on its cloud ambitions.
I align with Claude Opus on several fronts. Opus rightly identifies the revenue growth as genuine, not acquisition-driven, which supports Oracle's narrative of organic expansion. I also concur with the skepticism around the "Mature Earner" classification given the negative free cash flow, which contradicts the notion of a stable, cash-generating entity. Furthermore, the doubts about Oracle's ability to achieve hyperscaler-like returns on its cloud infrastructure investments resonate with me, considering the ROIC stands at 8%, below the typical cost of capital for a tech company.
However, I diverge from Opus on the interpretation of market sentiment. While Opus argues that the market is pricing Oracle as a successful cloud infrastructure player, I contend that the existing valuation partly reflects skepticism about Oracle's ability to compete with established players like AWS and Azure. The current multiples, particularly the high PE and PS ratios, suggest some optimism, possibly due to Oracle's recent revenue acceleration. Still, the market may also be cautious, reflected in the 49% stock price decline from its peak, hinting at underlying concerns about execution risks.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are overlooking Oracle's potential to innovate and capture a niche in AI infrastructure, which could justify its aggressive CapEx and current valuation. They might point to Oracle's strategic positioning in healthcare cloud services via the Cerner acquisition as a long-term growth driver that could differentiate it from competitors and support a higher valuation multiple.