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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Uipath Inc. (PATH) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -27 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 26 · Value -71 · Sentiment -23 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $8.81 vs $12.37 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Uipath Inc.
PATH NYSEUiPath Inc. is an enterprise software company specializing in automation solutions that help organizations streamline and orchestrate complex business processes. Headquartered in New York and founded in 2005, UiPath focuses on robotic process automation, delivering software robots that emulate human actions to handle repetitive, rules-based tasks across a wide range of systems and applications. Its end-to-end platform integrates robotic process automation with artificial intelligence, machine learning, and natural language processing to support advanced decisioning, document understanding, and process optimization. UiPath offers both cloud-based and enterprise deployments with governance, security, and multi-tenant capabilities designed for large and highly regulated organizations. The platform features low-code, drag-and-drop tools that enable both technical and non-technical users to design, deploy, and manage automations, as well as process mining and analytics to track performance and return on automation. UiPath today serves sectors such as financial services, healthcare, manufacturing, retail, and the public sector, playing a significant role in the broader digital transformation and enterprise productivity landscape.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.52
Total Equity: $2.08B
Shares: 544,860,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $871.16M
EBITDA: $73.73M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $871.16M
Revenue: $1.61B
Revenue: $1.61B
Revenue: $1.61B
Total Equity: $2.08B
Tax Rate: -180.6%
Equity: $2.08B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $871.16M
Current Liabilities: $905.42M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $2.08B
Shares: 544,860,000
Shares: 544,860,000
CapEx: -$19.05M
Shares: 544,860,000
Stock Price: $12.37
Net Income: $282.33M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 8:59pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $892.3M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $168.9M | $180.1M | $195.9M | $246.9M | $271.0M |
| Gross Profit | $723.4M | $878.5M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Operating Income | -$500.9M | -$348.3M | -$164.7M | -$162.6M | $56.8M |
| Net Income | -$525.6M | -$328.4M | -$89.9M | -$73.7M | $282.3M |
| EBITDA | -$486.2M | -$329.6M | -$142.1M | -$145.3M | $73.7M |
| EPS | $-1.16 | $-0.60 | $-0.16 | $-0.13 | $0.52 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $-1.16 | $-0.60 | $-0.16 | $-0.13 | $0.52 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:31pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.8B | $1.4B | $1.1B | $879.2M | $871.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.2B |
| Total Assets | $2.6B | $2.7B | $3.0B | $2.9B | $3.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $527.5M | $626.5M | $711.7M | $798.9M | $905.4M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $650.5M | $815.0M | $938.6M | $1.0B | $1.1B |
| Total Equity | $1.9B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.8B | $2.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$1.5B | -$1.8B | -$1.9B | -$2.0B | -$1.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 8:59pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$55.0M | -$10.0M | $299.1M | $320.6M | $371.2M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$8.9M | -$23.8M | -$7.3M | -$14.9M | -$19.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$63.8M | -$33.8M | $291.7M | $305.6M | $352.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$5.5M | -$29.5M | $0 | $0 | -$24.8M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | -$102.6M | -$390.8M | -$329.1M |
| Net Change in Cash | $1.4B | -$366.6M | -$340.0M | -$182.5M | -$8.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 8:59pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +18.6% | +23.6% | +9.3% | +12.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +21.4% | +26.6% | +6.3% | +13.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +30.5% | +52.7% | +1.3% | +134.9% |
| Net Income Growth | +37.5% | +72.6% | +18.0% | +483.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +32.2% | +56.9% | -2.3% | +150.7% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 10:26Recovery pays +14%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 30%. Ratio 0.5:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($12.37) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +27% | 22.5% | $14.11 | +14% |
| Base — stabilizes | +18% | 19.6% | $9.60 | -22% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +9% | 16.6% | $6.36 | -49% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +14% | 19.6% | $8.68 | -30% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
UiPath's quarterly revenue trajectory is not "steady" — it's seasonal SaaS with a January fiscal year, and the pattern is Q4-heavy. Comparing like quarters: Q1 FY26 (Apr'25) $418.4M vs Q1 FY25 $356.6M = +17.3% YoY, actually the strongest recent print. But Q4 FY26 (Jan'26) $481.1M vs Q4 FY25 $423.6M = +13.6%, and Q3 FY26 $411.1M vs Q3 FY25 $354.7M = +15.9%. So growth is running mid-teens, not the 12.7% the momentum module reports. That's a meaningful upward revision. Full-year FY26 revenue of $1.61B vs FY25 $1.43B = +12.6%. The trajectory is decelerating from the 20%+ era but stabilizing in the mid-teens, which is better than the "maturing RPA market" narrative implies.
The earnings picture is far messier than the P/E suggests. FY26 net income of $282M is inflated by a $198.8M net income quarter in Oct'25 that dwarfs the $56.8M full-year operating income — this is almost certainly a deferred tax asset valuation allowance release, not operating earnings. Strip that out and true operating NI is closer to $80-100M on $1.61B revenue, or ~5-6% net margin, not 17.5%. The 23.8x P/E is therefore fictitious; normalized P/E is closer to 65-80x. The honest anchor is FCF: $352M against a $6.41B market cap, less $871M cash = $5.54B EV, so ~15.7x EV/FCF. That's the number that matters, and it's genuinely cheap for a 15% grower with 83% gross margins and zero debt.
The prior models are internally contradictory and I side against the "Priced for Perfection" verdict. The classification bot calls it a mature earner; the pre-flight calls it high-growth; the thesis eval says priced for perfection at 4.0x sales — but 4.0x sales for a 15% grower with $352M FCF and 22% FCF margin is not perfection pricing, it's mid-tier SaaS pricing with pessimism baked in. Palantir trades at 60x sales, ServiceNow at 15x, Salesforce at 7x. UiPath at 3.4x EV/sales is priced closer to a declining legacy vendor. The contrarian bear case is real though: RPA is genuinely being cannibalized by LLM-native agent frameworks (LangChain, OpenAI Operator, Anthropic's computer use), and UiPath's "Agentic Automation" pivot is defensive. NRR has been compressing across the RPA cohort. If growth slips to single digits in FY27, the multiple compresses further and FCF stalls.
What I can't see in this data: net revenue retention, ARR vs revenue split, stock-based comp (critical — SBC is likely $300-400M annually for UiPath, which would wipe out most of the $352M FCF on a true economic basis), customer concentration, and any read on the agentic product traction. The absence of insider transactions is notable given founder Daniel Dines' history of selling; either the feed is stale or the insider window has been closed, which itself would be a mild positive tell ahead of a print. Macro headwinds flag is legitimate — enterprise software deal cycles have elongated and UiPath's federal exposure adds tariff/DOGE-adjacent risk. I'd want to stress-test FCF assuming SBC-adjusted FCF is closer to $50-100M, which would make the 55-110x multiple look demanding.
GPT Reading
What stands out is that UiPath is no longer the cash-burning “story stock” many investors still reflexively think it is, but the market is also right not to pay a premium growth multiple for what has become a much slower business. Revenue grew from $1.43B to $1.61B in FY2026, about 12.6%, and the latest quarter was similar at $418.4M versus $356.6M, up 17.3% YoY. That is respectable, but not enough to justify treating this as a high-growth platform category winner. The real improvement is below the revenue line: operating income swung from -$162.6M to +$56.8M, operating margin reached 3.5%, and free cash flow hit $352.2M, a hefty 21.9% of revenue. With $871.2M of cash and no debt, the balance sheet is clean and gives the equity real durability. At roughly $6.4B market cap and about $5.5B enterprise value, investors are paying around 3.4x EV/revenue and roughly 15-16x EV/FCF. For a sticky software company with 83.2% gross margin and genuine cash generation, that is not expensive.
The bigger issue is the quality and sustainability of the earnings optics. Net income of $282.3M on only $56.8M of operating income tells you reported earnings are flattered by non-operating items, tax effects, or other accounting gains rather than core operating leverage alone. Quarterly margins make that even clearer: net margin was 48.4% in the October quarter and then 21.7% in January before dropping to 5.4% in the latest quarter. That is not the profile of a business with settled, predictable earning power. So I reject the “mature earner” framing if it implies stable earnings quality; this is still a transition story. But I also reject the “priced for perfection” conclusion. A stock at 4.2x sales with net cash, positive FCF, and a demonstrated path from deeply negative operating margins to positive territory is not being valued like perfection. It is being valued like a company the market is still skeptical will reaccelerate.
My read is that the stock is modestly undervalued because the downside looks fairly well protected by the cash-rich balance sheet, high gross margins, and actual free-cash-flow generation, while the upside only requires the business to sustain low-teens growth and mid-teens FCF margins. Even if you haircut reported earnings and value UiPath on cash flow instead, the multiple is acceptable for software with these unit economics. The market cap is only about 18x current FCF, and after backing out cash it falls further. If revenue can compound around 10-12% and free cash flow stays above $300M, a valuation closer to 5x revenue or around $14-$16 per share is not heroic. The stock looks miscast as a broken former grower when the data actually show a company that has already crossed into self-funded profitability.
The best case against this is that revenue has decelerated sharply from the historical SaaS ideal, and once a software name slows to low-teens growth, the market often compresses it regardless of margins. FY2026 revenue growth of 12.6% on an 83% gross margin should arguably have produced more than a 3.5% operating margin if this were a truly elite software model; the fact it did not may indicate high sales intensity and a tougher competitive environment than the gross margin alone suggests. The latest quarter’s $22.5M net income on $418.4M of revenue is only a 5.4% margin, so if the October and January quarters contained unusually favorable items, the trailing P/E of 23.8x may actually understate the true multiple on normalized earnings. A bear can also argue that RPA is maturing just as AI agents threaten to commoditize parts of the workflow automation stack, leaving UiPath caught between slowing core demand and an expensive reinvestment cycle. If that is right, 3.4x EV/revenue is fair, not cheap.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next few quarters show revenue growth slipping into single digits while operating margin falls back toward breakeven and annual FCF drops materially below $250M, then the “cheap on cash flow” case is a trap and fair value is below $10. On the other hand, if UiPath can put up two or three consecutive quarters of 12-15% revenue growth with cleaner operating profitability—say 8-10% operating margin rather than earnings boosted below the line—then the market will have to re-rate it as a durable software compounder rather than a stalled automation vendor.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a company that has quietly crossed a structural threshold while the market still prices it as unfinished business. Fiscal 2026 delivered $1.61B revenue, up 12.6% from $1.43B, with free cash flow of $352M—a 22% FCF margin—on only $57M of operating income and a pristine balance sheet carrying $871M cash and zero debt. Gross margin sits at 83%, and the operating-line swing from a $163M loss the prior year to a $57M profit on just $180M of incremental revenue shows real leverage kicking in. The most recent quarter (April 2026) printed $418M, up roughly 17% year-over-year from $357M, suggesting the low-teens deceleration may be stabilizing rather than collapsing. At $12.37 the equity is $6.41B; enterprise value after cash is roughly $5.5B, or 3.4x sales and about 16x trailing FCF. That is not a perfection multiple for an 83-gross-margin software franchise that has already turned cash-flow positive at scale.
The contradiction that matters is between GAAP net income and the underlying engine. Reported NI of $282M (17.5% net margin) and a 23.8x P/E look tidy, yet operating margin is only 3.5% and the October 2025 quarter alone threw off $199M of net income at a 48% margin—clearly non-operating or one-time items, most likely tax-valuation-allowance releases that will not recur. Strip those away and the market is paying a far richer multiple on true run-rate earnings power. Revenue CAGR has slowed to 11%, and sequential seasonality remains sharp ($481M in January down to $418M in April). Rule-based models calling this a “mature earner” and pre-flight labels of “high-growth” are both half-right and therefore both misleading; it is a mid-teens grower whose profitability is real in cash but still optically fragile in GAAP operating income. Insider activity is pure award and withhold noise—zero signal.
The strongest bear case is straightforward: RPA is maturing, Microsoft and others are bundling automation, and the 38% drawdown from the 52-week high already embeds skepticism that AI agents expand the TAM rather than just re-label existing bots. If growth settles into high-single-digits while operating margin stalls in the mid-single-digits, the 3.4x sales multiple compresses further and the stock is dead money. The elevated EV/EBITDA of 75x correctly flags that earnings quality is still thin. I weigh this less heavily because FCF already exceeds $350M, net cash is 14% of market cap, and the operating-leverage math from here is asymmetric: every incremental point of margin on a $1.6B+ base drops heavily to cash. The market is pricing a growth scare that the latest quarterly trajectory has not confirmed.
I would flip to outright bearish if the next two quarters show revenue growth slipping below 10% year-over-year with FCF margins compressing, or if management guides to flat operating margins into fiscal 2027. I would become more aggressive if Q2/Q3 deliver sustained 15%+ growth and operating margin expands cleanly above 10% without one-time crutches.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
UiPath is a scaled RPA/automation software business with $1.61B revenue, 83% gross margins, and a genuinely fortress balance sheet: $1.47B net cash (23% of market cap) and $352M FCF, so survival math is a non-issue. The trajectory is real - operating margin has moved from -56% (2022) to +3.5% (2026), net income flipped positive to $282M, and FCF expanded from -$64M to $352M over four years. Earnings-quality checks are clean (Beneish -2.19, Altman Z 3.83, accruals -11.9%, OCF/NI 1.25x - i.e., cash exceeds reported earnings), which corroborates the reported turn. The soft spot is per-share economics. SBC runs 18.1% of revenue - a real, cash-equivalent cost that dwarfs GAAP net income and means 'adjusted' profitability materially overstates true owner earnings. Diluted shares grew from 454M (2022) to 545M (2026), a 4.6% CAGR, and buybacks recover only 43% of SBC, so shareholders are absorbing meaningful ongoing dilution. Insider tape shows only tax-withholding (F) and awards (A) - no open-market buys or sales, so no directional signal. Durability is inferable but not proven from this data: 83% gross margins and expanding operating leverage suggest a defensible niche, but competitive position vs. Microsoft Power Automate and broader AI-agent encroachment is a real overhang that this data cannot resolve.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Net revenue retention and customer concentration in the latest 10-K
- ARR growth and mix between RPA renewals vs. AI-agent products
- Competitive positioning commentary vs. Microsoft Power Automate and agentic AI entrants
- Any convertible notes or off-balance-sheet obligations not reflected in the net-cash figure
- Trajectory of SBC as % of revenue - is it declining as the company scales?
- Buyback authorization size and pace vs. ongoing SBC issuance
The e2e synthesis pegs composite FV at $6.87 and signal-adjusted FV at $7.73 against a $12.37 price - roughly 38% downside. The DCF alone gets to $11.88 (near price) but the EPV floor is negative $3.15, meaning strip out growth optionality and the current earnings base doesn't support the equity value. The gap between DCF and EPV is the whole ballgame: you are paying entirely for future growth on a business whose growth has decelerated to the mid-teens. The quality lens flags 18% SBC and ~5% dilution, which is a real deserved-value haircut - buybacks are just offsetting comp, not returning capital.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- ARR growth trajectory and net revenue retention in next 2 quarters
- FY guidance revisions - any sign of re-acceleration vs continued deceleration
- SBC run-rate and whether dilution moderates below 4%
- Competitive win/loss vs Microsoft Power Automate and agentic AI entrants
- Free cash flow ex-SBC to test if EPV floor is really negative
PATH sits in a genuinely ambiguous sentiment pocket. The dominant narrative is 'fallen-angel RPA vendor' - an 80% drawdown from bubble highs has left a strong-intensity but only moderately durable story that swings between 'foundational AI-automation pick-and-shovel' and 'mid-market vendor about to be crushed by hyperscalers.' Recent news flow is neither punishing nor rewarding: multiple 'below fair value' pieces provide a mild valuation-support drumbeat, while head-to-head comparisons against Marvell and Snowflake frame PATH as the cheap-but-slow option - a lukewarm framing that caps upside enthusiasm.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any AI-agent or Agentic Automation product announcement that could refresh the narrative arc
- Guidance revisions or analyst target changes that would confirm the story is stabilizing
- Hyperscaler moves (Microsoft Power Automate pricing/features) that could reignite the disruption bear case
- Whether the 'below fair value' framing gains traction with sell-side or fades
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 31, 2026, PATH was $12.37. We expect it to be $10.20 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $8.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 31, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.