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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Procter & Gamble Co (PG) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -7 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 68 · Value -68 · Sentiment -42 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $120.95 vs $144.50 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Procter & Gamble Co
PG NYSEProcter & Gamble Co. is a leading provider of branded consumer packaged goods worldwide. The company operates through five key segments: Beauty, featuring hair care and skin products; Grooming, including shaving and personal care items; Health Care, with oral care and digestive health offerings; Fabric and Home Care, encompassing laundry detergents and cleaning supplies; and Baby, Feminine and Family Care, offering diapers, feminine hygiene, and tissue products. Its portfolio includes well-known brands that serve everyday household needs across diverse categories. Procter & Gamble Co. distributes its products in approximately 180 countries through various channels such as mass merchandisers, grocery stores, membership clubs, drug stores, department stores, e-commerce platforms, and pharmacies. Founded in 1837 and headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, the company plays a central role in the consumer staples sector, focusing on innovation in product performance and consumer convenience to meet global demand for reliable, high-quality daily essentials.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.51
Total Equity: $52.29B
Shares: 2,454,400,000
Total Debt: $34.51B
Cash: $9.56B
EBITDA: $23.30B
Total Debt: $34.51B
Cash: $9.56B
Revenue: $84.28B
Revenue: $84.28B
Revenue: $84.28B
Total Equity: $52.29B
Tax Rate: 20.3%
Equity: $52.29B
Total Debt: $34.51B
Cash: $9.56B
Current Liabilities: $36.06B
Long-Term Debt: $25.00B
Total Debt: $34.51B
Total Equity: $52.29B
Shares: 2,454,400,000
Shares: 2,454,400,000
CapEx: -$3.77B
Shares: 2,454,400,000
Stock Price: $143.96
Net Income: $15.97B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:08am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $76.1B | $80.2B | $82.0B | $84.0B | $84.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $37.1B | $42.2B | $42.8B | $40.8B | $41.2B |
| Gross Profit | $39.0B | $38.0B | $39.2B | $43.2B | $43.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $21.0B | $20.2B | $21.1B | $24.6B | $22.7B |
| Operating Income | $18.0B | $17.8B | $18.1B | $18.5B | $20.5B |
| Net Income | $14.3B | $14.7B | $14.7B | $14.9B | $16.0B |
| EBITDA | $20.7B | $20.6B | $20.8B | $21.4B | $23.3B |
| EPS | $5.69 | $6.00 | $6.07 | $6.18 | $6.67 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.50 | $5.81 | $5.90 | $6.02 | $6.51 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:08am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $10.3B | $7.2B | $8.2B | $9.5B | $9.6B |
| Total Current Assets | $23.1B | $21.7B | $22.6B | $24.7B | $25.4B |
| Total Assets | $119.3B | $117.2B | $120.8B | $122.4B | $125.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $33.1B | $33.1B | $35.8B | $33.6B | $36.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $23.1B | $22.8B | $24.4B | $25.3B | $25.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $72.7B | $70.4B | $73.8B | $71.8B | $72.9B |
| Total Equity | $46.7B | $46.9B | $47.1B | $50.6B | $52.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $106.4B | $112.4B | $118.2B | $123.8B | $130.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 12:28am (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $18.4B | $16.7B | $16.8B | $19.8B | $17.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.8B | -$3.2B | -$3.1B | -$3.3B | -$3.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | $15.6B | $13.6B | $13.8B | $16.5B | $14.0B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$34.0M | -$1.4B | -$765.0M | -$21.0M | -$11.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$570.0M | $2.0B | $2.1B | $862.0M | $260.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$8.3B | -$8.8B | -$9.0B | -$9.3B | -$9.9B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$11.0B | -$10.0B | -$7.4B | -$5.0B | -$6.5B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$5.9B | -$3.1B | $1.0B | $1.2B | $75.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:08am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +5.3% | +2.3% | +2.5% | +0.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -2.5% | +3.2% | +10.1% | -0.2% |
| Operating Income Growth | -1.0% | +1.8% | +2.3% | +10.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +3.0% | -0.6% | +1.5% | +7.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -0.5% | +1.1% | +2.8% | +8.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:08am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-24 | $1.09 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-24 | $1.09 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-23 | $1.06 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-24 | $1.06 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-18 | $1.06 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-21 | $1.06 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-24 | $1.01 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-18 | $1.01 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-19 | $1.01 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-18 | $1.01 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-18 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-19 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-20 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-20 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-19 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-20 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-21 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-21 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-20 | $0.87 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-21 | $0.87 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a boring story that the models have essentially gotten right: P&G is a $335B compounder growing revenue at 1.4% CAGR and earnings at 4.4%, priced at 22x P/E and 15.5x EV/EBITDA. The most recent quarter (Mar-26) actually shows revenue declining sequentially to $21.24B from $22.39B in Sep-25, and net income falling to $3.93B from $4.75B — margin compression from 21.2% to 18.5% inside two quarters. That's not catastrophic, but it's the wrong direction for a stock trading at a 30% premium to DCF. FY25 revenue of $84.28B vs FY24's $84.04B is essentially flat organic growth once you strip pricing. FCF of $14.04B against a $335B cap = 4.2% FCF yield, and with a 2.98% dividend yield plus buybacks, total shareholder yield is maybe 5-6% — fine, but not a bargain when 10-year Treasuries pay ~4.3%.
I largely agree with the synthesis verdict of "fully_priced" at ~$110-118 fair value vs $144, though I'd push back on the precision. The DCF-implied $110 assumes ~2% terminal growth and something like a 7-8% discount rate; nudge the discount rate down 50bps for genuine defensive quality (Buffett's not wrong that this is a fortress) and you get closer to $125. So the "true" overvaluation is probably 15%, not 23%. The Market Forces "neutral hold" call is the most honest read here — this isn't a short, it's a stock where the next 5-year IRR is likely 4-7% (dividend + buyback + low-single-digit EPS growth) with downside if multiple compresses to the historical 18-19x median, which would take the stock to ~$118-125. That's a -15% price risk against a +5%/yr carry. Bad risk/reward for new money.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: P&G's ROIC of 21% and ROE of 30.5% are genuinely exceptional for a business this large, and the operating margin expansion from 22.1% (FY23) to 24.3% (FY25) suggests the pricing power story isn't fiction. If you believe emerging markets re-accelerate and beauty stabilizes, you could see 4-5% revenue growth resume, which would justify current multiples. The narrative model's "moderate intensity, durable, anchored" framing is right — this isn't a meme, it's institutional preference for balance-sheet quality that persists through cycles. The GLP-1 tail risk that Market Forces flags is real but overstated for a company where snacks are a rounding error; P&G divested Pringles in 2012. The bigger under-discussed risk is private label share gains in a stretched consumer environment — Q3 FY26 revenue decel to $21.24B may be an early tell.
Where I dissent mildly from the synthesis: calling this "vulnerable to disappointment" overstates the drawdown risk. P&G's beta is ~0.4 and the holder base is sticky (Berkshire, pensions, dividend funds). Even in a bad tape, this doesn't crater — it just underperforms. The right framing isn't "overvalued and dangerous," it's "priced for 5% IRRs when better risk-adjusted opportunities exist." I'd want to see this closer to $120 (18x forward EPS of ~$6.70) before it becomes interesting, and I'd note the anomaly nobody flagged: the current_ratio of 0.70 is structurally low but normal for a working-capital-negative consumer business — not a red flag despite looking alarming in isolation. Bottom line, the models converge on the right answer for slightly wrong reasons; the stock isn't overpriced because the story is broken, it's overpriced because the story is fully understood and reflected.
GPT Reading
P&G’s numbers say “excellent business, expensive stock.” The business itself is doing what a best-in-class staples franchise should do: annual revenue has held in a narrow but upward band from $76.1B in 2021 to $84.3B in 2025, while net income improved from $14.3B to $16.0B and operating income from $18.0B to $20.5B. That matters because the growth has not come from financial engineering alone; operating margin expanded from 23.6% in 2021 to 24.3% in 2025, gross margin recovered to 51.2%, and ROIC of 21.1% is elite for a consumer products company. Quarterly results also show resilience rather than acceleration: the last four quarters sum to roughly $86.7B of revenue and $16.6B of net income, ahead of the prior-year run rate, but not by enough to justify treating this as anything more than a low-single-digit grower with modest earnings leverage. At $335B market cap, investors are paying about 4.2x sales, 15.5x EV/EBITDA, and 22.1x earnings for that profile.
What stands out to me is the mismatch between operational steadiness and valuation optimism. Free cash flow of $14.0B on a $335B equity value is a roughly 4.2% FCF yield before asking whether growth can materially exceed inflation. Yet the actual growth record is thin: revenue CAGR is just 1.4% over the recent period, recent quarterly revenue growth is only 0.3%, and even the better earnings trend owes partly to margin discipline on a mature base rather than broad volume expansion. The latest quarter, March 2026, had revenue of $21.24B versus $19.78B a year earlier and net income of $3.93B versus $3.77B, which is good, but the quarter before that, December 2025, was only $22.21B versus $21.88B the prior year. This is not a company inflecting into a new growth phase; it is a company harvesting brand strength and cost control. That deserves a premium to the market in bad times, but not a “set it and forget it at any price” premium. For me, fair value is closer to 18-20x sustainable earnings, which on a roughly $6.75-$7.00 earnings power range implies something like $122-$140, and I lean toward the lower half because top-line momentum is so subdued.
The balance sheet and cash flow profile do support the stock from falling into obvious overvaluation territory. Net debt is manageable at roughly $25B after offsetting $34.5B of debt with $9.6B of cash, debt-to-equity of 0.66 is fine for this kind of business, and the dividend looks secure with a 61.8% payout ratio. Operating cash flow of $17.8B and capex of $3.8B leave room for both shareholder returns and select reinvestment. But these are support beams for a premium multiple, not evidence that the premium should widen from here. A 3.0% dividend yield is respectable, not compelling; for a stock priced at 6.8x book and over 4x sales, you need either faster growth or a clear dislocation. I see neither. This looks like the sort of name that preserves capital better than the market in a downturn but compounds slower than owners assume if bought near $144.
The best case against my skepticism is straightforward: P&G has earned the right to trade rich because few mega-caps combine 51% gross margins, 24% operating margins, 19% net margins, 30% ROE, and two decades of near-flawless cash conversion with everyday product demand. The annual revenue line may look dull, but earnings quality is unusually high, and the quarterly sequence from $20.53B, $21.74B, $21.88B, $19.78B, then $20.89B, $22.39B, $22.21B, $21.24B shows that seasonality aside, the floor keeps rising. If rates fall or recession fears rise, investors may happily pay 22x earnings for certainty, especially when many “growth” companies cannot match P&G’s 18%-21% quarterly net margins. I weigh that argument less heavily because the current price already embeds it. Paying a premium for quality is sensible; paying a premium for quality when growth, FCF yield, and dividend yield are all merely decent is where future returns get compressed.
What would change my mind is evidence that P&G can sustainably push above its recent algorithmic “mature earner” lane. If the next few quarters show organic top-line growth translating into annual revenue clearly above $87B-$88B, while maintaining net margins around 19%-20% and lifting free cash flow beyond $15B without balance-sheet stretching, then 22x earnings would look more defensible and I’d move toward fair-value rather than overvalued. Conversely, if revenue slips back toward the $84B area, operating income stalls around $20B, or free cash flow remains pinned near $14B while the stock stays in the mid-$140s, then the market is simply overpaying for reassurance.
Grok Reading
The numbers paint a classic late-cycle compounder that has already extracted most of the easy gains from pricing and mix. Annual revenue crawled from $76.12B in FY2021 to $84.28B in FY2025—a 1.4% CAGR—and the latest full year was essentially flat at +0.3% versus FY2024. Yet net income still advanced to $15.97B from $14.88B, and trailing quarterly margins have held in a tight 17–21% band, with the March 2026 quarter printing $3.93B of NI on $21.24B of sales. That divergence is the entire story: volume is stagnant, pricing power and cost discipline are doing the heavy lifting, and free cash flow of $14.04B on $17.82B of operating cash remains pristine. ROE at 30.5% and ROIC at 21.1% confirm the brand moat is real; the balance sheet (net debt roughly $25B, D/E 0.66) is serviceable even if the 0.70 current ratio is chronically tight. At 22.1× earnings, 15.5× EV/EBITDA and 4.2× sales, the market is simply capitalizing that quality at a full premium while growth has already decelerated to low-single digits.
The valuation synthesis that pins fair value near $111–118 is directionally correct and exposes the gap. A business growing revenue at 1.4% and FCF at 0.9% does not organically support a mid-20s earnings multiple once the re-rating from the inflation-pricing era is complete. Recent quarterly revenue of $21–22B is running only modestly above the year-ago $19.8–21.9B prints; the 7.4% earnings yoy figure is margin-driven, not top-line driven, and therefore finite. The 2.98% dividend yield and 62% payout are sustainable given the cash generation, but they are no longer a growth engine—they are a bond-proxy coupon. Paying $144 for that package embeds an assumption that the quality premium can expand or at least hold forever; history with mature staples says it compresses when volumes disappoint.
The strongest counter-argument is that the market is rationally paying for scarcity and liability-matching utility rather than growth. Berkshire’s large stake, six decades of dividend growth, and the demonstrated ability to expand operating margin from 22% to 24% even on flat sales are not trivial. In a macro-headwind tape, a 30% ROE fortress with $14B of FCF and pricing power is exactly what pension and insurance capital bids up; the narrative layer correctly notes that roughly half the premium to DCF is genuine moat value. A smart opponent would also note that earnings CAGR of 4.4% still outpaces many peers and that any modest re-acceleration in Beauty or Health Care volumes would justify the multiple instantly. I weigh those points as real but already fully reflected: the stock is not cheap enough to offer a margin of safety if the next two years look like the last two.
What flips the view is concrete evidence of re-acceleration—organic sales growth sustained above 4% for two consecutive quarters, or operating margin pushing through 25% while revenue compounds mid-single digits—or, on the downside, a clear break of the $15B NI run-rate that would confirm the multiple is too high. Until one of those arrives, the shares sit roughly 20–25% above a fundamentals-anchored value.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
PG is doing exactly what a mature earner should. Revenue grew from $76.1B (2021) to $84.3B (2025), operating margin expanded to 24.3% in 2025 (highest in the window), and net income hit a five-year high of $15.97B. Gross margin recovered from a 2022-2023 dip (47.4-47.9%) back to 51.2%, indicating pricing and mix have offset input cost pressure. FCF averages ~$14.7B/yr with OCF/NI of 1.2x and accruals at -2.5% of assets, confirming reported earnings convert cleanly to cash. Beneish M of -2.53 and Altman Z of 5.32 both sit firmly in the safe zone. Capital return is disciplined: diluted shares fell from 2.60B to 2.45B (-1.4% CAGR), with buybacks running ~15x SBC, so per-share value is being concentrated rather than eroded, and SBC at 0.6% of revenue is minimal for a company this size. The balance sheet is the one caveat - net debt of ~$25B against only $9.6B of liquid cash means it is not a cash fortress, but with $14B of annual FCF this leverage is trivially serviceable. Growth is slow (topline only +0.3% in 2025), and that gating factor plus reliance on brand/scale rather than any new secular tailwind is what keeps this a Strong rather than a Fortress-tier business.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Organic volume vs price mix in 2025 - is the flat revenue masking volume declines offset by price?
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted coupon on the ~$34B gross debt
- Segment-level growth (Beauty, Grooming, Health Care, Fabric, Baby) to see which categories are carrying vs dragging
- FX exposure and hedging - staples with global footprint often see reported growth muted by translation
- Retailer concentration (Walmart, Amazon, Costco) disclosed in 10-K
Every valuation method except the anchored-PE lands well below the market price: DCF at $110.51, EPV floor at $80.98, composite FV $117.77, and signal-adjusted $110.84 - implying roughly 18-23% downside to deserved value. Only the anchored-PE method ($169) supports the current quote, and that is essentially the market paying up for PG's historical multiple rather than for underlying cash generation. When three of four lenses cluster in the $80-$118 range and one outlier props up the price, the honest read is that the multiple, not the business, is doing the work.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Organic sales growth guidance for FY26 and whether volumes turn positive
- Gross margin trajectory as commodity tailwinds fade
- Buyback pace and net debt evolution
- Any FX or restructuring one-offs distorting reported EPS anchoring the PE method
The tape itself is neutral-to-slightly-constructive, and PG's 0.38 beta means macro (10y at 4.68%, VIX 16, mkt PE 26) barely grazes the name directly. But sentiment pressure here is not coming from the tape - it is coming from the narrative losing altitude. The steady-compounder story is intact but 'moderate intensity' with no cult following, meaning there is no fan base to defend the 30% quality premium when incremental news turns cautious. And this week the news turned cautious: a $1B cost hit headline, a Q4 call framed around a 'consumer growth reset,' a prudent FY27 guide, and an HSBC downgrade to Hold with the target cut from $182 to $149 - essentially at spot. That is a textbook de-rating setup for a premium defensive: numbers get trimmed, sell-side tone softens, and the multiple has nowhere to go but sideways-to-down. The offset is that PG is exactly the kind of low-beta, dividend-aristocrat name that gets bid in a genuine risk-off flush - but the tape is not risk-off yet, so that bid is not showing up. Net: a real, ordinary headwind - not a crisis, just a slow leak in the story as analysts move to the sidelines and the growth reset gets digested.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether other sell-side desks follow HSBC with downgrades or target cuts in the next 2-4 weeks
- VIX behavior - a spike above 20 would activate the defensive bid and flip the pressure
- Any incremental FY27 execution data point (pricing, volume, market share) that either confirms or breaks the 'reset' framing
- Rotation flows into staples vs out - if the K-shaped economy narrative deepens, PG could catch a bid
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 1, 2026, PG was $144.50. We expect it to be $132.50 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $120.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 1, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.