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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Progressive Corporation (PGR) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +16 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 80 · Value -36 · Sentiment 9 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $531.45 vs $215.34 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Progressive Corporation
PGR NYSEProgressive Corporation is an American insurance holding company specializing in property and casualty coverage for individuals and businesses. The company’s core offerings include personal and commercial auto insurance, residential property insurance, and a range of specialty lines tailored to specific customer needs. Progressive Corporation operates through three primary segments: Personal Lines, Commercial Lines, and Property, serving policyholders through both independent insurance agents and direct channels such as online platforms and call centers. Its product portfolio covers passenger vehicles, motorcycles, recreational vehicles, boats, and commercial vehicles, as well as homeowners and other related property risks. Headquartered in Mayfield Village, Ohio, Progressive Corporation plays a significant role in the U.S. insurance market as one of the largest auto insurers, providing risk protection and claims services that support households, small businesses, and larger commercial clients across diverse geographic markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 19.23
Total Equity: $30.32B
Shares: 588,039,522
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $138.00M
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $138.00M
Revenue: $87.64B
Revenue: $87.64B
Revenue: $87.64B
Total Equity: $30.32B
Tax Rate: 20.5%
Equity: $30.32B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $138.00M
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $30.32B
Shares: 588,039,522
Shares: 588,039,522
CapEx: -$348.00M
Shares: 588,039,522
Stock Price: $212.76
Net Income: $11.31B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 8:57am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $47.7B | $49.6B | $62.1B | $75.3B | $87.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $3.4B | $721.5M | $3.9B | $8.5B | $11.3B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $5.69 | $1.19 | $6.61 | $14.45 | $19.29 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.66 | $1.18 | $6.58 | $14.40 | $19.23 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:39am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $202.1M | $220.9M | $99.6M | $154.0M | $138.0M |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $71.1B | $75.5B | $88.7B | $105.7B | $123.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $52.9B | $59.6B | $68.4B | $80.2B | $92.7B |
| Total Equity | $18.2B | $15.9B | $20.3B | $25.6B | $30.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $15.3B | $15.7B | $18.8B | $24.3B | $27.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 8:57am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $7.8B | $6.8B | $10.6B | $15.1B | $17.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$243.5M | -$292.0M | -$252.0M | -$285.0M | -$348.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $7.5B | $6.6B | $10.4B | $14.8B | $17.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$313.2M | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$500.0M | $1.5B | $496.3M | $0 | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $125.6M | $18.8M | -$121.3M | $54.0M | -$16.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 8:57am (17d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.0% | +25.2% | +21.4% | +16.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | -78.5% | +440.9% | +117.3% | +33.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:40am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-02 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-02 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-02 | $13.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-02 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-03 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-03 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-10 | $4.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-03 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-03 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-03 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-18 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-04 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-06 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-05 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-05 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-06 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-06 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-06 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-06 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-17 | $1.50 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw tape first: Progressive has compounded revenue from $47.7B (2021) to $87.6B (2025) — an 84% cumulative gain — while net income went from $721M in 2022 to $11.3B in 2025, a 15x recovery from the underwriting-cycle trough. Trailing four quarters annualize to roughly $91B revenue and $11.7B NI. On 581M-ish shares implied by the $123.7B cap at $212.76, that's ~$20 in trailing EPS, so the 11.2x P/E is real, not a data artifact. ROE of 37% with zero debt and $30.3B of equity is genuinely elite. But the quarterly margin trajectory tells the more important story: 14.4% → 12.6% → 11.6% → 14% → 11.6% → 12.7% → 14% — margins are oscillating in a band, not expanding, and Q2'26's 14% is flat versus Q2'25's 14.4%. Revenue YoY (Q2'26 vs Q2'25) is only 7.3%, a sharp deceleration from the 16.3% recent print the momentum module cites and far below the 18.8% four-year CAGR. That's the pivot.
The synthesis verdict of $621 fair value ($871 signal-adjusted) versus a $212 print is absurd on its face and I dissent from it firmly. A DCF that spits out a 3x multiple of current price for a P&C insurer at peak-cycle profitability is almost certainly extrapolating 28.7% FCF CAGR and 70% earnings CAGR forward — but those growth rates are arithmetic artifacts of the 2022 combined-ratio blowout ($721M NI base). Normalize 2022 and the earnings CAGR collapses to maybe 15-20%. The Market Forces module and the Thesis Evaluation (score of +1, essentially balanced) are much closer to reality than the valuation synthesis. The narrative layer honestly diagnoses this: the "75% discount" is not a discount, it's a fundamentals-model error, and the engine's own reasoning admits it.
The contrarian bull case that actually deserves airtime is not the DCF — it's the expense-ratio moat. Progressive's direct/telematics model has structurally 3-5 points of expense-ratio advantage over Allstate and the mutuals, and that gap has widened, not narrowed. If auto pricing stays firm through 2026 (rate filings still flowing through), the 2026 numbers could annualize past $95B revenue and $13B NI, putting the stock at ~9.5x forward — cheap for a 35% ROE compounder with zero leverage. The contrarian bear case is that Q1'26 revenue ($22.19B) was sequentially DOWN from Q4'25 ($22.75B), the first sequential decline in the dataset, and Q2'26's rebound to $23.6B is only modest. Auto insurance shopping activity peaks when rates rise; retention weakens on the back end. Insider activity — five sales in a two-day window in late July 2026 with no offsetting open-market buys — is not neutral, it's a tell. Executives don't sell 60,000 shares in 72 hours at cycle peaks by coincidence.
My read: fairly valued to modestly undervalued, not the mispricing the synthesis claims. At $212, PGR trades at ~11x trailing and roughly 12-13x a normalized 2027 earnings power of $16-17/share. That's a reasonable multiple for a best-in-class P&C franchise but not a screaming buy — the peer group (TRV, ALL, CB) trades 11-14x and Progressive deserves a premium of maybe 2-3 turns, implying fair value in the $230-260 range, not $621. The 6.45% dividend yield print looks like a variable-dividend artifact (Progressive pays an annual variable dividend) and shouldn't be treated as a run-rate — verify before underwriting. I'd be a buyer under $200, a holder $200-240, and a trimmer above $260. The synthesis model is broken here; anyone acting on an $871 price target is going to be very disappointed when 2026 prints a combined ratio in the 89-91 range instead of the 86 that DCF is implicitly assuming.
GPT Reading
Progressive looks like a superb business priced more like a good one. The raw numbers show an insurer that has not merely recovered from a soft patch but has stepped up into a much higher earnings band: net income went from $721.5M in 2022 to $3.90B in 2023, $8.48B in 2024, and $11.31B in 2025. That is not just market beta or a treasury-yield assist; the quarterly run-rate has remained remarkably strong, with the last four quarters producing roughly $11.7B of earnings and quarterly margins staying in an 11.6%-14.4% range. Revenue has also kept climbing, from $75.34B in 2024 to $87.64B in 2025, and the first half of 2026 annualizes above $91B. For a P&C insurer, that combination of premium growth and sustained double-digit net margins is the core fact pattern. At $123.7B market cap and about 11x trailing earnings, the market is still treating a large part of this as cyclical normalization risk rather than giving full credit for a franchise that appears to be taking share while earning very high returns.
The balance sheet and cash profile reinforce that read. Reported debt is zero, equity is $30.32B, and ROE is 37.3%—an extraordinary figure even allowing for favorable cycle conditions. Free cash flow of $17.20B against $11.31B of net income is unusually strong and, while insurer cash flow can be noisy because of float dynamics, it still indicates a business generating substantial cash while barely needing capital spending. On book value, the stock is not optically cheap at 4.18x P/B, but that multiple only looks rich if you assume returns collapse. A company earning 30%+ on equity and compounding book rapidly should not trade anywhere near average insurer multiples. If the current earnings power is even mostly sustainable—say earnings settle in the $9B-$10B range rather than continue rising—today’s price implies a low-teens or even sub-13x multiple on normalized earnings for a category leader with no financial leverage.
What stands out most is how implausible the ultra-bull valuation model is, even though I still land bullish. A fair value of $600-$800 is fantasy for a regulated, cyclical insurer unless one assumes today’s margins and growth persist for a very long time with minimal catastrophe or pricing pressure. That model is over-reading cash flow and under-reading the mean reversion embedded in auto and property insurance. But rejecting the absurd DCF does not push me bearish; it just means the right debate is between “modestly cheap” and “fair,” not “4x upside.” Progressive’s recent price drop from roughly $255 to $213 makes more sense as the market discounting peak underwriting conditions than as a verdict that the franchise has deteriorated. If earnings power is peaking, the stock can still be worth more than today because the current multiple already bakes in a meaningful step-down.
The best bear case is straightforward and serious: nearly every number here is flattered by being on the right side of the underwriting cycle. Earnings CAGR of 70% since 2021 is not a durable operating reality for an insurer; it is a rebound from an abnormally weak 2022 plus aggressive repricing through an inflation shock. Revenue growth is already decelerating at the margin, and if loss-cost trends moderate while competition re-intensifies, premium growth could slow just as margins compress. A 4.2x book multiple leaves little room for underwriting mistakes, reserve slippage, or a bad catastrophe year, and “zero debt” is less meaningful for an insurer than it would be in an industrial because the real economic leverage is embedded in the liability structure. On that reading, 11x trailing earnings may actually be full if those earnings are near peak. The insider selling cluster in late July is not a thesis by itself, but it is consistent with management not viewing the shares as obviously mispriced after the run.
What would change my mind is evidence that the earnings plateau is already breaking. If revenue keeps rising but quarterly net income falls back toward $1.5B-$2.0B for multiple quarters, that would tell me the current 12%-14% net margin regime was cyclical froth, not improved structural economics. Likewise, if 2026 annual earnings look more like $8B than $11B despite continued top-line growth, the stock at $213 is closer to fair value than opportunity. On the other hand, if Progressive can sustain something like $22B-$24B quarterly revenue with net margins still around 11%-13% through the next few reports, then the market is still underestimating how durable this higher earnings base is, and I would expect the stock to work back toward the mid-$240s or better.
Grok Reading
Progressive’s numbers tell a story of a franchise that has converted an underwriting hard market into something closer to a structural earnings step-change, not a one-cycle sugar high. Revenue compounded from $47.7B in 2021 to $87.6B in 2025; net income went from a trough $722M in 2022 to $11.3B in 2025, with trailing four-quarter margins locked in the 12–14% band and the most recent quarter printing $23.6B revenue and $3.31B net income at 14%. Free cash flow of $17.2B against a $124B market cap, zero debt, 37% ROE and a 6.5% dividend yield at an 11.2x trailing P/E is not the setup of a fully priced peak-cycle name. The market is effectively capitalizing this run-rate at a discount rate that assumes sharp mean-reversion in underwriting profitability and little durability to the telematics/direct-distribution cost edge. Quarterly revenue is still advancing mid-teens year-over-year even as growth decelerates from the prior explosive pace, which is exactly what a share-gaining compounder should look like once the easy rate-hike tailwind fades.
The valuation synthesis output claiming $622–$871 fair value is not credible and should be discarded; that implies 30–40x earnings on an already-elevated margin base and invents a re-rating the insurance sector has never granted. A more disciplined frame is that Progressive is earning roughly 3x a reasonable cost of equity, which is why it trades at 4.2x book, and that the 11x earnings multiple embeds an expectation of mid-to-high single-digit earnings decline or stagnation. That expectation looks too punitive given $17B of annual FCF, pristine balance sheet, and continued unit growth. Insider sales in late July are noise relative to the cash-generation machine; they do not override the operating evidence.
The strongest counter-argument is straightforward and quantitative: 2022–2025 earnings CAGR of ~70% is almost entirely recovery from a trough combined-ratio disaster, not a new steady state. Net margin at 12.9% and ROE at 37% sit well above Progressive’s own longer-term history; any normalization toward 8–10% margins would cut earnings power to the $7–9B range and make today’s 11x multiple look ordinary-to-rich rather than cheap. Auto frequency/severity inflation, litigation trends, and climate-driven property losses are real, and the market-forces layer correctly flags that forward comparisons get harder from here. Competitors are not static; if State Farm or the nationals reprice aggressively, Progressive’s growth advantage compresses. The decelerating quarterly revenue trend and the thesis score near zero both reflect this legitimate mean-reversion risk. I weigh it as real but already more than discounted at 11x and 1.4x sales for a zero-debt, 18% revenue CAGR franchise still taking share.
What flips the view: two consecutive quarters of combined-ratio deterioration that push net margin sustainably below 10%, or a clear sequential stall in policy-in-force growth below mid-single digits, would force a move to fairly valued or worse. Conversely, another year of 12%+ margins with revenue still above 12% would justify a re-rating toward mid-teens earnings multiples and make the current $213 entry look like a clear miss.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Progressive has scaled revenue from $47.7B (2021) to $87.6B (2025), an ~16% CAGR, while net income went from $3.35B to $11.31B and FCF from $7.52B to $17.20B — a >2x expansion in three years. OCF/NI of 3.57x and accruals of -6.7% of assets indicate earnings are conservatively stated relative to cash generation (normal for a P&C insurer where float and reserves inflate OCF, but still confirms no aggressive accrual behavior). The 2022 net income trough of $721M reflects the underwriting cycle (catastrophe/loss-ratio pressure) which management has now clearly worked through, with 2024-2025 showing operating leverage on scale. Diluted share count actually declined slightly (592M to 588M, -0.2% CAGR) — per-share value is being protected, not diluted. Liquid cash of $10.1B with $17.2B annual FCF and zero net debt burden means the business is fully self-funding with substantial capital return capacity. The Altman Z of 1.82 (grey) is a quirk of the insurance model (large investment portfolio, low inventory/working capital) and not meaningful here. Insider activity shows routine sales around July equity awards including CEO Griffith — this is programmatic post-vest liquidation, not a red flag, but also no open-market conviction buys.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Combined ratio trend by segment (personal auto vs commercial vs property) in the 10-K
- Adequacy of loss reserves and any prior-year development disclosures
- Investment portfolio composition and credit quality given ~$10B liquid cash figure
- Whether 10b5-1 plans govern the July insider sales
- Policy-in-force growth vs rate to distinguish volume from price contribution
The e2e composite fair value of $621.83 and signal-adjusted $871.33 imply 300%+ upside, which fails the sanity check for a $124B P&C insurer already priced at a premium multiple. The DCF at $798.86 requires extrapolating recent hyper-growth (revenue nearly doubled in 4y, earnings tripled) far into the future in a cyclical underwriting business - heroic. The anchored PE of $267.78 is the more credible anchor, implying maybe 20-25% upside if current earnings power holds and normalizes, not a dislocation. Against the $215.34 price, the honest read is that this is a top-decile operator trading at a fair-to-slightly-full multiple after a huge run driven by the hard auto market. Earnings quality is high (no haircut needed) and the business quality is Fortress, both of which raise deserved value - but the market already knows this. The bear case is not that PGR is bad, it is that perfection is priced: loss-cost inflation, litigation trends, and eventual softening of the auto cycle can compress the combined ratio from the current exceptional level back toward normal, and the multiple will re-rate with it. Margin of safety here is thin. I would want a mid-teens pullback before calling it cheap on valuation alone.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Combined ratio trajectory next 2-4 quarters vs current exceptional level
- Loss-cost inflation and severity trends in auto (BI, physical damage)
- PIF growth deceleration or reacceleration
- Reserve development - favorable or adverse
- Any guidance on ceding, reinsurance costs, or CAT load assumptions
The tape is modestly risk-on (regime +46, VIX 15.2) which is a background positive, but PGR's 0.26 beta means the market's mood barely moves this name either way. What matters here is the narrative, and PGR sits in a comfortable spot: a durable, moderate-intensity steady-compounder story with the bull case (share gains, Snapshot moat, digital distribution) still intact and freshly reinforced by a Q2 earnings event that emphasized bundled auto+home expansion. That is a mild tailwind - the story is working, not breaking. Against that, the narrative is already well-known and low-cult; there is no fresh euphoria to inflate it, and the bear framing (priced for perfection, combined-ratio pressure, litigation/inflation drag on auto) is a persistent, quiet headwind that caps upside enthusiasm. Analyst tone around the print appears constructive-to-neutral based on the metrics-vs-estimates coverage, without a visible upgrade wave. Net: a name being carried gently by tape and narrative, but nothing decisive pressing it in either direction right now.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Analyst target-revision direction post Q2 print - are estimates drifting up or being trimmed on combined-ratio commentary
- Any sign of the auto-insurance narrative shifting from 'share gainer' to 'margin pressure' - would flip sentiment to headwind
- Rotation flows: if the tape turns more risk-on/high-beta, PGR could be a source of funds and drift on a relative basis
- Catastrophe/hurricane season headlines that could re-price the property expansion story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 7, 2026, PGR was $215.34. We expect it to be $210.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $180.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 7, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.