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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for PTC Inc. (PTC) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +9 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 60 · Value -33 · Sentiment -36 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $144.91 vs $140.61 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
PTC Inc.
PTC NASDAQPTC Inc. is a global software company that provides digital solutions for product design, engineering, manufacturing, and service operations. Its portfolio includes computer-aided design, product lifecycle management, industrial Internet of Things, augmented reality, and service management tools used by manufacturers and industrial organizations to connect product development with real-world operations. PTC Inc. serves industries such as discrete manufacturing, aerospace, automotive, industrial equipment, and high-tech, helping companies manage complex product data, improve collaboration, and streamline workflows across the product lifecycle. The company’s software is used by organizations that build, maintain, and service physical products, making PTC Inc. an important provider of enterprise technology for industrial digital transformation.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.08
Total Equity: $3.83B
Shares: 120,777,000
Total Debt: $1.20B
Cash: $184.42M
EBITDA: $1.08B
Total Debt: $1.20B
Cash: $184.42M
Revenue: $2.74B
Revenue: $2.74B
Revenue: $2.74B
Total Equity: $3.83B
Tax Rate: 20.2%
Equity: $3.83B
Total Debt: $1.20B
Cash: $184.42M
Current Liabilities: $1.24B
Long-Term Debt: $1.17B
Total Debt: $1.20B
Total Equity: $3.83B
Shares: 120,777,000
Shares: 120,777,000
CapEx: -$11.01M
Shares: 120,777,000
Stock Price: $141.85
Net Income: $734.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 1:16pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.8B | $1.9B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $371.1M | $386.0M | $441.0M | $444.8M | $445.0M |
| Gross Profit | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $2.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Operating Income | $380.7M | $447.4M | $458.5M | $588.1M | $982.4M |
| Net Income | $476.9M | $313.1M | $245.5M | $376.3M | $734.0M |
| EBITDA | $466.0M | $535.1M | $563.2M | $696.2M | $1.1B |
| EPS | $4.08 | $2.67 | $2.07 | $3.14 | $6.12 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $4.03 | $2.65 | $2.06 | $3.12 | $6.08 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:44pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $326.5M | $272.2M | $288.1M | $265.8M | $184.4M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.4B |
| Total Assets | $4.5B | $4.7B | $6.3B | $6.4B | $6.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $779.3M | $792.3M | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.7B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.5B | $2.4B | $3.6B | $3.2B | $2.8B |
| Total Equity | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.7B | $3.2B | $3.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $414.7M | $727.7M | $973.3M | $1.3B | $2.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 1:16pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $368.8M | $435.3M | $610.9M | $750.0M | $867.7M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$24.7M | -$19.5M | -$23.8M | -$14.4M | -$11.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $344.1M | $415.8M | $587.0M | $735.6M | $856.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$718.0M | -$282.9M | -$828.3M | -$93.5M | -$6.5M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $0 | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$30.0M | -$125.0M | $0 | $0 | -$300.0M |
| Net Change in Cash | $51.1M | -$54.2M | $15.9M | -$22.3M | -$81.5M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 1:16pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +7.0% | +8.5% | +9.6% | +19.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +7.8% | +7.0% | +11.9% | +23.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +17.5% | +2.5% | +28.3% | +67.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -34.4% | -21.6% | +53.3% | +95.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +14.8% | +5.3% | +23.6% | +55.8% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 10:58Recovery pays +12%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 55%. Ratio 0.2:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($140.61) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +23% | 35.0% | $157.45 | +12% |
| Base — stabilizes | +15% | 35.0% | $126.06 | -10% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +8% | 35.0% | $99.98 | -29% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -7% | 35.0% | $62.65 | -55% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers first: PTC printed $2.74B FY25 revenue with $735M net income and $857M FCF — that's a 31% FCF margin on a 14% revenue CAGR, which is genuinely high-quality mature software economics. But the quarterly tape has a problem the synthesis glosses over. The March 2026 quarter shows $774M revenue with $591M net income — a 76% net margin that is not a normal operating result. FY25 net margin was 27%; the trailing quarters ran 22-39%. A 76% margin quarter almost certainly reflects a one-time tax benefit, deferred tax asset release, divestiture gain, or accounting adjustment. Strip that out and normalized earnings look far less impressive than the "95% YoY earnings growth" momentum tag suggests. The models are anchoring on a flattered TTM.
The 14.3% revenue CAGR is real but the quarterly cadence is lumpy in a way consistent with ratable subscription accounting rather than true acceleration — $565M → $636M → $644M → $894M → $686M → $774M zigzags because bookings, not revenue, drive the underlying business. FY24 to FY25 revenue growth was 19% ($2.30B → $2.74B), which is genuinely good for a mature PLM vendor, but this includes the ServiceMax contribution and pricing actions, not just organic seat growth. At 6.25x sales and 16.6x EV/EBITDA on peak-cycle margins, the stock is priced for continued execution with essentially no cushion. Debt is manageable ($1.2B vs $857M FCF) but the current ratio of 1.12 and only $184M cash means there's no war chest for opportunistic M&A without leveraging up.
I largely agree with the synthesis that this is fairly valued, but I dissent on the direction of the risk. The synthesis lands at $142.5 fair value vs $141.8 price — essentially a coin flip labeled "slight upside." The Thesis Evaluation is more honest: -6 score, with the killer bear point that "IoT growth story has been two years away since 2016." That's true — ThingWorx and Vuforia have been the narrative crutch for a decade without ever becoming material P&L contributors. Meanwhile the market forces call correctly flags "cyclical risk underappreciated": PTC's customers are discrete manufacturers (auto, aerospace, industrial machinery), all of whom are in various states of capex hesitation. Insider activity is quietly negative — every non-award transaction is a sale or option exercise, no open-market buying, which is neutral-to-mildly-bearish for a stock that's already down 35% from highs.
The contrarian case a careful skeptic would push: at 23x earnings and 6x sales, PTC is being valued like Autodesk or Ansys despite structurally slower organic growth and a more concentrated customer base in cyclical end markets. Historical PE was 15-18x — a reversion to 18x on normalized ~$5.50 EPS (backing out the Q1 anomaly) gets you to ~$100, not $142. The bull needs both (a) ARR growth sustaining low-teens and (b) multiple holding at premium levels. Both can crack simultaneously in a manufacturing downturn. Conversely, the bull's real argument isn't IoT — it's that Creo/Windchill are so embedded that revenue is closer to a utility, and utilities deserve premium multiples in a low-rate environment. That's defensible but rate-regime dependent. My read: fairly valued at $142 giving credit to the durability, but the risk skew is to the downside because the momentum stats are flattered by a one-time earnings item and the sector is cyclically exposed. I'd want $115-120 for a real starter position, and I'd fade any rally above $155 absent evidence that manufacturing capex is turning. The models are directionally right that this isn't a screaming opportunity in either direction, but they're understating that "fair value" here is on top-of-cycle margins that could compress 300-500bps in a downturn.
GPT Reading
PTC looks like a very good business that is now priced like a merely good stock. What jumps out first is the operating model: revenue has scaled from $1.81 billion in 2021 to $2.74 billion in 2025, a 51% increase in four years, while operating income rose from $380.7 million to $982.4 million and net income from $476.9 million to $734.0 million. The annual gross margin is 83.8% and operating margin 35.9%, which is elite for a company tied to industrial end markets rather than pure horizontal SaaS. Just as important, the cash conversion is real: on $734.0 million of net income, PTC produced $867.7 million of operating cash flow and $856.7 million of free cash flow, with only $11.0 million of capex. That is a 31% FCF margin on 2025 revenue, and at a $15.85 billion market cap the stock trades around 18.5x trailing FCF. For a sticky software franchise with ROIC of 16.2%, modest leverage, and evident margin expansion, that is not expensive.
The quarterlies tell a stronger story than the “mature earner” label suggests, but also a messier one than the simple momentum metrics imply. Revenue stepped from $518.6 million in June 2024 to $626.5 million in September, dipped seasonally and then climbed to $636.4 million and $643.9 million, before jumping to $893.8 million in September 2025 and then $685.8 million and $774.3 million. That latest quarter is up 21.7% year over year against $636.4 million, and the prior quarter was up 21.4% against $565.1 million. This is not a flat legacy vendor. But the profit line is clearly distorted by periodic items: a 76.3% net margin in March 2026 and 38.9% in September 2025 are not normal run-rate economics. So I do not buy the superficial “95% earnings growth” excitement. The right read is that revenue growth has reaccelerated into the high teens to low 20s while the normalized earnings base is already very strong. On that basis, the stock around 6.3x sales and 16.6x EV/EBITDA feels more reasonable than demanding, particularly because this is software with unusually durable customer entrenchment.
The balance sheet does not worry me. Net debt is roughly $1.0 billion after backing out $184.4 million of cash against $1.20 billion of debt, which is light relative to nearly $857 million of annual FCF. Debt to equity at 0.31 is conservative, and the current ratio of 1.12 is adequate for a software company with low capital intensity and recurring collections. The market appears to be anchoring on “transition done, upside limited,” but the raw numbers suggest the company may still be in the phase where margin structure has improved faster than valuation has adjusted. If PTC can sustain even low-teens revenue growth rather than slipping back to mid-single digits, an 18-19x FCF multiple is too low for an 80%+ gross margin franchise. My base case is not multiple expansion to a flashy SaaS level; it is simply that the current multiple already bakes in more maturity than the recent revenue trajectory justifies.
The best bear case is that investors are getting tricked by accounting-noisy profit growth and a favorable patch in demand. The annual P/E of 23.3x is not cheap if the true normalized growth rate is closer to GDP-plus than to the recent 19-22% quarterly pace. Quarterly revenue is lumpy, the latest two standout quarters may be helped by timing and enterprise deal concentration, and software tied to manufacturing programs is still exposed to macro hesitation. The market is also right to distrust the perpetual optionality story around IoT and AR; if those adjacencies never become material, PTC is “just” a high-quality PLM/CAD/industrial software incumbent. In that framing, 6.6x EV/revenue and 4.5x book are not screaming bargains, especially after margins have already climbed this far. Insider activity is mildly unhelpful too: recent transactions skew to small sales rather than open-market buying, which does not confirm a dislocation.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next two quarters show revenue dropping back toward mid-single-digit growth, with annualized FCF failing to clear roughly $900 million despite these elevated margins, then this is a fair-value compounder and not an opportunity. I would also turn more cautious if the March 2026 profit spike proves to be masking weak underlying demand, visible through a reversal from $774.3 million revenue toward the mid-$600 millions without a clear seasonality explanation. Conversely, if PTC can hold quarterly revenue above $700 million outside the seasonal high point and convert that into a sustainable 30%+ FCF margin, then fair value is above the current price and likely into the $160-$170 range.
Grok Reading
PTC’s numbers describe a completed SaaS conversion that has already delivered the margin prize. Annual revenue climbed from $1.81B in FY2021 to $2.74B in FY2025 while operating income more than doubled to $982M and free cash flow reached $857M—an exceptional 31% FCF margin on virtually zero capex. Gross margin sits at 84% and operating margin at 36%, levels that look permanent rather than transitional. Recent quarterly run-rates ($636–$774M) confirm mid-teens-to-20% top-line growth is still intact, and the balance sheet is manageable at 0.31 debt-to-equity. The story the cash flows tell is therefore straightforward: a sticky industrial PLM/CAD franchise that has successfully shifted to recurring revenue and now prints high-quality cash.
What the headline multiples obscure is earnings quality and the true starting point for valuation. The March 2026 quarter printed a 76% net margin and $591M of net income—clearly a discrete tax or one-time item—while the September 2025 quarter also carried an elevated 39% margin. Strip those out and normalized annual earnings power sits closer to $600–650M, pushing the effective multiple above the stated 23x. More telling, the unadjusted composite fair value sits at $124, a full 12% below the current $142 print; only after “signal adjustment” does the model crawl back to parity. EV/FCF near 20x and EV/Revenue of 6.6x already embed continued 15%+ growth and further margin expansion that the decelerating quarterly revenue trend and “below sector benchmarks” flag do not support. FCF yield of roughly 5.4% is respectable but not cheap insurance against industrial-software cyclicality.
The strongest counter-argument is simply the durability of the installed base and the cash engine itself. Switching costs in Windchill and Creo remain high, ARR visibility is excellent, and ROIC of 16% with rising returns on a modest capital base is exactly what compounders are supposed to look like. A bull can fairly claim that 20x FCF for a 15% grower with 84% gross margins is no worse than fair, that net debt is easily serviceable out of $850M+ annual FCF, and that any IoT/AR optionality is free. Those points keep me from a more aggressive short stance; they do not, however, erase the fact that the raw DCF already says $124 and that the market is paying peak-cycle multiples for mid-cycle growth.
I would flip constructive on two concrete data points: sequential acceleration in subscription billings/ARR back above 20% for two consecutive quarters, or a clean FY2026 guide that shows operating margin holding above 35% while revenue clears $3.2B without one-time items. Either would justify the current multiple; neither is in the tape today.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Claude — Second Response · fairly valued held
VERDICT: Fairly valued at $142 with downside skew — normalized FV $120-130; add at $120, trim above $155, no edge in between
My colleagues and I landed in the same neighborhood by different routes, and the disagreement is really about which direction the risk skews from $142. Grok independently flagged the exact issue I anchored on — the March 2026 76% net margin as a one-time item and the unadjusted DCF at ~$124 — which reinforces rather than challenges my read. GPT's bull case is the one I need to engage with seriously, and the strongest piece of it is the revenue trajectory: $565M → $636M → $644M → $894M → $686M → $774M, with the two most recent non-peak quarters up 21%+ YoY. That is not a mid-single-digit legacy vendor, and I underweighted it in my first pass.
But GPT's own numbers cut against his conclusion. He arrives at $160-170 fair value by applying an 18-19x multiple to ~$857M FCF and assuming low-teens growth persists — yet he concedes the profit line is "clearly distorted by periodic items" and that if growth reverts to mid-single-digits this is a fair-value compounder, not an opportunity. That is precisely the asymmetry I'm pricing: you need both sustained high-teens growth AND clean normalized FCF above $850M to justify $165, and the tape gives us one quarter of each with accounting noise on top. The 31% FCF margin is real, but $11M capex on $2.74B revenue is suspiciously low for a company with any hardware/AR ambitions and suggests either capex is understated via capitalized-cloud accounting or it's genuinely a pure software annuity (which supports GPT) — I can't tell from the briefing, and that uncertainty is itself bearish for paying up.
I'm holding my verdict but tightening it. GPT moved me on growth durability enough that I won't call this overvalued, but the normalized earnings problem he acknowledges and Grok independently corroborates keeps me from crossing to undervalued. Fair value with downside skew, starter at $120, fade above $155.
GPT — Second Response · fairly valued changed direction
VERDICT: Roughly fairly valued at $142; quality and cash flow support the stock, but normalized earnings and cyclical exposure cap fair value around $130-$145 unless growth proves sustainably high-teens.
Claude and Grok moved me on one key point: I underweighted how much the trailing earnings and even the “cheapness” framing are flattered by the March 2026 anomaly. I had already noted the 76% net margin was non-recurring, but they are right that once you normalize earnings power, the apparent 23x P/E is less relevant and the market is really paying more like a premium multiple for a mature but excellent industrial software franchise. I’m not persuaded by the harsher $100-type bear case, though. That leans too hard on historical P/E ranges without giving enough credit to the post-transition model: 84% gross margin, 36% operating margin, and $857M of FCF on $2.74B of revenue are not the economics of the old PTC. Likewise, I don’t think the quarterly revenue pattern alone proves the recent growth is illusory; FY24 to FY25 at 19% is too strong to dismiss as mere accounting cadence.
What failed to move me is the idea that the stock is plainly overvalued today. On cash, the case is still sturdier than the normalized-EPS bears allow: at roughly 18.5x trailing FCF and about a 5%+ FCF yield, PTC is not priced like a speculative software name, and net debt near $1B is very manageable against that cash generation. But my original “undervalued to $165” call was too aggressive because it gave too much benefit of the doubt to sustaining high-teens growth and too little penalty for cyclical manufacturing exposure, ServiceMax/inorganic contribution, and the long-running failure of IoT/AR optionality to matter. So I’m revising from undervalued to roughly fair value, with a modestly negative skew if organic growth slips back toward low teens. I’d need either a cleaner read on ARR/billings durability or a better entry around the low-$120s to get constructive again.
Grok — Second Response · overvalued held
VERDICT: Fully priced at $142 with normalized FV $115-125; asymmetric downside if growth cools
Claude’s normalization math and historical-PE anchor sharpened my original caution rather than softened it. Backing out the 76% March quarter leaves true earnings power nearer $5.50–6.00, and a reversion even to the upper end of PTC’s own 15–18x history lands closer to $100–110 than my prior $124 raw DCF; the cyclical manufacturing exposure and quiet insider selling only reinforce that the risk skew is downward, not symmetric. GPT’s 18.5x FCF and $165 target correctly flag the high-teens quarterly growth and 31% cash conversion, yet those same numbers already sit inside the current 6.6x sales / ~20x EV/FCF print; the lumpy cadence and ServiceMax contribution make sustained 15%+ organic growth the bull case, not the base case I am willing to underwrite at $142.
Nothing in either reading overturns the core observation that the SaaS-margin prize has already been captured and is now fully reflected. I therefore hold the view that the stock is fully priced with asymmetric downside if industrial capex stalls, and I still require either clear ARR re-acceleration above 20% or a clean $3.2 B / 35%+ margin guide before turning constructive.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
PTC is a mature enterprise-software earner showing genuine operating leverage: revenue grew from $1.81B (2021) to $2.74B (2025), a ~11% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 79.5% to 83.8% and operating margin stepped from 21.1% to 35.9%. Net income more than doubled in the last year to $734M, and FCF has climbed every single year from $344M to $857M - a 2.5x lift on ~1.5x revenue. Earnings quality checks out: OCF/NI 1.57x, accruals -2.8% of assets, Beneish M -2.37, Altman Z 4.78. Cash conversion is real, not accounting-driven.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Composition and maturity ladder of the debt behind the $1.01B net-debt figure
- ARR/subscription mix and net retention to confirm the 2025 margin step-change is structural not one-off
- Whether the 2025 net-income jump to $734M includes any tax or one-time benefits (effective tax rate, discrete items)
- Customer concentration in industrial/CAD/PLM end markets
- Integration status and residual costs from ServiceMax acquisition (likely source of net debt)
The composite fair value of $124.06 sits ~12% below the $140.61 price, while the signal-adjusted FV of $142.51 lands within 1% of it. The DCF ($145.12) and anchored P/E ($160.61) bracket the price on the upside; the EPV floor of $45.40 is a runaway low-side print that assumes no growth and should be treated as a stress floor, not a serious deserved-value read. Averaging the two forward-looking methods gives roughly $150-155 of deserved value against $140.61 - a mid-single-digit discount, i.e. noise, not a margin of safety. Earnings quality is high (score 3), so no haircut is warranted, and the Strong quality grade (60) supports paying a full multiple rather than demanding one. But quality is already in the tape: at ~$15.8B market cap on a business the market widely recognizes as a sticky industrial-software compounder, the easy rerating is behind it. To underwrite meaningful upside from here you need continued FCF inflection and multiple maintenance - plausible, but that is the base case, not a mispricing. Nothing here screams cheap; nothing screams rich either. This is the textbook 'good company, fair price' setup.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- ARR and constant-currency ARR growth trajectory in the next print - the compounder thesis lives or dies here
- FCF conversion and any guidance revisions to full-year FCF
- Net debt paydown pace against the ~$1B balance - deleveraging supports deserved value
- Any softening in discrete-manufacturing end-markets that would compress the growth assumption in the DCF
PTC just printed a 6.8% YoY revenue decline in Q2, and while guidance was nudged up and AI initiatives got airtime, the tape treats this as a mature industrial-software compounder with a minimal-intensity narrative and low cult factor. There is no euphoric story pulling the stock up and no acute collapse pulling it down; the market has essentially accepted PTC as fairly valued at DCF, meaning sentiment adds almost nothing to the bid. News flow is mixed-to-cautious, with headlines framing the print as a 'sharp pullback', 'valuation reset', and 'execution in focus' - a tone that keeps a lid on multiple expansion. The macro tape is only mildly supportive (regime score +22) but rates at 4.68% and a market PE near 27 create a low-grade headwind for software names that are not part of the AI-winner cohort. With beta near 1.0, PTC absorbs the tape roughly one-for-one, and as a discrete-manufacturing-exposed software vendor it also carries cyclical industrial sensitivity that the narrative does not offset. Analyst framing has pivoted to Q4 ARR conversion as the make-or-break - a wait-and-see posture that suppresses near-term buying pressure. Net: not a crisis, but a persistent low-grade press to the downside from a fading revenue line, an unexciting AI story, and a tape that is rewarding louder narratives elsewhere.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Q4 ARR conversion print - the analyst-designated make-or-break for the tape
- Whether AI-lifecycle pilots convert to bookings language on the next call (would raise narrative intensity)
- Sector rotation: if industrial software catches an AI-adjacent bid (like ADSK/ANSYS), PTC likely follows
- Any downward revisions to consensus revenue that would confirm the miss was not one-off
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, PTC was $139.86. We expect it to be $149.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $118.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.