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AGING Analysis Report
Jun 18, 2026
8 days ago · 100% complete · +5 refreshed

PayPal Holdings, Inc.

PYPL NASDAQ Categories PDF
Financial Services · Financial - Credit Services
San Jose, CA 95131, United States IPO 2015 paypal.com Updated Jun 18, 10:17pm
Price
$42.51
Market Cap
$37.5B
Employees
24,400
Beta
1.34
Avg Volume
15,452,646
CEO
Enrique J. Lores
Business Description

PayPal Holdings, Inc. provides a worldwide technological framework that facilitates digital financial transactions for both businesses and individual users. The company offers a wide array of payment services through well-known brands such as PayPal, PayPal Credit, Braintree, Venmo, Xoom, Zettle, Hyperwallet, Honey, and Paidy. Through its extensive platform, consumers are able to send and receive funds across roughly 200 global markets and in approximately 100 different currencies. Additionally, users can transfer money to their bank accounts in 56 currencies and maintain account balances in 25 distinct currencies within their PayPal accounts. Founded in 1998, the company's corporate headquarters are situated in San Jose, California.

Business History
Generated: Jun 18, 2026 10:20pm
Price Overview
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:17pm (8d ago)
$42.51
+0.43 (+1.02%)
Day Range
$41.65 – $42.82
52-Week Range
$38.46 – $79.50
50-Day MA
$45.93
200-Day MA
$55.00
Volume
21,165,320.00
Analyst Price Targets
Low $34.00
Consensus $50.45
High $65.00
(207 analysts)
Share Structure
Outstanding 882,105,493.00
Float 880,014,903.00
Free Float 99.8%
High free float — 99.8% of shares trade freely, ~0.2% held by insiders/institutions
Very liquid — most shares trade freely. Low insider ownership can mean less management alignment, but makes large position sizing straightforward.
Price History (1 Year)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:22pm (8d ago)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
The directional story — useful even when net income is negative.
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:22pm (8d ago)
Revenue
The top line — total sales before any costs or taxes are subtracted. A measure of how much business the company is doing.
Net Income
The bottom line — profit left after subtracting all expenses, interest, and taxes from revenue. Reflects accounting profitability, but includes non-cash items like depreciation, so it isn't the same as cash earned.
Operating Cash Flow
The real cash generated by the day-to-day business — selling products, paying suppliers, collecting from customers. Calculated from net income by adding back non-cash items and adjusting for timing (unpaid bills, unsold inventory). When OCF consistently lags net income, the reported profit may not be converting to real money.
Period Revenue Net Income Net Margin YoY/QoQ
Key Metrics
API Direct from provider CALC Derived from statements
Industry comparison last run: Jun 18, 2026 10:19pm
P/E Ratio (Price per dollar of earnings)
API
Stock Price / EPS (Diluted)
7.67
Stock Price: $42.51
EPS (Diluted): 5.46
P/B Ratio (Price vs net asset value)
API
Stock Price / Book Value Per Share
2.76
Stock Price: $42.51
Total Equity: $20.26B
Shares: 968,000,000
EV/EBITDA (Total value vs operating profit)
API
Enterprise Value / EBITDA
5.34
Market Cap: $37.50B
Total Debt: $9.99B
Cash: $8.05B
EBITDA: $7.70B
Enterprise Value (Takeover price (cap + debt - cash))
API
Market Cap + Total Debt - Cash
$57.9B
Market Cap: $37.50B
Total Debt: $9.99B
Cash: $8.05B
Gross Margin (Revenue left after direct costs)
API
Gross Profit / Revenue
46.6%
Gross Profit: $15.47B
Revenue: $33.17B
Operating Margin (Revenue left after all operations)
API
Operating Income / Revenue
18.3%
Operating Income: $6.07B
Revenue: $33.17B
Net Margin (Revenue left as actual profit)
API
Net Income / Revenue
15.8%
Net Income: $5.23B
Revenue: $33.17B
ROE (Profit from shareholder equity)
API
Net Income / Total Equity
25.1%
Net Income: $5.23B
Total Equity: $20.26B
ROIC (Profit from all invested capital)
API
NOPAT / Invested Capital
15.2%
Operating Income: $6.07B
Tax Rate: 16.8%
Equity: $20.26B
Total Debt: $9.99B
Cash: $8.05B
Current Ratio (Can it pay short-term bills)
API
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
1.29
Current Assets: $59.76B
Current Liabilities: $46.44B
Debt/Equity (Leverage — debt vs equity)
CALC
Total Debt / Total Equity
0.49
Short-Term Debt: $0.00
Long-Term Debt: $9.99B
Total Debt: $9.99B
Total Equity: $20.26B
Rev/Share (Top-line per share)
CALC
Revenue / Shares Outstanding
$34.27
Revenue: $33.17B
Shares: 968,000,000
Book Value/Share (Net assets per share)
CALC
(Total Assets - Total Liabilities) / Shares
$20.93
Total Equity: $20.26B
Shares: 968,000,000
FCF/Share (Real cash generated per share)
CALC
(Operating Cash Flow + CapEx) / Shares
$5.75
Operating CF: $6.42B
CapEx: -$852.00M
Shares: 968,000,000
CapEx is negative (outflow) — added to OCF to get FCF
Div Yield (Annual income from holding)
API
Last Annual Dividend / Stock Price
0.2%
Last Dividend: N/A
Stock Price: $42.51
Payout Ratio (Earnings paid out as dividends)
Dividends Paid / Net Income
—
Dividends Paid: N/A
Net Income: $5.23B
Dividends paid not available in cash flow statement
Industry Benchmarks
Last run: Jun 18, 2026 10:19pm
Compares PYPL against LLM-researched typical ranges for its industry. One research call per industry, cached indefinitely — every stock in the same industry reuses the same baseline.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Three separate reads — Company Quality (is it a great business?), Valuation (is it mispriced?), and General Sentiment (how macro + narrative are pushing it), kept deliberately apart · 2026-06-18 22:26:59
Delvantic - Cairn AI
Cheap mature earner — buy now, scale in lower 7/10
Quality 47 says decent-not-great mature platform; Value 63 says it's priced like it's dying — the gap is the trade, and I'm a buyer here.
The cruxWhether gross margin compression stabilizes near current levels or keeps bleeding — that single variable decides if 12x FCF is deserved or if this re-rates down to 7-8x and the cheapness is a mirage.
Forensic checks Derived mechanically from PYPL's filed financials — not from the AI lenses
Liquidity & RunwaySelf-Funding
DilutionShare Count Shrinking
Earnings QualityGood Earnings Quality
The three lensesswitch a tab for its full read — score + evidence
Company Quality
+47
Strong
edge √Σ 137 · risk √Σ 89 · conf 7/10

PayPal generates real, high-quality cash: $5.56B FCF in 2025 on $33.17B revenue (~17% FCF margin), with OCF/NI of 1.59x and negative accruals (-2.5% of assets) — earnings are conservatively stated and backed by cash. Beneish M of -2.5 is well clear of manipulation thresholds. The balance sheet is healthy with $10.4B liquid cash and a small net cash position; the Altman Z of 1.81 is misleading for a payments/fintech platform (the model penalizes asset-light, working-capital-light business models) and shouldn't be read as distress here.

The per-share story is the strongest feature: diluted shares fell from 1.19B (2021) to 968M (2025), a -5% CAGR, with buybacks running ~389% of SBC — management is a genuine net buyer, not a dilution machine. Revenue compounded from $25.4B to $33.2B (~7% CAGR) and operating margin recovered to 18.3% in 2025 (highest in the window), with net income hitting a 5-year high of $5.23B. However, gross margin compressed sharply from 55.2% (2021) to 46.6% (2025) — a ~860bp permanent step-down reflecting unbranded/Braintree mix and competitive pressure on take rates. That's the central quality concern: the business is bigger and more profitable in absolute dollars, but structurally lower-margin and facing real competitive encroachment in checkout.

Insider activity is mixed-to-neutral (one ~$255K open-market buy by Miller alongside routine option-exercise sales) — not a strong signal either way. Overall this reads as a well-run mature earner with clean accounting and disciplined capital return, but not a moat-widening compounder.

Strengths 5
m80
Aggressive per-share concentration
Diluted shares down from 1.19B to 968M (-5% CAGR) with buybacks at 389% of SBC — per-share value is being meaningfully concentrated, not eroded.
m75
High-quality cash generation
$5.56B FCF on $33.17B revenue (~17% FCF margin), OCF/NI 1.59x, accruals -2.5% of assets — cash exceeds reported earnings and accruals are conservative.
m55
Operating margin recovery
Op margin rose to 18.3% in 2025, the highest in the 5-year window, and net income hit a cycle-high $5.23B — operating leverage is being extracted despite gross margin compression.
m45
Clean earnings integrity
Beneish M of -2.5 (well below -1.78 manipulation threshold) and EQ score of 1 — no evidence of aggressive accounting.
m40
Self-funding balance sheet
$10.4B liquid cash, modest net cash of $435M, no need for external capital — survival math is not in question.
Concerns 4
m70
Structural gross margin compression
Gross margin collapsed from 55.2% (2021) to 46.6% (2025), ~860bp permanent step-down — reflects unbranded/Braintree mix shift and lower take rates, signaling pressure on the core moat.
m45
Mid-single-digit revenue growth for a 'tech' platform
Revenue CAGR ~7% from $25.4B to $33.2B with deceleration evident — consistent with mature/competitive checkout business, not a category-defining grower.
m25
Altman Z in distress zone (1.81)
Z-score model is unreliable for asset-light fintech and overstates risk here, but flagged for completeness — true distress risk is low given FCF and cash.
m20
Insider tape leans sell
15 sells vs 1 buy in last 12 months; the single $255K Miller purchase is small and isolated — signal is neutral, not the conviction buy the summary suggests.
This is a solidly run mature earner, not a compounder and not a wreck. The accounting is clean, the cash is real, and management is genuinely shrinking the float at a rate that matters — that combination puts a floor under business quality. What stops me from grading it higher is the gross margin trajectory: a 860bp drop over four years tells me the moat around branded checkout is being competed away and the mix is shifting toward lower-quality unbranded processing volume. The 2025 op margin bounce is encouraging but I want to see it hold. Net: a Strong business with a deteriorating-but-still-good economic engine, run by people who at least understand capital return.
Verify before trusting this (6)
  • Branded vs unbranded (Braintree) take-rate split and trajectory — confirms whether GM compression is structural or stabilizing
  • Active account and transactions-per-active trends — checkout share data vs Apple Pay/Shop Pay
  • Buyback authorization remaining and pace into 2026 — sustainability of the -5% share count CAGR
  • Segment-level operating margins (Venmo, Braintree, branded checkout) to assess where the 2025 op-margin recovery came from
  • Credit/receivables exposure on the balance sheet given consumer credit cycle
  • Customer/merchant concentration disclosures in the 10-K
Valuation / Mispricing
+63
Undervalued
edge √Σ 120 · risk √Σ 57 · conf 7/10
Price $42.51 vs deserved ~$60-65 on a 12x FCF multiple — roughly 30-40% margin of safety on quality-adjusted numbers. attractive below $45.00

PayPal generates ~$6B in FCF on a $37.5B market cap — a ~16% FCF yield for a business the quality lens grades 'Strong' with clean accounting and real cash. Even on a skeptical view (gross margin down 860bps, branded checkout under attack from Stripe/Block/Apple Pay), a mature payments platform shrinking its float meaningfully shouldn't trade at 8-9x earnings and a mid-teens FCF yield. Deserved value on a 12-13x FCF multiple — appropriate for a no-growth-but-cash-rich incumbent — lands around $60-70/share, implying ~40-60% upside.

What the $42.51 price is pricing in: terminal decline of branded checkout, zero credit for Venmo monetization, and that buybacks merely offset SBC. That's a defensible bear case but an extreme one given PayPal still has 200M+ active accounts and is FCF-positive through the cycle. The e2e 'disconnected from fundamentals' tag and the good earnings-quality signal both argue the gap is real, not an accounting mirage. This isn't a 'wonderful business at a fair price' setup — it's a mediocre-growth business at a genuinely discounted price, which is exactly where mispricing lives.

The margin of safety isn't infinite — if take rates keep compressing and TPV growth stalls, deserved value drifts down toward the high $40s and the gap closes on its own. But at today's price you're paid to wait via the buyback.

Cheap signals 3
m80
~16% FCF yield on a Strong-graded business
~$6B FCF on $37.5B market cap is a mid-teens yield. Even pricing in zero growth, a 10-12x FCF multiple (deserved for a mature cash machine) implies $60-72/share.
m70
Buyback materially compounds per-share value at this price
Management is aggressively shrinking the float; at sub-9x earnings each $1B of buyback retires ~2.7% of shares. The lower the price, the more accretive — a self-reinforcing floor.
m55
Earnings quality is clean — the cheapness isn't an accounting artifact
The earnings-quality signal is good (score 1), meaning no haircut to deserved value. The 16% FCF yield is real cash, not adjusted EBITDA.
Rich / priced-in 2
m45
Gross margin down 860bps over four years — moat is leaking
Branded checkout is being competed away by Apple Pay, Shop Pay, and native bank rails. If take rate keeps compressing, deserved FCF multiple shrinks toward 8-9x and the gap closes from above.
m35
Venmo still not monetized at scale
A core bull pillar (Venmo monetization) has been promised for years without showing up in segment economics. Pricing this in would be paying for hope.
I think this is genuinely cheap, not a value trap dressed up as one. A 16% FCF yield on a clean-accounting business that's actively shrinking its share count is the kind of setup where mispricing usually lives — the market is extrapolating the gross margin slide to terminal value and ignoring the cash. I'd be a buyer here and add aggressively under $40. The risk isn't that I overpay; it's that the thesis takes 2-3 years to play out while branded checkout keeps eroding. But at this price the buyback does the work for me even if the multiple never re-rates.
Verify before trusting this (4)
  • Branded checkout TPV growth and take rate in the next print — the single biggest deserved-value driver
  • FCF guidance for the year and how much is committed to buyback vs M&A
  • Transaction margin trajectory — is the 860bp gross margin slide stabilizing or still bleeding
  • Venmo monetization KPIs (Pay with Venmo TPV, ad revenue if disclosed)
General Sentiment
-46
Headwind
tail √Σ 45 · head √Σ 91 · conf 6/10

The macro tape is roughly neutral (VIX 17, S&P just off highs) so this is not a risk-off mauling, but PYPL's 1.34 beta means even mild market wobbles get amplified into a name the buyside has already abandoned. The dominant force here is narrative, not macro: PayPal is a textbook fallen-angel with moderate intensity, fragile durability, and zero cult - bears control the microphone (Stripe is cooler, Block is faster, banks are cheaper, Venmo doesn't monetize) while believers have left the room. There is no story to defend the stock when sellers show up. Analyst tone confirms the apathy: 40 Holds vs 26 Buys, only 4 Sells, zero target revisions this month, and a $50 target that nobody is updating - classic abandoned-coverage stasis where the Street has neither conviction to upgrade nor catalyst to downgrade. The 5.6% revenue CAGR and clean cash generation give the bulls factual ammunition, but momentum-as-sentiment is muted because nobody is telling that story loudly. Net: not a crash setup, just persistent narrative gravity pulling against a name with elevated beta and no marginal buyer.

Tailwinds 2
m35
Quiet positive price action
Strong_positive momentum score and low revenue-growth volatility suggest the worst of the de-rating may be behind it; short interest and bear conviction look tired rather than building.
m28
Target above spot with no downgrades
$50 consensus vs $42 spot and zero negative revisions means the analyst floor is not actively cracking - sentiment is bad but not deteriorating.
Headwinds 4
m62
Fallen-angel narrative with no champion
Fragile durability, low cult coefficient, bears control the framing (squeezed between Stripe/Block/banks). Without a believer base, any disappointment gets sold and any beat gets faded.
m45
Analyst apathy, not conviction
40 Holds dominate, zero target revisions this month - the Street has stopped engaging. That removes the upgrade-cycle tailwind that normally rescues cheap quality names.
m38
High beta into a fragile tape
Beta 1.34 with VIX elevated to the 56th percentile and rates at 4.46% means PYPL gets disproportionately hit on any risk-off flinch despite the headline-neutral regime.
m32
Fintech cohort de-rating
Payments/fintech as a category remains out of favor versus AI and quality compounders - sector flow is a slow drip lower regardless of company-specific results.
Net pressure leans headwind but not severe. This is not a crash setup - it is a stock that nobody wants to own and nobody wants to short, drifting under a fallen-angel story with no marginal buyer to bid it. The macro tape is neutral so I'm not calling Strong Headwind, but the combination of fragile narrative, analyst apathy, sector out-of-favor, and elevated beta means any tape weakness lands harder here than the fundamentals deserve. Sentiment is the binding constraint on this name, and it leans down.
Verify before trusting this (5)
  • Any sell-side upgrade or target hike that signals the Hold-wall is breaking
  • Venmo monetization data points or merchant-services wins that could seed a new bull narrative
  • Sector rotation into fintech/payments away from AI - watch peer tape (SQ, ADYEN, FIS)
  • VIX break above 20 which would punish the 1.34 beta disproportionately
  • Activist or buyback acceleration news that gives the stock a non-fundamental bid
The market-wide tape + this name's exposure to it (beta / sector / narrative durability). Context on the non-fundamental pressure — not a call on the business or the price. processId: detail-general-sentiment
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Three lenses kept deliberately separate — Company Quality (price-agnostic), Valuation (price-conditional), and General Sentiment (non-fundamental macro/narrative pressure). The scores are not blended. Filing-level items (convertibles, lock-ups, customer concentration) are v2 — see each lens's "verify."
Deep Analysis
Last run: Jun 18, 2026 10:24:41 pm

Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.

0 Company Classification — What type of company is this?
1 Industry Landscape — Where is the industry headed?
2 Company Momentum — Where is this company trending?
3 Forward Projection — 1Y & 2Y projected metrics (requires Layer 1 + 2)
4a DCF Valuation — Present value of future cash flows
4b Earnings Power Value — Floor value — worth with zero growth
4c Anchored PE — Industry PE adjusted for growth differential
4d Reverse DCF — What growth is the market pricing in?
4e Revenue-Based DCF — For growth/narrative companies (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4f Anchored P/S — Price-to-Sales peer comparison (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4g Scenario Analysis — Bull / Base / Bear (skip if mature earner)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4h Dividend Discount Model — For dividend/income stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4i Book Value Analysis — For deep value / turnaround stocks only
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
4j Insider Activity — Are insiders buying or selling?
4f Cash Flow Quality — How trustworthy is the FCF?
4g Debt Maturity Risk — Can it handle its debt?
4h Macro Environment — Rates, market valuation, volatility
4i Sector Intelligence — How does this company compare within its sector?
4j Revenue Confidence — How reliable is the growth projection?
4k Sensitivity Analysis — How fragile is the fair value estimate?
4l Sector Demand Cycle — Is the sector in a boom, steady state, or contraction?
5 AI Investigation — Adaptive research engine (Claude)
5b Thesis Evaluation — What does the market believe? (narrative/platform stocks only)
Not applicable for Mature Earner companies
6 Valuation Synthesis — Weighted verdict from all methods (requires Layer 4)
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:22pm (8d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue $25.4B $27.5B $29.8B $31.8B $33.2B
Cost of Revenue $11.4B $13.7B $16.1B $17.1B $17.7B
Gross Profit $14.0B $13.8B $13.7B $14.7B $15.5B
Operating Expenses $9.7B $9.9B $8.7B $9.3B $9.4B
Operating Income $4.3B $3.8B $5.0B $5.3B $6.1B
Net Income $4.2B $2.4B $4.2B $4.1B $5.2B
EBITDA $5.6B $5.0B $6.8B $6.7B $7.7B
EPS $3.55 $2.10 $3.85 $4.03 $5.46
EPS (Diluted) — — — — —
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:18pm (8d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Cash & Equivalents $5.2B $7.8B $9.1B $6.6B $8.0B
Total Current Assets $52.6B $57.4B $62.6B $61.1B $59.8B
Total Assets $75.8B $78.6B $82.2B $81.6B $80.2B
Current Liabilities $43.0B $45.0B $48.5B $48.4B $46.4B
Long-Term Debt $8.0B $10.4B $9.7B $9.9B $10.0B
Total Liabilities $54.1B $58.4B $61.1B $61.2B $59.9B
Total Equity $21.7B $20.3B $21.1B $20.4B $20.3B
Retained Earnings $16.5B $19.0B $23.2B $27.3B $32.5B
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:19pm (8d ago)
Metric 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Operating Cash Flow $5.8B $5.8B $4.8B $7.5B $6.4B
Capital Expenditure -$908.0M -$706.0M -$623.0M -$683.0M -$852.0M
Free Cash Flow $4.9B $5.1B $4.2B $6.8B $5.6B
Acquisitions (net) -$2.8B $0 $466.0M $0 $0
Debt Repayment — — — — —
Dividends Paid — — — — —
Stock Buybacks -$3.4B -$4.2B -$5.0B -$6.0B -$6.1B
Net Change in Cash -$11.0M $1.1B $2.7B $656.0M $1.5B
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:18pm (8d ago)
Metric 2027 2028 2029 2030
Revenue $35.8B
$35.2B – $36.4B
 $37.4B
$37.4B – $37.4B
 $38.1B
$37.4B – $39.1B
 $43.3B
$42.5B – $44.5B
EBITDA $9.2B
$9.1B – $9.4B
 $9.6B
$9.6B – $9.6B
 $9.8B
$9.6B – $10.1B
 $11.2B
$11.0B – $11.5B
Net Income $5.5B
$5.1B – $5.9B
 $6.0B
$5.3B – $6.8B
 $6.0B
$5.9B – $6.2B
 $7.4B
$7.2B – $7.7B
EPS — — — —
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:22pm (8d ago)
Metric 2022 2023 2024 2025
Revenue Growth +8.5% +8.2% +6.8% +4.3%
Gross Profit Growth -1.6% -0.5% +7.0% +5.5%
Operating Income Growth -10.0% +31.0% +5.9% +13.9%
Net Income Growth -42.0% +75.5% -2.3% +26.2%
EBITDA Growth -10.9% +37.0% -1.3% +14.1%
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:22pm (8d ago)
Type codes PPurchase SSale AAward / grant MOption exercise FIn-kind (tax) CConversion GGift DReturn to issuer
All SEC Form 4 codes
Open market
P Purchase
Open-market or private purchase of shares.
S Sale
Open-market or private sale of shares.
Compensation (Rule 16b-3)
A Award / grant
Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
D Return to issuer
Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
F In-kind (tax)
Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
I Discretionary
Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
M Option exercise
Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
Derivatives
C Conversion
Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
E Short expiration
Expiration of a short derivative position.
H Long expiration
Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
O OTM exercise
Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
X ITM exercise
Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
Other exempt
G Gift
Bona fide gift of securities.
L Small acquisition
Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
W Inheritance
Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
Z Voting trust
Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
Other
J Other
Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
K Equity swap
Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
U Tender / buyout
Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.

Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.

Date Insider Type Shares Price Value
2026-06-15 Miller Jamie S F-InKind 6,129.00 $41.53 $254,537
2026-06-15 Miller Jamie S A-Award 146,778.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-15 Miller Jamie S M-Exempt 2,910.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-15 Miller Jamie S M-Exempt 9,094.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-15 Miller Jamie S P-Purchase 6,129.00 $41.53 $254,537
2026-06-15 Miller Jamie S M-Exempt 9,094.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-15 Miller Jamie S M-Exempt 2,910.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-15 Keller Frank A-Award 146,778.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-03 Natali Chris S-Sale 552.00 $42.65 $23,543
2026-06-03 Kereere Suzan S-Sale 3,379.00 $42.79 $144,579
2026-06-03 Keller Frank S-Sale 4,612.00 $42.54 $196,194
2026-06-01 Webster Aaron M-Exempt 4,602.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-01 Webster Aaron F-InKind 2,097.00 $44.75 $93,841
2026-06-01 Webster Aaron M-Exempt 4,602.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-01 Natali Chris M-Exempt 1,023.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-01 Natali Chris M-Exempt 103.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-01 Natali Chris M-Exempt 1,023.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-01 Natali Chris F-InKind 390.00 $44.75 $17,453
2026-06-01 Natali Chris M-Exempt 103.00 $0.00 $0
2026-06-01 Miller Jamie S M-Exempt 7,415.00 $0.00 $0
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 18, 2026 10:17pm (8d ago)
Date Dividend Declaration Record Payment
2026-06-04 $0.14 2026-05-04 2026-06-04 2026-06-25
2026-03-04 $0.14 2026-02-02 2026-03-04 2026-03-25
2025-11-19 $0.14 2025-10-27 2025-11-19 2025-12-10
Narrative Economics
The story the market is telling about this stock — the intangible X-factor (founder mythology, cult dynamics, TAM-of-imagination) that moves price beyond what cash flows alone explain. After Shiller, Narrative Economics.
No narrative profile yet for PYPL — it's generated by the pipeline (market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Independent analyst synthesis · Delvantic - Cairn AI · generated 2026-06-18 22:25:18
Reviews the pipeline's own verdicts
Verdict Undervalued with real risks — fair value $55-62 on 10-11x FCF; starter position justified at $42.51, but the thesis breaks if branded checkout TPV turns negative in the next two prints.

Looking at the raw tape first: PYPL is doing $33.2B TTM revenue growing 4-5% YoY, with Q1 2026 at $8.35B vs $7.79B prior-year (+7.2%, actually an acceleration, not deceleration as the secondary signals claim). Net income $5.23B annual, FCF $5.56B, on a $37.5B market cap — that's a 14.8% FCF yield and 7.2x earnings. Operating margins expanded from 14% (2022) to 18.3% TTM. ROIC 15.2%, ROE 25%. This is not a melting ice cube; it's a cash machine being priced like one. The Q1 2026 margin dip to 13.3% deserves scrutiny — three of the last four quarters printed 14.8-16.6%, so 13.3% is the low end but not catastrophic.

Where I push back on the prior models: the synthesis call of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" is directionally right but the framing is lazy. A reverse-DCF implying -9.6% FCF growth is only meaningful if you believe the discount rate assumption; at a 10% WACC, flat FCF justifies ~$55-60. The real question isn't whether PYPL is "cheap" — it obviously screens cheap — it's whether branded checkout TPV (the high-margin core) is structurally eroding faster than unbranded Braintree can compensate. The narrative layer correctly identifies this as "fallen-angel/fragile durability," and that's the crux: the multiple compression from 60x to 7.6x reflects real loss of pricing power at branded checkout, not just sentiment. Pre-flight's "multi-segment" framing is more useful than the rule-based "mature_earner" tag — Venmo and Braintree have different unit economics than legacy PayPal, and the consolidated numbers hide the mix shift.

The contrarian case the bulls aren't articulating well enough: if branded checkout is indeed in secular decline (call it -3 to -5% annually) and Braintree is lower-margin commodity processing, then consolidated operating margins should compress, not expand. Yet they've expanded ~400bps in three years. Either (a) Chriss's cost-out program is real and durable, or (b) margins are being flattered by transaction loss reserves and float income from higher rates — the latter is rate-sensitive and reverses in a cutting cycle. The $8.05B cash position is also misleading without the debt figure (missing from the tile); PYPL carries ~$12B in long-term debt, so net cash is closer to -$4B, not the "$10B in cash" the synthesis cites. That's a material error in the bull case.

I partially agree with synthesis but at a lower fair value. At 10-11x FCF for a 4-5% grower with margin risk and net debt, fair value sits at $55-62, not the implied $70+ the synthesis flirts with. The insider activity is noise — small awards and exempts, not a conviction signal despite the "Net Insider Buying" tag (a 6,129 share P-Purchase against 146k in awards is a rounding error). The bigger flag is what's NOT in the data: TPV growth, branded vs unbranded mix, take rate trajectory. Without those, this is a valuation call on a black box. That said, at 7.2x earnings and 14.8% FCF yield, the asymmetry favors longs: you're being paid to wait, and any stabilization in branded checkout triggers a re-rate to $60+. Downside is probably $32-35 (6x trough FCF) if branded TPV inflects negative. Reward/risk is roughly 2:1 to the upside from $42.51, which is enough to act on but not back up the truck.

GPT Critique
Second-opinion review · gpt-4o · generated 2026-06-18 22:25:28
Reviews the Opus findings above
Verdict I agree with Opus — undervalued with risks. Fair value should be closer to $55-62, acknowledging margin risks and competitive pressures.

In examining PayPal's recent financial data, a few key points stand out to me. The company has demonstrated a steady revenue growth trajectory, from $25.37 billion in 2021 to $33.17 billion in 2025, reflecting a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 6.8%. Notably, PayPal's net income has also improved from $2.42 billion in 2022 to $5.23 billion in 2025, showcasing a robust earnings CAGR of about 23.7%. Additionally, the free cash flow of $5.56 billion suggests strong cash generation capabilities, providing a healthy free cash flow yield of approximately 14.8%. Despite these positive indicators, PayPal's stock price remains under pressure, currently trading at a P/E ratio of 7.67, suggesting the market's skepticism about future growth prospects.

I find myself agreeing with Opus on several points. Opus correctly emphasizes the disparity between PayPal's fundamental performance and its market valuation. The company's cash generation ability, with a 14.8% FCF yield, indicates it is indeed being priced as if in terminal decline, despite evidence of ongoing profitability and operational improvements. Moreover, Opus highlights the importance of branded checkout total payment volume (TPV) as a critical factor, which is a valid concern given its impact on PayPal's high-margin business.

However, I diverge from Opus on some aspects. Opus mentions the "multi-segment" nature of PayPal's business as a strength, but I believe this diversification could also pose a risk if the company fails to manage its segments effectively, particularly as competitive pressures mount from firms like Stripe and Apple. Furthermore, Opus's assertion about the insider activity being noise might overlook potential signals of insider confidence or lack thereof, although I do acknowledge the limited volume of transactions.

A skeptic might argue that both my analysis and Opus's overlook the broader macroeconomic headwinds PayPal faces, such as regulatory challenges and shifting consumer preferences towards alternative payment methods. They might also point out that despite the company's historical performance, the narrative surrounding its growth potential and competitive positioning remains fragile, as indicated by its current valuation.

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My Notes personal — only you see this
Data via Financial Modeling Prep · Cached for performance · fmp
v1.1.352 · d1100787 · 2026-06-26 11:39:30