Business Description
Rollins, Inc. operates a network of subsidiaries that specialize in delivering pest and wildlife management solutions to a diverse clientele, encompassing both homeowners and commercial enterprises, throughout the United States and globally. For residential properties, the company offers comprehensive pest control, safeguarding homes from prevalent invaders such as rodents, insects, and other nuisance animals. Furthermore, it devises tailored pest management strategies for various business sectors, including healthcare, foodservice, and logistics. Beyond standard pest solutions, Rollins, Inc. also provides a range of termite defense options, from conventional treatments to baiting systems, alongside other complementary services. The firm serves its customers directly through its own operations as well as through its extensive franchisee network. Established in 1948, Rollins, Inc. maintains its headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.
Business History
Generated: Jun 7, 2026 5:25pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.09
Total Equity: $1.37B
Shares: 484,147,000
Total Debt: $609.83M
Cash: $100.00M
EBITDA: $854.23M
Total Debt: $609.83M
Cash: $100.00M
Revenue: $3.76B
Revenue: $3.76B
Revenue: $3.76B
Total Equity: $1.37B
Tax Rate: 24.9%
Equity: $1.37B
Total Debt: $609.83M
Cash: $100.00M
Current Liabilities: $785.53M
Long-Term Debt: $486.15M
Total Debt: $609.83M
Total Equity: $1.37B
Shares: 484,147,000
Shares: 484,147,000
CapEx: -$28.09M
Shares: 484,147,000
Stock Price: $42.80
Net Income: $526.71M
Industry Benchmarks
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 20, 2026 4:21pm (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $2.4B | $2.7B | $3.1B | $3.4B | $3.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.9B |
| Gross Profit | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $814.0M | $894.0M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Operating Income | $447.6M | $493.4M | $583.2M | $657.2M | $729.3M |
| Net Income | $356.6M | $368.6M | $435.0M | $466.4M | $526.7M |
| EBITDA | $569.9M | $592.9M | $688.2M | $771.1M | $854.2M |
| EPS | $0.72 | $0.75 | $0.89 | $0.96 | $1.09 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 20, 2026 4:21pm (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $105.3M | $95.3M | $103.8M | $89.6M | $100.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $352.4M | $348.6M | $406.6M | $442.6M | $472.7M |
| Total Assets | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $2.8B | $3.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $489.7M | $493.8M | $576.7M | $645.2M | $785.5M |
| Long-Term Debt | $136.3M | $236.8M | $490.8M | $395.3M | $486.1M |
| Total Liabilities | $910.3M | $854.8M | $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Total Equity | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.4B |
| Retained Earnings | $530.1M | $687.1M | $566.4M | $734.7M | $738.9M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 20, 2026 4:21pm (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $401.8M | $465.9M | $528.4M | $607.7M | $678.1M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$27.2M | -$30.6M | -$32.5M | -$27.6M | -$28.1M |
| Free Cash Flow | $374.6M | $435.3M | $495.9M | $580.1M | $650.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$146.1M | -$119.2M | -$351.0M | -$153.4M | -$309.5M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$10.7M | -$7.1M | -$315.0M | -$11.6M | -$216.9M |
| Net Change in Cash | $6.8M | -$10.0M | $8.5M | -$14.2M | $10.4M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 8:50am (23h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$4.5B $4.3B – $4.7B
|
$4.9B $4.9B – $4.9B
|
$5.3B $5.2B – $5.4B
|
$5.5B $5.3B – $5.6B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.0B $985.4M – $1.1B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.2B
|
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.3B
|
| Net Income |
$662.1M $635.3M – $697.9M
|
$732.3M $684.4M – $778.1M
|
$814.5M $791.3M – $835.5M
|
$850.1M $826.0M – $872.1M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 20, 2026 4:21pm (6d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.2% | +14.0% | +10.3% | +11.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +10.0% | +15.6% | +11.4% | +4.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | +10.2% | +18.2% | +12.7% | +11.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +3.4% | +18.0% | +7.2% | +12.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +4.0% | +16.1% | +12.1% | +10.8% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-02-20 | Harkins William Wayne II | A-Award | 6,112.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Harkins William Wayne II | F-InKind | 357.00 | $53.49 | $19,096 |
| 2026-04-29 | Gahlhoff Jerry Jr. | G-Gift | 3,629.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson John F | G-Gift | 4,795.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Bell Susan R. | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Carson Donald P | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Donahue Paul D | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Gunning Patrick J. | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Hardin Paul Russell | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | JONES DALE E | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Morrison Gregory B | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Rollins Pam R | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Rollins Timothy Curtis | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Sams Louise S | A-Award | 2,692.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-28 | Rollins Timothy Curtis | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-04-28 | Rollins Timothy Curtis | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-04-28 | Rollins Timothy Curtis | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-02-25 | Chandler Elizabeth B | S-Sale | 14,201.00 | $59.36 | $842,971 |
| 2026-02-20 | ROLLINS GARY W | F-InKind | 7,860.00 | $61.35 | $482,211 |
| 2026-02-20 | Tesh Thomas D | A-Award | 10,187.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 20, 2026 4:21pm (6d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-11 | $0.18 | 2026-04-21 | 2026-05-11 | 2026-06-10 |
| 2026-02-25 | $0.18 | 2026-01-22 | 2026-02-25 | 2026-03-10 |
| 2025-11-10 | $0.18 | 2025-10-28 | 2025-11-10 | 2025-12-10 |
| 2025-08-11 | $0.17 | 2025-07-22 | 2025-08-11 | 2025-09-10 |
| 2025-05-12 | $0.17 | 2025-04-22 | 2025-05-12 | 2025-06-10 |
| 2025-02-25 | $0.17 | 2025-01-22 | 2025-02-25 | 2025-03-10 |
| 2024-11-12 | $0.17 | 2024-10-22 | 2024-11-12 | 2024-12-10 |
| 2024-08-12 | $0.15 | 2024-07-23 | 2024-08-12 | 2024-09-10 |
| 2024-05-09 | $0.15 | 2024-04-23 | 2024-05-10 | 2024-06-10 |
| 2024-02-20 | $0.15 | 2024-01-22 | 2024-02-21 | 2024-03-11 |
| 2023-11-09 | $0.15 | 2023-10-24 | 2023-11-10 | 2023-12-11 |
| 2023-08-09 | $0.13 | 2023-07-25 | 2023-08-10 | 2023-09-08 |
| 2023-05-09 | $0.13 | 2023-04-25 | 2023-05-10 | 2023-06-09 |
| 2023-02-09 | $0.13 | 2023-01-23 | 2023-02-10 | 2023-03-10 |
| 2022-11-09 | $0.13 | 2022-10-25 | 2022-11-10 | 2022-12-09 |
| 2022-08-09 | $0.10 | 2022-07-26 | 2022-08-10 | 2022-09-09 |
| 2022-05-09 | $0.10 | 2022-04-26 | 2022-05-10 | 2022-06-10 |
| 2022-02-09 | $0.10 | 2022-01-25 | 2022-02-10 | 2022-03-10 |
| 2021-11-09 | $0.18 | 2021-10-26 | 2021-11-10 | 2021-12-10 |
| 2021-08-09 | $0.08 | 2021-07-27 | 2021-08-10 | 2021-09-10 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue went $891.9M → $916.3M → $832.2M → $822.5M → $999.5M → $1.03B → $912.9M → $906.4M. That's seasonality (Q2/Q3 are peak pest season), not deceleration — comparing Q1'26 ($906.4M) to Q1'25 ($822.5M) is +10.2% YoY, and Q4'25 to Q4'24 is +9.7%. Margins are similarly seasonal: 15.9% in peak Q3 vs 11.9% in Q1. The "decelerating" tag in the revenue confidence signal is reading seasonal noise. Full-year 2025 revenue of $3.76B on 2024's $3.39B is +10.9%, and NI grew +12.9% — both consistent with the 4-year CAGRs. FCF of $650M on $678M OCF with only $28M capex is a pristine 17.3% FCF margin. ROIC of ~21% is genuinely excellent. This is a high-quality compounder, full stop.
That said, the synthesis verdict pinning fair value at $11.88 is absurd and should be discarded — that implies a sub-4x P/E for a 20%+ ROIC business growing low double-digits with recurring revenue. Whatever DCF assumptions produced that number are broken (likely a punitive discount rate or terminal growth assumption mismatched to the business model). Throwing it out doesn't mean the stock is cheap, though. At $47.10, ROL trades at 42.8x TTM earnings, 27.5x EV/EBITDA, and 7.7x sales for a business growing revenue ~11% and earnings ~13%. A PEG north of 3 on a mature consolidator is rich by any historical standard. The pre-flight and market-forces models have this directionally right even if synthesis blew the magnitude.
The contrarian case for paying up: Rollins has compounded at ~11% revenue and ~15% FCF for years with recession resilience (pest control is non-discretionary), and the fragmented industry leaves a long M&A runway. If you assume 10% FCF growth for a decade and a 3.5% terminal, even at a 9% discount rate you get a fair value around $32-36 — still 25-30% below current. To justify $47, you need either sustained 13%+ FCF growth for 10+ years or a permanent re-rating to even higher multiples. The narrative model's "platform-monopoly" framing captures why the market is paying this: investors treat ROL like a toll road with a moat, not a roll-up exposed to labor inflation and franchisee churn. The bear cites are real — Orkin franchisee disputes are a known overhang, and DIY pest tech (smart traps, subscription chemicals) is a slow-burn threat, not an acute one. Insider activity here is mostly awards and gifts, not open-market sells — the "unusual heavy selling" tag looks overcooked; I'd discount that signal substantially.
I dissent from synthesis on magnitude but agree on direction: ROL is overvalued, not catastrophically mispriced. Fair value in my framework is $32-38 depending on how much credit you give the M&A runway and pricing power; $47 requires the quality-compounder narrative to remain intact through a labor-cost cycle and any future multiple compression. The data is fine — no staleness issues beyond standard TTM-vs-annual mismatches flagged in anomalies. What's thin is any catalyst for re-rating higher; what's stale is the post-COVID "essential services" premium that's been baked in for four years. I would not short this (quality compounders crush shorts), but I wouldn't initiate at $47 either. Wait for a multiple reset to the low-to-mid 30s P/E range, which historically happens on any earnings stumble or M&A integration miss. The asymmetry isn't there at current prices: limited upside if everything goes right, 25-35% downside if growth slips to 7-8% and the multiple normalizes to 28-30x.
GPT Critique
Upon reviewing Rollins, Inc., my analysis of the data highlights a mature, consistent performer with solid financial metrics but a valuation that appears stretched. The company has exhibited impressive revenue growth, with a CAGR of approximately 10.6% over the past few years, and net income growth closely mirroring that at 12.9% YoY for 2025. Free cash flow remains robust, clocking in at $650M for 2025 with a minimal capex requirement, indicative of a strong cash-generative business model. However, the current valuation metrics, particularly a P/E ratio of 42.8 and an EV/EBITDA of 27.5, suggest that the market is pricing in a significant premium for the company's perceived stability and market dominance, which might not be sustainable.
I agree with Opus that the fair value synthesis output of $11.88 is unrealistic and should be discarded. The assumptions leading to such a low valuation are likely flawed, perhaps due to an excessively high discount rate or overly conservative growth projections. However, I also concur with the notion that the stock is overvalued at its current price of $47.10. While Opus suggests a fair value range of $32-38, my assessment leans towards the lower end of that range, closer to $32, due to potential headwinds such as labor cost inflation and technological disruptions that could impact margins and growth trajectories.
Opus rightly points out the importance of Rollins' M&A strategy and the resilience of its business model in the face of economic downturns. However, I slightly diverge on the degree of risk posed by franchisee disputes and emerging DIY pest control technologies. These factors could exert more downward pressure on growth and margins than Opus anticipates, particularly if they lead to increased customer churn or reduced pricing power. Additionally, while the insider transactions appear to be primarily awards and gifts, the broader signal of insider sentiment shouldn't be entirely dismissed, as it may reflect internal perspectives on valuation.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are underestimating Rollins' ability to adapt and grow through strategic acquisitions and innovation in service offerings. They could point to the company's historical ability to integrate acquisitions successfully and maintain customer loyalty as evidence that the current valuation is justified. However, the absence of a strong, imminent catalyst for further multiple expansion makes the current price less appealing for new investors.