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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Royal Bank of Canada (RY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -8 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 54 · Value -59 · Sentiment 30 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $136.78 vs $209.51 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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Royal Bank of Canada
RY NYSERoyal Bank of Canada is a diversified financial services company and one of the largest banks in Canada. It provides personal and commercial banking, wealth management, insurance, corporate and investment banking, and capital markets services through its RBC brand. The company serves individuals, businesses, institutional clients, and public sector organizations with products and services that support everyday banking, borrowing, investing, cash management, and financial advisory needs. Royal Bank of Canada also operates in transaction processing and asset servicing, with a broad presence across Canada, the Caribbean, the United States, and other international markets. Headquartered in Toronto, Royal Bank of Canada plays a central role in North American banking and global financial services.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.04
Total Equity: $99.31B
Shares: 1,447,192,608
Total Debt: $2.00B
Cash: $26.42B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $2.00B
Cash: $26.42B
Revenue: $47.53B
Revenue: $47.53B
Revenue: $47.53B
Total Equity: $99.31B
Tax Rate: 20.6%
Equity: $99.31B
Total Debt: $2.00B
Cash: $26.42B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $2.00B
Total Equity: $99.31B
Shares: 1,447,192,608
Shares: 1,447,192,608
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 1,447,192,608
Stock Price: $209.51
Net Income: $14.53B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:10am (23d ago)| Metric | 2024 | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $40.9B | $47.5B | $47.5B | $47.5B | $47.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $10.8B | — | — | — | $16.5B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $11.6B | $14.5B | $14.5B | $14.5B | $14.5B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $8.04 | $8.79 | $8.99 | $9.46 | $10.06 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $8.03 | $8.77 | $8.96 | $9.43 | $10.04 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:10am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $81.2B | $51.7B | $44.2B | $40.5B | $26.4B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $1.2T | $1.4T | $1.4T | $1.5T | $1.7T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.1T | $1.3T | $1.3T | $1.5T | $1.6T |
| Total Equity | $70.5B | $77.2B | $84.0B | $90.8B | $99.3B |
| Retained Earnings | $51.2B | $55.7B | $60.2B | $63.2B | $69.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:10am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $43.6B | $15.7B | $18.6B | $16.5B | $39.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | -$1.5B | — | -$9.1B | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$4.6B | -$5.0B | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$3.6B | -$29.6B | -$7.4B | -$3.8B | -$14.1B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:10am (23d ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +16.1% | +0.0% | +0.0% | +0.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +25.5% | +0.0% | +0.0% | +0.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:10am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-27 | $1.25 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-23 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-24 | $1.13 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-24 | $1.07 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-27 | $1.03 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-24 | $1.03 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-25 | $1.03 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-24 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-24 | $1.03 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-25 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-25 | $1.02 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-24 | $0.98 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-25 | $0.99 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-25 | $0.93 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-25 | $0.99 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-22 | $0.95 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-25 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-25 | $0.88 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-23 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2021-04-21 | $0.86 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The data file is broken in a way that matters: all four "quarterly" rows for fiscal 2025 show identical $47.53B revenue and $14.53B net income, which is almost certainly the trailing-twelve-month figure repeated, not four discrete quarters. That means every downstream growth signal — the 0% revenue CAGR, 0% earnings YoY, "insufficient_data" quarterly trend — is garbage-in-garbage-out. The one real comparison we can make is FY2025 $47.53B rev / $14.53B NI vs. FY2024 $40.92B / $11.58B, which is +16.2% revenue and +25.5% earnings growth. That is not a stagnant mature earner; that is a bank having a very good year, likely on NIM normalization plus capital markets strength plus the HSBC Canada acquisition contribution. The synthesis verdict of "overvalued, fair value $140" was built on top of models that couldn't see this because they were reading duplicated rows as flat growth.
That said, I don't want to swing to the opposite pole. ROE at 14.6% is good but not spectacular for a Canadian Big Six bank in a cyclical peak year — historical range is 13-16%, so we're mid-to-upper, not breakout. ROA at 0.88% is decent for a diversified bank but leaves no room to argue RBC has structurally re-rated its return profile. P/B at 3.05x is genuinely rich — Canadian banks historically trade 1.5-2.2x book, and 3x has typically marked cyclical tops (2007, 2021). P/E at 20.9x on peak-cycle earnings is where the bear case has real teeth: if you normalize NI toward $12.5-13B (splitting the difference between FY24 and FY25 and haircutting for credit normalization), you get ~$8.85 normalized EPS and a 23.7x normalized P/E, which is expensive for any bank anywhere. The synthesis DCF at $140 is probably too punitive (it apparently assumed zero growth), but the market forces model's "can't analyze" abstention was the intellectually honest call given the data corruption.
The narrative layer is the most useful prior output here. The "scarcity premium for Canadian blue-chip yield" story is real and durable — Canadian pension funds and retirees genuinely have limited substitutes, and RY's 2.22% dividend yield combined with 160-year payment history is a legitimate demographic anchor. But a contrarian would point out three things the bulls are ignoring: (1) Canadian household debt-to-income sits near record highs and mortgage renewals through 2025-2026 at materially higher rates create credit risk that hasn't yet flowed through PCLs; (2) the HSBC Canada deal integration is still early — synergy realization is a management-execution bet, not a fait accompli; (3) 3x book only makes sense if you believe 15%+ ROE is the new floor, and there's no structural argument for that given rising capital requirements under Basel III endgame equivalents. The bull story requires believing this isn't peak cycle. History suggests it usually is when banks trade at 3x book.
My verdict: I partially dissent from the synthesis. The $140 fair value is too low because it was computed on broken data showing 0% growth when actual FY-over-FY growth was 16-26%. But the direction is right — RY is expensive, not cheap. A more defensible fair value framework: apply 15-16x to normalized EPS of ~$9.00 (blending peak and mid-cycle), gets you $135-145; apply 2.2-2.4x to book value of ~$68.60/share, gets you $151-165. Blended fair value $150-165, versus $209.50 current. That's roughly 25-30% overvaluation, not 33%, but still meaningful. I would not short a Canadian bank at cyclical strength — the dividend, buybacks, and narrative durability create a hard floor — but I would not be a fresh buyer here either. The setup for existing holders is trim-and-hold; for new capital, wait for a pullback to the $170s (roughly book-value-plus-25%) or for evidence that PCLs are rolling over favorably in FY2026. The market is pricing in continued 14%+ ROE with no credit cycle. That's a bet, not a valuation.
GPT Reading
The first thing I do here is discount a lot of the “trend” machinery because the dataset is clearly contaminated: 2025 revenue and net income are repeated across multiple dates, so the reported 0% recent growth is not evidence of a flat business, it is evidence of unusable quarterly stitching. What I do trust are the latest annual anchors, and those tell a cleaner story: revenue of $47.53B versus $40.92B in 2024, up about 16%, while net income rose from $11.58B to $14.53B, up roughly 25%. That is not a no-growth bank. It is a large, high-quality franchise that has just printed a strong earnings recovery with a 30.6% net margin and 14.6% ROE on $99.31B of equity. For a bank of this scale, $39.41B of operating cash flow and $26.42B of cash against only $2.00B of stated debt also reinforce that the balance-sheet presentation here should not be read like an industrial company; the canonical debt number is almost certainly economically incomplete for a deposit-funded bank. So the raw business read is solid to very good, not stagnating.
The valuation is where I part company with the business quality. At $209.51 and a $291.15B market cap, investors are paying 20.9x earnings, 3.05x book, and 6.38x sales for a mature diversified bank earning 14.6% on equity and 0.88% on assets. Those are rich multiples even if you grant RBC a deserved premium for scale, oligopolistic positioning, and earnings mix. A simple residual-income intuition says a bank that can sustainably earn mid-teens ROE deserves a premium to book, but 3.0x book implies either much higher normalized ROE than 14%-15%, a structurally lower cost of equity than I think is realistic for a levered financial, or many years of above-trend growth. The earnings yield here is only about 4.8%, and the dividend yield is 2.2%, which is thin compensation for owning a cyclical lender with macro and credit sensitivity. My read is that the market is capitalizing RBC less as a bank and more as a scarce “Canadian financial utility” compounder; that narrative can persist, but at this price it leaves little room for ordinary banking disappointments.
What stands out most is the mismatch between the healthy operating picture and the heroic multiple. If I annualize nothing and just use the provided numbers, the market is paying nearly $291B for $14.53B of net income and $99.31B of equity. That means every extra point of ROE defense matters enormously. If ROE merely stays around 14.6% rather than stepping up, the valuation already looks full. If credit costs rise, capital markets soften, or regulation pushes capital intensity up, a bank trading above 20x earnings has more multiple risk than fundamental downside protection. I do not need RBC to be a bad bank to be bearish on the stock; I only need it to remain a good bank that is priced like an exceptional growth franchise. On these figures, fair value is materially below the current quote; I would be much more interested closer to 2.1x-2.3x book or around 15x-16x earnings, which roughly points to the mid-$150s to high-$160s on the current earnings base.
The strongest case against this view is straightforward and serious: RBC may deserve a persistent scarcity premium because few North American banks combine this level of scale, domestic market power, wealth/capital-markets diversification, and earnings resilience. If the 2025 jump to $14.53B is not a rebound year but a new run-rate, then 25% earnings growth against only 16% revenue growth suggests strong operating leverage and mix quality. A 14.6% ROE with a 30.6% net margin is objectively excellent for a regulated financial, and if management can keep compounding book value while preserving asset quality, a 3.0x P/B may prove less egregious than it looks through a traditional bank lens. In other words, the smart bull says the stock is expensive because the franchise is genuinely superior and because Canada’s market structure supports that superiority for a very long time. I weigh that argument less heavily because even premium banks rarely escape gravity forever: when the starting point is a sub-5% earnings yield and a 2.2% dividend yield, the burden of proof shifts from “is this a great bank?” to “how much greatness is already fully capitalized?”
What would change my mind is not another generic quality argument but evidence that earnings power is stepping up enough to validate today’s multiple. Specifically, if the next annual print showed net income moving materially above $16B with ROE sustained at 16%+ without a deterioration in capital or credit quality, I would revisit the idea that RBC has structurally rerated. Likewise, if book value compounds fast enough to bring P/B down while the share price holds, that would make the current price easier to defend. On the other side, if revenue growth slips back toward low single digits, net income stalls around $14B-$15B, or ROE drifts below 14%, I would expect the premium multiple to look increasingly untenable.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers on Royal Bank of Canada tell a story of a high-quality franchise that the market has already paid up for in full. Fiscal 2025 revenue of $47.53B and net income of $14.53B represent a clean step-up from the prior year’s $40.92B and $11.58B—roughly 16% top-line and 25% bottom-line growth—with a net margin of 30.6% and ROE of 14.6%. Operating cash flow of $39.41B against that earnings base is robust, and the $99.31B equity base supports a fortress-like capital position even if the reported $2.00B debt figure is clearly incomplete for a deposit-funded bank. Yet at $209.51 the stock clears 20.9x earnings and 3.05x book. Those multiples embed permanence around both the elevated ROE and the recent earnings jump; for a mature, domestically concentrated lender they leave almost no room for mean reversion in net interest margins or credit costs. The 2.22% dividend yield is the only soft landing, and even that is thin relative to the cyclical risks still sitting on a Canadian bank balance sheet.
Data quality is an immediate red flag that undercuts any mechanical growth narrative. Identical quarterly revenue and net-income prints across four periods, zero reported revenue and earnings CAGRs, and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.02 are not features of RBC’s actual business—they are artifacts. Once those are stripped out, what remains is a one-year earnings acceleration that valuation models already refuse to capitalize at the current price. The composite fair-value work pointing to roughly $140 (signal-adjusted $140) versus $209 is directionally correct: the market is paying a 49% narrative premium for scarcity value inside Canada’s oligopoly and for the “steady-compounder” story, not for incremental free-cash-flow growth that can be verified in the briefing.
The strongest counter-argument is that RBC deserves a structural premium and the models are simply too conservative. A 14.6% ROE sustained above the long-term 13–14% Canadian-bank range, sector-leader status, and a sticky domestic deposit franchise can justify 2.5–3.0x book when rates are higher and wealth-management mix is expanding. The $14.53B earnings run-rate, if durable, makes the 20.9x multiple less extreme on a PEG-less mature-earner basis, and Canadian institutions will keep bidding for the limited supply of “safe” domestic bank exposure. I weigh this less heavily because the same ROE was available at materially lower multiples for most of the last decade; the current multiple expansion coincides with peak narrative intensity around fortress balance sheets rather than with a demonstrated acceleration in sustainable growth. Macro headwinds flagged in the secondary signals only reinforce that the multiple is the risk, not the earnings power.
A decisive re-acceleration in loan growth and fee income that pushes ROE sustainably above 16%, or a clean multi-quarter print showing revenue CAGR back above mid-single digits without margin compression, would force a re-rating of the fair-value range toward $180–190 and soften the overvaluation call. Conversely, any NIM squeeze or credit-cost uptick that drops earnings below $13B would confirm the downside embedded in the $140 anchor.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
RBC posted revenue of 47.5B in the latest period (up from 40.9B), net income of 14.5B, and reported operating cash generation that supports a very large FCF figure (39.4B on the most recent line). OCF/NI at 1.99x and accruals of -0.9% of assets indicate clean, cash-backed earnings - reported profits are being converted to cash, not manufactured through working-capital games. Liquid cash of 26.4B and net cash of 24.4B give ample near-term flexibility for a bank of this scale, and the business is clearly self-funding at the operating level. The Altman Z of 0.2 is a textbook false positive: Z-score is calibrated for industrial firms, not banks whose balance sheets are structurally leveraged with deposits and loans - it should not be read as distress here. The one real blemish in the data is dilution: diluted shares moved from 1.03B to 1.45B, an ~8.8% CAGR that is out of character for a mature Canadian bank and likely reflects the HSBC Canada acquisition close plus DRIP/stock-based comp. Even if strategic, that is a material drag on per-share compounding until absorbed. Franchise durability - oligopoly Canadian banking, top-tier deposit base, diversified wealth/capital markets/insurance - remains a genuine moat that the raw data (steady revenue growth, high absolute profits) is consistent with.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Confirm the diluted share jump from 1.03B to 1.45B ties to HSBC Canada acquisition consideration and DRIP rather than ongoing SBC or capital shortfall
- CET1 ratio trajectory and OSFI capital buffers post-HSBC integration
- Provisions for credit losses trend and stage 3 loan formation - the raw table lacks credit metrics essential to bank quality
- Net interest margin and deposit beta behavior across the recent rate cycle
- Composition of the 39.4B FCF figure - for a bank this is unusual and likely reflects working-capital-driven definitions rather than a durable owner-earnings number
- Buyback authorization status and pace of share retirement post-HSBC close
The e2e composite fair value pegs RY at $132.71 and the signal-adjusted FV at $140.14, implying roughly -33% downside from $209.51. Even acknowledging the anchored-PE method can under-reward a fortress oligopoly bank (Canadian Big Six typically trade at premium multiples), the gap is large enough that the price is discounting continued mid-single-digit EPS growth, benign credit, stable NIM, and successful HSBC Canada integration all at once. That is closer to the bull's steady-compounder story fully capitalized than a mispricing. Quality is strong, which lifts what I'd pay - a fair multiple on a franchise like RY is arguably 12-13x earnings rather than the ~10x embedded in the anchored PE. Even after generously flexing the deserved multiple up ~20% for franchise quality, deserved value sits around $160-170, still 15-20% below spot. Earnings quality is good (no haircut) but the ~40% diluted share jump from the HSBC deal is a real per-share drag that the composite already reflects. Net: fairly-to-richly priced, priced for perfection, no cushion.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- HSBC Canada integration synergies and revenue retention in next 2 quarters
- NIM trajectory and PCL (provisions) trend as Canadian consumer credit softens
- Capital return pace (buybacks) post-dilution
- Guidance on medium-term EPS growth and ROE targets
The macro tape is neutral-to-slightly-constructive (regime score +22, VIX 16, S&P only 1.6% off highs), and with a beta of 0.93 RY is close to a market-mirror name - it neither amplifies nor dampens the tape much. What matters more here is the narrative: RY carries a durable steady-compounder story as Canada's fortress bank and dividend aristocrat, with scarcity value for investors hunting 'safe' Canadian financials. That narrative is doing quiet, persistent work supporting the multiple even though the stock trades well above DCF fair value - the market is willing to pay for the story. Momentum is positive and volatility of results is low, reinforcing the compounder frame. News flow is benign-to-positive: a $1.5B advisor team poached from UBS is a small tangible win for the wealth franchise and reinforces the 'winner takes share' angle. The only real headwind in the backdrop is macro-structural (10y at 4.68%, market PE 26.2) which caps multiple expansion for rate-sensitive financials, but with a nascent risk-on regime and no adverse catalyst, the net non-fundamental pressure leans modestly to the upside.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any crack in Canadian housing / credit quality data that would puncture the fortress-bank narrative
- 10y yield direction - a move higher would compress the dividend-yield-hunter bid
- Sell-side target revisions post next print; watch for downgrades citing valuation
- Sector rotation out of defensive financials into higher-beta cyclicals in a stronger risk-on regime
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 2, 2026, RY was $209.51. We expect it to be $199.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $170.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 2, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.