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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Starbucks Corporation (SBUX) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -50 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -16 · Value -77 · Sentiment 41 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $38.09 vs $105.59 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Starbucks Corporation
SBUX NASDAQStarbucks Corporation engages in the production, marketing, and retailing of specialty coffee worldwide. It operates through three primary segments: North America, International, and Channel Development. In North America and International, the company sells coffee and other beverages, complementary food items, packaged coffees, single-serve coffee products, and a selection of merchandise via company-operated stores and licensed stores. The Channel Development segment focuses on distributing packaged goods through grocery channels, retail partners, and other outlets. Starbucks Corporation serves consumers seeking premium coffee experiences, handcrafted drinks, and ready-to-drink products, impacting the restaurants industry within the consumer cyclical sector. Founded in 1985 and headquartered in Seattle, Washington, it maintains a vast network of stores and licensing agreements, emphasizing quality sourcing, roasting, and brewing processes to deliver consistent customer experiences globally.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.63
Total Equity: -$8.09B
Shares: 1,139,800,000
Total Debt: $16.07B
Cash: $3.22B
EBITDA: $4.71B
Total Debt: $16.07B
Cash: $3.22B
Revenue: $37.18B
Revenue: $37.18B
Revenue: $37.18B
Total Equity: -$8.09B
Tax Rate: 25.9%
Equity: -$8.09B
Total Debt: $16.07B
Cash: $3.22B
Current Liabilities: $10.21B
Long-Term Debt: $14.58B
Total Debt: $16.07B
Total Equity: -$8.09B
Shares: 1,139,800,000
Shares: 1,139,800,000
CapEx: -$2.31B
Shares: 1,139,800,000
Stock Price: $105.58
Net Income: $1.86B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:18am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $29.1B | $32.3B | $36.0B | $36.2B | $37.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $4.9B | $4.6B | $5.9B | $5.4B | $2.9B |
| Net Income | $4.2B | $3.3B | $4.1B | $3.8B | $1.9B |
| EBITDA | $6.4B | $6.1B | $7.3B | $7.0B | $4.7B |
| EPS | $3.57 | $2.85 | $3.60 | $3.32 | $1.63 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.54 | $2.83 | $3.58 | $3.31 | $1.63 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:42am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.5B | $2.8B | $3.6B | $3.3B | $3.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $9.8B | $7.0B | $7.3B | $6.8B | $7.4B |
| Total Assets | $31.4B | $28.0B | $29.4B | $31.3B | $32.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $8.2B | $9.2B | $9.3B | $9.1B | $10.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $13.6B | $13.1B | $13.5B | $14.3B | $14.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $36.7B | $36.7B | $37.4B | $38.8B | $40.1B |
| Total Equity | -$5.3B | -$8.7B | -$8.0B | -$7.4B | -$8.1B |
| Retained Earnings | -$6.3B | -$8.4B | -$7.3B | -$7.3B | -$8.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:18am (16d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $6.0B | $4.4B | $6.0B | $6.1B | $4.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$1.5B | -$1.8B | -$2.3B | -$2.8B | -$2.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $4.5B | $2.6B | $3.7B | $3.3B | $2.4B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | $0 | $0 | -$177.1M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$1.3B | $498.1M | $497.8M | $170.2M | $498.5M |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.1B | -$2.3B | -$2.4B | -$2.6B | -$2.8B |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$4.0B | -$984.4M | -$1.3B | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $2.1B | -$3.6B | $733.1M | -$265.3M | -$66.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 7, 2026 4:18am (16d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.0% | +11.6% | +0.6% | +2.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -5.2% | +27.1% | -7.9% | -45.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -21.9% | +25.7% | -8.8% | -50.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | -3.9% | +19.1% | -4.4% | -32.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:42am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-14 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-15 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-14 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-15 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-14 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-15 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-16 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-08 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-09 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-10 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-11 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-09 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-09 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-11 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-12 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-10 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-10 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:03Even the bull case prices 53% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 90%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($105.59) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +5% | 14.8% | $49.38 | -53% |
| Base — stabilizes | +3% | 12.9% | $40.80 | -61% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +2% | 11.0% | $33.02 | -69% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +5% | 2.6% | $10.53 | -90% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a more nuanced story than the synthesis $37 fair value admits. Look at the quarterly trajectory: NI bottomed at $133M in Sep-2025 (1.4% margin) and has climbed to $293M → $511M → $1,050M over the next three quarters, with the most recent print (Jun-2026) showing an 11.2% net margin — essentially back to Sep-2024's 10% baseline. Revenue also re-accelerated from $8.76B in Q2-25 to $9.32-9.92B range, with the Dec-25 quarter at $9.92B suggesting the top line was never the problem. If you annualize the last four quarters ($9.57+9.92+9.53+9.32 = $38.34B) and apply a normalized 10-11% net margin, you get $3.8-4.2B in earnings — right back to FY2023-24 levels ($3.28-4.12B). That's not a company in secular decline; that's a company that already executed the turnaround the market was pricing in.
This directly contradicts the synthesis DCF of $36.84 and the thesis score of -16. A $37 fair value implies ~$1.2B of sustainable earnings — but the June quarter alone did $1.05B. The DCF is either using stale TTM inputs anchored to the Sep-2025 trough ($1.86B FY NI) or applying punitive terminal assumptions to a business now trending toward $4B run-rate earnings. On normalized $3.8B earnings, SBUX trades at ~32x — rich but not absurd for a global brand with 2.35% yield and re-accelerating comps. The narrative model's "cult premium" framing overweights the story and underweights that the fundamentals are visibly repairing. The thesis evaluator's top bear ("China structurally impaired," "labor permanently reset") should show up in margins — instead margins just printed 11.2%.
The contrarian case against my own read: one quarter doesn't make a trend, and the Jun-2026 $1.05B could include one-time items (restructuring reversals, tax benefits, real estate gains) — the data file doesn't break out operating vs. non-operating. The payout ratio of 1.49 and negative equity of -$8.09B mean the dividend is funded by debt/buybacks, not earnings, which constrains capital flexibility. Operating CF of $4.75B against $2.31B capex and ~$2.6B in dividends leaves almost nothing for the $16B debt stack. Current ratio of 0.72 is thin. And the "recovery" quarters coincide with what appears to be forward-dated data (2026 quarters shown as historical) — if this is projection rather than reported, the whole bull case collapses. That's a material data-quality flag the prior models didn't surface.
Assuming the quarterly data is real reported results, I dissent from the synthesis "overvalued to $37" verdict — that number is anchored to trough earnings and ignores the visible margin recovery. But I don't flip to undervalued either: at $105 on ~$4B normalized earnings that's 30x, roughly fair for the brand quality but offering no margin of safety given the leveraged balance sheet and unsustainable payout ratio. The narrative model is directionally right that story is doing heavy lifting, but wrong on magnitude — it's not a 185% premium, it's maybe a 15-20% premium to a defensible normalized multiple. Fair value in the $85-95 range feels closer to right than either $37 or $105. The market thesis (turnaround priced in) is correct; where I disagree with the bears is that the turnaround appears to already be executing, not merely hoped for. If the next two quarters confirm 10%+ margins and low-single-digit revenue growth, the stock defends $105. If Jun-2026 was a peak and margins revert to 5-6%, downside to $70-80 is real. Data anomaly note: the 2026 quarter dates need verification — if these are analyst estimates rather than reported figures, disregard my entire bull-side argument and default closer to the synthesis view.
GPT Reading
At $105.58, Starbucks is being valued like a high-quality compounder even though the recent numbers look like a damaged mature retailer trying to claw back normal economics. Revenue has barely moved over the last four fiscal years: $35.98B in 2023, $36.18B in 2024, and $37.18B in 2025. That is roughly 3% cumulative growth across two years, while operating income collapsed from $5.87B in 2023 to $5.41B in 2024 and then to $2.94B in 2025. Net income fell even harder, from $4.12B to $3.76B to $1.86B. The market is not paying for what Starbucks is; it is paying for what Starbucks used to be, or what it might become again. A 64.8x P/E, 28.3x EV/EBITDA, and 3.6x EV/revenue would be tolerable for a business with double-digit growth or visible margin expansion. Starbucks currently has neither.
The quarterlies do show that 2025 was likely a trough, but not enough to justify today’s price. Net margin bottomed at 1.4% in the September 2025 quarter, then 3.0%, 5.4%, and finally 11.2% in June 2026 on $9.32B of revenue and $1.05B of net income. That is real improvement, and if annualized mechanically it suggests earnings power is recovering. But even giving full credit, the revenue line remains flat to soft: $9.57B, $9.92B, $9.53B, then $9.32B over the last four quarters. So the story is almost entirely margin repair, not renewed demand strength. For a company of this scale, that matters. Cost takeout and operational fixes can restore profitability, but they are finite; without stronger traffic or mix, the upside multiple should still compress toward mature-consumer norms rather than stay at a premium-growth level.
The balance sheet and capital return posture make the valuation harder to defend, not easier. Starbucks has $16.07B of debt against $3.22B of cash, negative equity of $8.09B, and a current ratio of 0.72. Negative equity alone is not a thesis killer for a buyback-heavy franchised consumer brand, but in this case it sits alongside a payout ratio of 149% and free cash flow of only $2.44B in fiscal 2025. That means shareholders are still being paid like this is a steady, highly profitable cash machine while the underlying earnings base has weakened materially. On fiscal 2025 numbers, the stock trades at about 49x free cash flow. Even if free cash flow rebounds meaningfully, investors are paying upfront for a normalization that is not yet visible in the top line.
The best argument against this bearish read is straightforward: Starbucks may have already passed through the earnings valley, and the June 2026 quarter could be the first clean signal that the turnaround is working. If net income can run near $1B a quarter again, annual earnings could normalize toward $3.5B-$4.0B, which would pull the effective P/E down into the low-30s. For a globally dominant consumer brand with habitual demand, pricing power, and a long runway to optimize stores, labor, and digital engagement, that is not absurd. The company also still produced $4.75B of operating cash flow in fiscal 2025 despite ugly reported earnings, suggesting the franchise is more resilient than the headline P/E implies. A smart bull would say the market is looking through a bad year, not ignoring fundamentals. I weigh that less heavily because the recovery evidence so far is mostly margin, not growth, and mature brands rarely sustain premium multiples on self-help alone.
What would change my mind is a combination of sustained quarterly profit recovery and proof that sales are re-accelerating, not merely being defended. If Starbucks can put up two to three consecutive quarters with revenue back above $9.8B-$10.0B and net margins holding at 9%-11%, then the normalized earnings case becomes credible enough to support a much higher valuation than the backward-looking numbers suggest. I would also want to see annual free cash flow recover clearly above $3.5B while leverage and shareholder distributions remain controlled. Absent that, the current price still looks like a rerating on hope rather than on delivered economics.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a mature franchise that lost its earnings power and has only just printed one clean quarter of recovery. Annual revenue crawled from $36.18B to $37.18B while operating income collapsed from $5.41B to $2.94B and net income from $3.76B to $1.86B; the five-year earnings CAGR sits at –32.9% against a 1.7% revenue CAGR. Free cash flow of $2.44B still covers the dividend in cash terms, yet the 149% payout ratio on reported earnings and negative equity of –$8.09B show a balance sheet already levered for shareholder returns that the income statement can no longer comfortably support. The most recent quarter—$9.32B revenue, $1.05B net income, 11.2% margin—is a sharp rebound from the 1.4–5.4% trough of the prior four periods, but it arrives after six consecutive quarters of sub-10% net margins and does not yet reverse the structural compression visible in the annual operating margin of 7.9%.
At $105.58 the market is paying 65× trailing earnings, 28× EV/EBITDA and 3.2× sales for a business whose top-line growth has decelerated to low-single digits and whose FCF is shrinking at an 18.5% CAGR. Even if the latest quarter’s run-rate were annualized near $4B of net income, the multiple would still sit around 30×—rich for a 2% grower carrying $16B of debt, a current ratio of 0.72, and permanent labor-cost reset risk. The valuation models’ ~$37 fair value is too punitive if any durable margin recovery materializes, yet the gap between $37 and $105 is almost pure narrative: cult brand, third-place mythology, and the assumption that a new CEO playbook will restore 10–12% margins while China stabilizes. Fundamentals alone do not underwrite that price.
The strongest counter-argument is precisely that June quarter and the trough-multiple thesis. Net margin snapped back to 11.2%, operating cash flow remains solid at $4.75B annually, and the stock has historically re-rated once traffic and ticket stabilize. A smart opponent would note that 2025 earnings are the cycle low, that international and digital loyalty still provide pricing power, and that a return even halfway toward the $5.4–5.9B operating-income band of 2023–24 would make today’s enterprise value look merely expensive rather than absurd. They would also point out that FCF quality is still labeled strong and that dividend aristocrat status anchors a retail bid. I weigh this less heavily because one quarter does not erase multi-year labor inflation, China impairment signals, and same-store saturation; revenue confidence is already flagged as decelerating, and the payout ratio above 100% leaves little cushion if the rebound stalls.
I would reverse to neutral or constructive only if two consecutive quarters deliver net margins above 9% with positive traffic, China returns to growth, and the company guides operating margin back toward 12% while holding FCF conversion. A sustained print of $3.5B-plus trailing net income without multiple compression would also force a re-rating of the fair-value range upward from the mid-70s toward the low-90s. Until those numbers appear, $105 remains a premium to a recovery that has barely begun.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Starbucks remains a self-funding mature earner: FCF of $2.44B in 2025, OCF/NI of 1.68x, accruals at -6.5% of assets, and no mechanical earnings-quality red flags. Capital return discipline is genuine - diluted share count has drifted from 1.19B to 1.14B (roughly -1% CAGR), SBC is a modest 0.9% of revenue, and buybacks run 4.1x SBC, so per-share value is being concentrated rather than diluted. Revenue has still grown every year from $29.06B (2021) to $37.18B (2025). The concern is a real and recent profitability break. Operating margin collapsed from 16.8% (2021) / 16.3% (2023) to 7.9% in 2025, and net income nearly halved from $4.12B (2023) to $1.86B (2025) on higher revenue - classic negative operating leverage, likely tied to the ongoing 'Back to Starbucks' turnaround, wage/labor investment, and traffic softness. FCF also stepped down from $4.52B (2021) to $2.44B (2025). Balance sheet is the other constraint: net cash is -$12.61B against $3.47B liquid, and Altman Z of 2.8 sits in the grey zone. The company can service this comfortably at current FCF, but there is no cushion - a further margin leg down would pressure the dividend/buyback cadence rather than solvency. Overall a strong brand and clean accounting offset by a genuine and unresolved earnings deterioration.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment/regional detail behind the OpM drop - is it China weakness, US traffic, or wage/labor reinvestment (turnaround cost)?
- Debt maturity ladder and covenants against the -$12.61B net cash position
- Same-store sales and transaction trends over the last 4-6 quarters
- Whether the dividend + buyback pace is sustainable at ~$2.4B FCF
- Store growth and closure activity in North America and China
The three valuation methods cluster tightly: DCF $38.90, EPV floor $33.55, anchored PE $36.02, composite $36.84, signal-adjusted $37.02. Even granting that these methods likely understate a global brand franchise with pricing power and international runway, the gap is not a rounding error - price is roughly 2.85x the composite. To justify $105.59 you need mid-teens FCF growth for a decade plus terminal margins well above the currently halved operating margin. That is a heroic set of assumptions layered on a business the quality lens flagged as genuinely deteriorating, not cosmetically so. Earnings quality is high (score 2), so I cannot argue the reported numbers are inflated - the deserved-value math is trustworthy, which makes the premium harder, not easier, to defend. A generous quality uplift on the DCF (say 40-50%) still lands deserved value in the mid-$50s, well below spot. The market is paying a cult-brand multiple on a franchise whose margin structure is contracting; that is the textbook definition of rich.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Forward guidance on North America same-store sales and traffic vs pricing mix
- China segment margin and unit economics trajectory
- Labor cost per transaction and union settlement impacts on operating margin
- Capex and buyback pace given net debt position
- Any one-time charges inflating the margin compression narrative
The dominant force on SBUX right now is narrative momentum, not macro. A cult-favorite brand archetype just got fresh fuel: Q3 2026 comps at +7.9%, margin expansion, the China JV closure, and Cramer publicly endorsing the turnaround. That is exactly the kind of proof-point that reloads a story stock's ammunition and pulls skeptics off the sidelines. The 'Niccol turnaround is working' headline is now a durable media frame, and cult-high names with fresh evidence tend to trade above fundamentals for extended stretches.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether Q4 comps confirm the reacceleration or reveal a one-quarter pop
- Sell-side target revisions in the two weeks post-print
- Any escalation of the Korea regulatory issue
- Traffic vs ticket mix in the comp - price-led comps age poorly
- Whether Niccol keeps getting favorable media framing or if the honeymoon fades
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 8, 2026, SBUX was $105.59. We expect it to be $90.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $55.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 8, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.