For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for S&P Global Inc. (SPGI) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -12 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 71 · Value -79 · Sentiment -1 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $287.85 vs $408.17 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
S&P Global Inc.
SPGI NYSES&P Global Inc. is a financial information and analytics company that provides essential intelligence to participants across global capital, energy and commodity, and automotive markets. The firm delivers benchmarks, data, analytics, and workflow solutions that help investors, lenders, corporations, and governments assess risk, value assets, and make informed decisions. Its operations span five main business segments: S&P Global Market Intelligence, offering data platforms, research, and analytics; S&P Global Ratings, providing credit ratings and related research; S&P Global Energy, focused on energy and commodity insights; S&P Global Mobility, delivering automotive and transportation data; and S&P Dow Jones Indices, which maintains widely used equity and multi-asset benchmarks. Customers include asset managers, banks, insurance companies, corporates, and public-sector institutions that rely on its information, benchmarks, and analytical tools for pricing risk, regulatory reporting, portfolio management, and strategic planning. Founded in 1860 and headquartered in New York City, S&P Global today plays a central role in the infrastructure of modern financial markets and real-economy decision-making.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 14.66
Total Equity: $36.15B
Shares: 304,979,536
Total Debt: $13.09B
Cash: $1.75B
EBITDA: $7.41B
Total Debt: $13.09B
Cash: $1.75B
Revenue: $15.34B
Revenue: $15.34B
Revenue: $15.34B
Total Equity: $36.15B
Tax Rate: 22.6%
Equity: $36.15B
Total Debt: $13.09B
Cash: $1.75B
Current Liabilities: $7.64B
Long-Term Debt: $12.37B
Total Debt: $13.09B
Total Equity: $36.15B
Shares: 304,979,536
Shares: 304,979,536
CapEx: -$195.00M
Shares: 304,979,536
Stock Price: $408.19
Net Income: $4.47B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:41am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $8.3B | $11.2B | $12.5B | $14.2B | $15.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $2.2B | $3.8B | $4.1B | $4.4B | $4.6B |
| Gross Profit | $6.1B | $7.4B | $8.4B | $9.8B | $10.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.9B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.6B |
| Operating Income | $4.2B | $3.0B | $4.1B | $5.5B | $6.2B |
| Net Income | $3.0B | $3.2B | $2.6B | $3.9B | $4.5B |
| EBITDA | $4.4B | $4.1B | $5.2B | $6.7B | $7.4B |
| EPS | $12.56 | $10.25 | $8.25 | $12.36 | $14.67 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $12.51 | $10.20 | $8.23 | $12.35 | $14.66 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:41am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $6.5B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.7B |
| Total Current Assets | $8.8B | $5.7B | $5.1B | $5.5B | $6.3B |
| Total Assets | $15.0B | $61.8B | $60.6B | $60.2B | $61.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.8B | $6.0B | $6.1B | $6.4B | $7.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.1B | $10.7B | $11.4B | $11.4B | $12.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $9.5B | $22.0B | $22.5B | $22.7B | $25.0B |
| Total Equity | $5.5B | $39.7B | $38.1B | $37.5B | $36.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $15.0B | $17.8B | $18.7B | $21.0B | $23.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:39am (17d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.6B | $2.6B | $3.7B | $5.7B | $5.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$35.0M | -$89.0M | -$143.0M | -$124.0M | -$195.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.6B | $2.5B | $3.6B | $5.6B | $5.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$99.0M | $210.0M | -$296.0M | -$305.0M | -$2.0B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $5.3B | $744.0M | $0 | $993.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$743.0M | -$1.0B | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.2B |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$12.0B | -$3.3B | -$3.3B | -$5.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | $2.4B | -$5.2B | $4.0M | $375.0M | $79.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:41am (18d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +34.8% | +11.8% | +13.7% | +7.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +21.4% | +12.5% | +17.5% | +9.7% |
| Operating Income Growth | -28.3% | +34.3% | +35.1% | +12.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +7.4% | -19.2% | +46.7% | +16.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -8.2% | +28.6% | +28.4% | +10.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 5, 2026 9:41am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-29 | $0.97 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-25 | $0.97 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-25 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-26 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-28 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-26 | $0.96 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-26 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-27 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-29 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-26 | $0.91 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-27 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-25 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-25 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-23 | $0.90 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-25 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-25 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-26 | $0.85 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-09 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-24 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-25 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:05Even the bull case prices 37% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 61%. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($408.17) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +17% | 34.9% | $255.78 | -37% |
| Base — stabilizes | +12% | 30.4% | $189.45 | -54% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +6% | 25.8% | $137.48 | -66% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 30.7% | $159.46 | -61% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: SPGI is printing $4.17B in Q1'26 revenue against $3.55B in Q2'24 — that's roughly 17% cumulative over seven quarters, or ~9% annualized, with net margin marching from 28.5% to 33.4%. The most recent quarter shows a genuine step-function: Q1'26 NI of $1.40B is up 28% YoY against a Q1'25 base of $1.09B, and margin expansion of ~450bps YoY is doing most of the work. Annual 2025 came in at $15.34B revenue / $4.47B NI vs $14.21B / $3.85B — 8% top-line, 16% bottom-line. FCF of $5.46B on $15.34B revenue is a 36% FCF margin, which is extraordinary and validates the "infrastructure toll booth" framing. Debt/equity of 0.36 and $13.1B debt against $5.65B OCF is trivially serviceable. On $120B market cap and $5.46B FCF, that's a 4.5% FCF yield — not screaming cheap, not egregious for this quality.
Where I diverge from the synthesis: the composite fair value of $272 (implying -33% downside) looks mechanically wrong for this business. A $272 anchor on $4.47B in 2025 NI is a 24x earnings multiple applied to a business compounding earnings at 16% YoY with 33%+ margins expanding, 36% FCF margins, and a genuine duopoly/oligopoly moat (MCO is the only real comp, and it trades similarly). The signal-adjusted $328 is more defensible but still assumes multiple compression the fundamentals don't warrant while the trajectory is *accelerating*. The Q1'26 print in particular — 33.4% NI margin, well above the 28-30% band — either signals a new operating baseline (in which case forward EPS estimates are stale) or a one-time item the raw data doesn't disclose. That's the key question no model here addressed.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: ratings issuance is cyclical and 2025 benefited from a strong refi wave; if credit spreads widen and issuance normalizes down 15-20%, the Ratings segment (roughly a third of revenue, higher margin) could compress group margins 200-300bps and knock earnings growth to low-single-digits. Index competition from MSCI, FTSE Russell, and newer entrants is real but slow-moving — passive flows are sticky by construction. The bigger latent risk is regulatory: political pressure on the ratings agencies has been a recurring theme since 2008 and never quite materializes into structural damage, but it caps the multiple. I'd also flag that ROIC of 10.1% is unspectacular given the margins — that's the goodwill from IHS Markit ($44B deal) still dragging on capital efficiency, and it means the "compounding machine" narrative has to lean on organic growth, not reinvestment returns.
Data quality flags: the insider block dated 2026-07 and 2026-08 with "?" identities is unusable — it's award/return-to-issuer activity, not directional. "No Insider Transactions" as a secondary signal contradicts the raw log, though the log itself is administrative noise. The "Macro Headwinds" tag is unsupported by anything shown. Current ratio 0.82 is fine for this business model (deferred revenue is a liability but pre-paid cash) — don't over-read it. Net-net, I dissent from the "fully priced with -19.6% downside" framing. At 27x trailing / ~24x forward on a 10%+ revenue grower with expanding margins and 4.5% FCF yield, SPGI is roughly fairly valued to modestly rich, not overvalued. Fair value band $380-$430; current $408 sits inside it. The synthesis is anchoring to a DCF that likely under-models terminal margin and treats the multiple as mean-reverting when the business quality justifies a persistent premium. I'd hold existing positions, add on any pullback to $370, and would not chase above $440. The asymmetry isn't compelling either direction — this is a "own it, don't trade it" quality compounder priced approximately for what it is.
GPT Reading
S&P Global looks exactly like what the market thinks it is: a superb business. The revenue line has climbed from $12.50B in 2023 to $14.21B in 2024 and $15.34B in 2025, with the latest quarter at $4.17B up 10.3% from $3.78B a year earlier. What stands out more than the top line is the margin recovery and expansion after the IHS Markit integration period. Net income moved from $879M in 4Q24 to $1.13B in 4Q25, and then to $1.40B in 1Q26; quarterly net margin has stepped up from 24.5% in 4Q24 to 33.4% in the most recent quarter. On a full-year basis, operating income rose from $4.05B in 2023 to $5.48B in 2024 and $6.18B in 2025, so this is not just a cyclical bounce in issuance volumes — the company is translating scale into real operating leverage. Free cash flow of $5.46B on $15.34B of revenue is a 35.6% FCF margin, which is elite even by financial-data standards, and capex of just $195M shows how asset-light the machine is.
That said, the stock price already capitalizes almost all of that quality. At $408, SPGI trades around 27.8x earnings, 8.1x sales, and 17.9x EV/EBITDA. For a company growing revenue at 8% and earnings in the mid-teens recently, that is not absurd, but it is rich for a business whose most cyclical and politically exposed franchise remains ratings. The latest annual net margin is 29.2%; that is excellent, but not so rapidly improving that I want to pay a premium multiple on a premium multiple. If I take 2025 net income of $4.47B against a $120.3B market cap, the earnings yield is just 3.7%. Against 2025 free cash flow of $5.46B, the FCF yield is about 4.5%. Those are acceptable for a fortress asset, not attractive enough for a fresh aggressive entry. The balance sheet is fine rather than pristine — $13.09B of debt against $1.75B of cash means net debt of roughly $11.3B — but the real issue is not leverage, it is that the stock is being valued as if the current blend of double-digit EPS growth, high margins, and moat durability can continue with very little interruption.
The strongest argument against my caution is straightforward: businesses this good almost never screen cheap on static multiples, and SPGI keeps earning its premium. Gross margin at 70.3% and operating margin at 40.3% are evidence of real pricing power, not accounting optics. Return metrics are still healthy, and the current ratio below 1.0 is largely irrelevant for a business with recurring cash generation and negligible capital intensity. If the market is willing to pay up for exchanges, index providers, and mission-critical data vendors, SPGI deserves to sit near the top of that quality cohort because it has multiple engines: ratings, indices, market intelligence, and commodities. The quarterly trend also argues against waiting for a “better entry” that may never come. Revenue has gone from $3.55B in 2Q24 to $4.17B in 1Q26, and net income from $1.01B to $1.40B over that span, with no sign of deterioration. If management can sustain 9-10% revenue growth and keep converting that into mid-teens earnings growth, then 28x earnings can compound into a reasonable outcome even from here.
I still weigh it differently because the valuation leaves too little room for the ordinary frictions that always appear in mature franchises. Revenue CAGR of 10.8% since 2021 is solid, but some of the earnings and FCF acceleration reflects post-merger cleanup and margin normalization from a softer 2023 base rather than a permanently faster growth algorithm. Net income was actually $3.25B in 2022, then dropped to $2.63B in 2023 before rebounding to $3.85B and $4.47B, so the path has not been as linear as the premium multiple implies. This is a wonderful compounding business, but at $408 you are paying today for resilience, pricing power, and further margin gains that are increasingly harder to surprise on the upside. I would be materially more constructive below roughly $350, where the FCF yield would move closer to 5.5% and the valuation would better reflect the cyclical and regulatory risks embedded in ratings and benchmark businesses.
What would change my mind? A few specific things. If the next several quarters show revenue sustaining above 10% with net margin holding around or above 31-32%, that would tell me the company’s growth engine is stronger than I am underwriting and could justify the current multiple. Likewise, if annual free cash flow clears $6.0B without a meaningful increase in capex or leverage, the stock deserves more benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, a slip back toward high-single-digit revenue growth, or quarterly net income margins falling back into the 28-29% range, would confirm that today’s valuation is stretched. For now, I see a best-in-class business priced like one — and then some.
Grok Reading
S&P Global’s numbers describe a high-quality infrastructure compounder still harvesting merger synergies while delivering clean organic expansion. Revenue climbed from $14.21B in 2024 to $15.34B in 2025 (+8.0%), and the most recent quarter printed $4.17B—up 10.3% year-over-year from the $3.78B March 2025 print—with net margin expanding to 33.4% and net income of $1.40B. Trailing operating margin sits at 40.3% and free-cash-flow conversion is exceptional: $5.46B FCF on only $195M of capex, a 35.6% FCF margin that underscores the asset-light, subscription-and-ratings model. Debt of $13.09B against $36.15B of equity (D/E 0.36) is manageable, and the 10.8% revenue CAGR / 30.5% earnings CAGR over the multi-year window reflect both volume growth and post-IHS Markit cost take-out. The business is doing exactly what a mature earner with pricing power should do.
Yet the valuation does not leave room for ordinary execution. At $408 the stock trades at 27.8x trailing earnings, 8.1x sales and 17.9x EV/EBITDA while ROIC is only 10.1% and ROE 12.4%—returns depressed by acquisition goodwill but still uninspiring relative to the multiple. EV/FCF is roughly 24x on the latest free-cash-flow run-rate; for an 8% grower that is full pricing. The prior models’ signal-adjusted fair value near $328 implies the market is already capitalizing a durable platform-monopoly narrative and further margin upside that may prove harder to deliver once synergy capture decelerates. Recent-quarter acceleration is real, but one strong print does not rewrite a mid-single-to-high-single-digit organic trajectory in ratings and indices.
The strongest counter-argument is that accounting returns understate economic moat and that 28x is not extreme for scarce financial-data infrastructure with 70% gross margins, secular regulatory and indexing demand, and AI-analytics optionality layered on irreplaceable datasets. A skeptic of the overvalued call would note that annualizing the latest $1.40B quarterly net income produces a forward PE closer to 21–22x, that FCF quality is pristine, and that the $80 premium above the $328 anchor simply prices proven pricing power rather than froth. Insider activity is noise (option exercises and award mechanics), so it neither confirms nor refutes that view. I weigh the counter-case seriously but still discount it: mid-teens ROIC businesses rarely justify mid-to-high-20s earnings multiples once growth settles in the high-single digits, and the narrative durability, while genuine, is already fully reflected across institutional ownership.
I would reverse to a constructive stance if the next two quarters sustain revenue growth above 11–12% year-over-year with net margins holding above 32%, or if the shares pull back toward the mid-$340s while FCF continues to compound at mid-teens rates—either path would restore an adequate margin of safety.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
The operating business is elite: revenue grew from $8.3B (2021) to $15.34B (2025), gross margin sits at 70.2%, operating margin has climbed back to 40.3%, and net income reached $4.47B on $5.46B of free cash flow. OCF/NI of 1.23x, accruals of -1.9% of assets, Beneish M of -2.44, and Altman Z of 3.98 all point to clean, cash-backed earnings with no mechanical red flags. This is the profitability signature of an entrenched duopoly-style data and ratings franchise. The 6% diluted-share CAGR headline is misleading in context: shares jumped from 241.7M (2021) to 318.4M (2022) because of the IHS Markit merger, then have been steadily reduced to 305.0M by 2025. SBC is only 1.5% of revenue and buybacks are running at ~24x SBC, so per-share discipline going forward looks strong, not deteriorating. The balance sheet carries $11.29B net debt against $5.46B annual FCF (roughly 2x FCF), a manageable constraint for a subscription/ratings business with recurring revenue, not a survival issue. Insider tape shows only routine awards, option exercises, and tax withholdings - no directional P or S trades to read either way. Margins recovering from the 2022 merger trough (27% OpM) back above pre-deal levels (40.3%) suggest integration is largely digested and operating leverage is returning.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment mix and organic vs acquired growth within Ratings, Market Intelligence, Indices, Mobility, Commodity Insights
- Debt maturity ladder and fixed vs floating mix underlying the $11.29B net debt
- Recurring/subscription revenue percentage and retention rates
- Any customer or issuer concentration in the Ratings segment
- Goodwill and intangible balance from IHS Markit and impairment testing assumptions
The price of $408.17 sits ~25% above the signal-adjusted fair value of $328.38 and ~50% above the composite $272.32. The DCF pins deserved value at $262 and the EPV floor at just $133 - both well below spot. Only the anchored-PE method ($432.61) supports the tape, and that method essentially says 'the multiple is what the multiple is,' which is circular in a bull tape. Strip that out and every cash-flow-based method screams full-to-rich.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Ratings segment issuance run-rate and 2025 guidance (biggest DCF swing factor)
- Market Intelligence organic growth ex-Markit synergy tailwinds
- Buyback pace vs SBC to confirm the anti-dilution reversal continues
- Any commentary on index-business competitive share vs Nasdaq/MSCI
- Litigation reserves and regulatory posture on ratings
The macro tape is mildly supportive: VIX at 14.9, index at highs, risk-on regime building. For a beta-1.07 financial-data compounder like SPGI that means no meaningful headwind from the tape itself, but also no rocket fuel - this is not a name that rips on risk-on days the way high-beta story stocks do. The 10y at 4.69% and a market PE of 27.7 sit as a soft rates/valuation drag on any high-multiple recurring-revenue name, and SPGI at 25x earnings is squarely in that bucket. Narrative-wise, the platform-monopoly story is durable and low-cult - the kind of story that quietly holds a floor rather than driving explosive re-rating. That is a mild tailwind. Working the other way: recent news flow features a pointed post-earnings drop piece questioning whether the ratings moat justifies 25x, echoing the bear frame that valuation already prices in perfection. Analyst tone has cooled around the print. Net, the pressures roughly offset; the stock is not being pushed hard either direction right now.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether post-earnings analyst target revisions turn net-negative or stabilize
- Any escalation in ratings-agency political/litigation news that would sharpen the bear frame
- 10y yield direction - a move above 4.8% would tighten pressure on 25x recurring-revenue names
- Signs the platform narrative is broadening (AI/analytics monetization wins) vs fading
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 8, 2026, SPGI was $408.17. We expect it to be $389.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $330.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 8, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.