Business Description
Providing virtual behavioral healthcare services, Talkspace, Inc. operates a digital platform accessible via secure web and mobile applications. It offers a wide array of treatment options, including psychiatry, adolescent counseling, individual therapy, and support for couples. Clients can communicate with their dedicated therapists through various channels such as text, video, and voice messages, or by scheduling live video sessions. The company is based in New York, New York.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 6:59pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.05
Total Equity: $117.02M
Shares: 173,753,763
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $37.35M
EBITDA: $11.24M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $37.35M
Revenue: $228.87M
Revenue: $228.87M
Revenue: $228.87M
Total Equity: $117.02M
Tax Rate: 6.9%
Equity: $117.02M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $37.35M
Current Liabilities: $17.40M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $117.02M
Shares: 173,753,763
Shares: 173,753,763
CapEx: -$10.64M
Shares: 173,753,763
Stock Price: $5.22
Net Income: $7.79M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The headline numbers look like a clean turnaround: revenue compounded from $113.7M (2021) to $228.9M (2025), op margin flipped from -82.6% to +1.4%, and net income went from -$62.7M to +$7.8M. Balance sheet is fortress-grade — $92.6M net cash (10.6% of market cap), Altman Z of 29.35, OCF/NI of 2.79x. That's a real business that has clawed its way to profitability, and the market is paying ~14x trailing earnings for it. Not obviously expensive.
But the forensic read is uglier than the trajectory suggests. Gross margin has compressed every single year — 58.7 → 50.5 → 49.6 → 45.8 → 43.0 — that's not noise, that's mix shift to lower-margin B2B/payor contracts, and it's accelerating into the most recent year. FCF actually went NEGATIVE in 2025 (-$2.1M) versus +$6.3M in 2024, even as reported net income rose to $7.8M — the OCF/NI ratio masks that capex/working-capital absorbed the cash. Diluted share count grew from 154.1M to 173.8M (3.1% CAGR), SBC is 3.7% of revenue, and buybacks recover only 43% of dilution. The Beneish M-score of -0.81 (vs -1.78 threshold) is a yellow flag worth investigating but not damning given the otherwise clean accruals (-4.1%).
Insider tape is unambiguously NOT 'neutral with sells' — the $314K of 'sales' are F-codes (tax withholding on vesting), not open-market sales. There are ZERO P-code buys and ZERO S-code sales in the visible tape. It's just RSU vesting plumbing. The real signal is the March 31 award cluster (722K shares granted to five executives) — that's the dilution machine in action, not a sentiment read.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $113.7M | $119.6M | $150.0M | $187.6M | $228.9M |
| Cost of Revenue | $46.9M | $59.2M | $75.7M | $101.8M | $130.5M |
| Gross Profit | $66.8M | $60.3M | $74.4M | $85.8M | $98.3M |
| Operating Expenses | $160.7M | $137.4M | $97.6M | $90.3M | $95.2M |
| Operating Income | -$93.9M | -$77.0M | -$23.2M | -$4.5M | $3.2M |
| Net Income | -$62.7M | -$79.7M | -$19.2M | $1.1M | $7.8M |
| EBITDA | -$60.7M | -$78.1M | -$17.8M | $2.1M | $11.2M |
| EPS | $-0.72 | $-0.51 | $-0.12 | $0.01 | $0.05 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $198.3M | $138.5M | $123.9M | $76.7M | $37.4M |
| Total Current Assets | $213.3M | $152.6M | $139.8M | $130.2M | $111.1M |
| Total Assets | $223.6M | $156.3M | $142.2M | $138.7M | $134.9M |
| Current Liabilities | $27.2M | $27.3M | $21.6M | $19.0M | $17.4M |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Total Liabilities | $31.3M | $28.7M | $23.6M | $21.3M | $17.8M |
| Total Equity | $192.3M | $127.5M | $118.6M | $117.4M | $117.0M |
| Retained Earnings | -$171.5M | -$251.2M | -$270.4M | -$269.2M | -$261.4M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$65.7M | -$61.1M | -$16.4M | $11.7M | $8.5M |
| Capital Expenditure | $-663,000 | $-350,000 | $-151,000 | -$5.4M | -$10.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$66.4M | -$61.4M | -$16.5M | $6.3M | -$2.1M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $33,000 | $10,000 | $0 | -$4.9M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$11.0M | -$17.2M |
| Net Change in Cash | $185.0M | -$59.7M | -$14.6M | -$47.2M | -$39.3M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$342.0M $331.6M – $348.4M
|
$402.8M $401.1M – $404.5M
|
$494.2M $484.3M – $500.3M
|
$595.6M $583.6M – $602.9M
|
| EBITDA |
-$85.2M -$86.8M – -$82.6M
|
-$100.3M -$100.7M – -$99.9M
|
-$123.1M -$124.6M – -$120.6M
|
-$148.3M -$150.1M – -$145.3M
|
| Net Income |
$34.0M $29.6M – $40.6M
|
$52.1M $51.2M – $53.0M
|
$71.2M $69.4M – $72.4M
|
$100.8M $98.1M – $102.4M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 7:59am (just now)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +5.2% | +25.5% | +25.0% | +22.0% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -9.6% | +23.3% | +15.4% | +14.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | +18.0% | +69.9% | +80.6% | +170.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -27.0% | +75.9% | +106.0% | +578.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -28.6% | +77.2% | +111.8% | +435.1% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-18 | Reilly John Charles | S-Sale | 39,115.00 | $5.20 | $203,398 |
| 2026-06-18 | Reilly John Charles | S-Sale | 474.00 | $5.21 | $2,470 |
| 2026-06-18 | Reilly John Charles | S-Sale | 700.00 | $5.21 | $3,647 |
| 2026-06-12 | Reilly John Charles | F-InKind | 17,574.00 | $5.23 | $91,912 |
| 2026-06-12 | Reilly John Charles | S-Sale | 900.00 | $5.22 | $4,698 |
| 2026-06-12 | Reilly John Charles | S-Sale | 54,244.00 | $5.21 | $282,611 |
| 2026-06-12 | Cohen Jon R | F-InKind | 99,720.00 | $5.23 | $521,536 |
| 2026-06-12 | Watson Katelyn | F-InKind | 7,181.00 | $5.23 | $37,557 |
| 2026-06-12 | Harris Ian Jiro | F-InKind | 38,561.00 | $5.23 | $201,674 |
| 2026-06-01 | Shachar Erez | A-Award | 2,402.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Braunstein Douglas L | A-Award | 3,363.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-01 | Pawar Madhu | A-Award | 1,922.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Cohen Jon R | A-Award | 387,823.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Margolin Gil | A-Award | 58,174.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Harris Ian Jiro | A-Award | 145,434.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Watson Katelyn | A-Award | 38,783.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-31 | Reilly John Charles | A-Award | 92,108.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-13 | Watson Katelyn | F-InKind | 2,640.00 | $4.82 | $12,725 |
| 2026-03-13 | Watson Katelyn | F-InKind | 1,312.00 | $4.82 | $6,324 |
| 2026-03-13 | Watson Katelyn | F-InKind | 1,598.00 | $4.82 | $7,702 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a cleaner story than the models acknowledge. Revenue has compounded from $113.7M (2021) to $228.9M (2025) — a 19% CAGR — but the more important fact is the operating leverage inflection: op income went from -$93.9M (2021) to -$77.0M (2022) to -$23.2M (2023) to -$4.5M (2024) to +$3.2M (2025). That's $97M of operating margin expansion on ~$115M of incremental revenue, an ~85% incremental margin. Q1'26 at $61.7M is +18% YoY but down sequentially from $63.0M in Q4'25, and the swing to -$6.3M NI from +$4.8M is the first real wobble. The "decelerating quarterly trend" tag in secondary signals is doing real work here — this is the print that breaks the linear extrapolation everyone was running.
I disagree with the rule-based "high_growth_profitable" archetype at confidence 0.5 — that's a misclassification. Five-year cumulative net income is still deeply negative; 2025's $7.8M NI on $228.9M revenue is a 3.4% net margin that just turned negative again in Q1'26. The pre-flight tag of "pre-profit-platform" is more honest. The synthesis verdict of "High Conviction Required" and Market Forces' "value trap" framing are both defensible but they're hedging in opposite directions and the user should notice: synthesis sees a "plausible path," market-forces sees insider awards during the inflection (387K + 145K + 92K share grants on 3/31/26 — that's dilutive issuance, not conviction buying) plus structural churn. The insider data is actually a mild negative the models soft-pedaled: five A-Awards totaling ~720K shares on the same day Q1 closed is management paying itself in equity right before a margin miss.
The contrarian case against the bull thesis is sharper than the narrative layer suggests. At $0.88B market cap, 2.67x sales, and TTM net margin of 3.4% (generously), you're paying ~78x normalized earnings for a business whose Q1'26 just demonstrated that profitability is non-linear and reversible. BetterHelp (Teladoc segment) revenue has been declining; that's not a sign of category consolidation, it's a sign of category fatigue at the consumer-pay end. Talkspace's growth is increasingly B2B/payer-driven, which structurally caps gross margin at ~43% (already visible: gross margin went from 58.7% in 2021 to 43.0% in 2025 — that's a 1,500 bps compression nobody flagged). Revenue is growing but unit economics are getting worse, not better. FCF of -$2.1M on $8.5M OCF with $10.6M capex for an asset-light platform is also a yellow flag — what is a teletherapy company capitalizing?
I dissent partially from the synthesis. "High Conviction Required" is a non-verdict. The numbers say this is a decent business with deteriorating gross margins, a Q1 profitability reversal, dilutive insider awards, and a valuation (2.67x sales, ~$0.88B cap) that already credits the bull case of sustained 20% growth plus margin expansion. Fair value, if you haircut growth to 15% and assume gross margin stabilizes at 42-43% with 5-7% steady-state operating margin, lands around $3.75-4.25 — roughly 20-25% downside from $5.23. The bull case to $7-8 requires Q2'26 to reassert the Q4'25 trajectory ($4.8M NI on $63M rev) and gross margin to stop compressing. Both are testable in the next two prints. This isn't a value trap yet and it isn't a buy — it's a show-me stock that the market has already shown some patience with, and Q1'26 used up a chunk of that patience.
GPT Critique
In my independent assessment of Talkspace, Inc., the most striking aspect is the company's rapid revenue growth juxtaposed with its volatile profitability. From 2021 to 2025, Talkspace's revenue grew from $113.7 million to $228.9 million, a commendable CAGR of approximately 19%. However, despite this growth, the company has struggled with consistent profitability, as seen in the net income fluctuations, with a notable negative margin in Q1'26 (-$6.3M) after a positive Q4'25 ($4.8M). This recent downturn suggests fragility in their profit momentum, contradicting the narrative of sustained operational improvement. The gross margin compression from 59% in 2021 to 43% in 2025 further indicates deteriorating unit economics, which is concerning for a company that operates in a competitive digital health sector.
Regarding Delvantic AI's analysis, I agree with Opus's view that Talkspace is modestly overvalued at $5.23, given the gross margin compression and recent profitability issues. The EV/EBITDA and P/E ratios, both well above normative thresholds, underscore the precarious valuation. Opus rightly highlights the sequential revenue decline from Q4'25 to Q1'26, which challenges the high-growth classification and supports the pre-profit platform tag. The insider awards during a margin miss also raise red flags about leadership's confidence in sustained performance improvement.
However, I diverge from Opus on the characterization of the insider transactions. While Opus interprets these as dilutive and a negative signal, I argue that they might reflect standard compensation practices rather than a deliberate sell-off, particularly in tech companies where equity-based compensation is prevalent. Nonetheless, the timing of these awards does warrant scrutiny, especially given the company's financial volatility.
A careful skeptic might argue that the market has already priced in much of the risk, as the stock trades at a relatively modest 2.67x sales, suggesting skepticism about Talkspace's ability to sustain its growth and margins. This view could be bolstered by the broader competitive landscape and potential regulatory headwinds that could cap the company’s long-term growth prospects.