For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +21 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 19 · Value 22 · Sentiment 34 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $172.09 vs $121.15 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
The Toronto-Dominion Bank
TD NYSEThe Toronto-Dominion Bank is a Canadian multinational banking and financial services institution headquartered in Toronto, Ontario. It operates today as a universal bank serving retail, commercial, wealth, insurance, and wholesale clients in Canada, the United States, and select international markets. The bank’s core activities span Canadian personal and commercial banking under TD Canada Trust, U.S. retail banking along the East Coast through TD Bank, as well as business banking, auto finance, and a broad suite of everyday financial products such as deposits, lending, credit cards, and cash management services. The Toronto-Dominion Bank also provides wealth management and insurance solutions, including advisory services, direct investing platforms, and protection products for individuals and businesses. Through its wholesale banking arm, principally TD Securities and TD Cowen, it delivers corporate and investment banking, capital markets, and global transaction services to corporate, government, and institutional clients worldwide. Founded in 1855 and headquartered in Toronto, Canada, The Toronto-Dominion Bank is recognized today as one of North America’s largest and most diversified financial institutions by assets and customer base.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 8.25
Total Equity: $91.23B
Shares: 1,776,643,599
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.36B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.36B
Revenue: $48.37B
Revenue: $48.37B
Revenue: $48.37B
Total Equity: $91.23B
Tax Rate: 14.4%
Equity: $91.23B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $5.36B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $91.23B
Shares: 1,776,643,599
Shares: 1,776,643,599
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 1,776,643,599
Stock Price: $121.15
Net Income: $14.25B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:18am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $30.5B | $35.0B | $36.0B | $40.8B | $48.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $11.6B | $12.6B | $15.9B | $12.9B | $18.5B |
| Operating Income | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income | $10.0B | $12.3B | $7.3B | $5.9B | $14.3B |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $5.52 | $6.77 | $3.95 | $3.38 | $8.26 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.51 | $6.76 | $3.94 | $3.37 | $8.25 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:18am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.2B | $6.1B | $4.8B | $4.6B | $5.4B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $1.2T | $1.4T | $1.4T | $1.5T | $1.5T |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $1.2T | $1.3T | $1.3T | $1.4T | $1.4T |
| Total Equity | $71.2B | $79.5B | $80.0B | $82.2B | $91.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $45.6B | $52.6B | $52.1B | $50.5B | $55.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:18am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $35.8B | $27.8B | -$46.6B | $39.2B | -$49.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | $0 | $2.4B | $1.6B |
| Dividends Paid | -$4.0B | -$4.8B | -$4.2B | -$5.1B | -$5.5B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$366.8M | $1.9B | -$1.3B | -$202.7M | $767.2M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:18am (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +14.8% | +3.0% | +13.3% | +18.4% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Net Income Growth | +22.2% | -40.5% | -18.6% | +140.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:18am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-10 | $0.79 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-09 | $0.78 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-10 | $0.77 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-10 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-10 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-10 | $0.74 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-10 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-08 | $0.75 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-09 | $0.76 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-05 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-07 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-05 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-05 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-06 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-07 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-07 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-07 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-07 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2021-07-08 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2021-04-08 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The 2025 print is the fulcrum of this entire debate, and the models are treating it too casually. Revenue jumped from $40.84B to $48.37B (+18.4%) and net income from $5.93B to $14.25B (+140%) — but 2024 was depressed by the ~$3B AML penalty and 2025 almost certainly includes the Schwab stake divestiture gain (reportedly ~$8B pre-tax). Strip both and normalized NI is closer to $9-10B, or ~14% ROE on $91B of equity, not the 15.6% headline. That means the 14.7× trailing P/E the synthesis leans on is really ~20-22× on normalized earnings — right at peer multiples, not a discount. The revenue CAGR of 15.9% and earnings CAGR of 39.8% are arithmetic artifacts of a penalty year in the denominator and a one-time gain in the numerator; treating them as trend is malpractice.
The valuation synthesis's $175.71 fair value (+45% upside) is the outlier here and I dissent from it forcefully. A DCF that produces 45% upside on a G-SIB Canadian bank under a U.S. asset cap is almost certainly using the reported $14.25B as run-rate — a category error. Meanwhile the Market Forces read ("30-40% below apparent baseline") and the Thesis Evaluation (-4, essentially neutral) are directionally right. The bear case that matters — U.S. asset cap constrains the growth engine that justified TD's premium to Canadian peers for a decade — is a structural revenue drag, not a one-time hit. TD paid ~$13B for First Horizon-adjacent U.S. ambitions and now can't grow the U.S. balance sheet; that's stranded strategic capital, and the market's 2.36× P/B versus RY's ~1.8× (higher, not lower — check this) or the peer discount narrative needs to be verified against actual comparable multiples before anyone calls it cheap.
The contrarian read the models miss: operating cash flow of -$49.7B is enormous and unremarked. For a bank this reflects balance sheet mechanics (loan/deposit flows, trading assets), not distress, but it means the "free cash flow" framing that anchors most DCFs is meaningless here — you have to value TD on earnings power and capital return, and capital return is exactly what OSFI/OCC are constraining. The narrative layer calls this "fallen angel" with moderate durability; I'd argue durability is higher than moderate because AML consent orders historically run 4-6 years (see Wells Fargo's asset cap, now in year 7), and the models' 12-18 month milestone framing is optimistic. ROA of 0.95% is mediocre for a bank claiming franchise premium — RY runs ~1.0%+, JPM ~1.3%. TD is not a sector leader on the metric that matters; the "Sector Leader" tag is wrong.
GPT Reading
The first thing that jumps out is how distorted the recent earnings record is, and that distortion makes the headline valuation less attractive than it looks. TD earned $14.25B in 2025 after just $5.93B in 2024, versus $7.29B in 2023 and $12.25B in 2022. That is not a clean compounding story; it is a bank with a major earnings hole in 2024 and a sharp rebound the year after. On the surface, 14.7x trailing earnings and 15.6% ROE sound reasonable for a high-quality North American bank, but if 2025 is partly a recovery year from unusually depressed 2024 profitability rather than a new steady-state, the P/E is flattering. Revenue has risen nicely from $30.47B in 2021 to $48.37B in 2025, but net income has not followed a smooth path, and for banks I care far more about durable earnings power than reported sales growth. A 29.5% net margin in 2025 looks strong, yet the four-year average earnings base is materially lower than the current year implies.
The balance-sheet-based valuation is where the market is already telling you this is not a bargain. At $200.15B market cap against $91.23B of equity, the stock trades around 2.2x book using the raw figures, consistent with the cited 2.36x P/B. That is a rich multiple for a bank facing unresolved execution and regulatory skepticism; it only makes sense if investors believe TD deserves a premium franchise valuation and can sustain mid-teens ROE. But 15.6% ROE divided by about 2.3x book gets you an earnings yield on price in the high single digits before asking whether that ROE is normalized. If I haircut 2025 earnings toward something closer to the 2022-2023 range plus modest growth — say $10B-$11B rather than $14.25B — then the effective multiple is not 14.7x but more like 18x-20x, which is expensive for a mature bank with macro headwinds. The dividend does not bail out the thesis either: a 2.54% yield is modest in a sector where income is usually part of the appeal, and the 38.4% payout ratio mainly says the dividend is safe, not that the stock is cheap.
I also do not like the way some of the machine summaries lean on sales-based valuation and DCF-style upside while the raw bank data undercuts that framing. Price-to-sales of 4.45x and EV/revenue of 4.21x are not useful reasons to get excited about a bank; those are noisy metrics for financials. The “composite fair value” around $175 looks especially fragile when the cash flow statement shows operating cash flow of negative $49.70B, which is not inherently alarming for a bank but does demonstrate why conventional cash-flow models can produce false precision here. For a diversified bank, the right anchors are normalized earnings, book value, ROE, and the quality of that ROE. On those anchors, TD looks more like a decent franchise already carrying a substantial premium than a fallen angel sitting at a giveaway price. If there is a dislocation here, it is not obvious in the numbers provided.
The strongest case against my skepticism is straightforward: 2024 was the aberration, not 2025. If the $5.93B in 2024 was depressed by extraordinary charges and the $14.25B in 2025 is a closer representation of underlying power, then TD at 14.7x earnings and 2.3x book could still work, especially if the market has embedded an ongoing governance discount. Revenue growth has been better than a typical mature bank, up 59% from 2021 to 2025, and ROE of 15.6% is not the profile of a broken franchise. A Canadian oligopoly bank that can earn mid-teens on equity and distribute less than 40% of earnings should plausibly deserve a premium multiple. I weigh that case less heavily because the provided data do not prove the 2025 earnings level is durable; they only prove that profitability rebounded sharply from a weak year. Paying a premium to book for a bank before durability is re-established is where investors usually give back the “cheapness” they thought they saw.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025 earnings are not just a bounce but a base. If TD can hold net income above $13B for the next year while keeping ROE at or above 15% and growing equity without a meaningful further hit to capital returns, then the current $121 price could be justified and perhaps conservative. I would also want to see that the market’s qualitative discount is actually lifting in a measurable way — either through a clear resolution of the regulatory overhang or through enough operating consistency that investors stop treating 2025 as a one-off normalization year. Conversely, if earnings slip back toward $10B-$11B, the stock at over 2x book is too expensive for the risk.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers tell a recovery story that is both impressive and incomplete. TD’s fiscal 2025 revenue of $48.37B and net income of $14.25B represent a sharp rebound from the AML-scarred 2024 trough of $5.93B NI, restoring earnings power above the prior 2022 peak of $12.25B. Trailing net margin of 29.5% and ROE of 15.6% look fortress-like on the surface, and the 15.9% revenue CAGR over five years is genuine expansion rather than pure rate beta. Yet the market is only willing to pay 14.7× that peak earnings and 2.36× book for a $200B franchise—hardly a distressed multiple, but one that embeds skepticism that $14.25B is the new run-rate rather than a post-penalty snap-back. The deeply negative $49.7B operating cash flow is classic banking noise from deposit and loan-book swings, not a solvency flag, given $91B of equity. What stands out is the gap between the clean 2025 P&L and the still-unresolved U.S. asset-cap and governance overhang that produced the 2024 collapse in the first place.
The valuation synthesis calling for $175 (+45%) treats the 2025 print as sustainable normalized earnings and layers on a mean-reversion multiple. That is too aggressive. Earnings CAGR of 39.8% is an artifact of the $3B+ AML hit in the base year; strip that out and the underlying trajectory is solid but mid-single-digit at best once Canadian rate cuts and U.S. deposit competition bite. A 2.36× P/B on 15.6% ROE already prices a premium franchise, not a 0.6× deep-value story some narratives incorrectly claim. The Canadian oligopoly pricing power is intact and the 2.5% yield with a conservative 38% payout provides a floor, but the multiple expansion required to reach $170+ assumes both the asset cap lifts cleanly and efficiency ratios normalize—neither of which is visible in the current data.
The strongest case against this cautious stance is simply that 2025 already delivered the “show me” year: revenue +18% YoY, earnings +140%, margins back to peak, and the market still refuses to re-rate. If the AML remediation is truly behind them and the U.S. retail franchise can grow again inside or outside the cap, then 14.7× is cheap for a 15%+ ROE compounder and the stock should trade closer to RBC’s historical premium. I weigh that less heavily because the regulatory timeline remains binary and multi-year; one more enforcement action or an extended asset cap turns the current earnings base into a temporary ceiling rather than a floor, and the 2.36× book leaves limited margin of safety if ROE compresses toward 12%.
What would flip the view is two consecutive quarters of U.S. loan growth inside a relaxed asset-cap regime together with a clear OSFI/FinCEN sign-off that restores full capital return flexibility, or conversely a renewed provision spike or further governance fine that drops run-rate NI back below $11B.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
TD generated $48.37B of revenue and $14.25B of net income in the latest year, up from $30.47B and $10.03B in 2021 — a mature, scaled diversified bank rather than a distressed entity. Diluted share count has actually shrunk at roughly a 1% CAGR (1.85B to 1.78B, with a 2024 dip to 1.36B worth verifying), so per-share value is being concentrated, not diluted. That is unusual discipline for a big bank and points to management protecting existing holders.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Confirm nature and remaining exposure of the US AML consent order / asset cap and any residual penalties
- Reconcile the 2024 diluted share count (1.36B) — likely a data artifact vs the 1.78B in 2025
- CET1 ratio, liquidity coverage ratio, and provision for credit losses trend — the actual bank-quality metrics not captured in this brief
- Loan book composition and net charge-off trend, especially US commercial real estate
- Insider transaction pattern and executive turnover following AML matter
The e2e composite fair value of $172 (signal-adjusted $176) implies ~45% upside, but that anchored-PE method leans on a normalized earnings level that pre-dates the 2024 AML settlement, US asset cap, and elevated cost of deposits. Haircutting for the poor earnings-quality flag and the real regulatory drag, a defensible deserved value is closer to $135-$150 - roughly 1.3-1.4x tangible book on a $14B run-rate earnings base at a discounted P/E of ~10-11x. Against $121.15, that is a 10-20% margin of safety: real, but not extraordinary.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Post-AML normalized US segment ROE and any updates on the asset cap timeline
- Reconciliation of OCF/NI 0.51x - is it working-capital/trading-book noise or real cash conversion weakness
- Guidance on capital return pace once regulatory reviews complete
- NIM trajectory in Canadian retail as rate cycle turns
TD sits in a benign tape (VIX 15.9, S&P near highs, mild risk-on) that is friendly to under-owned, low-beta financials being re-rated off a trough. With beta 0.87 and a defensive diversified-bank profile, TD does not need the tape to be euphoric to work; it just needs the fear premium in the name to bleed off, and the current regime allows that. The active narrative is a fallen-angel rehabilitation story of strong intensity and moderate durability, which is the exact archetype that quietly compounds in a calm tape as forced sellers finish and generalists tiptoe back. Strong 3-year momentum (+9.2pp acceleration, 15.9% CAGR) confirms the tape is already leaning the stock's way, not against it. The pushbacks are real but ordinary: a 4.75% 10y and a 26.9 market PE cap multiple expansion for banks broadly, and the AML/regulatory overhang remains the sticky bear anchor that keeps analyst tone cautious and prevents a full narrative flip. Net, the non-fundamental pressure leans positive - not a mania, just a steady tailwind as a hated name gets re-underwritten in a non-hostile tape.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any AML consent-order milestone or capital-return (buyback/dividend) commentary that would flip analyst tone from cautious to constructive
- Sell-side target revisions - watch for the first meaningful upward revision as the tell that the fallen-angel story is being underwritten by consensus
- Canadian bank peer tape (RY, BMO) - if the cohort rotates in, TD gets the biggest lift as the laggard
- A break in the risk-on regime (VIX above 20) that would disproportionately stall low-conviction rehabilitation trades
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, TD was $121.15. We expect it to be $141.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $108.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.