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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Teradyne, Inc. (TER) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-11): Designation Watch · Cairn score -12 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 61 · Value -71 · Sentiment -100 (timing only, not weighted)
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Teradyne, Inc. is a technology company that designs, develops, and manufactures automated test equipment and advanced robotics systems for global electronics and manufacturing markets. Its semiconductor and electronics test solutions are used to verify the performance and reliability of chips, circuit boards, wireless devices, and complex electronic systems across industries such as consumer electronics, automotive, industrial, computing, communications, and aerospace and defense. Teradyne’s robotics business, including brands like Universal Robots and Mobile Industrial Robots, provides collaborative robotic arms and autonomous mobile robots that support manufacturing, logistics, and warehouse operations for companies of various sizes. These systems help customers improve production efficiency, quality control, and material handling. The company operates globally with a significant presence in the Americas, Asia-Pacific, and Europe, Middle East and Africa regions, serving many leading semiconductor manufacturers and advanced manufacturing customers. Founded in 1960 and headquartered in North Reading, Massachusetts, Teradyne today plays a central role in test, measurement, and industrial automation within the broader semiconductor and electronics supply chain.
Earnings Schedule
Checked daily · calendar updated Aug 11| Print date | EPS est. | EPS actual | Revenue est. | Revenue actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 23, 2026 | $3.32 | $3.52 +6.0% | — | — |
| Jun 25, 2026 | $-0.14 | $-0.16 -14.3% | — | — |
Green = beat the estimate, red = missed. An earnings print is the fastest way a thesis changes — our designations should be re-read after each one.
Recent SEC Filings
| Filed | Form | Document |
|---|---|---|
| Aug 10, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Aug 4, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Aug 3, 2026 | 144 | View |
| Jul 31, 2026 | 10-Q | View |
| Jul 30, 2026 | SCHEDULE 13G/A | View |
| Jul 29, 2026 | 8-K | View |
| Jul 16, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 16, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 15, 2026 | 144 | View |
| Jul 15, 2026 | 144 | View |
| Jul 2, 2026 | 4 | View |
| Jul 1, 2026 | 144 | View |
Filings link to the SEC’s EDGAR system. Annual/quarterly reports (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F) carry the full story; 8-K/6-K current reports are the fastest signal that something material happened.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.47
Total Equity: $2.80B
Shares: 159,667,723
Total Debt: $283.24M
Cash: $293.75M
EBITDA: $826.64M
Total Debt: $283.24M
Cash: $293.75M
Revenue: $3.19B
Revenue: $3.19B
Revenue: $3.19B
Total Equity: $2.80B
Tax Rate: 12.1%
Equity: $2.80B
Total Debt: $283.24M
Cash: $293.75M
Current Liabilities: $1.12B
Long-Term Debt: $63.90M
Total Debt: $283.24M
Total Equity: $2.80B
Shares: 159,667,723
Shares: 159,667,723
CapEx: -$224.01M
Shares: 159,667,723
Stock Price: $334.77
Net Income: $554.05M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 12:27am (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.7B | $3.2B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Gross Profit | $2.2B | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $996.6M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.2B |
| Operating Income | $1.2B | $849.1M | $522.3M | $552.2M | $688.6M |
| Net Income | $1.0B | $715.5M | $448.8M | $542.4M | $554.0M |
| EBITDA | $1.3B | $972.0M | $661.5M | $690.9M | $826.6M |
| EPS | $6.19 | $4.52 | $2.91 | $3.41 | $3.48 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.56 | $4.22 | $2.73 | $3.32 | $3.47 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 24, 2026 3:06am (18d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.1B | $854.8M | $757.6M | $553.4M | $293.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.6B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| Total Assets | $3.8B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $4.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $805.1M | $746.3M | $660.0M | $624.6M | $1.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $145.4M | $64.2M | $65.1M | $57.9M | $63.9M |
| Total Liabilities | $1.2B | $1.0B | $960.9M | $889.4M | $1.4B |
| Total Equity | $2.6B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $2.8B | $2.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $736.6M | $725.7M | $706.5M | $970.8M | $744.4M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 12:27am (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.1B | $577.9M | $585.2M | $672.2M | $674.4M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$132.5M | -$163.2M | -$159.6M | -$198.1M | -$224.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $965.9M | $414.7M | $425.6M | $474.1M | $450.4M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$12.0M | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$144.4M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$66.0M | -$69.7M | -$67.9M | -$76.4M | -$76.3M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$600.0M | -$752.1M | -$397.2M | -$198.6M | -$702.1M |
| Net Change in Cash | $208.1M | -$267.4M | -$97.2M | -$204.2M | -$259.6M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 12:27am (14d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -14.8% | -15.2% | +5.4% | +13.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -15.4% | -17.7% | +7.3% | +12.6% |
| Operating Income Growth | -29.8% | -38.5% | +5.7% | +24.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -29.5% | -37.3% | +20.9% | +2.2% |
| EBITDA Growth | -26.0% | -31.9% | +4.4% | +19.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 24, 2026 3:06am (18d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-21 | $0.13 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-13 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-24 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-05 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-22 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-14 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-25 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-05 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-21 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-15 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-24 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-23 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-16 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-25 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-30 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-24 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-17 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-23 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-31 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jul 28, 2026 12:17am (14d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 | JOHNSON MERCEDES | S-Sale | 166.00 | $358.15 | $59,453 |
| 2026-07-15 | MATZ MARILYN | S-Sale | 1,200.00 | $356.31 | $427,572 |
| 2026-07-15 | Smith Gregory Stephen | S-Sale | 4,000.00 | $356.31 | $1.4M |
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Starting with the raw tape: TER's quarterly trajectory is not what a 96x P/E should look like. Q1 2025 revenue of $685.7M is *down* sequentially from Q4 2024's $752.9M, and net margin compressed hard to 14.4% from 19.4%. Yes, Q1 is seasonally soft and up 14% YoY from the $599.8M trough, but the 2024 margin peak of 25.5% in Q2 already looks like a local high that won't be repeated soon. Annual 2025 revenue of $3.19B is still 14% below the 2021 peak of $3.70B, and 2025 net income of $554M is roughly half of 2021's $1.01B. Operating margin has compressed from 32.7% (2021) to 21.6% (2025) — that's a 1,100bp structural give-back, not a rounding error. FCF of $450M against a $52B market cap is a 0.86% FCF yield. That is venture-like pricing for a business whose FCF CAGR is 2.9%.
Where I disagree with the prior models: the "mature_earner" classification from the rule-based layer is wrong, and the pre-flight "cyclical-platform-hybrid" is closer to right. Mature earners don't post -46% peak-to-trough earnings swings (2021 $1.01B → 2023 $448.8M) and then get re-rated to 96x on hopes of a cycle turn. The synthesis verdict of "Priced for Perfection" is directionally correct but I think under-weights the deceleration already visible in Q1 2025. The market-forces layer flagging a "2026-2027 revenue cliff" from equipment replacement dynamics is the most useful contrarian input in this file, and it's inconsistent with the narrative layer's "moderate durability" framing — those two views can't both be right. If ATE (automated test equipment) demand front-loaded into 2024-2025 on AI/HBM test intensity, then 2026 comps get ugly fast, and the current multiple has zero room for that.
The contrarian argument that isn't being made forcefully enough: Teradyne's ROIC of 21.7% and ROE of 19.8% are fine but not extraordinary — and they're computed off a depressed equity base. Normalize earnings to mid-cycle $800M (splitting the difference between 2021's $1.01B and 2023's $449M) and you get ~$65 EPS-equivalent, so 20x normalized is $200B — er, $200/share fair value on normalized. Even generously granting mid-cycle of $900M NI as the pre-flight suggests, 25x that = $22.5B enterprise value fair, versus current $52B. The stock has to earn its way into this multiple via AI test intensity being genuinely structural (HBM, co-packaged optics, advanced packaging test) AND robotics reaching real scale. Robotics (UR/MiR) has been "about to inflect" for five years and remains a rounding error on margins. Insider activity showing two sales in July 2026 (which is a suspicious date — data anomaly, possibly a typo for 2025 or 2024) is minor but not a confidence signal; nobody is buying at these levels.
Data quality flags: the insider transaction dates are in the future (2026-07-15), which is either stale/corrupted or timestamped incorrectly — I'd not weight them. Annual 2025 numbers being present alongside a Q1 2025 quarterly datapoint suggests the annual figure may be a projection or trailing composite; worth verifying before anchoring. The FCF CAGR of 2.9% against an earnings CAGR of 11.1% is a red flag for earnings quality on a multi-year basis — capex intensity is rising or working capital is absorbing cash, and this deserves more scrutiny than the "Strong Cash Flow Quality" tag suggests. Recent earnings YoY of just 2.2% versus revenue YoY of 13.1% confirms margin compression is live, not theoretical. I concur with the synthesis verdict but would price it more aggressively to the downside: fair value in a $180-220 range on normalized earnings and a reasonable (but still premium) 20-25x multiple, not the $335 tape. The AI test intensity story is real but already 2x over-earned in the multiple, and any Q2/Q3 2025 guide-down turns this into a $250 stock fast. Position accordingly: this is a short candidate on a rip, not a buy on a dip until the multiple compresses meaningfully.
GPT Reading
What jumps out to me is not simply “cyclical semiconductor equipment with a rich multiple,” but a business that has recovered enough to look optically better while still failing the basic test of valuation support. Revenue has climbed from $2.68B in 2023 to $2.82B in 2024 and $3.19B in the latest annual figure, so the top line is no longer in a downturn. But earnings have not recovered proportionally: net income is only $554M versus $715M in 2022 and $1.01B in 2021, while quarterly net margins have swung from 10.7% in Q1 2024 to 25.5% in Q2 2024 and back down to 14.4% in Q1 2025. That tells me the issue is not a broken franchise; it is that TER remains a volume-sensitive, mix-sensitive equipment name whose earnings power is far less stable than the current $52.4B equity value implies. A company on roughly $3.2B of revenue, $674M of operating cash flow, and $450M of free cash flow is being priced like a software compounder. Even if the balance sheet is clean with cash roughly matching debt, that does not rescue a 16.8x sales, 64x EV/EBITDA, 96x earnings setup.
The deeper story I see is that the market is capitalizing TER on peak expectations before peak economics have actually shown up. Gross margin at 58.2% is still healthy, and ROIC above 21% says this is a good business, but operating margin of 21.6% is dramatically below the 32.7% achieved in 2021. More importantly, the quarterly cadence says the recovery is not broad enough to justify a heroic multiple: Q1 2025 revenue of $685.7M was up from $599.8M a year earlier, yet net income only rose from $64.2M to $98.9M, leaving margin still well below the stronger 2024 quarters. In other words, TER is getting some cyclical revenue rebound without proving that higher demand will convert into sustainably elevated profit. If I strip away the AI aura and look at this as an equipment vendor with mid-cycle earnings somewhere around the 2022-2025 range, I do not see how the stock deserves more than a premium industrial-tech multiple on normalized earnings and cash flow. At $334.77, the market is assuming not just recovery, but a structurally better Teradyne than the one that earned $1.01B at the last cycle peak.
On Opus’s narrative, I agree with the central claim that “the quarterly trajectory is not what a 96x P/E should look like.” That is plainly right; a stock on this multiple should not be showing quarterly margins bouncing between 14% and 20% with earnings growth lagging revenue growth. I also agree with Opus that the rule-based “mature_earner” label is wrong. A company whose annual revenue went from $3.70B in 2021 to $2.68B in 2023 and whose net income fell from $1.01B to $448.8M is not a stable mature earner in any valuation-relevant sense. I further agree with Opus’s dismissal of the insider data and annual/quarterly timing inconsistencies; the 2026 sale dates are obviously unusable, and the dataset should not be treated as pristine. Where I disagree is with Opus’s framing that the 1,100bp operating-margin decline is “structural.” The raw numbers do not prove structural erosion; they prove cyclicality and incomplete recovery. Gross margin in 2025 at 58.2% versus 59.7% in 2022 and 59.7% implied from 2021’s gross profit/revenue suggests the core economics have softened only modestly. The larger hit is operating leverage, which can recover if volume and mix improve. I would not underwrite that recovery at today’s price, but I also would not call the margin give-back structural on this evidence alone.
I also disagree with Opus’s valuation math and short call. Opus argues for fair value in a $180-220 range and even says “20x normalized is $200B — er, $200/share fair value,” which is obviously a numerical stumble and, more importantly, too severe in conclusion relative to the quality of the franchise. TER is expensive, but it is not junky: net cash-ish balance sheet, 58% gross margins, 20% ROE, and positive FCF through a downcycle deserve a premium. If normalized net income is $800M-$900M, then a 30-35x multiple is rich but plausible for a category leader with AI-linked upside, which gets you closer to a $24B-$31.5B equity value, or roughly $150-$200 per share if one uses a rough share count inferred from market cap and price. That still implies major downside from $335, but I am not as aggressive as Opus on “short candidate on a rip” because the stock can remain detached from near-term fundamentals if AI-test enthusiasm persists. I do agree with Opus that the prior synthesis understates how much future success is already embedded, but I think he overstates the immediacy of a cliff. The data show volatility and overearning in the multiple; they do not yet show a collapse in the business.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are both anchoring too hard to trailing earnings on a company whose value may sit in a coming test-intensity step-up rather than current margins. They would point out that revenue has already reaccelerated from $2.68B to $3.19B, that Q1 2025 was still up 14% year over year, and that if TER can push back toward even 2022 profitability on a larger revenue base, the earnings denominator can change quickly. They would also note that P/E is especially misleading during cyclical trough-to-recovery periods. That skepticism is fair. But even granting it, today’s valuation leaves almost no room for execution slips, and that is the decisive fact.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · four lenses
Teradyne prints real cash: FCF of $450M in the most recent year on $3.19B revenue (about 14% FCF margin), with OCF/NI of 1.13x and accruals of -1.7% of assets. Earnings integrity looks pristine on the mechanical checks (Beneish -2.14, Altman Z 24.45), gross margins are steady in the high-50s (58-60% across five years), and the balance sheet is essentially unlevered with $322M cash and $39M net cash. Share count has been shrinking at a -3.3% CAGR with buybacks running 9.6x SBC, so per-share value is being concentrated rather than eroded - a hallmark of a mature, shareholder-conscious operator. The main quality caveat is cyclicality: revenue fell from $3.70B (2021) to $2.68B (2023) and operating margin compressed from 32.7% to 19.5% before recovering only modestly to 21.6%. That is a meaningful trough in operating leverage that hasn't fully snapped back even as revenue recovered to $3.19B, suggesting either mix shift, pricing pressure, or higher opex base. Insider activity is small routine selling with no directional signal. Overall this reads as a durable, well-run semi-cap franchise - not a fortress because of the inherent cyclical earnings swings and the fact that operating margins haven't reclaimed prior peaks, but clearly a high-integrity business with strong cash conversion and disciplined capital allocation.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Why operating margin has not recovered to prior peak despite revenue rebound - mix shift toward Robotics/lower-margin segments, or elevated R&D/opex?
- Customer concentration in Semiconductor Test segment (historically heavy exposure to a few large mobile/HPC customers).
- Robotics segment (UR + MiR) trajectory and whether it is a drag on consolidated margins.
- Backlog and book-to-bill trends to gauge cycle position.
- Any convertible or off-balance-sheet obligations behind the $283M gross debt figure implied.
The e2e synthesis flags 'Priced for Perfection' and the market cap of ~$52.4B is being paid for a company whose operating margins just round-tripped through a cyclical trough. On mid-cycle assumptions, semi-test EPS power is probably in the $4-5 range and robotics is still sub-scale on margins; a 25-30x mid-cycle multiple on a cyclical (even a high-quality one) gets you to a deserved value in roughly the $230-280 zone. Paying $334.77 implies the market is capitalizing peak-of-cycle earnings from AI/HBM test tailwinds at a full multiple - a double-count.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Next-quarter guide on SOC test bookings and HBM/AI test mix - is the tailwind broadening or concentrating?
- Robotics segment revenue growth and segment operating margin trajectory
- Management commentary on customer capex plans for 2025 (memory vs logic)
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization
- Any one-time items inflating current EPS run-rate
The tape just turned risk-off (VIX 18.7, S&P -2.6% off highs) at the worst possible moment for TER: KOSPI just crashed 8% on an AI chip selloff hours before SK Hynix and Teradyne itself print earnings. With a beta of 1.74 and roughly 70% of revenue explicitly tied to the AI narrative per recent coverage, this stock is a high-torque expression of exactly the trade that is unwinding overnight. The narrative premium the market has been paying is 'AI supercycle extends through 2026' - and that assumption is being stress-tested in real time. Narrative-wise the archetype is a steady compounder with moderate intensity and low cult, so there is no fanatical retail base to defend the tape - holders are institutional value managers who trim into macro shocks and disappointing prints. The stock has nearly doubled in 2026 into an earnings event framed as 'priced for perfection,' which creates asymmetric downside if the guide is anything short of pristine. News flow is entirely event-gated on the July 28 print, and the setup going in is hostile: Asia red, peers (FORM) flagged for valuation/trade risk, and a macro backdrop of 4.69% 10y and 26.6 market PE offering no cushion. Net: sentiment pressure is decisively negative into the catalyst. Even a good print may be sold given the tape; a soft print into this setup would be punished disproportionately given the beta and AI-concentration framing.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- July 28 Q2 print and 2H guide - specifically SoC test and HBM commentary
- SK Hynix earnings and any capex commentary as an AI-capex tell
- Whether the KOSPI AI selloff extends to US semi-caps at the open or fades
- Sell-side target revisions in the 48h after the print
- VIX behavior - a break above 20 would confirm the risk-off regime is entrenched
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.