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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (TEVA) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -34 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -2 · Value -60 · Sentiment 30 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $10.69 vs $37.34 at analysis
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Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.
TEVA NYSETeva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. ADR represents shares of an Israeli-based global pharmaceutical company focused on developing, manufacturing, and marketing medicines across multiple therapeutic areas. Teva is widely recognized for its large portfolio of generic drugs, which provide cost-effective alternatives to branded treatments and support healthcare systems in controlling medication expenditure. Alongside generics, Teva offers specialty and biopharmaceutical products in fields such as central nervous system disorders, respiratory conditions, oncology, and other chronic diseases. The company serves hospitals, pharmacies, healthcare providers, and wholesalers across North America, Europe, and a broad range of international markets through regionally organized business segments. Teva also engages in the sale of active pharmaceutical ingredients and provides contract manufacturing services, reinforcing its role in the wider pharmaceutical supply chain. Founded in 1901 and headquartered in Tel Aviv, Israel, Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. ADR gives investors exposure to one of the world’s leading players in generic and branded pharmaceutical products.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.21
Total Equity: $7.91B
Shares: 1,163,000,000
Total Debt: $1.82B
Cash: $3.56B
EBITDA: $3.16B
Total Debt: $1.82B
Cash: $3.56B
Revenue: $17.26B
Revenue: $17.26B
Revenue: $17.26B
Total Equity: $7.91B
Tax Rate: -14.7%
Equity: $7.91B
Total Debt: $1.82B
Cash: $3.56B
Current Liabilities: $13.46B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $1.82B
Total Equity: $7.91B
Shares: 1,163,000,000
Shares: 1,163,000,000
CapEx: -$501.00M
Shares: 1,163,000,000
Stock Price: $37.34
Net Income: $1.41B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:19pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $15.9B | $14.9B | $15.8B | $16.5B | $17.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $8.3B | $8.0B | $8.2B | $8.5B | $8.3B |
| Gross Profit | $7.6B | $7.0B | $7.6B | $8.1B | $8.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $5.9B | $9.1B | $7.2B | $8.4B | $6.8B |
| Operating Income | $1.7B | -$2.1B | $433.0M | -$303.0M | $2.2B |
| Net Income | $417.0M | -$2.4B | -$559.0M | -$1.6B | $1.4B |
| EBITDA | $3.0B | -$791.0M | $1.6B | $756.0M | $3.2B |
| EPS | $0.38 | $-2.12 | $-0.50 | $-1.45 | $1.23 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.38 | $-2.12 | $-0.50 | $-1.45 | $1.21 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:04pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2023 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | — | — | $3.2B | $3.3B | $3.6B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | $12.5B | $12.6B | $13.9B |
| Total Assets | $43.1B | $42.1B | $43.5B | $39.3B | $40.7B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | $12.2B | $12.8B | $13.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $35.5B | $34.7B | $35.4B | $33.6B | $32.8B |
| Total Equity | $7.6B | $7.4B | $8.1B | $5.7B | $7.9B |
| Retained Earnings | -$14.1B | -$14.0B | -$13.5B | -$15.2B | -$13.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:19pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $798.0M | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.6B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$562.0M | -$548.0M | -$526.0M | -$498.0M | -$501.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $236.0M | $1.0B | $842.0M | $749.0M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | -$7.0M | $0 | -$15.0M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$6.6B | -$1.4B | -$4.2B | -$1.6B | -$4.1B |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $21.0M | $636.0M | $393.0M | $74.0M | $256.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:19pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -6.0% | +6.2% | +4.4% | +4.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -8.2% | +9.6% | +5.5% | +10.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -222.3% | +120.6% | -170.0% | +811.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -664.3% | +76.2% | -193.2% | +186.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | -126.0% | +300.5% | -52.3% | +317.9% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:04pm (1d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2017-11-27 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2017-08-25 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2017-06-01 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2017-02-28 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2016-12-01 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2016-08-18 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2016-05-20 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2016-02-25 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2015-11-13 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2015-08-18 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2015-05-15 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2015-02-17 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2014-11-13 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2014-08-19 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2014-05-16 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2014-02-20 | $0.29 | — | — | — |
| 2013-11-18 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2013-08-16 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2013-05-16 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
| 2013-02-19 | $0.27 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-23 02:47Even the bull case prices 33% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 91%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($37.34) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +3% | 17.3% | $25.11 | -33% |
| Base — stabilizes | +2% | 15.0% | $21.29 | -43% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +1% | 12.8% | $17.68 | -53% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | -1% | 2.0% | $3.27 | -91% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-22 15:28The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a more nuanced story than either the 30.9x P/E (implying a completed turnaround) or the $10.30 DCF anchor (implying wild overvaluation) suggest. Revenue trajectory is real but modest: $14.93B (2022) → $15.85B → $16.54B → $17.26B (2025), roughly 4-5% growth. Gross margin has held steady around 51-52%. The operating swing is dramatic — from -$2.10B op loss in 2022 to +$2.16B in 2025 — but that's largely litigation/impairment normalization, not underlying earnings power expanding 4x. Strip goodwill impairments and legal accruals and Teva's "normalized" operating margin is probably 15-18%, generating maybe $1.2-1.5B in sustainable net income on $17B revenue. That's what the $1.15B FCF confirms.
The most alarming data point everyone glossed over: Q2 2026 shows revenue of $4.14B with a **-$576M net loss**, snapping five consecutive profitable quarters. That's not noise — that's either a fresh litigation charge, an impairment, or something structural, and it directly undercuts the "turnaround complete" narrative that supports today's multiple. Coupled with a decelerating revenue trend (Q4'25 $4.71B → Q1'26 $3.98B → Q2'26 $4.14B) and insiders selling every share they exercise on 8/3, the setup for a re-rating lower is materially better than the setup for a re-rating higher. The synthesis's $10.30 fair value is where I part ways, though — that appears to anchor on a distressed-equity DCF that ignores $1.15B of real FCF and a genuinely deleveraged balance sheet ($1.82B debt vs. $3.56B cash is *net cash*, not distress).
Where I think the models over-shoot in opposite directions: the Valuation Synthesis at $10.30 is mechanically applying growth/margin haircuts appropriate to 2019-2022 Teva, not 2025 Teva with net cash and normalized ops. Meanwhile Pre-Flight and Market Forces correctly identify the "priced for perfection" problem but underweight that the 30.9x reported P/E is inflated by one-time items — normalized P/E on ~$1.3B run-rate earnings is closer to 33x, still expensive but not absurd for a generic-plus-specialty pharma with Austedo growing. A fair generic pharma multiple of 10-12x normalized earnings gets you $10-12/share of "generic Teva" value, plus $3B+ net cash cushion ($2.50/share), plus optional specialty pipeline value (Austedo, Ajovy, biosimilars) worth maybe $8-12/share if you believe the ramp. That triangulates to roughly $22-27 fair value, not $10 and not $37.
The contrarian long argument: Teva's opioid settlement is largely quantified and paid down, Austedo hit $1.6B+ run-rate and could double, and biosimilar Humira/Stelara offer real optionality — none of which shows up in a backwards-looking DCF. But the Q2 2026 loss is a warning shot, insider behavior is quietly bearish, and buying a 4-5% grower at 30x GAAP earnings requires believing specialty accelerates *and* generics stop deflating *and* no new litigation tail emerges — three independent bets. I dissent from the synthesis's magnitude (-72% is not credible given the balance sheet and cash flow) but agree with its direction. Fair value is roughly $23-27; current $37.34 embeds a specialty-drug success premium that Q2 2026 just made harder to defend. This is overvalued but not a short — it's a "wait for the Q3 print or a re-rating to mid-$20s before touching it" situation.
GPT Reading
Teva’s raw numbers look like a real operating recovery, but not one that justifies paying up as if the business has become a durable compounder. Revenue has climbed from $14.93B in 2022 to $17.26B in 2025, a solid 5% annualized recovery for a company many had written off, and the margin repair is more important than the top line: gross margin improved from 46.7% in 2022 to 51.8% in 2025, while operating income swung from -$2.10B to +$2.16B. That is not cosmetic. The quarterly run-rate through the last four reported quarters before the latest quarter was also credible: $3.89B, $4.18B, $4.48B, $4.71B of revenue, with net income stepping up from $214M to $481M. If I only looked at 2025, I’d say this is a textbook late-turnaround rerating candidate.
But the most recent quarter is exactly why I won’t underwrite the current $37.34 price. June 2026 revenue was $4.14B, down about 1% year over year from $4.18B, and net income was -$576M versus +$282M a year earlier. One ugly quarter does not invalidate the turnaround, but it does invalidate the idea that earnings quality is now stable enough for a 30.9x P/E and 13.0x EV/EBITDA in a generic-heavy pharma business. Even if some of that loss is driven by one-offs, the market is no longer valuing Teva as distressed; it is valuing it as largely de-risked. That is too generous for a company with a 2025 free cash flow of $1.15B against a $43.5B market cap, barely a 2.6% FCF yield. For a business that only grew revenue 4.3% recently, has a current ratio of 1.04, and still operates in a structurally price-competitive category, that cash yield is simply not compelling.
What stands out most is the mismatch between balance-sheet optics and valuation. On the supplied figures, Teva actually looks net cash, with $3.56B of cash against $1.82B of debt, and debt-to-equity of 0.23. If those numbers are directionally right, then yes, one of the historic reasons to discount Teva has meaningfully faded. But the equity is already priced for that improvement and then some. At 2.5x sales and 5.5x book, investors are paying multiples more consistent with a specialty pharma franchise than with a still-mixed business whose annual net margin was 8.2% in 2025 and whose quarterly profitability just snapped back into a deep loss. The rule-based “mature earner” label is more useful than the “deep-value” story here: this is no longer priced as a broken asset. It is priced as a cleaned-up incumbent with dependable earnings power, and the latest quarter argues that confidence is premature.
The strongest pushback is obvious: 2024 was likely the trough, 2025 proved earnings normalization, and the first quarter of 2026 still showed $369M of net income on $3.98B of revenue, so the June quarter may be litigation, restructuring, or other non-core noise rather than business deterioration. A bull would also note that operating cash flow of $1.65B and free cash flow of $1.15B remain healthy, gross margin above 51% is much stronger than old generic-pharma stereotypes, and if debt really is this low, the equity deserves a very different multiple than legacy Teva ever got. I take that seriously. My issue is that even granting the turnaround, you do not need heroic assumptions to get to “better business, mediocre stock.” At $37, the market has already captured the rerating from “survival” to “stability,” while the reported earnings path still has enough lumpiness that I’m unwilling to capitalize peak-ish 2025 profits as if they are the new floor.
What would change my mind is not a narrative event but proof in the next two or three reports that the June 2026 loss was truly non-recurring. If Teva can put up two consecutive quarters around $4.2B-$4.5B of revenue with net margins back near 8%-10%, sustain annualized free cash flow above $1.5B, and do so without renewed balance-sheet strain or litigation leakage, then the current multiple becomes less offensive and I could justify a valuation in the low-to-mid $30s as fair rather than rich. Conversely, if revenue stalls around $4.0B-$4.1B quarterly and earnings remain erratic, the stock should not hold a premium multiple; in that case, a retreat toward the mid-$20s would look more appropriate.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a repair story that has already been celebrated, not one still being discovered. Teva printed $17.26B of revenue and $1.41B of net income in 2025 after three years of losses, free cash flow of $1.15B, and a balance sheet that flipped to net cash ($3.56B cash against $1.82B debt). Gross margin reached 51.8% and operating margin 12.5%, with ROIC at an eye-catching 40%. That is real operational progress from the 2022–2024 trough. What the price of $37.34 (roughly $43.5B equity value) is asking you to believe, however, is that this cleaned-up mid-single-digit grower deserves a 31x earnings multiple and nearly 38x trailing FCF. Revenue CAGR is only 4.4% and recent quarterly growth is decelerating; the Q2 2026 print of $4.14B revenue and a $576M loss (–13.9% margin) immediately reintroduces earnings volatility that the 2025 clean-up year had papered over. Paying growth-stock multiples for a specialty-and-generics franchise still dominated by price-pressured volume is the core mismatch.
The prior models’ $10.30 fair-value anchor is directionally correct in calling the stock expensive, but too punitive on the repaired capital structure. Net cash and $1.15B of FCF support something closer to the mid-teens to low-20s on a normalized basis—still a large gap below $37. EV/EBITDA of 13x and EV/sales of 2.4x look full once you strip the narrative premium; generic peers historically clear 8–12x earnings, not 31x. The “fallen angel” story is doing the heavy lifting: investors are capitalizing the end of the debt spiral and assuming specialty mix (CNS, migraine) plus litigation quiet will compound margins from here. Q2’s swing back to a half-billion-dollar loss is the first hard data point that the earnings base is not yet a smooth annuity.
The strongest counter-argument is the quality of the turnaround itself. Debt-to-equity of 0.23, a current ratio above 1, FCF CAGR of 16.8%, and ROE of 18% are not the statistics of a still-distressed name; a skeptic of the overvalued call would say the market is simply re-rating a fortress balance sheet and that 2025’s $2.16B of operating profit is the new run-rate once one-offs are ignored. They would also note that the valuation models appear to embed residual “debt burden” language that the 2025 balance sheet has already retired, and that any sustained specialty ramp could justify a higher multiple on a cleaner earnings stream. I weigh that evidence as already in the price: at 31x you need the specialty story to deliver and the charge-heavy quarters to vanish, not merely hope they might.
What flips the verdict is concrete evidence that the earnings power is both higher and smoother than 2025–early 2026 imply—specifically two consecutive quarters of double-digit net margins without large negative one-timers, plus visible sequential growth in the higher-margin specialty portfolio that lifts company-level revenue growth sustainably above mid-single digits. A clear resolution or quantification of remaining litigation tail that removes the binary overhang would also support a higher multiple. Conversely, another loss quarter or margin compression back toward the 2024 pattern would confirm the $37 handle is pure sentiment and accelerate mean reversion toward the low-20s or below.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Teva is a mature, self-funding drug manufacturer that has clearly bent the operating curve in 2025: revenue grew to $17.26B (from $15.88B in 2021), gross margin expanded to 51.8% (from 47.8%), operating margin swung to +12.5% from -1.8% in 2024, and net income printed +$1.41B after three consecutive GAAP loss years (2022 -$2.35B, 2023 -$559M, 2024 -$1.64B). FCF has been positive every year of the window ($236M to $1.15B) and the company sits on $3.56B liquid cash with $1.74B net cash, so survival is not in question despite the Altman Z of 0.93. The dilution profile is disciplined for a company of this size: diluted shares crept from 1.11B to 1.16B (about 1.2% CAGR), SBC is <1% of revenue, and there is no buyback offset - per-share value is being lightly eroded but not destroyed. Insider tape is neutral-to-mildly-negative: option-exercise-and-sell behavior from Hughes and Jover, no open-market buys. The core concerns are the sheer volume of cumulative GAAP losses over 2022-2024 (roughly -$4.5B combined) reflecting impairments/legal charges endemic to this franchise, and a leveraged balance sheet where liquid cash is only 8.2% of market cap and Altman Z sits in distress territory - typical for a debt-heavy specialty pharma but still a real constraint. OCF/NI of -0.16x looks alarming on the module but reflects the prior-year loss base rather than a cash-quality problem, since FCF is solidly positive.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant headroom - the Altman Z distress reading hinges on this
- Status and reserve levels for outstanding opioid and price-fixing litigation
- Sustainability of 2025 margin uplift - is it Austedo/Ajovy/biosimilar mix or one-off items?
- Segment split between North America generics, innovative branded, and biosimilars
- Whether 2022-2024 losses were dominated by non-cash impairments vs cash legal payouts
- Any pending refinancing needs given only 8.2% cash-to-market-cap coverage
The composite fair value comes in at $10.69 (DCF $11.70, EPV floor $8.67) against a $37.34 price - a headline downside of about 72%. I do not take that gap at face value: EPV/DCF on a leveraged generics turnaround with three prior loss years will under-credit the visible 2025 margin recovery and the specialty pipeline (Austedo, Ajovy, Uzedy). But even flexing deserved value materially higher - say $18-22 to give credit for the cash-flow inflection and deleveraging - the price still sits well above it. The market is clearly paying for a re-rating that is already underway, not a discount to it. What is priced in at $37: sustained specialty growth, continued debt paydown without further legal charges, and multi-year margin expansion. That is the bull case fully embedded, not a coiled spring. With a distress-zone Altman Z, opioid tail risk, and generic pricing pressure still real, the risk-reward on valuation is asymmetric to the downside. This is a fallen-angel that has already been recognized - the easy mispricing was $8, not $37.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Austedo and Ajovy run-rate growth and 2026 guidance
- Free cash flow conversion excluding legal settlements
- Remaining opioid and other litigation reserves vs cash outflow schedule
- Net debt trajectory and refinancing terms
- Generic pricing commentary in latest transcript
The macro backdrop is mildly supportive - a risk-on tape with VIX at 15 and the S&P near highs - and with a beta of 0.88 TEVA isn't especially levered to it either way. What matters more is that the fallen-angel narrative, normally fragile and dominated by debt and opioid tail risk, just got two concrete positive prints in 72 hours: FDA priority review for ecopipam in pediatric Tourette (a genuine specialty-pipeline validation, exactly what the bull story needs) and an Aurinia settlement pushing out a generic launch to 2036 (removes a small overhang, keeps the specialty story clean). Neither is transformative, but for a low-cult, moderate-intensity story stock, positive specialty headlines are the swing factor. Momentum is already tagged strong_positive with a multi-year rerating, so the tape is inclined to reward good news rather than fade it. The counterweight is real but quiet: the story is fragile and durability is low, opioid litigation can flare at any time, and the broader generics narrative (commodity pricing, Alvotech-style biosimilar competition in adjacent news) remains a slow headwind. Net, the current press is a modest tailwind - specialty-drug validation is landing on a friendly tape, with no acute negative catalyst in view.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any opioid settlement or litigation headline that could flare the tail risk
- Ecopipam PDUFA date and any label/scope signals from FDA
- Sell-side target revisions or upgrades following the ecopipam priority review
- Generic pricing commentary from peers (Viatris, Sandoz) that could reset the sector narrative
- Debt paydown milestones - the core of the fallen-angel-to-recovery story
The generics world is a volume business losing price: healthcare systems want the cost containment, but buying consortia and channel concentration keep extracting the margin, which is why industry operating and net margins have compressed by 20-30pp in three years. The durable winners are the ones who bolt branded, patent-protected CNS/biologic revenue onto a generics cash engine — which is precisely Teva's chosen shape. Policy (US pricing reform, potential pharma tariffs, onshoring pressure) raises the cost of the generics leg while doing little to the specialty leg, reinforcing that mix shift. So the world supports Teva's direction of travel but not its speed: the addressable growth is mid-single-digit revenue with faster earnings via deleveraging, not a step-change. Nothing in the macro or category data supplies a mechanism for the ~41% growth embedded in the price.
When we made this prediction on Aug 23, 2026, TEVA was $37.34. We expect it to be $29.20 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $22.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 23, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.