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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc. (TMO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -18 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 43 · Value -68 · Sentiment 52 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $353.37 vs $574.30 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.
TMO NYSEThermo Fisher Scientific Inc. is a life sciences and laboratory solutions company that provides the tools and services used in research, diagnostics, and biopharmaceutical manufacturing. Its portfolio spans analytical instruments, laboratory equipment, reagents, consumables, software, and specialized services that support scientific workflows from sample preparation and analysis to clinical testing and production. The company serves pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms, hospitals, clinical laboratories, universities, research institutions, and industrial customers across environmental and quality-control applications. Thermo Fisher Scientific operates through four main businesses: Analytical Instruments, Laboratory Products and Biopharma Services, Life Sciences Solutions, and Specialty Diagnostics. It plays a central role in the global scientific infrastructure by supplying products and services that help customers generate data, improve laboratory productivity, and support research and diagnostic operations worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 17.74
Total Equity: $53.54B
Shares: 378,000,000
Total Debt: $42.71B
Cash: $9.85B
EBITDA: $10.53B
Total Debt: $42.71B
Cash: $9.85B
Revenue: $44.56B
Revenue: $44.56B
Revenue: $44.56B
Total Equity: $53.54B
Tax Rate: 7.5%
Equity: $53.54B
Total Debt: $42.71B
Cash: $9.85B
Current Liabilities: $15.19B
Long-Term Debt: $39.17B
Total Debt: $42.71B
Total Equity: $53.54B
Shares: 378,000,000
Shares: 378,000,000
CapEx: -$1.53B
Shares: 378,000,000
Stock Price: $574.30
Net Income: $6.70B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 4:36pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $39.2B | $44.9B | $42.9B | $42.9B | $44.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $10.0B | $8.4B | $6.9B | $7.3B | $7.7B |
| Net Income | — | — | $6.0B | $6.3B | $6.7B |
| EBITDA | $12.6B | $11.8B | $10.3B | $10.4B | $10.5B |
| EPS | $19.62 | $17.75 | $15.52 | $16.58 | $17.77 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $19.46 | $17.63 | $15.45 | $16.53 | $17.74 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:16am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.5B | $8.5B | $8.1B | $4.0B | $9.9B |
| Total Current Assets | $20.1B | $25.2B | $24.6B | $22.1B | $28.7B |
| Total Assets | $95.1B | $97.2B | $98.7B | $97.3B | $110.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $13.4B | $17.0B | $14.0B | $13.3B | $15.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $34.7B | $34.3B | $34.7B | $31.1B | $39.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $54.1B | $53.0B | $51.9B | $47.7B | $56.8B |
| Total Equity | $41.0B | $44.1B | $46.8B | $49.7B | $53.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $35.4B | $41.9B | $47.4B | $53.1B | $59.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 4:36pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $9.3B | $9.2B | $8.4B | $8.7B | $7.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$2.5B | -$2.2B | -$1.5B | -$1.4B | -$1.5B |
| Free Cash Flow | $6.8B | $6.9B | $6.9B | $7.3B | $6.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$19.4B | -$39.0M | -$3.7B | -$3.1B | -$4.0B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $6.4B | $2.8B | $160.0M | -$2.4B | $5.3B |
| Dividends Paid | -$395.0M | -$455.0M | -$523.0M | -$583.0M | -$636.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.0B | -$3.0B | -$3.0B | -$4.0B | -$3.0B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$5.8B | $4.0B | -$440.0M | -$4.1B | $5.8B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 4:36pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +14.5% | -4.6% | +0.1% | +3.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -16.3% | -18.3% | +7.0% | +5.6% |
| Net Income Growth | — | — | +5.7% | +5.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -6.7% | -12.8% | +1.8% | +0.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:16am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-13 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-15 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-15 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-13 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-13 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-14 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-14 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-14 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-14 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-14 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-14 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-14 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-15 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-14 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-14 | $0.26 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:09Even the bull case prices 40% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 62%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($574.30) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +8% | 22.5% | $341.73 | -40% |
| Base — stabilizes | +5% | 19.6% | $276.05 | -52% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 16.6% | $218.75 | -62% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +5% | 15.1% | $216.81 | -62% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly cadence first: TMO printed $11.99B in Q2'26 vs $10.86B in Q2'25 — that's 10.4% YoY, materially better than the 3.9% "recent yoy" tag suggests, and Q1'26 was $11.01B vs $10.36B (6.3%). Net income $1.74B vs $1.62B (7.4%). So the first half of 2026 is actually running hotter than the momentum module credits — revenue is re-accelerating off the post-COVID trough, not decelerating. The synthesis module's -44% "overvalued" call and the thesis engine's snarky "10x acceleration in a 4% grower" framing both anchor on trailing 2021-2025 CAGRs that include the COVID-diagnostics roll-off. That's the wrong denominator. Normalize out the COVID bulge (peak 2022 rev of $44.9B was inflated by testing revenue that's now largely gone) and you're looking at a core business that grew ~4% in 2024 and is tracking ~8% in 1H26. Different animal.
That said, the models aren't wrong that $574 is a full price. At 32x trailing earnings, 23x EV/EBITDA, 5.5x EV/sales, TMO trades meaningfully above its own pre-COVID median (~22-25x P/E) and its ROIC is only 8.3% — below what you'd want to see for a "platform monopoly" narrative. ROE of 12.5% with 0.8x debt/equity is fine, not spectacular. FCF of $6.29B on a $213B market cap is a 3% FCF yield; even if you underwrite 8-10% FCF growth (double the 5-year CAGR but consistent with the 1H26 reacceleration), you get to a fair value in the $400-460 range, not $320 and not $574. The DCF-implied $320 assumes the deceleration continues; the market's $574 assumes GLP-1/CGT/AI-drug-discovery pull-through actually shows up in numbers. The 1H26 prints are the first evidence it might be — but one half doesn't make a trend.
Where I'd push back on the prior models: the narrative layer calls this "platform-monopoly" with "strong" intensity and low cult coefficient, which I think overstates the story premium. TMO doesn't trade like NVDA or LLY — it trades like a high-quality industrial compounder that got re-rated modestly on hopes of biopharma recovery. The insider data is essentially useless (one 400-share sale is noise, not signal — the "neutral" tag is generous; we simply don't have visibility). The "lagging sector peers" flag deserves more weight than the synthesis gave it: DHR, A, WAT have all struggled with the same bioprocessing destocking cycle, and if peers are cheaper on comparable metrics that's a real relative-value problem for TMO specifically. Nobody flagged that the FCF CAGR is *negative* 4.7% — that's a genuine yellow flag against the "compounder" framing, even if 2026 capex normalization fixes it.
The contrarian case worth taking seriously: bioprocessing destocking is ending (Sartorius, Danaher have both signaled this), pharma R&D budgets stabilize in 2026-2027, and TMO's Life Sciences Solutions segment returns to high-single-digit organic growth. Add in the PPD/CDMO business benefiting from GLP-1 fill-finish demand and cell therapy commercialization, and you can defend low-teens EPS growth for 3-4 years. In that world, $574 at 32x on $17.75 TTM EPS becomes $650+ on $20 forward EPS at a 28x multiple. That's not the base case, but it's not crazy either — and it's what the market is paying for. My problem is the asymmetry: you're paying full price for a scenario that's plausible but unproven, with a 3% FCF yield floor if it doesn't materialize.
I land on partial agreement with the overvalued verdict but strong dissent on magnitude. The synthesis $320 fair value is too punitive — it's mechanically extrapolating a COVID-distorted trailing period. My fair value sits in the $440-490 range on 18-20x normalized ~$25 EPS three years out, discounted back, which puts TMO roughly 15-25% overvalued rather than 44%. Not a short, not a buy here, but a "wait for $475 or a bioprocessing miss" name. The 1H26 reacceleration is the single most important data point in the file and the models mostly ignored it.
GPT Reading
At $574, Thermo Fisher is being valued like a high-quality compounder that has already put its post-COVID reset behind it. The business quality is real, but the numbers here do not support that price. Revenue has recovered from the 2023–2024 trough, yet only modestly: 2025 revenue was $44.56B, still below 2022’s $44.92B, and the last four reported quarters sum to roughly $46.3B annualized, which is better but not remotely a breakout growth profile for a $213B market cap company. Quarterly growth is steady rather than exciting: $10.36B in March 2025 grew to $11.99B by June 2026, and the latest quarter is only about 4% above the year-ago comp. Net income has improved similarly, from $1.51B to $1.74B over that span, with margins stuck in a tight 14.5%–16.1% band. That tells me the core franchise is resilient, but it does not tell me the business is inflecting into a materially higher earnings algorithm.
The valuation is the problem. On 2025 numbers, investors are paying 32.4x earnings, 23.4x EV/EBITDA, 5.5x EV/revenue, and nearly 4.9x sales for a company whose 5-year revenue CAGR is only 2% and whose free cash flow in 2025 was $6.29B. That is about a 2.9% FCF yield on market cap before even adjusting for the $42.71B of debt against $9.85B of cash. Operating income of $7.75B on $44.56B of revenue is a healthy 17.4% margin, but still below the $10.03B operating profit produced in 2021 on just $39.21B of revenue. In other words, Thermo has not yet fully rebuilt its earnings power to pre-normalization levels despite a much larger enterprise value. Paying a premium multiple for a business with ROIC of 8.3% and ROE of 12.5% is only sensible if durable high-single-digit to low-double-digit growth is visible. In this dataset, it isn’t.
What stands out most is that the stock seems to be priced on strategic importance rather than financial acceleration. That can work for a while because Thermo is mission-critical to biopharma workflows, and recurring consumables plus service revenue make the business structurally better than a plain instrument manufacturer. But the actual cash-flow progression is not strong enough to justify this degree of confidence. Operating cash flow was $7.82B and capex $1.53B, leaving $6.29B of FCF; that is good absolute cash generation, but not enough to make a $213B equity value look cheap. The balance sheet is manageable with debt-to-equity below 0.8 and a 1.89 current ratio, yet leverage still matters when growth is middling. This is not a broken company; it is a very good company whose stock price implies a better business trajectory than the reported figures currently show.
The best argument against this bearish read is that Thermo deserves a structural premium precisely because near-term reported growth understates the moat. A smart bull would point to the sequential quarterly recovery from $10.36B to $11.99B, annual net income rising from $6.00B in 2023 to $6.70B in 2025, and the company’s ability to hold net margins around 15% through a difficult normalization period. They would also note that mature, diversified life-science tools leaders rarely screen cheap on near-term DCF because a large share of the value comes from durability, switching costs, M&A optionality, and exposure to secular R&D growth. I take that seriously. If you believe this is a scarce “infrastructure” asset that can grow mid-single digits organically and add a point or two through bolt-ons for a decade, then 32x trough-ish earnings is not insane. My issue is that the current multiple leaves too little room for the still-evident reality of subpar FCF growth and only modest top-line reacceleration.
What would change my mind is simple: I would need to see the growth algorithm actually turn. If Thermo can deliver several quarters of 7%-plus revenue growth with operating margin expanding above 18%, or push annual FCF materially above $8B without financial engineering doing the heavy lifting, then the premium would be easier to underwrite. Likewise, if annual revenue moves decisively beyond the 2022 peak while net income gets into the $7.5B–$8B range, I would revisit the idea that today’s valuation is fair for a re-accelerating compounder. Until then, I see a high-quality franchise priced as if the comeback is already complete.
Grok Reading
Thermo Fisher’s numbers describe a high-quality but thoroughly mature industrial franchise, not the growth compounder the $574 price implies. Revenue crawled from $42.88B in 2024 to $44.56B in 2025 (+3.9%), and the trailing multi-year revenue CAGR sits at roughly 2% once the 2021–22 COVID diagnostics spike is stripped out; operating income has compressed from $10.03B in 2021 to $7.75B in 2025 even as the top line stabilized. Net margins have settled in a tight 14.5–16% band across the last six reported quarters, and free cash flow of $6.29B against a $213B enterprise produces a sub-3% FCF yield. ROIC of 8.3% and ROE of 12.5% are respectable for a capital-intensive tools business but nowhere near the returns that historically justify a 32x earnings multiple or 23x EV/EBITDA. The balance sheet is serviceable—net debt roughly $33B against $53.5B of equity and a 1.89 current ratio—but $42.7B of gross debt is not trivial when growth has decelerated and FCF CAGR is negative 4.7%. The market is therefore paying for a narrative of platform monopoly and next-gen biotech pull-through that the income statement has not yet validated.
What stands out most is the gap between the valuation synthesis (~$320 composite fair value) and the tape. At 32x trailing earnings and 5.5x sales, TMO embeds something close to mid-20% annual FCF compounding for half a decade; actual recent earnings growth is 5.8% and organic revenue is mid-single digits. Quarterly progression—$10.36B → $10.86B → $11.12B → $12.22B → $11.01B → $11.99B—shows seasonal lumpiness and modest sequential gains, not an inflection. Insider activity is a non-event (one small sale), and the secondary signals correctly flag decelerating revenue confidence plus macro headwinds in biopharma budgets. The rule-based “mature earner” label at 0.88 confidence fits the data better than the platform-monopoly story the price is telling.
The strongest counter-argument is that Thermo’s installed base and consumables lock-in really do create switching costs and pricing power that pure DCF models underweight. A smart bull would note that operating cash flow of $7.82B converts cleanly, the 9.5% payout ratio leaves ample reinvestment capacity, and any sustained acceleration in cell/gene therapy commercial volumes or GLP-1 manufacturing scale-up would drop straight through high-incremental-margin reagents and instruments. They would also argue that scarce, mission-critical healthcare infrastructure assets simply clear at 25–30x in this rate regime, and that the 2022–24 biotech funding winter is already easing. I weigh that less heavily because the same “critical vendor” language has been true for a decade while organic growth stayed mid-single digits; the premium only expands if growth re-accelerates, and the current multiple already assumes that acceleration has begun.
I would flip if two consecutive quarters show organic revenue growth sustainably above 8–10% with operating margin expansion back toward 20%, or if management guides to a multi-year FCF CAGR north of 12% backed by visible CDMO backlog. A sharp multiple compression toward 22–24x on stable earnings would also make the risk/reward tolerable near $400.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
TMO is a mature earner throwing off $6-7B of FCF annually on $44.6B of revenue (2025), with operating margin stable in the 17% range after compressing from a COVID-era 25.6% peak in 2021. Earnings integrity looks clean: OCF/NI at 1.31x, negative accruals (-2% of assets), and an Altman Z of 3.79 in the safe zone. Capital allocation is shareholder-friendly - diluted shares have contracted from 397M (2021) to 378M (2025), a -1.2% CAGR, with buybacks running ~10x SBC, and SBC itself modest at 0.7% of revenue. Per-share value is being concentrated rather than diluted. The main constraint is the balance sheet: net debt of ~$32.6B against $10.1B liquid cash, a legacy of the M&A-driven build. But with $6B+ of consistent FCF, this is a serviceable load rather than a survival issue. Post-2021 revenue and margin normalization is real - the pandemic testing tailwind faded and 2023 revenue actually declined - but the business has stabilized and resumed modest top-line growth (+3.9% in 2025). Insider activity is a non-signal (one small sale). Overall a solidly healthy, well-run compounder with a leveraged capital structure as the one meaningful blemish.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Debt maturity ladder and weighted average interest cost on the $32.6B net debt position
- Organic vs acquired growth split - how much of 2025 revenue growth is real vs M&A
- Goodwill and intangibles as % of assets given the acquisition-heavy history (Patheon, PPD, Olink etc.)
- Segment mix and whether Life Sciences Solutions has fully lapped the COVID testing runoff
- Customer/end-market concentration in biopharma services (PPD/CRO) given biotech funding pressure
The composite fair value of $330 (signal-adjusted $320) implies roughly -44% downside from $574, and the EPV floor at $211 says the current earnings stream alone justifies barely a third of today's price. Even the most generous internal method, anchored P/E at $555, only gets you to today's price - meaning the market is already paying for the optimistic multiple case with no cushion. The DCF at $277 is the honest middle read: a mid-single-digit organic grower with strong margins is worth good money, but not 20x-plus forward earnings on a levered balance sheet.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Organic revenue growth trajectory in next 2-3 quarters vs the high-single-digit assumption embedded in the multiple
- Bioprocessing/pharma services book-to-bill and any inflection signal
- Capital allocation cadence - buyback pace vs deleveraging given the levered balance sheet
- Management's forward EPS guide and whether consensus multiple is defensible
The active narrative on TMO is a strong, durable 'irreplaceable infrastructure of biotech and pharma' story - platform-monopoly archetype with low cult risk, meaning it is a serious, institutional narrative rather than a fragile retail one. That story just got refreshed by a Q2 2026 beat (revenue +10% to $12B, adj EPS +13%), and news flow within the last 72 hours is explicitly framed around analyst bullishness and AI-led bioproduction growth. That is the dominant force on the tape for this name right now, and it points up. Analyst tone is tilting positive into the print, adding to the push. The macro tape is only mildly supportive - a neutral regime with VIX at 16 and the S&P barely off highs - but TMO's 0.87 beta means the tape barely moves the needle either way; this is not a name that gets whipped by risk-on/risk-off. The one real crosswind is the rate/valuation backdrop: 10y at 4.68% and a market PE of 26.9 make it harder for premium-multiple compounders like TMO (trading well above modeled fair value) to keep re-rating, and any biotech funding wobble would land directly on the bear thesis. Net, the narrative and news-cycle tailwind clearly outweighs the rates-driven headwind for now, but this is a name where the pressure could flip fast if the biotech-capex or funding story cracks.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether biotech funding/XBI trend rolls over, which would hit the bear thesis directly
- Sell-side target revisions in the 2-3 weeks post-Q2 print
- Any crack in the 'monopoly stickiness' framing (pricing pressure on consumables, share loss in bioproduction)
- 10y yield direction - a move toward 5% would pressure premium-multiple compounders
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 3, 2026, TMO was $574.30. We expect it to be $535.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $430.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 3, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.