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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Texas Pacific Land Corporation (TPL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-10-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score -10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 86 · Value -74 · Sentiment -9 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $150.31 vs $374.34 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Texas Pacific Land Corporation
TPL NYSETexas Pacific Land Corporation is a land and resource management company focused on owning and operating extensive surface acreage and mineral interests in West Texas. Texas Pacific Land Corporation generates income through oil and gas royalty interests, land leases, easements, commercial agreements, and water-related services tied to energy development in the Permian Basin. Its operations are centered on managing land use across infrastructure, utility, and industrial activities, while also providing sourced water, produced water handling, and saltwater disposal services. The company serves as a key landholder in one of the most active U.S. energy-producing regions, giving it a distinctive role in the broader oilfield services and royalty markets. Texas Pacific Land Corporation is headquartered in Dallas, Texas.
Price Overview
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 6.97
Total Equity: $1.46B
Shares: 69,027,492
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $144.81M
EBITDA: $654.69M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $144.81M
Revenue: $798.19M
Revenue: $798.19M
Revenue: $798.19M
Total Equity: $1.46B
Tax Rate: 21.1%
Equity: $1.46B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $144.81M
Current Liabilities: $72.60M
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $1.46B
Shares: 69,027,492
Shares: 69,027,492
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 69,027,492
Stock Price: $374.34
Net Income: $481.38M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 2:12am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $451.0M | $667.4M | $631.6M | $705.8M | $798.2M |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $88.6M | $105.1M | $145.5M | $166.7M | $206.0M |
| Operating Income | $362.4M | $562.3M | $486.1M | $539.1M | $592.2M |
| Net Income | $270.0M | $446.4M | $405.6M | $454.0M | $481.4M |
| EBITDA | $378.7M | $577.7M | $500.8M | $564.3M | $654.7M |
| EPS | $34.83 | $57.80 | $52.81 | $19.75 | $6.98 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $34.83 | $57.77 | $52.77 | $19.72 | $6.97 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 2:00am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $428.2M | $510.8M | $725.2M | $369.8M | $144.8M |
| Total Current Assets | $526.5M | $633.4M | $862.5M | $503.4M | $319.3M |
| Total Assets | $764.1M | $877.4M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $50.9M | $39.6M | $44.4M | $46.6M | $72.6M |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $112.4M | $104.5M | $113.2M | $115.6M | $164.4M |
| Total Equity | $651.7M | $772.9M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $668.0M | $866.1M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 2:23am (36d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $265.2M | $447.1M | $418.3M | $490.7M | $545.9M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$16.4M | -$19.0M | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | $248.7M | $428.2M | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$85.3M | -$247.3M | -$100.0M | -$347.3M | -$147.8M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$19.7M | -$87.8M | -$42.6M | -$29.2M | -$8.4M |
| Net Change in Cash | $145.2M | $88.9M | $213.4M | -$359.2M | -$226.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 2:12am (36d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +48.0% | -5.4% | +11.8% | +13.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +55.2% | -13.6% | +10.9% | +9.8% |
| Net Income Growth | +65.3% | -9.1% | +11.9% | +6.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +52.6% | -13.3% | +12.7% | +16.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Sep 1, 2026 2:00am (36d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-01 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $1.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $1.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-01 | $10.00 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $1.17 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $1.17 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.36 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-07 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-07 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-07 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-07 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-07 | $6.67 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-07 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-07 | $0.92 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-16 02:01A +1σ run of quarters pays -56%; a −1σ run costs 85%. Ratio -0.7:1 (μ 17.1%, σ 17.4% floored by sector, 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.9 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($374.34) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +26% | 35.0% | $130.18 | -65% |
| Base — stabilizes | +18% | 35.0% | $101.03 | -73% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +9% | 35.0% | $77.45 | -79% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +14% | 35.0% | $90.56 | -76% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +34% | 35.0% | $163.22 | -56% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -0% | 35.0% | $57.93 | -85% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-01 02:33The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly cadence first: revenue has moved $173.6M → $187.5M → $196.0M → $203.1M → $211.6M → $236.8M → $246.1M over eight quarters — that's ~42% growth trough-to-peak, and the most recent two quarters accelerated (+6.6% and +3.9% sequential). Net margins are parked between 58-64%, ROIC 35.5%, zero debt, $145M cash. Q2 2026 annualized run-rate is ~$984M revenue and ~$616M NI, so forward P/E is ~42x, not the 54x trailing. That's still expensive, but the deceleration story the "mature cycle headwinds" note implies isn't in the numbers — it's the opposite, reacceleration, likely from WTI strength and water services scaling.
The synthesis verdict of $107 fair value against $374 is, frankly, not credible for this asset. A DCF that produces a 71% discount on a zero-debt, 60%+ net margin, 35% ROIC royalty stream growing 13% YoY is almost certainly using a discount rate and terminal growth combo appropriate for a cyclical E&P — which TPL categorically is not. TPL has no reserves to deplete on its own balance sheet; it collects royalties in perpetuity on ~900k Permian acres it will never sell. The correct comp set is Franco-Nevada (FNV trades ~40x earnings) and Wheaton (~35x), not Diamondback or Pioneer. On a royalty-comp basis, TPL at 42x forward with faster growth and better margins than either FNV or WPM is arguably fairly valued, not 71% overvalued. The pre-flight note calling this "dividend-income" is also wrong — 0.6% yield with 30% payout ratio means this is a compounder that happens to pay a token dividend, not an income vehicle.
That said, the contrarian case is real and the models underweight it. First, the "insider purchases" of 1 share daily for 10+ consecutive days is almost certainly a data artifact or an odd-lot DRIP — not a signal, and anyone treating it as such is being fooled. Second, TPL's revenue is levered to Permian rig count and completion activity, both of which have plateaued in 2024-2025 despite the revenue line growing — meaning the growth is coming from mix (water services, easements, surface leases) rather than royalty volume. If WTI drops to $60 and operators cut capex 15%, the water services line — the higher-multiple growth story — compresses fastest. Third, at 32x EV/sales and 39x EV/EBITDA, you're paying full FNV-like multiples for single-basin concentration risk. FNV is globally diversified across gold, oil, and iron ore; TPL is 100% Permian. That concentration deserves a discount to royalty peers, not parity.
My read: the synthesis is directionally right that the stock is not cheap but wildly overshoots on the magnitude — $107 is a fantasy number that no rational holder would sell into. The market forces "neutral" call is closer to correct than the "71% overvalued" synthesis. I'd anchor fair value at $260-310 using a royalty-comp framework (35-40x forward earnings on ~$620M NI, adjusted for single-basin risk), meaning the stock is ~20-30% overvalued, not 71%. The narrative layer's "250% premium to DCF" observation is real but the DCF is the wrong tool here. I dissent from the synthesis magnitude while agreeing with its direction. This is a hold-if-you-own-it, wait-for-$280-before-buying situation, not a short. The bear case that kills the thesis is technology-driven water reuse eliminating the recurring water services revenue — that's the actual risk to monitor, not "Permian maturity" which is a decade away given inventory depth.
GPT Reading
What stands out is not the quality of the asset base — that is obvious in the numbers — but how completely the market has already capitalized that quality. TPL is producing extraordinary economics: 2025 revenue of $798.2M generated $592.2M of operating income and $481.4M of net income, a 60.3% net margin, with no debt and $144.8M of cash. The quarterly run-rate is still improving, with revenue rising from $173.6M in 2024-09 to $246.1M in 2026-06, while net income climbed from $106.6M to $153.9M. Even more impressive, margins have not broken under growth; the last eight quarters stayed between 58.3% and 63.7% net margin. This is an elite royalty-like business, not a normal E&P, and the market is right to award it a premium multiple to operators with capex, leverage, and decline curves.
But the current valuation is not just a premium; it is a perfection multiple. At $25.82B market cap against $798.2M of 2025 revenue and $481.4M of net income, investors are paying 32.4x sales, 53.7x earnings, 39.2x EV/EBITDA, and 17.7x book for a business whose recent growth is good rather than explosive. Annual revenue went from $705.8M in 2024 to $798.2M in 2025, up 13.1%, and net income rose only 6.0% in the latest reported quarterly YoY frame. Even using the stronger recent quarterly annualization, the business is roughly at a $950M-$985M revenue run-rate and about $590M-$615M net income run-rate; that still leaves the stock around 26x-27x sales and roughly 42x-44x earnings on a forwardized basis. Those are software-like multiples attached to a basin-concentrated, commodity-adjacent land and royalty platform. The durability is real, but the growth rate does not justify the price.
The key contradiction I see versus the romanticized “scarce asset” framing is that the financial trend is excellent but not accelerating fast enough to support the narrative premium. Revenue growth is steady, not compounding upward: $185.8M in 2024-12, $196.0M in 2025-03, down to $187.5M in 2025-06, then $203.1M, $211.6M, $236.8M, and $246.1M. That is healthy progression, but not the shape of a business that should trade at more than 50x trailing earnings unless one assumes decades of high-teens growth or major hidden monetization not yet visible in reported results. Return metrics like 33% ROE and 35.5% ROIC are superb, but they are returns on a very small accounting equity base relative to market value; they prove business quality, not valuation support. A great business can still be a bad stock when bought at too rich a price, and here the market appears to be discounting TPL less as a current cash-flow vehicle and more as a perpetual call option on Permian intensity.
The best bear-case against my own view is simple: most valuation frameworks systematically undervalue unique royalty franchises because they treat them like finite-cycle industrials. TPL has no debt, minimal capital intensity, a 4.4 current ratio, payout ratio of only 30.7%, and operating cash flow of $545.9M on $798.2M of revenue. That kind of cash conversion deserves a structural premium, especially when tied to irreplaceable acreage in the best U.S. basin. If production density, water monetization, and infrastructure fees keep scaling, today’s earnings may understate normalized future cash generation by a lot. The fact that net income margins have remained above 58% even as revenue grows argues this is not a one-off commodity spike story. I still weigh that argument less heavily because even wonderful monopoly-like assets can be overowned when investors extrapolate scarcity into near-infinite duration growth. The 1-share insider purchases are noise, not a serious capital signal.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of “good” performance; the bar is much higher. I would need to see either sustained reacceleration to something like 20%+ annual revenue growth with net income maintaining around 60% margins, or a material pullback in the share price toward a level where the market is paying closer to 25x-30x earnings on a credible forward run-rate. Concretely, if quarterly revenue can move from $246.1M toward $275M-$300M over the next several quarters without margin slippage, the current premium would become more defensible. Absent that, I think the stock is pricing in too much permanence and too much growth for a company whose actual reported numbers, while outstanding, still look like a superb mature royalty compounder rather than a hyper-growth platform.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe an exceptional royalty and surface-rights franchise, not a conventional E&P operator. Revenue has compounded from $451M in 2021 to $798M in 2025, with the latest two quarters at $237M and $246M already annualizing above $950M if the run-rate holds. Net margins have stayed locked between 58% and 64% across eight consecutive quarters; operating margin sits at 74% and ROIC at 35.5%. The balance sheet is fortress-like—zero debt, $145M cash, current ratio 4.4—and operating cash flow of $546M against a $1.46B equity base produces the kind of capital-light economics that justify a premium multiple in almost any sector. The story the income statement tells is clean, asset-light compounding tied to Permian activity, with water and infrastructure layers adding non-commodity ballast.
That quality does not justify the price. At $374 the stock trades at 54× trailing earnings, 32× sales and 39× EV/EBITDA while earnings have grown only 8.9% annually and recent earnings YoY is just 6%. A $25.8B enterprise value on roughly $550M of annual cash generation implies a sub-2.5% free-cash-flow yield before any reinvestment or distribution. The dividend yield is a token 0.6%. Even granting the scarcity of core Permian surface and mineral acreage, the market is capitalizing current cash flows as if they will compound at mid-teens rates for multiple decades with no margin compression and no operator capital discipline. The quantitative fair-value cluster around $107 is not an outlier; it is the arithmetic consequence of applying any reasonable terminal multiple or discount rate to the observed growth and margin profile. The 250% premium is pure narrative—platform-monopoly storytelling that has outrun the cash-flow engine.
The strongest counter-argument is that TPL is not a normal earner and should not be valued like one. Believers will correctly note that royalty streams require almost no incremental capital, that the ~900k-acre position is effectively irreplaceable, and that water/infrastructure revenue can scale with denser drilling without the same commodity beta. They will point to the 12.4% revenue CAGR, the steady quarterly uptrend, sector-leader status, and the fact that every prior period of “overvaluation” has eventually been grown into by Permian intensity. A smart opponent will also argue that a zero-debt, 60%-margin toll collector in the lowest-cost U.S. oil basin deserves a scarcity premium that DCF models systematically understate, and that the modest insider open-market purchases, while tiny, at least signal no internal panic. Those points have force on quality; they do not close a 3.5× gap between price and fundamental value when earnings growth is single-digit and the payout remains conservative.
My mind would change if two consecutive quarters delivered 20%+ revenue growth with stable or expanding margins while oil prices stayed range-bound, proving the water and surface businesses can decouple from commodity cycles at scale, or if management initiated a material return-of-capital program that lifted the cash yield above 4% without sacrificing the growth runway. Sustained earnings CAGR above 15% for three years would also force a re-rating of the terminal assumptions. Until then the stock is a superb asset at a speculative price.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
TPL is a Permian Basin land/royalty owner with structurally extraordinary economics: FY2025 revenue $798.2M, operating margin 74.2%, net income $481.4M, and FCF $545.9M (FCF/revenue ~68%). Earnings quality is clean — OCF/NI 1.05x, accruals -1.5% of assets, Altman Z of 97.5 reflects a virtually unlevered balance sheet. Liquid cash of $144.8M against zero net debt on a business throwing off half a billion of FCF means survival math is not a live question at any oil price short of catastrophic. The reported 72.7% diluted share CAGR is almost certainly a mechanical artifact of TPL's 3-for-1 stock split (shares moved from ~7.7M in 2023 to 23.0M in 2024 to 69.0M in 2025 — that is 3x then 3x, split math, not issuance). SBC is only 1.9% of revenue and buybacks are 4x SBC, so per-share value is being protected, not eroded. Revenue has grown from $451M (2021) to $798M (2025) with operating margin holding in the 74-84% range across the cycle — the moat is the deeded Permian surface/mineral acreage itself, which is irreplaceable. Insider tape shows Horizon Kinetics (a large long-term holder) accumulating daily in small lots, which is a steady vote of confidence rather than a signal.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Confirm the 2024 and 2025 diluted share counts reflect the 3-for-1 stock split rather than real issuance (10-K share history)
- Segment mix: royalty revenue vs water services vs surface leases — durability differs across segments
- Customer/operator concentration on the acreage (which E&Ps drive the royalty stream)
- Buyback authorization and pace vs SBC to confirm per-share protection continues
- Water services segment capital intensity and margin trajectory
The e2e composite fair value of $100 and signal-adjusted $107 imply -71% downside, but those methods (EPV floor $79, anchored P/E $122) almost certainly under-weight TPL's optionality on surface/water royalties and irreplaceable acreage — treat them as a floor, not gospel. Still, even generously adjusting the deserved value upward for Fortress-tier quality (74% op margins, no debt, monopoly acreage), a defensible range lands roughly $150-220, well below the $374 print. At $25.8B market cap on a business earning under $500M net income, the market is paying ~50x+ for a commodity-linked royalty stream whose top line moves with Permian rig count and realized prices. The bull case (perpetual Permian growth, expanding water/surface tolls) is the consensus already embedded in price; the bear case (capex discipline, water reuse tech, oil price mean-reversion) is not discounted at all. This is a wonderful business at a price that requires everything to keep going right — the classic 'quality tax' situation where the gap between price and deserved value is wide despite the underlying asset being genuinely special. Margin of safety is negative.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Permian rig count and TPL royalty volume trajectory in latest 10-Q
- water services segment growth and pricing durability
- management commentary on operator capex outlook for 2025
- any surface-use revenue diversification (solar, data centers, carbon) that would raise deserved value
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 14.9, S&P near highs) but TPL's 0.63 beta means the market vector barely touches it either way. What actually moves this name is the Permian royalty narrative, and that story is in an interesting spot: intensity is strong and the cult coefficient is medium, which has kept the stock levitating at a 250% premium to a DCF-based fair value. That is a durable tailwind while operator capex holds and Permian volumes grind higher, but it is also the kind of setup where any crack in the story (water-reuse tech, operator discipline, an oil rollover) gets punished disproportionately because the price embeds perfection.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any operator capex guide-downs from major Permian E&Ps in upcoming prints
- Oil price action - a break below key support would strain the royalty narrative
- News on water-reuse or synthetic frac fluid adoption that undercuts the water-services leg
- Sell-side target revisions or a downgrade cluster that signals analyst tone rolling over
- Sector-fund flows into/out of energy royalties and MLP-adjacent names
Macro backdrop is a headwind: 10y at 4.73 with a 0.39 curve raises the discount on long-duration land/royalty cash flows and tightens operator capital budgets. Global oil demand growth is modest and OPEC+ spare capacity caps upside price scenarios, so the world is unlikely to hand TPL a price-led boom; conversely, US shale remains the marginal barrel and the Permian is the last basin with meaningful core inventory, so activity does not vanish. The genuinely new world vector is West Texas power/land demand (data centers, transmission, renewables) intersecting TPL's surface ownership — an optionality that did not exist a cycle ago and is not commodity-linked.
When we made this prediction on Sep 1, 2026, TPL was $366.73. We expect it to be $322.00 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $200.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 1, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.