Business Description
Trimble Inc. develops and supplies technology solutions globally, empowering professionals and field workers to significantly improve or revolutionize their operational workflows. Through its Buildings and Infrastructure segment, the company delivers a comprehensive array of digital tools for the construction sector. This includes software for route planning, 3D design, and data exchange, along with systems for guiding construction machinery and for monitoring and managing assets, personnel, and equipment. The segment also offers advanced Building Information Modeling (BIM), Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), and project management platforms. Furthermore, it provides integrated solutions for site layout, measurement, cost estimation, scheduling, and project control, alongside specialized applications tailored for subcontractors and various trades. The Geospatial segment focuses on advanced surveying products, geographic information systems (GIS), and related geospatial technologies. For the Resources and Utilities sector, Trimble provides precision agriculture products and services. These encompass sophisticated guidance and positioning systems, autonomous steering capabilities, and automated, variable-rate application technologies. The offerings also include manual and automated navigation for farm equipment, solutions for automating pesticide and seeding processes, water management systems, and agricultural software designed for data and operational insights. Finally, the Transportation segment caters to the long-haul trucking and freight shipping industries. Its offerings span comprehensive mobility solutions such as route optimization, safety and compliance tools, end-to-end vehicle management, video intelligence, and supply chain communication platforms. Additionally, it delivers advanced fleet and transportation management systems, powerful analytics, mapping, reporting, and predictive modeling capabilities. Initially known as Trimble Navigation Limited, the company adopted its current name, Trimble Inc., in October 2016. Established in 1978, it maintains its headquarters in Sunnyvale, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 21, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:00am (6d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.77
Total Equity: $5.84B
Shares: 239,800,000
Total Debt: $1.39B
Cash: $253.40M
EBITDA: $763.70M
Total Debt: $1.39B
Cash: $253.40M
Revenue: $3.59B
Revenue: $3.59B
Revenue: $3.59B
Total Equity: $5.84B
Tax Rate: 16.8%
Equity: $5.84B
Total Debt: $1.39B
Cash: $253.40M
Current Liabilities: $1.50B
Long-Term Debt: $1.39B
Total Debt: $1.39B
Total Equity: $5.84B
Shares: 239,800,000
Shares: 239,800,000
CapEx: -$253.00M
Shares: 239,800,000
Stock Price: $49.16
Net Income: $424.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Trimble looks like a genuine mature_earner with improving business mix. Gross margin has expanded materially from 55.6% (2021) to 68.3% (2026), and operating margin recovered to 16.9% in 2026 after dipping to 11.8% in 2023 — consistent with a shift toward higher-quality software/subscription revenue. Earnings quality is clean: accruals just 1% of assets, OCF/NI at 1.12x, Beneish M at -2.27, and Altman Z of 3.1 (safe zone). The 2025 net income of $1.50B is an obvious divestiture/one-time spike and should be disregarded as normalized earnings; 2026's $424M is the more honest figure.
Capital discipline is a genuine strength: diluted shares declined from 254.3M to 239.8M (-1.5% CAGR), and buybacks ran at 252% of SBC, meaning management is actually concentrating per-share value rather than papering over comp with dilution. SBC at 4.1% of revenue is reasonable for the sector. The blemishes: revenue is flat-to-declining ($3.66B → $3.59B over five years), net debt sits at -$1.14B against only $253M liquid cash (2.2% of mkt cap), and FCF dropped sharply to $133M in 2026 from $498M the prior year — a swing that demands scrutiny. Insider tape shows only routine awards and tax withholdings, no open-market conviction either way.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Cause of FCF drop from $498M to $133M in 2026 — working capital, restructuring cash outflows, or pension/tax payments?
- Confirm 2025 net income includes divestiture gain (likely the agriculture JV/sale) and what normalized earnings power is post-portfolio reshuffle
- Recurring/ARR mix as % of revenue and growth rate — the GM expansion thesis hinges on software transition being durable
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants given $1.14B net debt position
- Customer concentration in Construction & Geospatial segments
- Whether revenue decline reflects divestitures (apples-to-apples) or true organic softness
Trimble trades at ~$11.5B market cap on a business that has clean earnings quality, expanding gross margins, and recurring SaaS mix — but flat revenue and net debt. On rough heuristics (mid-teens EV/EBITDA, ~25–28x earnings for a quality compounder with no top-line growth), deserved value clusters in the mid-$40s to low-$50s. $49.16 sits squarely inside that band. The e2e synthesis calling this 'disconnected from fundamentals' is unhelpful without a direction; given flat revenue, I'd lean toward the market having already correctly priced the quality-without-growth profile.
What's priced in: continued margin expansion, successful SaaS transition, and eventual return to mid-single-digit growth. That's a reasonable — not heroic — bar, but it leaves little margin of safety. For this to be a clear buy on valuation, I'd want either (a) a visible revenue inflection that isn't yet in numbers, or (b) a 15–20% price drawdown to create a real cushion against the cyclical construction-capex bear case. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted; the business deserves its multiple, but it isn't being given away.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance for organic revenue growth — any inflection above flat changes the deserved multiple materially
- ARR / recurring revenue mix and growth rate vs total revenue — the SaaS transition pace
- Segment detail on construction software vs hardware exposure to gauge cyclical sensitivity
- Net debt trajectory and capital allocation between buybacks and deleveraging
- Any one-time items in the recent margin expansion to confirm it's structural
The narrative engine here is essentially idle. Trimble carries a 'steady-compounder' archetype with minimal intensity and low cult coefficient, meaning there is no momentum crowd bidding it up and no short narrative actively de-rating it. That is unusual for a 1.37-beta tech-hardware hybrid: the name should be moving, but the story is too quiet to generate flow either direction. In a neutral tape (VIX 17, S&P just 1.8% off highs), that quietness becomes the dominant feature - TRMB drifts. Analyst tone is the one clear tailwind: 17 Buys vs 1 Sell and a $90.5 target against a $49 tape implies roughly 85% upside in the sell-side model, yet zero revisions this month. That is a classic stale-Buy setup - covered, liked, but not being actively pushed. Against that, macro is a soft headwind: 10y at 4.46% pressures all equities, and TRMB's construction-capex exposure plus 1.37 beta means a risk-off flinch would hit it harder than the tape suggests. News flow is absent, momentum is flat (-2.8% CAGR), and the stock is doing nothing because nobody is telling a story about it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether construction-capex commentary in upcoming peer earnings shifts the bear narrative from dormant to active
- Any sell-side target cut - the first revision in a stale-Buy book often triggers cascade
- VIX break above 20 or S&P drawdown past 5% - would expose the 1.37 beta with no narrative shield
- Emergence of an AI-in-construction angle that could re-rate the compounder story upward
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:07am (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.7B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.7B | $3.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.6B | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.1B |
| Gross Profit | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.5B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.8B |
| Operating Income | $561.0M | $510.9M | $448.8M | $460.7M | $607.5M |
| Net Income | $492.8M | $449.7M | $311.3M | $1.5B | $424.0M |
| EBITDA | $819.9M | $747.4M | $768.6M | $2.3B | $763.7M |
| EPS | $1.96 | $1.81 | $1.26 | $6.13 | $1.77 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:02am (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $325.7M | $271.0M | $229.8M | $738.8M | $253.4M |
| Total Current Assets | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.3B | $1.6B |
| Total Assets | $7.1B | $7.3B | $9.5B | $9.5B | $9.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.2B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.3B | $1.2B | $2.5B | $1.4B | $1.4B |
| Total Liabilities | $3.2B | $3.2B | $5.0B | $3.7B | $3.5B |
| Total Equity | $3.9B | $4.1B | $4.5B | $5.7B | $5.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.2B | $2.2B | $2.4B | $3.8B | $3.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:07am (6d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $750.5M | $391.2M | $597.1M | $531.4M | $386.2M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$46.1M | -$43.2M | -$42.0M | -$33.6M | -$253.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $704.4M | $348.0M | $555.1M | $497.8M | $133.2M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$168.8M | -$158.1M | -$2.1B | -$22.0M | -$8.8M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$195.1M | -$408.3M | -$100.0M | -$181.5M | -$863.4M |
| Net Change in Cash | $88.0M | -$54.7M | -$32.1M | $508.9M | -$494.4M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:00am (6d ago)| Metric | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$3.6B $3.6B – $3.6B
|
$3.9B $3.8B – $3.9B
|
$4.2B $4.2B – $4.2B
|
$4.6B $4.6B – $4.7B
|
| EBITDA |
$1.1B $1.0B – $1.1B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.3B
|
$1.4B $1.4B – $1.4B
|
| Net Income |
$741.1M $738.7M – $743.5M
|
$861.6M $853.1M – $870.0M
|
$984.8M $963.0M – $1.0B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.2B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:07am (6d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +0.5% | +3.3% | -3.0% | -2.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +3.5% | +10.8% | +2.7% | +2.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -8.9% | -12.2% | +2.7% | +31.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -8.7% | -30.8% | +383.3% | -71.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -8.8% | +2.8% | +203.0% | -67.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 3:06am (6d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-17 | Gabriel Kaigham | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $50.78 | $201,800 |
| 2026-06-17 | Gabriel Kaigham | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | Lloyd Meaghan | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $50.78 | $201,800 |
| 2026-06-17 | Lloyd Meaghan | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | EKHOLM BORJE | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $50.78 | $201,800 |
| 2026-06-17 | EKHOLM BORJE | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | SPRAGUE KARA LYNN | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $50.78 | $201,800 |
| 2026-06-17 | SPRAGUE KARA LYNN | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | Sweet Thomas W | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $50.78 | $201,800 |
| 2026-06-17 | Sweet Thomas W | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | Wibergh Johan | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $50.78 | $201,800 |
| 2026-06-17 | Wibergh Johan | F-InKind | 265.00 | $50.78 | $13,457 |
| 2026-06-17 | Wibergh Johan | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-17 | Nersesian Ronald S. | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $50.78 | $201,800 |
| 2026-06-17 | Nersesian Ronald S. | M-Exempt | 3,974.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Sweet Thomas W | A-Award | 4,725.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Wibergh Johan | A-Award | 4,725.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | SPRAGUE KARA LYNN | A-Award | 4,725.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Gabriel Kaigham | A-Award | 4,725.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-26 | Nersesian Ronald S. | A-Award | 4,725.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly print first: revenue went $840.6M → $875.7M → $901.2M → $969.8M → $939.9M across the last five quarters, with NI margins climbing from 7.9% to 16.1% before settling at 10.5%. That is a real sequential acceleration, not a mirage — and the prior models that lean on "revenue decline" are anchoring on annual comparisons distorted by the 2024 Agriculture JV divestiture (which also explains the $1.32B NI quarter in mid-2024 and the $1.50B FY2025 net income). Strip that out and you have a smaller, higher-margin Trimble growing the remaining base at a mid-single-digit pace with gross margin at 68.3% versus 55.6% five years ago. That's a genuine mix shift toward software, not just accounting theater.
Where I disagree with the synthesis: calling this "Disconnected from Fundamentals" and a "value trap" overweights the headline -2.8% revenue CAGR and the -51% FCF CAGR without adjusting for the divestiture. FY2026 operating income of $607.5M on $3.59B (16.9% op margin) versus FY2021's $561M on $3.66B (15.3%) shows the remaining business is structurally more profitable. EV/EBITDA of 15.4x and P/S of 5.2x for a 68% gross margin software-transitioning business with accelerating quarterly revenue is not obviously expensive — it's roughly in line with mid-quality industrial software peers (PTC, Bentley trade materially richer at 25-40x EBITDA). The market-forces model's "painful portfolio transition" framing is directionally right but the conclusion is too bearish given that the transition is now visible in the quarterly numbers, not just promised.
That said, the contrarian case is real and the bulls (including me, tentatively) need to respect it. FCF of $133.2M against $424M net income is a 31% conversion ratio — terrible for a supposed software business, and the $253M capex line is heavy for an asset-light narrative. ROIC of 7.1% and ROE of 7.95% are mediocre and don't justify a premium multiple regardless of gross margin optics. The current ratio of 1.09 with only $253M cash is thin for a company that's been acquisitive. Insider activity is entirely awards and tax-withholding — no open-market buying despite a 44% drawdown from highs, which is a quiet tell. And construction-tech end markets genuinely are cyclically exposed; if 2026 commercial construction rolls over, the accelerating revenue trend reverses fast. The narrative engine's "steady-compounder, minimal speculative premium" read is the most honest of the prior outputs — this isn't a story stock, it's a fundamentals stock, which means you actually have to underwrite the cash flow conversion.
My verdict: the synthesis is too negative because it's mechanically reading divestiture-distorted annuals. But the bull case is also weaker than the gross margin headline suggests because FCF conversion is the actual problem and ROIC is unimpressive. At $49.16 and ~15x EV/EBITDA, you're paying a fair-to-slightly-cheap price for a business whose Q1'26 revenue grew ~12% YoY ($939.9M vs $840.6M) with margins normalizing in the 10-16% range. If FCF conversion recovers toward 60-70% of NI over the next two prints — call it $260-300M FCF run rate — fair value is closer to $60-65 on a 20x FCF multiple. If FCF stays sub-$200M, the value-trap thesis wins and fair value is $40-45. The split is genuinely binary and the next two quarterly FCF prints decide it. I'd take a starter position here, not a full one, and explicitly dissent from the "Disconnected from Fundamentals" verdict — the disconnect is in the prior models' refusal to normalize for divestitures.
GPT Critique
In examining Trimble Inc.'s recent performance, a few key points stand out to me from the raw data. The company has seen a sequential revenue increase from $840.6M in early 2025 to $939.9M in early 2026, with net income margins showing significant fluctuations, peaking at 16.1% in early 2026 before receding to 10.5%. This pattern suggests a company experiencing genuine improvement in operational efficiency rather than merely benefiting from one-off events. However, the free cash flow (FCF) of $133.2M compared to a net income of $424M indicates a concerningly low FCF conversion rate, which underscores potential issues in cash management or capital allocation.
Opus's analysis emphasizes the transformation narrative of Trimble, highlighting the margin expansion from 55.6% to 68.3% over five years as evidence of a successful shift towards a higher-margin software model. I concur with Opus that this shift appears genuine and is not merely an accounting exercise. However, I diverge from the Delvantic AI Findings' outlook that classifies Trimble as a "Disconnected from Fundamentals" value trap. While the -2.8% revenue CAGR and -51% FCF CAGR are alarming, these figures are indeed skewed by the 2024 divestiture. The recent quarterly performance suggests a more profitable core business with a 16.9% operating margin compared to 15.3% in 2021.
Where I align with Opus is in the valuation of Trimble. At an EV/EBITDA of 15.4x and a P/S ratio of 5.2x, the company is not egregiously priced relative to its gross margin and sector peers. However, I am skeptical of Opus's $58-62 fair value assessment. Given the low FCF conversion and heavy capex, I would argue that the fair value is likely closer to $50-55, contingent upon improvement in FCF conversion rates. The insider transactions, primarily award-based, and the thin current ratio of 1.09 with limited cash reserves suggest caution.
A careful skeptic might challenge both Opus's and my views by arguing that the positive narrative around the software transition overlooks potential cyclicality in Trimble's end markets. The macroeconomic headwinds and the inherent volatility in construction spending could undermine revenue stability. Additionally, the modest ROIC and ROE figures do not inspire confidence in Trimble's ability to generate high returns on reinvested earnings, which could cap upside potential.