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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for T. Rowe Price Group Inc. (TROW) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-07): Designation Watch · Gem Score +11 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 28 · Value -1 · Sentiment -9 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $104.39 vs $109.38 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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T. Rowe Price Group Inc.
TROW NASDAQT. Rowe Price Group Inc. is a global investment management company that provides a broad range of financial services to individuals, financial advisers, retirement plans, institutions, and other intermediaries. T. Rowe Price offers actively managed mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, separately managed accounts, collective investment trusts, model portfolios, and target-date retirement solutions, supported by investment advisory and recordkeeping services. The company also serves institutional clients with strategies across equity, fixed income, multi-asset, and alternative investments, while distributing products through multiple channels and investment vehicles. Based in Baltimore, Maryland, T. Rowe Price plays a significant role in retirement investing and long-term asset management, helping clients access diversified portfolios and professional portfolio management across global markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 9.24
Total Equity: $12.05B
Shares: 225,876,623
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $3.38B
EBITDA: $2.69B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $3.38B
Revenue: $7.31B
Revenue: $7.31B
Revenue: $7.31B
Total Equity: $12.05B
Tax Rate: 23.2%
Equity: $12.05B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $3.38B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $12.05B
Shares: 225,876,623
Shares: 225,876,623
CapEx: -$274.20M
Shares: 225,876,623
Stock Price: $109.38
Net Income: $2.09B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 5:28am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $7.7B | $6.5B | $6.5B | $7.1B | $7.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.0B | $2.9B | $3.3B | $3.4B | $3.6B |
| Gross Profit | $4.7B | $3.6B | $3.2B | $3.7B | $3.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $968.7M | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.3B |
| Operating Income | $3.7B | $2.5B | $2.0B | $2.5B | $2.5B |
| Net Income | $3.1B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.1B |
| EBITDA | $3.6B | $3.7B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $2.7B |
| EPS | $13.25 | $6.73 | $7.78 | $9.18 | $9.26 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $13.12 | $6.70 | $7.76 | $9.15 | $9.24 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 5:00am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.5B | $1.8B | $2.1B | $2.6B | $3.4B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $12.5B | $11.6B | $12.3B | $13.5B | $14.3B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $2.3B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $2.3B |
| Total Equity | $10.3B | $9.7B | $10.3B | $11.5B | $12.1B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 5:39am (3d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $3.5B | $2.4B | $1.2B | $1.7B | $1.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$239.1M | -$237.6M | -$307.9M | -$423.4M | -$274.2M |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.2B | $2.1B | $911.2M | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.5B | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.7B | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.1B | -$1.1B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.1B | -$849.8M | -$254.4M | -$337.2M | -$620.9M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$632.3M | $250.5M | $269.1M | $569.1M | $704.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Sep 3, 2026 5:28am (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -15.4% | -0.4% | +9.8% | +3.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -23.8% | -10.1% | +14.9% | +1.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -32.7% | -18.3% | +21.5% | +0.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -49.5% | +14.8% | +17.4% | -0.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +1.3% | -44.1% | +28.2% | +2.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 31, 2026 1:03pm (6d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-15 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-15 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-16 | $1.30 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-15 | $1.27 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-15 | $1.27 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-13 | $1.27 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $1.27 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-13 | $1.24 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-13 | $1.24 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-14 | $1.24 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-14 | $1.24 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-14 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-14 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-14 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-14 | $1.22 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-15 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-14 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-14 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-14 | $1.20 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-15 | $1.08 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-09-06 19:30A +1σ run of quarters pays -9%; a −1σ run costs 49%. Ratio -0.2:1 (μ 5.9%, σ 6.0% , 16 pairs).
Older method (repeat-worst-quarter): -0.2 : 1
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($109.38) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +10% | 33.7% | $98.20 | -10% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 29.3% | $78.86 | -28% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 24.9% | $62.34 | -43% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 22.9% | $63.26 | -42% |
| Upside — a +1σ run of quarters (v2) | +12% | 32.1% | $100.07 | -9% |
| Stress — a −1σ run of quarters (v2) | -0% | 24.6% | $55.76 | -49% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-09-03 05:49The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw tape first: TROW is doing $7.31B TTM-ish revenue with the last four quarters running $1.76B → $1.93B → $1.86B → $1.91B — that's not decelerating, that's plateauing around $1.9B with a modest step-up from the 2024 base of $1.79B/quarter. Net income is noisier ($445M-$646M) driven by mark-to-market on seed capital and performance fees, not operational deterioration. The 33% Q2'26 margin is real but flattered; the 23-27% Q4/Q1 prints are the underlying reality. Annualizing FY25 at $2.09B NI against a $23.3B cap gives 11.2x earnings with a 4.7% yield and $3.38B cash, zero debt. FCF of $1.48B against $23.3B is a 6.3% FCF yield. This is not a broken business — it's a boring one being priced like it's melting, and it isn't melting yet.
The prior models are internally inconsistent and I'd push back on the synthesis. The DCF composite says $126-$130 fair value (+15%), Market Forces says "neutral, lacks catalysts," and Narrative says "defensive not visionary." You can't hold all three with equal weight — either the 15% discount is a real mispricing (buy) or it's the correct discount for a structurally declining fee base (fair). I lean toward the latter being closer to right but for a reason none of the models emphasized: TROW's AUM is levered to equity markets at what appear to be cycle-high valuations. If the S&P draws down 20%, TROW's revenue drops ~15% and NI drops ~25% because the cost base is sticky. The 11.8x P/E is not a discount — it's appropriate for a business whose earnings have embedded beta to peak-ish index levels. The 2021 revenue peak of $7.67B and $3.08B NI was a bull-market artifact TROW has never recovered, and won't until the next bubble.
The contrarian bull case the models undersell: net flows have stabilized at less-bad levels, the target-date retirement franchise (~$470B+) is genuinely sticky and defensible against passive because it's a wrapper business not a stock-picking business, and management has been buying back stock and raising the dividend for 38 straight years. If active management's death has been exaggerated — and Bridgewater/Blackstone/Ares valuations suggest the market pays up for active in other wrappers — TROW at 7.5x EV/EBITDA is cheap. The contrarian bear case the models undersell: the 10K insider sale on 2026-08-25 against only token award grants is not "neutral" — insiders don't sell 10K shares of a stock they think is 15% undervalued. And the recent earnings YoY of -0.6% against 3.1% revenue growth means margins are compressing at the incremental dollar, which is exactly what the fee-pressure bears predict.
My read: the synthesis "fair value with +15% upside to $126" is directionally too bullish because it doesn't stress-test the AUM/market-level dependency. My fair value is $105-$115, essentially where it trades. I dissent from the "undervalued by 15%" framing and land on genuinely fair-valued with an asymmetric downside if equity markets correct. The 4.7% yield with 55% payout ratio is well-covered and gives you a floor, but the upside case requires either (a) a value-style rotation that re-rates asset managers as a group, or (b) a genuine AUM inflection, neither visible in the data. I'd own this for the dividend in a taxable income sleeve, not as a total-return idea. Below $95 it becomes interesting; above $120 it's a sell. At $109 it's dead money with a coupon.
GPT Reading
T. Rowe Price looks cheaper than its reputation problem, but not cheap enough to be a clear bargain. The business is still throwing off very solid economics: 2025 revenue was $7.31B, operating income $2.48B, net income $2.09B, with 28.5% net margin, 17.3% ROE, 21.9% ROIC, no debt, and $3.38B of cash. At $23.3B market cap, that is only 11.8x earnings, 7.5x EV/EBITDA, and a 4.7% dividend yield with a 54.8% payout ratio. For a debt-free franchise with recurring fee revenue, those are not demanding numbers. The quarterly pattern is also better than the “declining active manager” caricature: revenue has moved from $1.72B in 2025 Q2 to $1.91B in 2026 Q2, up about 11% over four quarters, while net income in the latest quarter hit $632M versus $505M a year earlier, pushing margin from 29.3% to 33.1%.
What stands out to me is that the annual numbers understate the current earnings run-rate. The last four quarters sum to about $7.59B of revenue and roughly $2.22B of net income, above reported 2025 levels. Even if I haircut that for market sensitivity and quarter-to-quarter volatility, the business today is not earning like a melting ice cube. On the current market cap, that trailing quarterly run-rate implies closer to 10.5x earnings. Free cash flow of $1.48B on the 2025 statement gives a 6.3% FCF yield, and with no leverage the equity is not financially fragile. The multiple says the market expects either stagnant AUM, persistent fee compression, or both. That skepticism is understandable, but the observed data here show stabilization and modest improvement, not ongoing collapse.
The main reason I stop short of calling it outright undervalued is that this is still a market-beta business wearing a quality multiple. Revenue rose from $6.46B in 2023 to $7.31B in 2025, but that only slightly surpasses the $7.67B generated back in 2021. Net income is more telling: $2.09B in 2025 remains far below the $3.08B peak in 2021, and operating income of $2.48B is nowhere near 2021’s $3.71B. So while current valuation screens cheap against present earnings, those earnings are partly a function of favorable markets rather than clear structural growth. This is not an industrial compounding off unit growth; it is an asset manager whose fee base can look healthy right up until markets or flows turn. A price/sales ratio of 3.38x is not expensive, but it is not distressed either for a business with limited long-term top-line certainty.
The best counterargument to my cautious stance is simple: this may already be the exact sort of high-quality cyclical compounder investors should buy when sentiment is stuck on secular decline. The company has rebuilt revenue from the 2023 trough, preserved operating income at $2.48B in both 2024 and 2025 despite industry fee pressure, and has now posted two straight quarters near or above $1.9B of revenue. If the latest $632M quarter is closer to normal than exceptional, then the market is paying a low-teens multiple for a debt-free franchise with strong brand equity, durable retirement exposure, and a near-5% yield. Against that, the model-derived fair value around the mid-$120s is not crazy. A smart bull would also note that free cash flow has held up better than accounting earnings and that the balance sheet gives TROW optionality for buybacks, acquisitions, or simply dividend durability through downturns.
What would change my mind in either direction is pretty concrete. I would turn more bullish if the next two quarters sustain revenue above $1.9B and net margins around 30%+, because that would validate that earnings power has reset above $2.2B annually and make $125-$135 look reasonable. I would also want evidence that 2025-2026 strength is not just market lift by seeing operating income break clearly above the $2.48B plateau on an annual basis. Conversely, I would get more negative if revenue slips back toward the $1.75B-$1.80B quarterly range or if margins retreat into the mid-20s, because that would confirm the market’s fear that this is just a good tape temporarily masking structural fee and flow pressure.
Grok Reading
T. Rowe Price at $109.38 is a high-quality cash compounder being priced like a business in gentle decline, and the numbers do not fully support that pessimism. Revenue has climbed from the $6.46–6.49B trough in 2022–23 back to $7.31B in 2025, with the two most recent quarters at $1.86B and $1.91B—above the year-ago run-rate—while trailing net income holds near $2.09B. That is essentially flat versus 2024’s $2.10B, yet still produces a 28.5% net margin, 33.9% operating margin, and $1.48B of free cash flow against only $274M of capex. Zero debt, $3.38B of cash, 17.3% ROE and 21.9% ROIC on a clean equity base of $12.05B is not the profile of a melting franchise; it is a fortress balance sheet throwing off a 4.7% dividend at a sustainable 55% payout. At 11.8x earnings, 7.5x EV/EBITDA and 2.05x book, the market is embedding low-single-digit growth or mild secular erosion—yet the multi-year revenue CAGR of 6.4% and FCF CAGR of 27.4% already exceed that embedded expectation, and the stock sits roughly 15% below the composite intrinsic anchors near $126–130.
What stands out most is the gap between the structural narrative and the recent operating tape. Margins are volatile quarter to quarter—23% to 34% net—because performance fees and market marks swing, but the annual picture has stabilized: operating income held flat at $2.48B in both 2024 and 2025 even as revenue rose modestly, implying cost discipline is offsetting fee pressure. The 2021 peak ($7.67B revenue, $3.08B NI, nearly 50% operating margin) remains a distant high-water mark, so the recovery is incomplete; however, calling the franchise broken when it still converts more than 20% of revenue into FCF and funds a multi-decade dividend streak is an overreach. Insider flow is noise—routine awards plus one 10k-share sale—and does not signal distress. The decelerating quarterly revenue trend (recent yoy only +3.1%, earnings yoy –0.6%) is the legitimate soft spot, not a collapse.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward and must be weighed seriously. Active equity management remains in structural retreat; passive vehicles continue to siphon flows, and TROW’s fee rate has nowhere to go but sideways-to-down. Earnings are still roughly one-third below the 2021 peak, recent organic momentum is soft, and the business retains high operating leverage to equity markets—any sustained risk-off period will hit AUM, fees, and performance income simultaneously. Macro headwinds are flagged explicitly, and the valuation models themselves disagree, with the synthesis cautioning that the market may already be pricing more growth than the firm can deliver. A smart bear argues the 15% discount to DCF is thin insurance against another leg of fee compression or a 2022-style AUM drawdown, and that 11.8x is cheap only if earnings power holds; if NI drifts back toward the $1.6–1.8B zone, the multiple is not a bargain.
I still side with modest undervaluation because the balance-sheet fortress, FCF coverage, and already-compressed multiple provide asymmetric downside protection that the bear case underweights, while the bull case needs no heroic re-rating—only stability. My mind would change on two concrete paths: four consecutive quarters of negative organic AUM growth paired with net margins compressing through 25%, or a full-year NI print below $1.8B, would flip me to fairly valued or worse; conversely, a return to mid-single-digit organic inflows and operating margins sustained above 36% would justify a move toward the mid-$130s and raise conviction materially.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
T. Rowe Price is a self-funding mature earner: $3.38B liquid cash against zero debt (net cash equals gross cash), $1.48B FCF in 2025, and an Altman Z of 7.2 in the safe zone. Earnings quality is clean - OCF/NI of 0.99x and accruals at 0% of assets say reported net income is backed by cash. Per-share value is being concentrated: diluted share count fell from 235.0M (2021) to 225.9M (2025), SBC is a modest 3% of revenue, and buybacks run 248% of SBC. The business quality issue is the profitability reset, not survival. Revenue fell from $7.67B (2021) to a $6.46B trough (2023) and has recovered to $7.31B (2025), but gross margin compressed from 61% to 51.3% and operating margin from 48.4% to 33.9% - and neither has re-expanded despite revenue recovery. Net income at $2.09B is roughly two-thirds of the 2021 $3.08B peak. This is characteristic of an active manager pressured by fee compression and passive competition; AUM-driven revenue re-based to a lower economic equilibrium. Insider activity is neutral-to-slightly-negative (one $1.1M sale, otherwise routine awards), and there is no forensic red flag. This is a solidly healthy, durable franchise in a structurally challenged industry - fortress-like on the balance sheet, but with a moat that is visibly narrowing rather than widening.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- AUM trend and net flows by year - are outflows continuing and in which asset classes?
- Fee rate (revenue/average AUM) trajectory to confirm structural vs. mix-driven margin compression
- Compensation and G&A as % of revenue - is the operating margin drop cost inflation or fee erosion?
- Composition of the $3.38B cash and any seed/co-investment obligations that reduce truly discretionary cash
- Dividend coverage and payout ratio sustainability given lower earnings base
- Any strategic pivots (ETFs, alternatives, OHA integration performance) that could stabilize the fee mix
The composite fair value of $129.68 and signal-adjusted $126.01 imply roughly 15% upside from $109.38 - a real but not screaming gap. The method spread is wide and telling: DCF pegs deserved value at $61.65 and EPV floor at $76.44, while the anchored P/E prints $318.96 - clearly a runaway on trailing multiples applied to depressed forward earnings, and I discount it heavily. Splitting the difference more skeptically, the honest deserved value sits somewhere in the $95-$125 zone depending on how much you believe active AUM stabilizes. That puts today's price near the low end of fair, not deeply cheap. What's priced in: continued fee compression, slow-bleed outflows from active equity, and no margin recovery to 2021 peaks. What's NOT required to justify $109: heroic growth, market beta tailwinds, or a passive reversal. That asymmetry - a Strong-quality, cash-rich, buyback-supported business trading where the bear case is largely embedded - is what nudges this from Fair to Modestly Cheap. Earnings quality is good (no haircut needed), which lets the deserved value hold rather than erode.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Net flow trend by asset class (active equity outflows vs target-date/fixed-income inflows)
- Fee rate trajectory and any incremental fee cuts
- Operating margin guidance and expense discipline
- Capital return pace - buyback authorization use and dividend coverage
- OHA/alternatives AUM growth and fee contribution
The market tape is mildly constructive (regime +19, VIX 15.2, S&P just 1.7% off highs) but TROW's 1.48 beta means any risk-off flare would hit it harder than the average financial. Right now the tape is calm, so beta is not doing much damage. The active narrative is a low-intensity, durable 'steady compounder' story with a defensive tilt, and recent flow (dividend-aristocrat features, safe-yield rotation as tech cools) is quietly pulling capital toward exactly this profile. That is a modest tailwind, not a mania. Cult coefficient is low, so there is no story-premium to unwind either. Against that, the structural passive-vs-active narrative remains an ever-present overhang on the whole active-manager cohort - it is not intensifying in the news flow, but it never leaves. News items are benign to slightly positive: the PensionBee rollover-IRA integration is a small distribution win, TROW economists get airtime on Bloomberg (brand tailwind), and TROW keeps appearing on 'safe dividend' screens. No target-revision or analyst-tone shock is visible. Net: the forces roughly cancel, with a faint lean toward defensive rotation support offset by the always-on passive headwind and macro rate pressure on a high-beta name.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Monthly AUM/flow prints - any acceleration in net outflows would reactivate the passive-decline narrative
- VIX break above 20 or S&P drawdown past 5% - would amplify the 1.48 beta headwind
- Any sell-side downgrade or target cut on active-manager cohort peers (BEN, IVZ) as a read-through
- Rotation persistence - whether 'safe dividend' flows into financials hold if tech rebounds
Two forces cut against each other. Tailwind: retirement contributions, target-date defaults and the intergenerational wealth transfer keep pushing savings dollars into managed vehicles, and asset managers are one of the few financial businesses that need no incremental capital to capture them. Headwind: the vehicle preference has permanently shifted — the fee a dollar of assets earns keeps falling, which is exactly why industry revenue grows 5.7% while industry earnings fall 11.2%. Add a 4.79% 10-year and a flagged macro headwind: high risk-free rates cap multiple expansion in equities (the AUM base) and give savers a cash alternative. The honest structural read is a business whose asset base can keep growing while its revenue per asset declines — leaving earnings power roughly flat, with market direction as the swing factor.
When we made this prediction on Sep 3, 2026, TROW was $110.03. We expect it to be $116.50 by Mar 2027, and we consider it great value under $95.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Sep 3, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.