Business Description
Tesla, Inc. operates globally, specializing in the creation, production, and distribution of electric vehicles, alongside comprehensive energy generation and storage solutions. Its market reach extends across the United States, China, and various other international regions. The company's operations are primarily divided into two main segments: its Automotive business and its Energy Generation and Storage division. Within its Automotive division, Tesla not only provides a range of electric cars but also generates revenue from selling automotive regulatory credits. This segment further encompasses a variety of post-sale services, including non-warranty vehicle support, sales of pre-owned vehicles, various retail products, and car insurance offerings. Customers can acquire Tesla's sedans and sport utility vehicles through direct sales, purchases of used vehicles, or via in-app upgrades often facilitated by the extensive Tesla Supercharger network. The company supports these acquisitions with financing and leasing options. Furthermore, it ensures vehicle upkeep through its proprietary service centers and a fleet of mobile technicians, complemented by both standard and extended vehicle warranty programs. The Energy Generation and Storage segment focuses on the development, manufacturing, setup, sale, and rental of solar power systems and energy storage products, along with associated services. This caters to a diverse clientele, spanning residential users, commercial enterprises, industrial entities, and public utilities. Distribution channels include Tesla's online platform, physical stores, galleries, and a network of collaborative partners. The company also offers servicing and repairs for its energy products, including warranty support, and provides multiple financing avenues for those investing in its solar solutions. Founded in 2003, the corporation was initially named Tesla Motors, Inc., before officially rebranding to Tesla, Inc. in February 2017. Its corporate headquarters are situated in Austin, Texas.
Business History
Generated: May 17, 2026 4:11pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:07am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.18
Total Equity: $82.14B
Shares: 3,528,000,000
Total Debt: $8.38B
Cash: $16.51B
EBITDA: $11.76B
Total Debt: $8.38B
Cash: $16.51B
Revenue: $94.83B
Revenue: $94.83B
Revenue: $94.83B
Total Equity: $82.14B
Tax Rate: 27.0%
Equity: $82.14B
Total Debt: $8.38B
Cash: $16.51B
Current Liabilities: $31.71B
Long-Term Debt: $6.74B
Total Debt: $8.38B
Total Equity: $82.14B
Shares: 3,528,000,000
Shares: 3,528,000,000
CapEx: -$8.53B
Shares: 3,528,000,000
Stock Price: $379.71
Net Income: $3.79B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Tesla's balance-sheet and earnings-integrity picture is genuinely elite: $44.1B liquid cash, $35.7B net cash, Altman Z of 16.88, Beneish M of -2.45, accruals -5% of assets, and OCF/NI of 2.02x. FCF is positive every year ($6.22B in 2025) so the business self-funds, and diluted share count growth of ~1%/yr with SBC at 3% of revenue is disciplined for a company of this profile. No mechanical red flags in the accounting. The operating trajectory, however, is deteriorating sharply. Revenue stalled ($81.5B to $97.7B to $94.8B), gross margin compressed from 25.6% (2022) to 18.0% (2025), operating margin collapsed from 16.8% to 4.6%, and net income fell from $15.0B (2023) to $3.79B (2025) - a 75% drawdown. The auto business is clearly under price/volume pressure and operating leverage is working in reverse. Capital allocation and insider behavior are mixed-to-positive: zero buybacks despite the cash pile, and the big Musk 'M-Exempt' line items are option exercises (not open-market conviction buys), while routine executive selling continues. The quality verdict hinges on whether one believes the narrative-platform optionality (AI, robotaxi, energy) justifies the core-auto margin erosion - on the reported numbers alone, this is a decelerating, margin-shrinking manufacturer with a great balance sheet.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Segment-level margins: is the auto gross margin (ex-credits) still positive after the 2023-2025 price cuts, and how much of reported GM is regulatory credits?
- Energy storage and services segment growth and margin - is the mix shift offsetting auto compression?
- Capex trajectory and AI/compute spend - how much of falling op margin is investment vs core deterioration?
- Robotaxi/FSD revenue recognition and any deferred revenue release that may be flattering reported numbers
- Detail on the 304M-share Musk M-Exempt event - dilution impact, strike, and any associated comp package approval
The e2e synthesis literally tags this 'Priced for Perfection' and I agree. At $374.83 the market cap is $1.41T on a business whose operating margin has fallen from 16.8% to 4.6% and net income is down 75% from peak on flat revenue. Even crediting fortress balance sheet and clean accruals, the deserved value of the underlying auto + energy business is nowhere near a trillion-plus; the rest is an option premium on FSD, robotaxi, Optimus, and Elon. That option is not free - it is most of the price.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Auto gross margin ex-credits next quarter - is the 4.6% op margin the floor or still falling
- Robotaxi unit economics and any real revenue disclosure
- China volume and ASP trend
- FSD take-rate and deferred revenue recognition
- Energy storage segment margin trajectory - the one genuine bright spot
The tape is barely neutral (+3, VIX 18.6) but tilts macro-headwind with the 10y at 4.41%, and TSLA's 1.8 beta means any risk-off twitch lands roughly twice as hard here as on the average name. That is the single biggest non-fundamental risk: this is a high-beta, long-duration story stock priced on a narrative multiple, exactly the cohort that gets marked down first when rates bite or sentiment wobbles. Yet the market is NOT in stress, so that pressure is latent, not active. What is active is the narrative: visionary-founder, strong intensity, high cult coefficient. That is a structural tailwind unique to TSLA - the bid never fully leaves because believers treat dips as gifts, and the energy/AI/robotaxi optionality keeps re-loading the bull story. Against that, analyst tone is conspicuously lukewarm - Hold consensus, 15 Sells, zero Strong Buys, and zero revisions this month. That stasis is a quiet headwind: sell-side is not chasing the narrative, and the $450 target sits only ~20% above spot, leaving little institutional cover if the story cracks. Momentum is mixed (3y underperformance, flat CAGR) which says the cult is holding the floor but not driving fresh inflows. Net: the up-pressure from narrative roughly offsets the down-pressure from macro sensitivity and tepid analyst tone.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any Elon headline or policy/regulatory tweet that could swing intensity
- Robotaxi/FSD milestone dates that could reignite or fracture the narrative
- 10y yield breaking above 4.5% - would activate the beta-1.8 headwind hard
- First analyst downgrade or target cut after the long revision silence
- China BYD pricing news that pressures the auto-margin leg of the story
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:03am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $53.8B | $81.5B | $96.8B | $97.7B | $94.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | $40.2B | $60.6B | $79.1B | $80.2B | $77.7B |
| Gross Profit | $13.6B | $20.9B | $17.7B | $17.5B | $17.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $7.1B | $7.2B | $8.8B | $10.4B | $12.7B |
| Operating Income | $6.5B | $13.7B | $8.9B | $7.1B | $4.4B |
| Net Income | $5.5B | $12.6B | $15.0B | $7.1B | $3.8B |
| EBITDA | $9.6B | $17.7B | $14.8B | $14.7B | $11.8B |
| EPS | $1.87 | $4.02 | $4.73 | $2.23 | $1.18 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:02am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $17.6B | $16.3B | $16.4B | $16.1B | $16.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $27.1B | $40.9B | $49.6B | $58.4B | $68.6B |
| Total Assets | $62.1B | $82.3B | $106.6B | $122.1B | $137.8B |
| Current Liabilities | $19.7B | $26.7B | $28.7B | $28.8B | $31.7B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.3B | $1.0B | $2.7B | $5.5B | $6.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $30.5B | $36.4B | $43.0B | $48.4B | $54.9B |
| Total Equity | $30.2B | $44.7B | $62.6B | $72.9B | $82.1B |
| Retained Earnings | $329.0M | $12.9B | $27.9B | $35.2B | $39.0B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:02am (5d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $11.5B | $14.7B | $13.3B | $14.9B | $14.7B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$8.0B | -$7.2B | -$8.9B | -$11.3B | -$8.5B |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.5B | $7.6B | $4.4B | $3.6B | $6.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$64.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.8B | -$1.2B | $265.0M | -$152.0M | $579.0M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:00am (5h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$117.9B $104.0B – $131.0B
|
$139.3B $139.1B – $139.5B
|
$223.8B $197.7B – $266.4B
|
$237.7B $210.0B – $282.9B
|
| EBITDA |
$19.4B $17.1B – $21.6B
|
$22.9B $22.9B – $23.0B
|
$36.8B $32.5B – $43.8B
|
$39.1B $34.6B – $46.6B
|
| Net Income |
$7.1B $4.8B – $12.2B
|
$9.7B $4.6B – $18.2B
|
$22.9B $19.4B – $28.6B
|
$31.9B $27.1B – $39.8B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 22, 2026 3:03am (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +51.4% | +18.8% | +0.9% | -2.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +53.3% | -15.3% | -1.2% | -2.0% |
| Operating Income Growth | +109.4% | -34.9% | -20.4% | -38.5% |
| Net Income Growth | +127.8% | +19.2% | -52.5% | -46.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | +83.4% | -16.2% | -0.6% | -20.0% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:03am (5h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-16 | Musk Elon | M-Exempt | 303,960,630.00 | $23.34 | $7.1B |
| 2026-06-16 | Musk Elon | F-InKind | 17,531,857.00 | $404.66 | $7.1B |
| 2026-06-16 | Musk Elon | M-Exempt | 303,960,630.00 | $23.34 | $7.1B |
| 2026-06-05 | Taneja Vaibhav | M-Exempt | 6,538.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-05 | Taneja Vaibhav | M-Exempt | 6,538.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-08 | Taneja Vaibhav | S-Sale | 2,605.50 | $402.20 | $1.0M |
| 2026-05-13 | Taneja Vaibhav | M-Exempt | 2,000.00 | $18.22 | $36,440 |
| 2026-05-13 | Taneja Vaibhav | M-Exempt | 2,000.00 | $18.22 | $36,440 |
| 2026-05-13 | Taneja Vaibhav | M-Exempt | 1,000.00 | $18.44 | $18,440 |
| 2026-05-13 | Taneja Vaibhav | S-Sale | 3,000.00 | $450.00 | $1.4M |
| 2026-05-13 | Taneja Vaibhav | M-Exempt | 1,000.00 | $18.44 | $18,440 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | M-Exempt | 40,948.00 | $14.99 | $613,811 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | S-Sale | 840.00 | $369.01 | $309,968 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | S-Sale | 1,520.00 | $369.77 | $562,049 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | S-Sale | 1,275.00 | $370.93 | $472,934 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | S-Sale | 1,020.00 | $371.88 | $379,319 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | S-Sale | 619.00 | $372.82 | $230,775 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | S-Sale | 520.00 | $374.40 | $194,689 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | S-Sale | 280.00 | $375.15 | $105,042 |
| 2026-04-30 | Wilson-Thompson Kathleen | S-Sale | 1,081.00 | $376.69 | $407,201 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a story the bulls don't want printed cleanly: TTM revenue is running roughly $97.9B versus $97.7B in 2024 and $96.8B in 2023 — three years of flat-to-down topline at a company priced as a hypergrowth platform. Net income trajectory is worse: $15.0B (2023) → $7.13B (2024) → $3.79B (2025), a 75% peak-to-trough collapse. The quarterly margin walk is the real tell — 9.0% in Q4'24 collapsing to 2.1-2.2% in the two most recent quarters, with Q3'25's apparent 4.9% bounce ($28.1B rev) almost certainly distorted by EV tax-credit pull-forward demand ahead of policy expiration. Strip that and underlying auto economics are deteriorating, not stabilizing. Gross margin at 18% is structurally below what a "tech platform" needs to justify 15x sales — Ferrari runs ~50%, Apple ~45%, even BYD's gross is competitive now. At $1.43T market cap on $3.8B of net income, you're paying 376x on collapsing earnings.
The synthesis verdict of "Disconnected from Fundamentals" is directionally correct but I'd push harder on the magnitude. The pre-flight's sum-of-parts ($100-150 auto + $100-200 robotaxi + $50 energy + Optimus wildcard) is itself generous narrative scaffolding masquerading as analysis. The auto business, at $3.8B NI declining and shrinking topline, is worth maybe $60-80B on a generous 15-20x normalized earnings — call it $20-25/share, not $100-150. Energy storage is genuinely growing but is still <10% of revenue; $50/share ($188B) implies a valuation richer than the entire S&P industrials median for a segment doing maybe $10B in run-rate revenue. Robotaxi at $100-200/share assumes regulatory approval, technological achievement (after 8 missed FSD timelines), and competitive moat against Waymo, which already operates commercially — none of which are in evidence. The honest auto-anchored fair value is closer to $90-130; everything above is paying for narrative.
The contrarian case for owning here isn't crazy but requires intellectual honesty about what you're buying: you're buying a call option on Musk, not a business. FCF CAGR of 19.5% and $6.2B FCF in 2025 against $14.75B operating CF shows the cash engine isn't broken — capex of $8.5B is real investment, not maintenance. Cash of $16.5B with no disclosed debt is a fortress balance sheet that buys time for the optionality to mature. The "Net Insider Buying" tag is misleading though — those 303.96M share M-Exempt entries on June 16, 2026 are almost certainly Musk's compensation award option exercises, not open-market conviction buys; treating that as insider bullishness is a category error the secondary signals module is making. Real insider behavior here is option monetization plus small S-Sales.
I dissent partially from the synthesis only on framing: "disconnected from fundamentals" implies the gap might close via fundamentals catching up. It won't on any reasonable timeline — to justify $380 on traditional metrics you need ~$25B in normalized earnings (current: $3.8B and falling), implying a 6.5x increase. That requires robotaxi monetization or Optimus revenue, both unproven, both years out, both with competition. The narrative layer's "moderate durability" rating is the key risk: this stock can hold $380 indefinitely while Musk tweets, then drop 40% on a single FSD timeline miss or Optimus demo embarrassment. Anchored fair value is $110-140 (auto + energy + modest autonomy optionality); current price embeds roughly $240/share of pure narrative premium. I would not short — narrative-platform stocks crush shorts on timing — but I would not own at $380, and I would aggressively trim above $300 if held from lower. The 2.2% net margin print is a real warning, not noise, and the Q3 pull-forward distortion means Q4'25 and Q1'26 prints may look worse before they look better.
GPT Critique
Examining the raw data, Tesla's revenue has plateaued in the range of $96-$98 billion over the past three years, signaling a growth stagnation. Notably, net income has plummeted from $15 billion in 2023 to $3.79 billion in 2025, marking a significant 75% decline. The most recent quarterly margins are troubling, with net margins consistently hovering around 2.2% to 4.9%, far below the margins of leading tech companies like Apple or even luxury auto brands like Ferrari. The company's free cash flow of $6.22 billion is supported by robust operating cash flows, but high capex suggests significant reinvestment, which doesn't seem to reflect in top-line growth. Tesla's balance sheet shows $16.51 billion in cash and no disclosed debt, which provides financial flexibility but doesn't offset the operational challenges evident in the financials.
Opus argues that Tesla is overvalued by 2-3x on fundamentals, suggesting an auto-anchored fair value of $110-140 per share. I agree with this assessment, given the minimal revenue growth and severe margin compression. Opus highlights the collapse of net income and quarterly margins as a core concern, which aligns with my observation of declining profitability despite relatively stable revenue. I concur with their view that the $1.43 trillion market cap is excessively optimistic, relying heavily on speculative future streams like robotaxis and energy storage, which currently contribute minimally to revenue.
Where I diverge from Opus is the valuation of Tesla's more speculative ventures. Opus suggests a sum-of-parts valuation that generously assigns $100-200 per share to the robotaxi and energy segments. I am more conservative, seeing these as highly uncertain bets that should not command such a high premium without clearer regulatory and technological pathways. The assumed valuation for these nascent segments seems overly generous given the competitive landscape and unproven revenue models.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are overly focused on traditional metrics, missing the broader market narrative and the potential for transformational technology to justify a higher valuation. They might posit that the market's pricing reflects a belief in Tesla's ability to leverage its technological edge to dominate future mobility and energy markets. However, this narrative hinges on execution and innovation that are far from guaranteed.