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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. (TTWO) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -48 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -28 · Value -68 · Sentiment 50 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc.
TTWO NASDAQTake-Two Interactive Software, Inc. is a video game and interactive entertainment company that develops, publishes, and markets digital content for consumers worldwide. The company focuses on console, PC, and mobile platforms, offering games across genres such as action-adventure, role-playing, strategy, sports, and family/casual entertainment. Its portfolio is delivered through both physical retail distribution and digital channels, including online platforms and cloud streaming services, giving it broad reach across major gaming ecosystems. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. operates through several prominent labels, notably Rockstar Games, 2K, Private Division, and Zynga, which collectively manage some of the industry’s most recognizable franchises. These labels enable the company to participate in key segments of the global gaming market, from premium console and PC titles to mobile and social games. Headquartered in New York City and founded in 1993, Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. holds a significant position in the technology and entertainment landscape, serving players across the Americas, Europe, and Asia-Pacific.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -1.62
Total Equity: $3.51B
Shares: 184,074,074
Total Debt: $2.52B
Cash: $1.55B
EBITDA: $94.30M
Total Debt: $2.52B
Cash: $1.55B
Revenue: $6.66B
Shares: 184,074,074
Revenue: $6.66B
Revenue: $6.66B
Revenue: $6.66B
Total Equity: $3.51B
Tax Rate: -50.8%
Equity: $3.51B
Total Debt: $2.52B
Cash: $1.55B
Current Liabilities: $2.59B
Long-Term Debt: $2.49B
Total Debt: $2.52B
Total Equity: $3.51B
Shares: 184,074,074
Shares: 184,074,074
CapEx: -$162.80M
Shares: 184,074,074
Stock Price: $242.40
Net Income: -$298.20M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 9:42pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $3.5B | $5.3B | $5.3B | $5.6B | $6.7B |
| Cost of Revenue | $1.5B | $3.1B | $3.1B | $2.6B | $2.8B |
| Gross Profit | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.2B | $3.1B | $3.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $1.5B | $3.5B | $5.8B | $7.5B | $3.9B |
| Operating Income | $473.6M | -$1.2B | -$3.6B | -$4.4B | -$104.2M |
| Net Income | $418.0M | -$1.1B | -$3.7B | -$4.5B | -$298.2M |
| EBITDA | $534.7M | -$1.0B | -$3.4B | -$4.2B | $94.3M |
| EPS | $3.62 | $-7.03 | $-22.01 | $-25.58 | $-1.62 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.58 | $-7.03 | $-22.01 | $-25.58 | $-1.62 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:28pm (4d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.7B | $827.4M | $754.0M | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $3.9B | $2.5B | $2.3B | $2.8B | $3.2B |
| Total Assets | $6.5B | $15.9B | $12.2B | $9.2B | $9.4B |
| Current Liabilities | $2.1B | $3.9B | $2.4B | $3.6B | $2.6B |
| Long-Term Debt | $0 | $1.7B | $3.1B | $2.5B | $2.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $2.7B | $6.8B | $6.5B | $7.0B | $5.9B |
| Total Equity | $3.8B | $9.0B | $5.7B | $2.1B | $3.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.3B | $1.2B | -$2.6B | -$7.1B | -$7.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 9:42pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $258.0M | $1.1M | -$16.1M | -$45.2M | $624.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$158.6M | -$204.2M | -$141.7M | -$169.4M | -$162.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | $99.3M | -$203.1M | -$157.8M | -$214.6M | $461.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | -$3.3B | -$7.3M | $6.5M | -$2.6M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $0 | $2.1B | $1.3B | $598.9M | $0 |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$200.0M | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $135.1M | -$960.8M | -$132.6M | $457.2M | $78.9M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 9:42pm (3d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +52.6% | 0.0% | +5.3% | +18.2% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +16.0% | -1.9% | +36.6% | +24.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -346.0% | -208.2% | -22.3% | +97.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -369.1% | -232.9% | -19.6% | +93.3% |
| EBITDA Growth | -295.0% | -227.9% | -21.7% | +102.3% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 19, 2026 12:19pm (4d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008-09-25 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 23:38Even the bull case prices 72% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 100%. Caveat: the company is pre-profit — scenario margins are a glide-path assumption, not a track record.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($237.04) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +10% | 17.3% | $67.28 | -72% |
| Base — stabilizes | +7% | 15.1% | $51.70 | -78% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +3% | 12.8% | $38.61 | -84% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +31% | -4.8% | $0.00 | -100% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-19 23:34The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw trajectory first: quarterly revenue has actually been decelerating sequentially — $1.77B (Sep-25) → $1.70B → $1.68B → $1.53B (Jun-26) — and net losses persist across every one of the last eight quarters. The "18.2% recent YoY" masks a lumpy comp; the trailing four quarters sum to ~$6.68B, essentially flat with the FY26 print of $6.66B. Gross margin is genuinely healthy at 57%, and FY26 FCF of $461M is real — but at a $45B market cap that's a 1.0% FCF yield. The classification as "pre_profit_growth" (confidence 0.47) is wrong: this is a mature publisher digesting a bad acquisition ($3.55B goodwill impairment in FY25 net loss of $4.48B is the tell), not a scaling growth company. The pre-flight model correctly overrides this to "traditional" — I side with pre-flight.
The synthesis "high conviction required / binary GTA VI bet" is directionally right but I think slightly undersells the asymmetry against holders here. EV/revenue at 6.93 on a business with 11.6% revenue CAGR and negative operating margins is a rich multiple even by gaming standards — EA trades roughly 5x on positive operating margins. The bull math requires GTA VI to do what, exactly? If GTA VI ships in FY27 and generates $3B in year-one revenue at 40% incremental operating margin, that's ~$1.2B operating income against a current $45B EV — call it 27x incremental. The stock already prices that. For $242 to be undervalued, GTA VI needs to be a multi-year annuity comparable to GTA V's $8B lifetime — plausible but not a bargain thesis, it's a confirmation thesis. The thesis engine's -6 score (bear 88 vs bull 82) captures this: the risk/reward is roughly symmetric with a slight bear lean, which does NOT justify a $45B market cap trading at 98x FCF.
A careful contrarian would push back on the insider selling read — 20K shares across scattered small sales is noise at a company this size, not "unusual." The real contrarian argument cuts the other way: what if the market is actually UNDER-pricing GTA VI because everyone assumes it's priced in? Rockstar has shipped exactly one mainline GTA in the last 12 years and it's still generating recurring revenue a decade later. If GTA VI + GTA Online 2 becomes a $2B/year annuity for a decade, DCF supports $280-320. But that's a specific bet, not a margin-of-safety thesis. The narrative layer's "70% narrative / 30% fundamentals" split is honest — you're paying $45B for a story with a known catalyst and known integration disaster ($12.7B Zynga at ~$3.5B impaired equity value already recognized).
Data quality is thin where it matters: no quarterly FCF disclosure, no segment-level Zynga vs Rockstar vs 2K breakout in what's provided, and the "2026" date stamps suggest we're looking at fiscal year data that ends in calendar Q1/Q2 — GTA VI timing is the entire thesis and we don't have a firm launch date here. The market-forces model failing entirely ("Could not parse") is a real gap given this is a catalyst-driven name. Net: I partially agree with synthesis's "high conviction required" framing but lean more bearish than their neutral read. At $242, you're paying premium multiples for a company with two years of accelerating losses, decelerating recent quarterly revenue, 1% FCF yield, and a binary catalyst that the sellside has been front-running for three years. Fair value on realized fundamentals is closer to $180-200 (5.5x EV/sales, in line with EA); the $40-60 premium is the GTA VI option value, which is real but not free money. I'd rather own this at $200 into the launch than $242 on hope.
GPT Reading
At $242, Take-Two is not being valued on what it is earning; it is being valued on what one future launch might unlock. The raw numbers are clear: revenue has improved meaningfully, from $5.35B in FY24 to $5.63B in FY25 and $6.66B in FY26, and the quarterly run-rate has stepped up from roughly $1.35B-$1.36B in late 2024 to $1.68B-$1.77B in late 2025/early 2026 before easing to $1.53B in the latest quarter. Gross profit also rose to $3.81B in FY26, with gross margin at 57.2%, so the core content engine is not broken. But investors are paying 6.7x sales and about 12.7x book for a company that still posted a FY26 operating loss of $104M and net loss of $298M. Even after the worst acquisition/accounting noise faded, the business did not snap back to strong earnings; the last five quarters were all still loss-making, with net margins between -0.8% and -7.5% aside from the giant impairment quarter. That is the central issue: the market cap implies elite economics, while the current P&L still shows subscale profitability relative to valuation.
The part bulls will emphasize—correctly—is that cash generation is better than GAAP suggests. FY26 operating cash flow was $624M and free cash flow was $462M, which matters because this is not a distressed balance sheet story. Net debt is under $1B if you offset $2.52B debt with $1.55B cash, and the current ratio of 1.24 is fine. But even if I give full credit to the cash flow and treat FY26 as a transition year, the valuation is still aggressive. A $45.3B market cap against $461M of FCF is roughly a 98x equity FCF multiple. Against $6.66B of revenue, the business needs either a dramatic margin inflection or a major revenue step-function to justify today’s price. The obvious candidate is GTA VI. The problem is that this is not a hidden catalyst; it is the entire stock. When one title is doing this much valuation work, the margin for error on timing, reception, monetization cadence, or cost absorption is tiny.
What stands out in the quarterly data is that profitability is improving only gradually even as revenue has scaled. Net losses narrowed from -$365M and -$125M in the 2024 year-end quarters to low double-digit losses in the 2025/26 period, but that still leaves TTWO as a premium-rated company without premium earnings. If this were trading at 3x-4x sales, I would be more forgiving because the franchise portfolio is real and gross margins are healthy. At nearly 7x sales, I need evidence that EBITDA and net income are about to inflect hard, not merely that they might someday. Insider activity does not help the case: the recent tape is dominated by sales, not accumulation. I would not overread small awards and sales, but there is certainly no insider behavior here suggesting management sees obvious mispricing at $240-plus.
The strongest case against my skepticism is that Take-Two is one of the few game publishers with genuinely scarce IP, and scarce IP can make conventional multiples look stupid in hindsight. FY26 revenue growth of 18.2% is healthy for a company of this scale, gross margin recovered to 57%, quarterly losses are small relative to revenue, and cash flow stayed positive despite heavy development spending. If GTA VI lands anywhere near the high end of expectations, one year of bookings could reset every current ratio. A business doing $6.66B of annual revenue today could plausibly jump much higher, and if that comes with digital mix and recurrent spending, the eventual margin structure could look more like the FY22 model, when Take-Two earned $418M on just $3.5B of revenue. On that reading, today’s valuation is paying up in advance for a rare asset rather than overpaying for a broken income statement. I weigh that argument less heavily because investors already know all of it; the stock is not cheap enough to compensate for execution risk, and the burden of proof lies with future results, not franchise mythology.
What would change my mind is concrete evidence that the earnings model is finally matching the revenue base. I would turn more constructive if one of the next few quarters showed revenue above $2.0B with a clearly positive net margin, or if FY27/FY28 results demonstrated that the company can convert its current 57% gross margin into at least low-teens operating margin sustainably. I would also revisit valuation if free cash flow moved decisively above $1.0B annualized without a corresponding surge in capitalized development risk. Conversely, a delay or softer-than-expected launch cadence around the major pipeline would make the stock much harder to defend, because at $242 there is very little room for “good, not great.”
Grok Reading
The numbers show a publisher that has finally stopped the bleeding from the Zynga deal but has not yet earned the multiple the market is assigning. FY2026 revenue hit $6.66B, up roughly 18% from the prior year’s $5.63B, with trailing quarters holding in a $1.53–1.77B band. Gross margin sits at a healthy 57%, and operating loss collapsed from –$4.39B to just –$104M; free cash flow turned solidly positive at $461M on $624M of operating cash flow. That is real progress. Yet GAAP remains red (–$298M net income, –4.5% net margin), ROIC and ROE are still negative, and the balance sheet carries $2.52B of debt against $1.55B cash. At $242 and a $45B enterprise, investors are paying 6.7× sales and an effectively infinite earnings multiple for a business whose current FCF yield is barely 1%. The entire premium is the capitalized option on GTA VI plus residual faith that Zynga’s mobile base will eventually stop being a drag.
What the quantitative labels call “pre-profit growth” is really a mature hit-driven publisher temporarily distorted by acquisition accounting. The 11.6% revenue CAGR and recent 18% y/y print are respectable, not explosive; quarterly revenue has actually been flat-to-down from the $1.77B peak. Insider activity is net selling across multiple June–July prints, and cash-flow quality is flagged poor—consistent with a company still digesting a $12.7B deal that produced multi-billion-dollar impairments. The market narrative is unanchored and intense: GTA VI is treated as a near-certainty $15–20B franchise event that will redefine margins. That story may prove correct, but it is already fully reflected in a price that leaves almost no room for delay, softer launch metrics, or continued Zynga underperformance.
The strongest contrary case is straightforward. GTA V generated more than $8B lifetime; a modern equivalent with tighter live-service hooks, higher attach rates, and cross-gen reach could easily justify several turns of multiple expansion and turn the current $461M FCF into multi-billion annual cash generation within two years of launch. NBA 2K already supplies recurring high-margin revenue, the catalog remains durable, and operating leverage is visibly kicking in as amortization rolls off. If those elements land, today’s 6.7× sales will look cheap in hindsight and the stock can re-rate toward $300+ without needing heroic assumptions. I weigh this less heavily because the same data already embed those outcomes: the valuation synthesis itself scores the bear mass higher, expectations-gap risk is rated 75, and every incremental quarter of merely adequate results without GTA VI news has left the shares range-bound. Paying 13× book and mid-single-digit sales for a still-unprofitable publisher is not a free option; it is a priced-in bull case.
I would flip to a clear undervalued stance on two concrete developments: GTA VI launch-quarter bookings that imply lifetime revenue comfortably above $10B with early high-margin online engagement, or two consecutive quarters of positive operating margin above 10% and FCF above $400M even before the title ships—evidence that the base business alone can support a mid-teens earnings multiple. Conversely, a multi-quarter delay or launch metrics that merely match (rather than exceed) GTA V would confirm the expectations gap and push the stock toward $180–200.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Take-Two runs premium IP (GTA, NBA 2K, Red Dead) with revenue climbing from $3.50B in FY2022 to $6.66B in FY2026 and gross margin recovering to 57.2%. FY2026 marks a real inflection: FCF swung from -$214.6M to +$461.5M and operating margin from -77.9% to roughly breakeven. However, the company has posted cumulative net losses of roughly $9.6B across FY2023-FY2026, and the Zynga-era goodwill impairments and integration costs show up as persistent operating red ink. Net cash is negative ($-528.7M) so the balance sheet is a constraint, not a buffer, though $1.99B of liquid cash and positive FCF remove any near-term survival question. The real quality issue is per-share value creation. Diluted shares went from 116.8M (FY2022) to 184.1M (FY2026) - a 12.1% CAGR, or roughly 58% dilution in four years, driven by the Zynga stock deal plus ongoing SBC at 4.6% of revenue. Buybacks recover only 13.6% of SBC, so shareholders are structurally diluted. Insider tape reinforces caution: 44 sales, zero open-market buys over 12 months, with Slatoff, Emerson and others liquidating meaningful blocks in June 2026 into the post-inflection print. Earnings-quality mechanicals look clean (Beneish -2.9, Altman Z 4.28, no accrual flags), and the FY2026 OCF-to-NI swing is a genuine improvement, not a manipulation signal. But 'high earnings quality' here mostly reflects that the losses were honestly reported. Durability of the IP is real; discipline around dilution and cost structure is not yet demonstrated over a full cycle.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- How much of FY2026 revenue and FCF is attributable to GTA VI pre-orders/deferred revenue vs. recurring live-services
- Zynga goodwill remaining on balance sheet and impairment risk if mobile softens further
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants underlying the $-528.7M net cash position
- Whether June 2026 insider sales were 10b5-1 pre-scheduled or discretionary
- SBC dilution trajectory guidance and any authorized buyback capacity
- Segment-level operating margin for Zynga/mobile vs. console/PC to see where losses concentrate
The e2e synthesis frames the setup honestly: $45B is a bet that GTA VI justifies the Zynga debt load and redefines hit economics. That is not a value setup - that is a growth/catalyst setup where the deserved value depends almost entirely on one unreleased title. Against a business that has printed $9.6B of cumulative GAAP losses over four years and diluted shares 58%, the per-share deserved value based on realized economics is materially below $237; the gap is closed only by capitalizing an unshipped release at bull-case assumptions. That is the definition of priced-for-perfection. Quality-adjusting: the franchise IP is genuinely durable (raises deserved value), but capital allocation and dilution cut the other way, and NBA 2K/Zynga are maturing, not accelerating. A fair deserved value on realized cash generation plus a probability-weighted GTA VI contribution likely sits in the $180-210 range, not $237+. The market is paying full sticker for the bull case with the bear case (delay, monetization miss, franchise fatigue) essentially uncompensated. Insider tape (44 sells, 0 buys) corroborates that people close to the asset do not see a discount here.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY2026 guidance detail and how much GTA VI contribution is embedded
- GTA VI release date confirmation and any monetization model disclosures (live service, microtransactions)
- Zynga segment bookings trajectory and DAU trends
- Net debt post-Zynga and cash flow available to delever
- Any FY2026 one-offs inflating the rebound narrative
The tape is mildly risk-on (regime +38, VIX 14.9) and TTWO's near-market beta (0.98) means macro is a non-factor here - this is a narrative-driven name and the narrative is doing the work. The platform-monopoly archetype is intense, with GTA 6 preorders described as 'record' and the bull frame (durable franchise engines + Zynga mobile + AI dev leverage) still dominant in coverage. Momentum confirms it: +18% recent vs 11.6% long-term CAGR and +65pp over three years - the market is paying up for the catalyst and holding the bid. News flow last week leaned constructive ('13% undervalued', 'shift to modest profit guidance reframes the bull case'), meaning even the softer guidance is being re-narrated as de-risking rather than a story break. That said, the pressure is not euphoric - it is a steady, priced-in tailwind, not a mania. The bear counter (fatigue, everything priced at $237, Zynga stalling) is present and the Aug 7 print showed the tape can wobble on cautious guidance before recovering. Durability is only 'moderate' - once GTA 6 actually ships, the narrative fuel burns off and this could flip to headwind on any execution slip.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- GTA 6 launch date confirmation or any hint of delay - the single biggest narrative pivot
- Preorder / engagement metrics vs street whispers as launch nears
- Zynga bookings trend - the secondary story leg that could crack first
- Sector rotation out of gaming/comm-services if risk-on tape fades
- Analyst target revisions post-Aug 7 print - are upgrades broadening or stalling
Global interactive-entertainment spend keeps expanding while engagement concentrates into a shrinking number of mega-franchises with live-service economics — a structure that favors owners of top-tier IP over mid-tier publishers. Consoles are late-cycle but the installed base is at a peak, and digital/direct distribution keeps improving unit economics. Macro is neutral (10y 4.71, no acute consumer stress signal); gaming spend is among the more resilient discretionary categories. The main world-level swing for this company is not demand, it is execution and timing on a single release.
When we made this prediction on Aug 19, 2026, TTWO was $237.04. We expect it to be $225.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $190.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 19, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.