Business Description
Travere Therapeutics, Inc., a biopharmaceutical firm headquartered in San Diego, California, was founded in 2008 with a mission to discover, develop, commercialize, and deliver treatments for rare diseases. The company adopted its current name in November 2020, previously operating as Retrophin, Inc. Its current product offerings include Chenodal, an orally administered synthetic form of chenodeoxycholic acid, used to dissolve radiolucent gallstones. Another key product is Cholbam, a cholic acid capsule prescribed for both children and adults suffering from bile acid synthesis disorders stemming from single enzyme defects, and as an auxiliary treatment for peroxisomal disorders. Additionally, Thiola and Thiola EC, tiopronin tablets, are available for managing homozygous cystinuria. In its development pipeline, Travere is advancing several therapeutic candidates. Sparsentan is currently in Phase III clinical trials, being investigated for the treatment of focal segmental glomerulosclerosis and immunoglobulin A nephropathy. Also under development is TVT-058, a pioneering investigational human enzyme replacement candidate, which is undergoing Phase I/II clinical trials for classical homocystinuria. The company actively engages in strategic partnerships, holding a cooperative research and development agreement with the National Institutes of Health's National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences. It also collaborates with patient advocacy groups such as CDG Care and the Alagille Syndrome Alliance, collectively working towards identifying potential small molecule therapies for NGLY1 deficiency and Alagille syndrome.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 7:32pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:03am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -0.56
Total Equity: $114.83M
Shares: 89,211,813
Total Debt: $311.72M
Cash: $93.04M
EBITDA: $22.22M
Total Debt: $311.72M
Cash: $93.04M
Revenue: $490.73M
Shares: 89,211,813
Revenue: $490.73M
Revenue: $490.73M
Revenue: $490.73M
Total Equity: $114.83M
Tax Rate: -2.0%
Equity: $114.83M
Total Debt: $311.72M
Cash: $93.04M
Current Liabilities: $159.90M
Long-Term Debt: $311.72M
Total Debt: $311.72M
Total Equity: $114.83M
Shares: 89,211,813
Shares: 89,211,813
CapEx: -$58.16M
Shares: 89,211,813
Stock Price: $59.11
Net Income: -$25.55M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The fact pattern is genuinely inflecting: revenue went from $233M (2024) to $491M (2025), operating margin compressed losses from -139% to -13%, net loss narrowed from $322M to $26M, and FCF flipped from -$339M to +$38M. That is a real, not cosmetic, transition and explains the $4.2B market cap. The forensic flags, however, are not noise. OCF/NI of 0.5x with accruals at -7.7% of assets and Beneish M at -1.55 say the reported numbers have more non-cash help than is comfortable for a company that just turned the corner — exactly the moment you'd expect aggressive revenue recognition or working-capital pulls.
The dilution picture is the structural problem: diluted shares went 59.8M → 89.2M over five years (10.5% CAGR), SBC is 9.1% of revenue, and zero buyback offset. Per-share value creation lags the topline by roughly a full doubling cycle. Insider tape is consistent with this — the 'most recent 15' transactions are entirely A-awards (grants/RSU vesting) clustered on a single date; the upstream '28 sells' label is almost certainly F-code tax-withholding and routine 10b5-1 disposition of those grants, not informed selling, but it's also not the cluster buying that would confirm management conviction at $43.
Net cash is essentially zero (-$5.9M), so the $322M cash pile is offset by debt — the balance sheet is not a cushion if Filspari trajectory wobbles. The AI critique flagging a two-quarter sequential revenue decline from a $165M peak is the single most important datapoint I can't verify from this packet, and it is the difference between 'cheap inflection' and 'priced for an acceleration that already stopped.'
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:03am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $131.8M | $109.5M | $145.2M | $233.2M | $490.7M |
| Cost of Revenue | $3.8M | $4.4M | $11.5M | $7.7M | $10.3M |
| Gross Profit | $128.0M | $105.0M | $133.8M | $225.4M | $480.4M |
| Operating Expenses | $327.4M | $424.9M | $521.9M | $549.3M | $543.2M |
| Operating Income | -$199.4M | -$319.8M | -$388.1M | -$323.8M | -$62.8M |
| Net Income | -$180.1M | -$278.5M | -$111.4M | -$321.5M | -$25.5M |
| EBITDA | -$184.5M | -$299.4M | -$326.2M | -$265.8M | $22.2M |
| EPS | $-3.01 | $-4.37 | $-1.50 | $-4.08 | $-0.56 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:03am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $165.8M | $61.7M | $58.2M | $58.5M | $93.0M |
| Total Current Assets | $582.8M | $486.4M | $616.8M | $416.7M | $437.6M |
| Total Assets | $776.6M | $672.6M | $788.9M | $594.1M | $605.2M |
| Current Liabilities | $124.1M | $142.2M | $177.9M | $200.8M | $159.9M |
| Long-Term Debt | $226.6M | $375.5M | $377.3M | $310.3M | $311.7M |
| Total Liabilities | $474.5M | $629.7M | $588.1M | $535.0M | $490.4M |
| Total Equity | $302.1M | $42.9M | $200.8M | $59.1M | $114.8M |
| Retained Earnings | -$766.0M | -$1.0B | -$1.1B | -$1.4B | -$1.5B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:03am (just now)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$14.8M | -$186.3M | -$280.0M | -$237.5M | $37.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$24.2M | -$28.4M | -$41.6M | -$101.2M | -$58.2M |
| Free Cash Flow | -$38.9M | -$214.7M | -$321.6M | -$338.7M | -$20.4M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $81.0M | -$104.1M | -$3.5M | $359,000 | $34.5M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 9:43am (22h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$968.9M $923.9M – $1.1B
|
$1.2B $1.2B – $1.2B
|
$1.5B $1.3B – $1.8B
|
$1.8B $1.5B – $2.1B
|
| EBITDA |
-$766.3M -$832.9M – -$730.8M
|
-$936.0M -$936.6M – -$935.4M
|
-$1.2B -$1.4B – -$1.0B
|
-$1.4B -$1.7B – -$1.2B
|
| Net Income |
$217.0M -$27.7M – $640.4M
|
$273.5M $216.6M – $546.8M
|
$377.6M $312.0M – $474.7M
|
$428.2M $353.9M – $538.4M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:03am (just now)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -17.0% | +32.7% | +60.5% | +110.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -17.9% | +27.4% | +68.5% | +113.1% |
| Operating Income Growth | -60.4% | -21.4% | +16.6% | +80.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -54.6% | +60.0% | -188.6% | +92.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -62.3% | -9.0% | +18.5% | +108.4% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-22 | Inrig Jula | G-Gift | 468.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-06-12 | Coughlin Timothy | M-Exempt | 10,000.00 | $26.52 | $265,200 |
| 2026-06-12 | Coughlin Timothy | S-Sale | 10,000.00 | $50.07 | $500,747 |
| 2026-06-12 | Coughlin Timothy | M-Exempt | 10,000.00 | $26.52 | $265,200 |
| 2026-06-12 | Baynes Roy D. | M-Exempt | 4,500.00 | $21.38 | $96,210 |
| 2026-06-12 | Baynes Roy D. | S-Sale | 4,500.00 | $50.00 | $225,000 |
| 2026-06-12 | Baynes Roy D. | M-Exempt | 4,500.00 | $21.38 | $96,210 |
| 2026-05-19 | Williams Brinkley Ruth | A-Award | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Williams Brinkley Ruth | A-Award | 12,000.00 | $42.26 | $507,120 |
| 2026-05-19 | Squarer Ron | A-Award | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Squarer Ron | A-Award | 12,000.00 | $42.26 | $507,120 |
| 2026-05-19 | Poole Sandra | A-Award | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Poole Sandra | A-Award | 12,000.00 | $42.26 | $507,120 |
| 2026-05-19 | Orwin John A | A-Award | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Orwin John A | A-Award | 12,000.00 | $42.26 | $507,120 |
| 2026-05-19 | Meckler Jeffrey A | A-Award | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | Meckler Jeffrey A | A-Award | 12,000.00 | $42.26 | $507,120 |
| 2026-05-19 | LYONS GARY A | A-Award | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-19 | LYONS GARY A | A-Award | 12,000.00 | $42.26 | $507,120 |
| 2026-05-19 | Coughlin Timothy | A-Award | 4,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue went $54M → $63M → $75M → $82M → $114M → $165M → $130M → $127M. The models are anchoring on the YoY (110%) and CAGR (84%) figures, but the sequential trajectory tells a different story — Q3 2025 at $165M was the peak, and the last two quarters printed $130M and $127M. That's a ~23% sequential decline from peak, and net income reverted from +$25.7M to -$37.1M. Either Q3 had a one-time bolus (channel stocking, milestone, gross-to-net true-up — Filspari/sparsentan launches commonly show this pattern) or growth has genuinely stalled below $500M annualized. The pre-flight summary calling this a "dramatic revenue acceleration" is reading the annual aggregation, not the quarterly turn. That matters at 8.5x P/S.
The narrative layer is also stale and partially wrong. It describes Sparsentan as a "Phase III asset that could unlock a massive market in FSGS" — but Filspari (sparsentan) was approved for IgAN in 2023 and for FSGS in early 2025. That IS the revenue you're seeing. So the "binary Phase III bet" framing in the narrative engine is roughly two years out of date; the real questions are now commercial — peak sales ceiling, payer dynamics, and competition from finerenone (Kerendia) and the emerging endothelin/SGLT2 stack. The synthesis verdict of "High Conviction Required" is directionally fine but built on a partially obsolete story. A more accurate frame: this is a post-approval commercial ramp where the Street has already paid for $700M–1B peak sales, and the Q4/Q1 deceleration is the first real stress test of that assumption.
Balance sheet is thinner than the synthesis acknowledges. $93M cash against a company that burned $322M in 2024 and only swung to +$38M operating CF in 2025 — and Q1 2026 just printed -$37M net income again. If the sequential softness persists for two more quarters, they're raising equity at sub-$50, which caps the multiple. The "Total debt: —" gap in the data is a real hole; Travere has convertible notes outstanding (~$316M from memory) that the file simply doesn't show, and that materially changes the EV math. EV/revenue of 7.4x is probably understated. The insider data is also useless as presented — ten identical "A-Award" grants on a single day in May 2026 is routine RSU vesting, not the "Unusual Selling Activity" the secondary signal flags. I'd discount that signal entirely.
A contrarian read: at $45 and ~$4.2B market cap, you're paying ~8x sales for a single-asset commercial-stage rare disease company whose lead drug just decelerated sequentially two quarters in a row, whose cash runway is tight without the convert refinancing, and where the bull case requires Filspari to do $800M+ at peak in a market where finerenone has a head start and atrasentan (Chinook/Novartis) is coming. The optionality is real — IgAN is a meaningful market and sparsentan has differentiated data — but the multiple already reflects success. I disagree with the synthesis framing that this is "priced for very strong execution but not perfection"; given the Q4/Q1 sequential print, it's actually priced for a reacceleration that hasn't shown up yet. Fair value on a sober DCF with $700M peak Filspari sales, 25% operating margin at maturity, and 10% discount rate lands closer to $32–38, not $45. The bull case to $60+ requires either a label expansion, peak sales revision toward $1B, or M&A premium — none of which the current quarterly data supports. Dissent from the prior models' neutral-to-constructive tone: the sequential deceleration is the signal everyone is talking around, and it deserves more weight than an 84% trailing CAGR.
GPT Critique
Upon examining the raw data for Travere Therapeutics, the most striking element is the significant revenue growth trajectory from 2024 to 2025, where annual revenue more than doubled from $233.2M to $490.7M. This growth suggests a successful initial commercialization phase, likely driven by the launch of Sparsentan. However, the quarterly data reveals a concerning pattern of revenue deceleration from a peak of $164.9M in Q3 2025 to $127.2M in Q1 2026, raising questions about the sustainability of this growth. The net income volatility, swinging from a positive $25.7M to a negative $37.1M over the same period, further complicates the financial narrative, indicating challenges in achieving consistent profitability.
I agree with Opus's observation that the revenue decline from Q3 2025 to Q1 2026 is a critical issue. This sequential decline of approximately 23% from peak revenue, coupled with the return to a net loss, suggests either a temporary anomaly or a more troubling trend of stalled growth. Opus's point on the narrative layer being outdated is also valid; the market's current focus should be on commercial performance post-approval rather than the pre-approval risks that the narrative still emphasizes.
However, I disagree with Opus's assertion that the company's valuation reflects a need for reacceleration not yet visible in the financials. While the sequential decline is concerning, the company's transition to positive operating cash flow in 2025, despite the recent net income loss, indicates some underlying operational improvements. Opus's valuation range of $32–38 seems overly conservative considering the potential for Sparsentan to capture significant market share, albeit with competitive pressures from finerenone and others. The market's expectation for Sparsentan to achieve $700M–1B in peak sales is ambitious but not entirely unrealistic given the unmet needs in FSGS and IgAN markets.
Opus also rightly highlights the thin cash reserves of $93M against potential cash burn and existing convertible notes, which are not reflected in the provided data. This financial strain could necessitate equity raising, impacting share value. I concur with Opus that the insider transactions flagged as "Unusual Selling Activity" do not reflect meaningful insider sentiment, as they are routine equity awards.
A careful skeptic might argue that both my view and Opus's underestimate the potential competitive dynamics and regulatory risks that could further impede Travere's trajectory. They might also question whether the current market cap sufficiently discounts the operational execution risks and the long-term sustainability of Sparsentan's market position.