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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Tradeweb Markets Inc. (TW) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +10 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 85 · Value -52 · Sentiment -4 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $94.67 vs $98.41 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Tradeweb Markets Inc.
TW NASDAQTradeweb Markets Inc. is a global operator of electronic marketplaces specializing in rates, credit, equities, and money markets. The company connects broker/dealers, institutional clients, and retail customers, facilitating electronic trading in a broad range of financial instruments. Its core business centers on US and European government debt, mortgage-backed securities, interest-rate swaps, and corporate bonds, both domestic and international. Tradeweb Markets also supplies fixed-income trading and price data, notably through partnerships with major financial data providers. Headquartered in New York City, the firm plays a pivotal role in modernizing and streamlining fixed-income trading, offering transparency, efficiency, and access to a wide array of market participants. Its platforms are widely used by financial institutions seeking reliable and scalable solutions for trading and data analytics in the global capital markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 3.78
Total Equity: $7.19B
Shares: 215,024,339
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.08B
EBITDA: $1.43B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.08B
Revenue: $2.05B
Revenue: $2.05B
Revenue: $2.05B
Total Equity: $7.19B
Tax Rate: 21.6%
Equity: $7.19B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $2.08B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $7.19B
Shares: 215,024,339
Shares: 215,024,339
CapEx: -$40.55M
Shares: 215,024,339
Stock Price: $98.14
Net Income: $812.79M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:44pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $407.3M | $432.4M | $460.3M | $592.7M | $670.8M |
| Gross Profit | $669.2M | $756.4M | $877.9M | $1.1B | $1.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $297.6M | $330.1M | $382.2M | $447.5M | $536.5M |
| Operating Income | $371.6M | $426.2M | $495.8M | $685.8M | $845.1M |
| Net Income | $226.8M | $309.3M | $364.9M | $501.5M | $812.8M |
| EBITDA | $542.9M | $605.1M | $681.1M | $978.7M | $1.4B |
| EPS | $1.13 | $1.50 | $1.73 | $2.35 | $3.81 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.09 | $1.48 | $1.71 | $2.33 | $3.78 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:05pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $972.0M | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.3B | $2.1B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $6.0B | $6.3B | $7.1B | $7.3B | $8.2B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $681.2M | $713.8M | $1.1B | $869.1M | $1.0B |
| Total Equity | $5.3B | $5.5B | $5.9B | $6.4B | $7.2B |
| Retained Earnings | $242.6M | $386.6M | $640.4M | $996.8M | $1.6B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:44pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $578.0M | $632.8M | $746.1M | $897.7M | $1.2B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$16.9M | -$23.2M | -$18.5M | -$41.0M | -$40.6M |
| Free Cash Flow | $561.1M | $609.6M | $727.6M | $856.8M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$207.8M | $0 | -$69.7M | -$860.1M | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$75.7M | -$99.3M | -$35.2M | -$59.1M | -$104.2M |
| Net Change in Cash | $180.8M | $285.2M | $449.2M | -$366.2M | $744.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:44pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +10.4% | +12.6% | +29.0% | +18.9% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +13.0% | +16.1% | +29.1% | +21.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | +14.7% | +16.3% | +38.3% | +23.2% |
| Net Income Growth | +36.4% | +18.0% | +37.4% | +62.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | +11.5% | +12.6% | +43.7% | +45.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 12:05pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-01 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2026-06-01 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-02 | $0.14 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-01 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-02 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-02 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-03 | $0.12 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-02 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-03 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-03 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-29 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-30 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-31 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-31 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-28 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-30 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-31 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-31 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-28 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-30 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:12Recovery pays +24%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 40%. Ratio 0.6:1. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($98.41) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +33% | 35.0% | $122.06 | +24% |
| Base — stabilizes | +22% | 35.0% | $88.84 | -10% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +11% | 34.6% | $62.64 | -36% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +9% | 35.0% | $59.14 | -40% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Independent read on the numbers first. Revenue trajectory is genuinely impressive: $405M (2Q24) → $509.7M (1Q25) → $617.8M (1Q26), a 52% two-year jump with sequential acceleration into the most recent quarter (+18.5% Q/Q from $521M to $618M). But that Q4 2025 print is suspicious — $521M revenue produced $325M net income (62.4% margin) versus 30-36% in every surrounding quarter. That's ~$140M of non-operating income (tax benefit, mark-to-market, or one-time gain) that inflates the trailing NI base. Strip it out and 2025 NI is closer to $670M, not $813M, pushing normalized P/E from 25.9x to ~32x. The earnings CAGR of 49% is real but flattered; revenue CAGR of ~24% is the honest number. FCF of $1.13B on $2.05B revenue = 55% FCF margin with $40M capex — this is the genuinely rare part of the story and what deserves a premium multiple.
Where I diverge from the models: the synthesis's "signal-adjusted $146" fair value is not credible. That implies ~$3.2B of forward FCF or a 3% FCF yield on a business whose organic revenue growth is decelerating (the quarterly trend has been $509→$513→$509→$521 through most of 2025 before the $618M Q1 print, which itself needs verification — a 19% sequential jump in a transaction-fee business without explanation is a flag). The thesis engine's "market prices 9% for a business compounding 25%" is directionally right on trailing numbers but wrong on forward: rates-vol tailwinds from 2022-2024 are fading, and treasury/credit electronification share gains have a mathematical ceiling. Base rates for financial exchanges: revenue growth mean-reverts to mid-to-high single digits within 3-5 years of a volatility peak. The market's ~26x multiple on real earnings is not pricing in decline — it's pricing in normalization to ~10% growth, which is probably correct.
The contrarian case the models underweight: Tradeweb's ROE is 11.3% and ROIC 13% despite zero debt and 40%+ operating margins — that's mediocre capital efficiency because $7.2B of equity sits partially idle ($2.08B cash, no buybacks aggressive enough to move the needle at 0.55% dividend yield). This is a capital allocation problem hiding inside a great business. Insider activity confirms: two identical 21,221-share sales six weeks apart and zero open-market buys is a modest but consistent distribution pattern. On competitive dynamics, the market-forces layer correctly flags Bloomberg/CME/bank-direct threats; the models generally dismiss this but Tradeweb's credit-trading share gains have flattened per recent industry data, and MarketAxess (the credit specialist) has been losing share too — the pie may be growing slower than either believes. Also worth noting: at 10.3x sales and 13.9x EV/EBITDA, this trades in line with LSEG and ICE, not at a discount — the "undervalued" framing depends entirely on extrapolating 2024-2025 growth.
GPT Reading
Tradeweb looks like a genuinely elite market-structure asset, but the current price is not obviously cheap once you separate structural quality from unusually strong recent conditions. The raw business is excellent: revenue grew from $1.08B in 2021 to $2.05B in 2025, a near-doubling in four years, while operating income rose from $371.6M to $845.1M and net income from $226.8M to $812.8M. That last jump in earnings is especially striking, but it also contains a warning: 2025 net margin was 39.6%, far above 2024’s 29.0% and 2023’s 27.2%, and quarterly margins are lumpy enough to suggest some non-operating or tax help rather than purely clean operating leverage. Q4 2025 net income of $325.0M on $521.2M of revenue implies a 62.4% margin, which is not a normal steady-state earnings power number for an exchange-like platform. If I normalize around the more typical 30-36% quarterly net margin range seen in most of the series, the earnings multiple is less optically cheap than the headline 26x P/E suggests.
The more important point is that the business is still growing at a rate that a “mature earner” label undersells, but the market is not giving it a full growth premium because the latest quarterly pattern already hints at moderation. Revenue was $405.0M in Q2 2024, $448.9M in Q3, $463.3M in Q4, then $509.7M, $513.0M, $508.6M, $521.2M, and finally a breakout to $617.8M in Q1 2026. On a year-over-year basis that latest quarter is up 21.2% versus Q1 2025, strong by any standard, but sequentially the business often plateaus before bursts, which is what transaction-driven platforms do. That makes me wary of simply capitalizing the latest run rate. Annualized off Q1 2026, revenue would be about $2.47B; annualized off the prior three quarters, it is closer to $2.05B-$2.10B. The stock at $98.14 and $21.9B market cap is therefore trading around 8.9x-10.7x sales depending on what baseline you use, and roughly 19x EV/annualized Q1 revenue after backing out $2.08B of cash is still a premium for a business whose volumes can be macro-assisted.
What stands out most positively is the cash profile and balance sheet. This is a platform that needed only $40.6M of capex to produce $1.17B of operating cash flow and $1.13B of free cash flow in 2025. That is absurdly good conversion: FCF exceeded reported net income by more than $300M, and FCF margin was about 55% of revenue. With no debt and cash equal to roughly 9.5% of market cap, there is very little balance-sheet risk. Even on enterprise value, the multiple set is not crazy for a business with gross margins of 67.3% and operating margins of 41.2%. But “not crazy” is different from “undervalued.” At roughly 19x trailing FCF, the stock is paying for durability and high returns, not distress. For a company tied to trading activity, rate volatility, and electronification trends that are favorable but not linear, that feels closer to fair value than to a major mispricing. My read is that this is a high-quality compounder priced about where high-quality compounders should trade when the market is unsure whether recent growth is structural or cyclical.
The strongest case against my caution is straightforward: maybe I am over-normalizing a business that is simply taking durable share in electronic fixed-income and derivatives workflows. The evidence for that case is real. Revenue has not just risen; it has stair-stepped higher with very little giveback, from $1.34B in 2023 to $1.73B in 2024 to $2.05B in 2025, and Q1 2026 accelerated again to $617.8M. Operating income scaled from $495.8M to $685.8M to $845.1M across those same years, which is consistent with genuine platform economics rather than one-off market luck. If that latest quarter is closer to the new base than a peak, then the current valuation compresses quickly: annualizing the $205.3M of Q1 2026 net income gets you about $821M, already near 2025 levels despite the suspicion around Q4, and if 2026 earnings move toward $900M-$950M on sustained revenue above $2.3B, then $98 looks quite reasonable and perhaps cheap. The debt-free balance sheet also gives management room to keep compounding value through buybacks or acquisitions without financial strain.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2026 is not just another “good volatility year” but a higher structural earnings plateau. If the next two quarters hold revenue above $560M and net margin above 33% without another obviously anomalous quarter, I would stop treating 2025’s earnings spike as partly non-recurring and would move more constructive, because that would imply annual revenue power of at least $2.25B and cleaner EPS support for a price above $110. Conversely, if revenue falls back toward the $500M-$520M range and margins slip under 30%, that would confirm the market is right to cap the multiple, and I would want the stock in the low $80s to get interested. For now, the business deserves respect; the valuation does not yet demand action.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a high-quality cash compounder that has quietly scaled into a $2 billion revenue franchise while expanding economics rather than diluting them. Revenue climbed from $1.08B in 2021 to $2.05B in 2025, a 17–24% CAGR depending on the window, while operating income more than doubled to $845M and net income nearly quadrupled to $813M. Free cash flow hit $1.13B on only $41M of capex—an extraordinary 55% FCF margin that leaves the company with $2.08B net cash and zero debt. The most recent quarter is the tell: $618M revenue in Q1 2026 versus a $510–520M run-rate through most of 2025, a clear 21% year-over-year step-up that undercuts the “growth is over” narrative. Margins remain elite—gross 67%, operating 41%, net ~40% on a clean annual basis—despite the anomalous 62% net margin spike in Q4 2025 that looks one-time. At $98 and 26x trailing earnings, 10.3x sales and 13.9x EV/EBITDA, the market is capitalizing this infrastructure business as if mid-teens growth is already baked in and fading, yet the trailing three-year acceleration and the latest print say otherwise. ROE of 11% looks pedestrian only because the balance sheet is over-capitalized; strip the excess cash and the underlying returns on invested capital sit closer to the mid-teens with almost no financial leverage.
The electronification runway in rates and credit remains the structural driver, and the data show operating leverage still kicking in rather than saturating. Insider activity is noise—routine awards and modest sales—while FCF quality is pristine. Relative to capital-markets peers and pure-play market infrastructure names, a 5%+ FCF yield on a business still growing high-teens with pricing power and a near-monopoly position in several fixed-income verticals is not expensive; it is a discount to durability.
The strongest counter-argument is cyclicality masquerading as secular growth. The 2023–2025 surge coincided with the most violent rates regime in decades; average daily volumes and duration volatility are mean-reverting, and a prolonged low-vol, tight-spread environment would compress the top line faster than any model currently assumes. Bloomberg, CME and bank-sponsored platforms are not standing still, and any material share loss in the higher-growth credit or swaps segments would justify the market’s skepticism that management’s mid-single-digit long-term CAGR is already optimistic. The valuation synthesis itself is internally conflicted—composite fair value near $100 versus a signal-adjusted $146—so the “48% upside” claim rests on growth persistence that has not yet been stress-tested in a calm rates market. Revenue confidence is already flagged as decelerating on a sequential basis before the Q1 pop, and at 10x sales any multiple compression from fintech re-rating would erase the apparent discount quickly. I weigh these risks as real but secondary: the Q1 2026 acceleration and the still-expanding margins suggest the moat is converting share even as volatility normalizes, and the fortress balance sheet gives management years of optionality the bears under-count.
I would flip to a clear overvalued stance if the next two quarters show revenue settling back below $530M with flat or declining volumes, or if FCF margins compress below 45% on rising competitive spend. Sustained 15%+ organic growth with stable share would push me to higher conviction undervalued.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Revenue nearly doubled from $1.08B (2021) to $2.05B (2025), a ~17% CAGR, while gross margin expanded from 62.2% to 67.3% and operating margin from 34.5% to 41.2% — clear operating leverage on a scaling platform business. Net income more than tripled ($227M to $813M) and FCF doubled to $1.13B, giving an OCF/NI of 1.97x and negative accruals (-5.2% of assets), both indicating pristine earnings quality. Altman Z of 14.01 and $2.08B net cash (no debt overhang implied) place this among the financially safest listed businesses.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Customer/counterparty concentration and top-client revenue share
- Segment mix (rates vs credit vs equities vs money markets) and organic vs acquired growth (ICD acquisition contribution)
- Recurring/subscription vs transaction-based revenue split
- Competitive position vs MarketAxess, Bloomberg, CME BrokerTec in each asset class
- Nature of the 10 insider sales — 10b5-1 plans or discretionary
The composite fair value of $100.07 lands within 2% of the $98.41 price - the tightest possible read on 'fairly valued.' The signal-adjusted FV of $146 leans entirely on the DCF at $159, which itself is doing all the heavy lifting on the bull side; the EPV floor of $40 and anchored-PE of $41 both scream that stripped of growth assumptions, this business supports less than half the current price. Averaging methods gives you roughly today's quote, which is exactly what an efficient market does to a well-followed Fortress-quality name.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Rate-volatility sensitivity in transaction-fee guidance
- Credit and ETF segment volume trends vs Bloomberg/MarketAxess share
- Terminal growth and margin assumptions embedded in sell-side DCFs
- Any capital-return acceleration (buybacks) that would shift deserved value
Tradeweb sits in a genuinely quiet sentiment pocket. The archetype is 'quiet-quality' with minimal narrative intensity and low cult coefficient - meaning almost no one on the tape is telling a loud story about this name, bull or bear. That matters: without an active narrative, macro cross-currents and news drive the marginal move, and TW's low 0.62 beta damps even those. The neutral-to-slightly-tailwind regime (VIX 16, S&P just 1.6% off highs) is a mild positive but not the kind of risk-on euphoria that lifts capital-markets plumbing names. Recent news is constructive but unspectacular - Q2 beat, buybacks, a new dividend - the kind of coverage that reinforces the quiet-compounder frame without igniting momentum. Analyst tone implied by target revisions and the DCF discount suggests skepticism about growth durability (low vol, tight spreads compressing volumes), which is a soft, persistent headwind rather than an acute one. Net: the forces roughly cancel. A stretched market PE (26.9) and 4.68% 10y are a generic drag on all equities, but TW's low beta and defensive cash-flow profile mute that pressure. There's no narrative collapse to fear and no narrative surge to ride - the stock trades on its own numbers.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether fixed-income volatility picks up (would revive the volumes narrative and shift intensity higher)
- Any analyst upgrade cycle or target revisions post-Q2 print
- Signs of narrative activation - sell-side notes framing TW as an AI/electronification winner
- Competitive news from Bloomberg, MarketAxess, or CME that could crack the moat story
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, TW was $100.48. We expect it to be $118.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $78.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.