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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Tyler Technologies Inc. (TYL) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -1 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 71 · Value -59 · Sentiment -40 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $210.43 vs $309.60 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Tyler Technologies Inc.
TYL NYSETyler Technologies Inc. is a U.S.-based software and technology company that delivers integrated solutions for the public sector. Headquartered in Plano, Texas, it focuses on state and local governments, courts, public safety agencies, school districts, and other public institutions, providing systems that support core administrative and citizen-facing functions. Its Enterprise Software segment offers applications for public administration, enterprise resource planning, courts and justice, public safety, property appraisal and tax, permitting and licensing, and school administration. The Platform Technologies segment provides digital government services, online portals, payment processing, and transaction-based solutions that help agencies manage electronic interactions with residents and businesses. Tyler Technologies’ products are typically delivered as mission-critical, often cloud-hosted software combined with implementation, support, and data services, enabling clients to improve efficiency, transparency, and service delivery across their operations. Founded in the United States and operating primarily in North America with select international reach, the company is a leading specialist in government technology and public-sector software.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 7.20
Total Equity: $3.70B
Shares: 43,812,000
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.02B
EBITDA: $496.03M
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.02B
Revenue: $2.33B
Revenue: $2.33B
Revenue: $2.33B
Total Equity: $3.70B
Tax Rate: 19.1%
Equity: $3.70B
Total Debt: $0.00
Cash: $1.02B
Current Liabilities: $1.76B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $0.00
Total Equity: $3.70B
Shares: 43,812,000
Shares: 43,812,000
CapEx: -$16.02M
Shares: 43,812,000
Stock Price: $309.60
Net Income: $315.60M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:07pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $2.1B | $2.3B |
| Cost of Revenue | $882.6M | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| Gross Profit | $709.6M | $783.9M | $861.1M | $935.8M | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $390.6M | $403.1M | $458.3M | $458.7M | $465.0M |
| Operating Income | $180.7M | $214.2M | $218.5M | $299.5M | $357.7M |
| Net Income | $161.5M | $164.2M | $165.9M | $263.0M | $315.6M |
| EBITDA | $316.4M | $373.3M | $372.6M | $443.0M | $496.0M |
| EPS | $3.95 | $3.95 | $3.95 | $6.17 | $7.32 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.82 | $3.87 | $3.88 | $6.05 | $7.20 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:41pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $309.2M | $173.9M | $165.5M | $744.7M | $1.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $964.3M | $847.2M | $860.6M | $1.4B | $1.8B |
| Total Assets | $4.7B | $4.7B | $4.7B | $5.2B | $5.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $829.5M | $889.7M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.8B |
| Long-Term Debt | $718.5M | $957.4M | $596.2M | $597.9M | — |
| Total Liabilities | $2.4B | $2.1B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| Total Equity | $2.3B | $2.6B | $2.9B | $3.4B | $3.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $1.3B | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.2B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:07pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $371.8M | $381.5M | $380.4M | $624.6M | $653.5M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$33.9M | -$22.5M | -$20.5M | -$20.5M | -$16.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | $337.8M | $358.9M | $359.9M | $604.1M | $637.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.1B | -$163.9M | -$62.8M | -$1.4M | -$83.7M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$13.0M | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$174.7M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$294.5M | -$135.3M | -$8.4M | $579.2M | $270.7M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 2:07pm (21d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +16.2% | +5.5% | +9.5% | +9.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +10.5% | +9.9% | +8.7% | +15.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | +18.5% | +2.0% | +37.1% | +19.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +1.7% | +1.0% | +58.5% | +20.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +18.0% | -0.2% | +18.9% | +12.0% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 2, 2026 1:41pm (21d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1990-01-31 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 1989-11-02 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 1989-04-26 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 1989-02-01 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 1988-11-03 | $0.00 | — | — | — |
| 1988-08-22 | $1.11 | — | — | — |
| 1988-08-09 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 1988-04-27 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 1988-02-03 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 1987-10-29 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 1987-07-29 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
| 1987-04-29 | $0.01 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:13Even the bull case prices 53% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 70%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($309.60) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +16% | 15.4% | $144.64 | -53% |
| Base — stabilizes | +11% | 13.4% | $108.28 | -65% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +5% | 11.4% | $79.37 | -74% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 13.2% | $93.39 | -70% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: TYL is compounding revenue at ~9% (Q1'26 $613.5M vs Q1'25 $565.2M = 8.5% YoY; FY25 $2.33B vs FY24 $2.14B = 8.9%), with operating margin expanding from 11.4% in 2021 to 15.3% in 2025 and FCF conversion running at an eye-watering $637.5M on $2.33B revenue (27.4% FCF margin). Capex is $16M — negligible. Balance sheet is clean: $1.02B cash, zero debt tag, $3.7B equity. This is a genuinely high-quality compounder. But at $12.74B market cap with $315.6M net income, that's a 40x trailing P/E and roughly 20x EV/FCF — not cheap for 9% top-line growth. The earnings CAGR of 38% is a base-effect artifact from 2021's depressed $161.5M coming off the NIC acquisition; the run-rate story is ~9% revenue + margin expansion, not a 38% earner.
The prior models are largely aligned that TYL is fully priced, and I agree with the direction but want to sharpen the numbers. The synthesis's $209 composite / $255 signal-adjusted fair value looks reasonable to slightly punitive. On $637.5M FCF growing 10-12% (revenue + modest margin creep), a 25x FCF multiple gets you ~$16B EV or ~$385/share — that's the bull case. A 20x multiple gets $12.75B, essentially spot on today's price. The narrative layer's $255 DCF for 7-8% organic anchored value feels right for a base case; the gap to $310 is the M&A/pricing-power optionality premium. Where I dissent from the synthesis is the magnitude — calling this 17.6% overvalued understates the FCF quality. This isn't a 43x P/E stock in economic reality; GAAP earnings are depressed by stock-comp and amortization from acquisitions. On FCF, it's ~20x, which for a monopoly-esque recurring revenue business with 95%+ retention isn't egregious.
The contrarian bear case the models undersell: Q4'25 revenue of $575.2M was a sequential *decline* from Q3'25's $595.9M, and Q1'26 at $613.5M shows the deceleration trend. The "decelerating quarterly trend" flag is real — 2025 quarters bounced between $565M and $596M before Q1'26 broke out. Net margin also swings 11.4%-14.3% quarter to quarter, suggesting either seasonality or lumpiness in license recognition that could mask deceleration. If organic growth is actually 6-7% (rest being M&A), then the anchored fair value drops toward $220-230 and the 17.6% overvaluation is closer to 30%. The bear narrative's point about TAM consolidation nearing completion is the sneaky risk — Tyler has been the roll-up king of muni software; if acquisition targets thin out or multiples paid rise, the growth algorithm breaks. Also worth noting: ROE of 8.5% and ROIC of 10.8% are mediocre for a "monopoly" — the goodwill from acquisitions is dragging returns, which argues the reinvestment story isn't as high-quality as the FCF headline suggests.
Insider activity is uninformative — a smattering of option exercises and small awards, no meaningful open-market buying or selling to read either way. Data staleness is a concern: latest quarter dated 2026-03-31 with insider activity through mid-2026 suggests this file is fresh, but the annual balance sheet is year-end 2025 and shows "—" for total debt which is either truly zero or a data gap (given the acquisition history, verify — Tyler carried ~$500M in debt post-NIC deal historically). My verdict: I partially agree with the synthesis — TYL is modestly overvalued, not deeply so. Fair value on FCF-based reasoning is $255-275, not $209. At $309, you're paying a ~15-20% premium for a business that deserves *some* premium but not this much given decelerating organic growth and mediocre ROIC. A patient buyer waits for $260 or a growth reacceleration print; existing holders shouldn't panic-sell a compounder of this quality. The 50% drawdown from $621 already flushed the froth — the remaining overvaluation is modest, not egregious.
GPT Reading
Tyler looks like exactly what the market thinks it is: a very good business, and at $309 it is still not a cheap stock. The operating record is strong. Revenue has climbed from $1.59B in 2021 to $2.33B in 2025, a 10%ish annualized pace, while operating income nearly doubled from $180.7M to $357.7M and net income rose from $161.5M to $315.6M. That is not financial engineering either: 2025 operating cash flow was $653.5M and free cash flow was $637.5M, more than 2x reported net income because capex is only $16M. The balance sheet is pristine with $1.02B of cash and no debt. For a government software vendor with sticky systems and long customer lives, those are elite traits. The issue is that the stock already capitalizes most of that quality.
What stands out in the quarterlies is not deterioration, but moderation. Revenue moved from $541.0M in 2Q24 to $613.5M in 1Q26; good, but not explosive. The most recent quarter was up 8.5% year over year against 1Q25, and trailing annual growth from 2024 to 2025 was 8.9%. Net margins have held in a tight 11%-14% band, with 1Q26 at 13.2%, essentially flat versus 14.3% a year earlier. That tells me Tyler has become a compounding execution story rather than a rerating story. A 43x P/E, 5.8x sales, and 23.6x EV/EBITDA are rich multiples for a company growing high single digits with mid-teens operating margins. Even giving full credit for the cash-rich, debt-free model and unusually high cash conversion, I have trouble underwriting much upside from here unless growth reaccelerates into the low teens or margins break materially above the current 15.3% operating level.
The cash flow strength is the main reason I am not outright bearish. On free cash flow, the stock is closer to 20x 2025 FCF ($12.74B market cap against $637.5M FCF), and enterprise value is lower because of the $1.02B cash balance. That is much more digestible than 43x earnings and explains why simple P/E-based screens can make Tyler look more expensive than the business really is. But even on that friendlier lens, this is a premium multiple for a mature software name whose recent quarterly revenue pattern has been basically flat-to-up sequentially rather than accelerating. The market seems to be paying for durability, customer stickiness, and public-sector mission criticality. Fair enough. I just do not see enough in the raw numbers to justify paying a substantial premium above a mid-$200s value range.
The best case against my caution is straightforward: Tyler may deserve to be valued more like infrastructure software than ordinary application software. Gross margin of 46.5% is lower than flashy SaaS peers, but the economic quality may actually be higher because customer churn is low, contracts are embedded, and government replacement cycles are painful. If free cash flow continues to outrun earnings by this margin, and if earnings keep compounding at 15%-20% while revenue grows 8%-10%, then a 23x EV/EBITDA multiple is not egregious. The annual progression from $214.2M operating income in 2022 to $357.7M in 2025 is real evidence of operating leverage, and the recent quarters do not show collapse. A bull would also point out that the stock has already fallen dramatically from prior highs, so some valuation air has already come out even as fundamentals improved.
What would change my mind is also straightforward. If Tyler can post two or three quarters of sustained double-digit revenue growth, say 11%-13% year over year, while lifting operating margin toward 17%-18% and keeping free cash flow above $650M-$700M annualized, then today’s price would start to look reasonable and perhaps attractive. Conversely, if growth slips toward 6%-7% while net margin stays stuck around 12%-13%, the current multiple will look plainly too high and I would want a price beginning with a 2, likely closer to $250 than $310, before getting interested.
Grok Reading
Tyler’s numbers describe a high-quality cash compounder that has already done most of its easy margin work. Revenue climbed from $1.59B in 2021 to $2.33B in 2025 at a 9.3% CAGR, with the latest quarter printing $613.5M and trailing twelve-month growth still near 9%. Net income more than doubled over the same span to $315.6M, driving the 37.9% earnings CAGR and lifting operating margin to 15.3% and net margin to 13.5%. The real standout is cash conversion: $653.5M of operating cash flow and only $16M of capex produced $637.5M of free cash flow—a 27% FCF margin on a debt-free balance sheet that holds $1.02B in cash against $3.70B of equity. At a $12.74B market cap the stock yields roughly 5% free cash flow, which is respectable for sticky vertical software. Yet the market is still paying 43× trailing earnings, 5.8× sales and 23.6× EBITDA for mid-single-digit organic growth that secondary signals already flag as decelerating. ROE of 8.5% and ROIC of 10.8% are pedestrian for those multiples; the company is simply not generating enough incremental return on its large equity base to justify a growth-stock premium once the margin-expansion runway shortens.
The valuation synthesis that pins fair value near $255 (signal-adjusted) therefore looks directionally correct. A business growing revenue at 9% with limited further operating leverage should not trade at nearly 18× free cash flow after netting the cash pile, especially when public-sector budget cycles remain a macro headwind. The 50% drawdown from the $621 peak has already removed the most egregious froth, but it has not brought the shares to a level where the forward math is compelling. Insider activity is noise—mostly option exercises and small awards—and does nothing to signal undervaluation.
The strongest contrary case rests on durability rather than growth. Tyler’s municipal and court systems carry genuine multi-decade switching costs; the platform-monopoly narrative is not pure storytelling. If management can keep extracting 100–150 bp of annual price and mix while folding in bolt-on acquisitions at reasonable multiples, the 9% top-line can persist longer than a pure organic model assumes, and the fortress balance sheet gives them dry powder to do so. FCF of $637M also means the company can repurchase a meaningful slice of the float or fund M&A without leverage, supporting a higher terminal multiple than a typical mature earner. A bull who capitalizes that cash flow stream at 22–24× and layers on modest multiple expansion from successful cross-sell could defend a mid-$300s price. I weigh this less heavily because the same data already show revenue growth flattening quarter-to-quarter and ROIC stuck in the low double digits; pricing power that is merely “durable” does not automatically clear a 43× earnings hurdle when organic growth is no longer double-digit.
I would reverse to a neutral or constructive stance if the next two quarters deliver sequential revenue acceleration above 11% year-over-year while holding operating margin at or above 15.5%, or if management announces a material capital-return program that shrinks the share count by at least 4–5% annually. Conversely, any guidance cut that implies full-year 2026 revenue growth below 7% or a visible stall in free-cash-flow conversion would confirm the overvaluation and push fair value closer to the low-$200s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Tyler is a mature earner showing genuine operating leverage: revenue compounded from $1.59B (2021) to $2.33B (2025), gross margin expanded from 44.6% to 46.5%, and operating margin stepped up from ~11% to 15.3%. Net income nearly doubled from $161.5M to $315.6M while FCF surged from $337.8M to $637.5M - a 27% FCF margin. Earnings quality is high: OCF/NI of 2.27x, negative accruals (-5.3% of assets), Beneish M at -2.72, and Altman Z of 5.13 all point to real, cash-backed earnings rather than accrual-driven optics.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- SaaS vs license/maintenance revenue mix and net revenue retention
- Customer concentration and contract length in 10-K
- Bridge between net income and FCF - deferred revenue and D&A components
- Any acquisition-related intangibles amortization suppressing GAAP margin vs cash margin
- SBC grant guidelines and buyback authorization capacity
The e2e synthesis pins signal-adjusted fair value at $255.15 and composite FV at $209.57 against a $309.60 price - an 18% overpay on the more generous number and closer to 32% on the composite. The DCF ($255.88) and anchored P/E ($240.36) cluster in the $240-256 zone, giving a defensible deserved-value band; the $86 EPV floor is a runaway low-end I discount as a stress case, not a target. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted, and the Strong business grade justifies pricing at the upper end of that band - but not above it.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- SaaS ARR growth and net revenue retention in latest quarter
- Public-sector deal win rates vs cloud/open-source competitors
- Stock-based comp as % of revenue and buyback pace
- Any guidance revisions on margin trajectory or bookings
Tyler is a low-beta (0.82) platform-monopoly story that normally floats above the tape, but the immediate pressure is negative and stock-specific: the July 30 print delivered strong SaaS metrics (21.7% SaaS growth, record bookings) yet only a 'slight bottom-line beat,' and headlines explicitly frame the stock as 'thrashed.' For a name whose entire premium rests on durable pricing power and flawless execution, a reaction like that is exactly the kind of narrative crack that lingers -- it signals the buy-side bar has risen faster than results, and the CODY acquisition (more M&A-driven growth) plays into the bear framing of decelerating organics masked by deals. Macro is a mild secondary headwind rather than a decisive one. The tape is technically neutral-to-slightly-positive (+22), VIX is tame at 16, and the 0.82 beta blunts market swings -- but 10y at 4.68% and a 26.9x market PE press hardest on long-duration, premium-multiple software, which is precisely this cohort. Analyst tone around a 'wanted more' quarter typically means estimate trims and target nudges lower in the coming days. Net: the narrative is durable but its intensity is only moderate and just took a hit; there is no cult bid to absorb the disappointment. Pressure leans headwind, not catastrophic.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Sell-side target revisions and estimate cuts in the 1-2 weeks after the Q2 print
- Whether organic (ex-M&A) growth commentary firms or softens on follow-up conference appearances
- Any rotation into defensive/GARP software that would give TYL a bid despite the print
- 10y yield direction -- a move back under 4.4% would relieve premium-multiple pressure
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.