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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Ulta Beauty Inc. (ULTA) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -22 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 31 · Value -65 · Sentiment -13 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $460.84 vs $534.41 at analysis
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Ulta Beauty Inc.
ULTA NASDAQUlta Beauty Inc. is a specialty beauty retailer offering a comprehensive range of cosmetics, skincare, haircare, fragrance, and bath and body products. The company operates a single, integrated business model that combines retail stores, in-store salon services, and e-commerce to serve customers across the United States. Ulta Beauty’s assortment spans mass to prestige brands, as well as professional salon products, beauty tools, and brushes, catering to a wide spectrum of consumer preferences and price points. Its stores typically feature full-service salons providing hair, skin, and brow services, which complement product sales and create a one-stop beauty destination. Ulta Beauty also sells products through its digital platforms, integrating online and in-store experiences such as buy-online-pickup-in-store. Founded in 1990 and headquartered in Bolingbrook, Illinois, Ulta Beauty plays a significant role in the U.S. beauty market as a multibrand retailer that bridges the gap between drugstore and high-end beauty offerings.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 25.64
Total Equity: $2.80B
Shares: 44,991,000
Total Debt: $62.29M
Cash: $424.24M
EBITDA: $1.83B
Total Debt: $62.29M
Cash: $424.24M
Revenue: $12.39B
Revenue: $12.39B
Revenue: $12.39B
Total Equity: $2.80B
Tax Rate: 24.4%
Equity: $2.80B
Total Debt: $62.29M
Cash: $424.24M
Current Liabilities: $2.22B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $62.29M
Total Equity: $2.80B
Shares: 44,991,000
Shares: 44,991,000
CapEx: -$434.83M
Shares: 44,991,000
Stock Price: $534.41
Net Income: $1.15B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:50pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $8.6B | $10.2B | $11.2B | $11.3B | $12.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.3B | $6.2B | $6.8B | $6.9B | $7.5B |
| Gross Profit | $3.4B | $4.0B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.1B | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.3B |
| Operating Income | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.6B | $1.5B |
| Net Income | $985.8M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | $1.2B |
| EBITDA | $1.6B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.8B |
| EPS | $18.09 | $24.17 | $26.18 | $25.44 | $25.72 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $17.98 | $24.01 | $26.03 | $25.34 | $25.64 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:18pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $431.6M | $737.9M | $766.6M | $703.2M | $424.2M |
| Total Current Assets | $2.3B | $2.7B | $2.8B | $3.0B | $3.1B |
| Total Assets | $4.8B | $5.4B | $5.7B | $6.0B | $7.0B |
| Current Liabilities | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $2.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $3.2B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.5B | $4.2B |
| Total Equity | $1.5B | $2.0B | $2.3B | $2.5B | $2.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $653.4M | $995.8M | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:50pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.1B | $1.5B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$172.2M | -$312.1M | -$435.3M | -$374.5M | -$434.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | $887.1M | $1.2B | $1.0B | $964.1M | $1.1B |
| Acquisitions (net) | — | — | — | — | -$386.8M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | -$195.4M | -$199.7M | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$1.5B | -$900.0M | -$995.7M | -$1.0B | -$901.4M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$614.5M | $306.3M | $28.7M | -$63.4M | -$279.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:50pm (20d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +18.3% | +9.8% | +0.8% | +9.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +20.1% | +8.3% | +0.1% | +10.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | +26.3% | +2.4% | -6.7% | -2.0% |
| Net Income Growth | +26.0% | +3.9% | -7.0% | -4.0% |
| EBITDA Growth | +20.1% | +2.2% | -4.7% | +0.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 3, 2026 5:18pm (20d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012-03-16 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:13Even the bull case prices 16% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 40%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($534.41) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +13% | 10.8% | $451.58 | -16% |
| Base — stabilizes | +9% | 9.4% | $347.40 | -35% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +4% | 8.0% | $262.07 | -51% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +12% | 7.7% | $322.58 | -40% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Independently, the quarterly tape is more interesting than the "mature earner" label suggests. Q1 FY26 (May '26) revenue of $3.16B is up 10.9% YoY vs $2.85B, and Q4 FY25 was $3.90B vs $3.49B (+11.7%). That's an acceleration off the ~1% growth Ulta printed in FY24 (rev $11.21B → $11.30B). Net income in Q1 FY26 was $340.5M (10.8% margin) vs $305.1M (10.7%) — margins are holding, not compressing, which directly contradicts the Market Forces "losing the profitability battle" thesis. Trailing four quarters revenue is ~$12.7B, NI ~$1.19B; on a $22.97B market cap that's ~19x trailing earnings and ~1.8x sales, with $1.07B FCF (~4.7% yield). ROIC of 47% and D/E of 0.02 are pristine. This is not a company in structural decline — it's a company that stumbled in FY24, is re-accelerating, and the market has already partially credited it (stock 25% off highs but still above the DCF anchor).
Where I diverge from the synthesis: the $441 DCF fair value implicitly extrapolates the FY24 slump. If you use the last two quarters' run-rate (~10% growth) and hold 9–10% net margins, FY26 earnings land around $1.30–1.35B, putting forward PE at ~17x — not expensive for a 47% ROIC retailer with net cash. The synthesis "17.5% overvalued" call rests on mid-single-digit growth assumptions that the most recent two prints just violated. Conversely, the bull case has its own problem: Q4 FY25 NI of $356.7M was actually *down* from Q4 FY24's $393.3M despite higher revenue — so operating leverage is negative on the biggest quarter of the year. Gross margin compressed from 39.1% (FY25) with op margin down from 14.8% to 12.4% over two years. Growth is being bought with margin, which is exactly the Sephora/Amazon-pressure story, just muted.
The contrarian argument writes itself and the models mostly miss its sharpest form: beauty is cyclical, and the FY25/FY26 reacceleration coincides with a strong-ish consumer and prestige-beauty tailwind (fragrance, premium skincare). If discretionary rolls over — and "Macro Headwinds" is flagged — a specialty retailer with 12% op margins and rising labor/rent could see EBIT down 20% quickly. At $534, you're paying a premium to a DCF that assumes stability; you get punished twice in a downturn (multiple contraction + earnings cut). The Sephora-at-Kohl's rollout is now largely lapped, so that specific bear catalyst is arguably spent — but Amazon Premium Beauty is quietly building, and prestige brands' DTC ambitions haven't peaked. Insider activity is basically neutral noise (routine awards, tiny sale) — I wouldn't read anything from it, and I disagree with anyone extracting signal from a 383-share sale against 10x 404-share grants.
Net: I partially dissent from the synthesis. "Fully priced" is directionally right but the $441 anchor is too low given the acceleration in the last two quarters — a fairer range is $475–520, meaning the stock is modestly rich, not 17.5% overvalued. I'd also push back on the Market Forces "neutral/losing profitability" framing: two consecutive quarters of ~11% growth with flat-to-up margins is not what losing looks like; it's what a well-run specialty retailer looks like mid-cycle. The narrative layer nails it — this is a steady compounder with a ~10–15% confidence premium, and that premium is fragile to any comp miss. I would not short and would not buy here. A $475 entry (~11% lower, ~16x forward) is where the risk/reward actually pays; below $450 it becomes compelling given the balance sheet and FCF. The Q2 FY26 print is the fulcrum — if comps decelerate below 5% or gross margin slips another 50bps, the DCF anchor reasserts fast.
GPT Reading
Ulta’s numbers read like a very high-quality retailer that has moved from “growth + margin expansion” into “growth offset by margin pressure.” Revenue is still healthy: fiscal 2026 sales were $12.39B, up 9.6% from $11.30B, and the latest quarter at $3.16B grew about 10.9% year over year versus $2.85B. That is not a broken top line. What has changed is the earnings conversion. Operating income slipped to $1.53B from $1.56B despite nearly $1.1B of added revenue, and net income fell to $1.15B from $1.20B. Quarterly margins tell the same story: the latest quarter printed 10.8% net margin versus 10.7% a year ago, but the intervening quarters were weaker, including 8.1% in the November quarter and 9.1% in the January quarter, leaving trailing annual net margin at 9.3% versus 10.6% in fiscal 2025 and 11.5% in fiscal 2024. So the core fact is not demand collapse; it is a retailer still attracting spend but doing so with less incremental profitability.
The valuation is where I part company with any bullish “quality compounder” reflex. At $534, the stock is worth about $23B, or roughly 20.8x trailing earnings, 1.94x sales, and 12.9x EV/EBITDA. Those are not absurd multiples for a structurally advantaged business, but they are rich for one whose five-year revenue CAGR is only 5.2%, earnings CAGR is negative 5.5%, and free cash flow CAGR is just 1.3%. Even using the strong cash generation story, $1.07B of free cash flow is a 4.7% FCF yield on the current market cap. For a low-debt company with excellent returns on capital, that can be acceptable if earnings are set to reaccelerate. The problem is the reported data do not yet show that. Ulta still generates elite economics — 39.1% gross margin, 12.4% operating margin, 41% ROE, 47% ROIC, and net cash given just $62M of debt against $424M of cash — but investors are paying up as if the recent margin reset is temporary and largely solved. I do not see enough evidence of that in the actual progression of annual profit.
What stands out most is the tension between business quality and stock cheapness. This is a great business, but great businesses are not always great stocks at any price. The annual pattern since 2024 is clear: revenue went from $11.21B to $11.30B to $12.39B, while net income went from $1.29B down to $1.20B and then down again to $1.15B. That is a meaningful deterioration in earnings power despite scale gains. The balance sheet removes existential risk, and operating cash flow of $1.50B against $434.8M of capex shows the model still throws off real cash, but the market is not valuing Ulta as a no-growth cash cow; it is valuing it as a resilient, still-compounding franchise. If the normalized earnings base is now closer to $1.1B-$1.2B than the $1.3B many investors once extrapolated, then a low-20s multiple is too full. I land closer to high teens earnings for this setup, especially in a competitive category where margin protection matters more than one strong revenue quarter.
The best counterargument is straightforward and respectable: the market may be right to look through the earnings dip because Ulta remains the category leader and the top line has plainly reaccelerated. The quarterly revenue sequence of $2.53B, $2.55B, $3.49B, $2.85B, $2.79B, $2.86B, $3.90B, and $3.16B shows a larger business continuing to grow, not one in secular decline. Latest-quarter net income of $340.5M was up from $305.1M a year earlier, so the most recent read actually hints that pressure may be stabilizing. With almost no leverage, a current ratio of 1.41, and over $1B of annual free cash flow, Ulta has room to repurchase stock, reinvest in stores and digital, and absorb competition better than weaker peers. If margins merely stop falling, today’s multiple can work. I weigh that less heavily because one better quarter does not erase two years of annual profit compression, and mature retailers rarely deserve a premium valuation until the margin floor is visible in the annual numbers, not just suggested in one print.
What would change my mind is evidence that fiscal 2026 was the trough, not the new normal. Specifically, I would want to see annual operating income recover above $1.60B while revenue continues above high-single-digit growth, or at minimum two to three consecutive quarters with net margin back sustainably above 10% on year-over-year sales growth. If free cash flow moves back toward $1.2B-$1.3B without debt-funded financial engineering, then paying above 20x earnings becomes easier to defend. Conversely, if revenue stays strong but annual net income remains stuck around $1.1B or slips below it, the stock still has room to de-rate even after the drawdown from its peak.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a high-quality retailer whose growth engine is still running while its earnings engine is quietly stalling. Ulta just put up $12.39B in fiscal 2026 revenue, a clean 9.6% leap from the prior year’s $11.30B after two years of near-stagnation, and the two most recent quarters confirm the reacceleration—$3.90B holiday and $3.16B spring, both double-digit ahead of the year-ago prints. Yet operating income fell from $1.68B to $1.53B over the same three-year stretch, net income slid from $1.29B to $1.15B, and the earnings CAGR sits at –5.5%. Gross margin is holding near 39%, but the operating line is absorbing the competitive tax: Sephora’s Kohl’s rollout, Amazon’s prestige push, and the labor intensity of salon services are converting incremental sales into thinner dollars. The balance sheet remains pristine—$62M debt against $424M cash and a 0.02 debt-to-equity ratio—and ROIC of 47% plus $1.07B of free cash flow prove the core economics are still elite. At $534 the stock trades 20.8× trailing earnings and roughly 21× FCF; that multiple assumes the margin bleed stops and the 9–10% top-line clip continues. The data do not yet underwrite both.
The contradiction with the quantitative models is therefore real but incomplete. Their $441 composite fair value correctly flags that the market is paying a 15–20% narrative premium for “steady compounder” status, yet it under-weights the fresh evidence of revenue reacceleration and the fortress capital structure that gives Ulta years of dry powder for buybacks or share gains. A smart opponent will hammer the earnings trajectory: three consecutive years of lower operating profit despite higher sales is not a temporary blip, and a 12.9× EV/EBITDA multiple on a business whose FCF CAGR is a meager 1.3% leaves zero room for a consumer-discretionary downturn or further salon-margin compression. They will also note that the PE of 20.8× sits well above the historical band for specialty retail once growth decelerates into the mid-single digits. I weigh those points seriously; they keep me from calling the stock cheap. I simply refuse to treat the recent 10%+ quarterly revenue prints as noise—loyalty-program stickiness and prestige mix are still converting into traffic, and the cash-flow quality remains high enough that a modest multiple contraction, not a collapse, is the base case.
What flips the verdict is straightforward: two more quarters of operating-margin stabilization above 12.5% alongside sustained mid-to-high single-digit comps would justify the current price and push fair value toward $560–580. Conversely, a holiday-quarter revenue miss below 4% growth or another 50–75 bp operating-margin step-down would confirm the structural-profitability thesis and open a path to the low $400s.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Ulta is a mature, self-funding beauty retailer producing $1.07B FCF on $12.39B revenue with a fortress-like Altman Z of 6.28, negative accruals (-3.3% of assets), and OCF/NI of 1.17x — mechanical earnings-quality checks are clean and Beneish M at -2.38 shows no manipulation flags. Net cash position ($432M) is modest at 2.2% of market cap but adequate given consistent cash generation. Capital allocation is genuinely shareholder-friendly: diluted shares fell from 54.8M to 45.0M (a -4.8% CAGR), buybacks run 24x SBC, and SBC is a trivial 0.3% of revenue.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether OpM compression reflects wage/rent inflation, promotional intensity, or Sephora-at-Kohl's / Amazon competitive share loss
- Comparable store sales trend and traffic vs ticket decomposition
- Long-term lease obligations and store fleet productivity metrics
- Management commentary on whether margin normalization has a floor
- Any customer or vendor concentration in loyalty program or key beauty brands
The composite fair value of $442 (signal-adjusted $441) sits meaningfully below the $534 price, implying roughly -17% downside to deserved value. The DCF ($407) and EPV floor ($297) both anchor well below spot; only the anchored-PE cross-check at $659 argues for upside, and that method extrapolates a multiple the business earned when operating margins were 16%+, not the current 12.4%. Weighting toward the cash-flow-based methods, which are more defensible given the 370bps margin compression flagged by the quality lens, the honest read is that today's price already embeds a return-to-form on margins that hasn't shown up in results.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the 12.4% operating margin has stabilized or is still trending down in the next print
- Same-store sales trajectory and any commentary on prestige-brand DTC leakage (Sephora at Kohls, Amazon Premium Beauty)
- Salon services segment profitability given wage pressure
- Guidance on SG&A leverage and gross margin cadence for the next 4 quarters
The market regime is mildly constructive (neutral, +22) with VIX at 16 and the S&P only 1.6% off highs, so there is no risk-off wave to punish a 0.88-beta specialty retailer. But 10y at 4.68% and a 26.9 market PE quietly weigh on consumer cyclical multiples, and Ulta is exactly the kind of mature retailer where a rich tape does not lift you but a de-rating would sting. Net macro pressure on THIS name: slight headwind, not decisive. The narrative is a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability steady-compounder story with low cult factor - meaning no mania is bidding it up, but no collapse is dumping it either. There is no active disruption thesis (Amazon/DTC bear is chronic background, not acute), no fresh analyst re-rating cycle in the brief, and the 72h news flow is empty for Ulta itself (the CAVA headline is unrelated). That absence of narrative energy is itself the story: Ulta is not being pushed hard in either direction.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any comp-store sales print or guide that would either validate or crack the steady-compounder story
- Analyst target revisions post next earnings - a wave of cuts would flip tone
- Signs of prestige-beauty share loss to Amazon/Sephora accelerating in scanner data
- A sharper move up in 10y yields that would pressure consumer cyclical multiples more forcefully
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, ULTA was $543.86. We expect it to be $500.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $440.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.