For AI assistants & researchers — machine-readable summary of this page
What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Visa Inc. Class A (V) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score -3 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 85 · Value -75 · Sentiment -37 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $225.75 vs $369.59 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
/llms.txt ·
any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Visa Inc. Class A
V NYSEVisa Inc. Class A is a leading global payments technology company that operates one of the world's largest digital payment networks. It facilitates secure, convenient transactions between consumers, merchants, financial institutions, businesses, and governments across more than 200 countries and territories, supporting over 160 currencies. The company's core purpose is to enable seamless value and information transfer through its advanced processing systems, capable of handling high volumes of transactions efficiently. Visa Inc. Class A powers a wide array of payment products, including credit, debit, and prepaid cards, as well as digital wallets and contactless payments, serving diverse sectors such as retail, travel, e-commerce, and cross-border commerce. Its network connects millions of merchants and billions of cardholders, providing essential infrastructure for everyday purchases and large-scale commercial activities. Founded in 1958 and headquartered in San Francisco, California, Visa Inc. Class A plays a pivotal role in the financial services industry by driving innovation in payment processing and promoting financial inclusion worldwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.20
Total Equity: $37.91B
Shares: 1,966,470,588
Total Debt: $25.17B
Cash: $17.16B
EBITDA: $27.78B
Total Debt: $25.17B
Cash: $17.16B
Revenue: $40.00B
Revenue: $40.00B
Revenue: $40.00B
Total Equity: $37.91B
Tax Rate: 17.1%
Equity: $37.91B
Total Debt: $25.17B
Cash: $17.16B
Current Liabilities: $35.05B
Long-Term Debt: $19.60B
Total Debt: $25.17B
Total Equity: $37.91B
Shares: 1,966,470,588
Shares: 1,966,470,588
CapEx: -$1.48B
Shares: 1,966,470,588
Stock Price: $369.59
Net Income: $20.06B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 2:06pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $24.1B | $29.3B | $32.7B | $35.9B | $40.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.0B | $5.7B | $6.6B | $7.0B | $7.9B |
| Gross Profit | $19.1B | $23.6B | $26.1B | $28.9B | $32.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.3B | $3.9B | $4.2B | $4.8B | $5.6B |
| Operating Income | $15.8B | $19.7B | $21.9B | $24.1B | $26.6B |
| Net Income | $12.3B | $15.0B | $17.3B | $19.7B | $20.1B |
| EBITDA | $16.6B | $20.5B | $22.9B | $25.1B | $27.8B |
| EPS | $5.63 | $7.01 | $8.29 | $9.74 | $10.22 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.63 | $7.00 | $8.28 | $9.73 | $10.20 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 6:47am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $16.5B | $15.7B | $16.3B | $12.0B | $17.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $27.6B | $30.2B | $33.5B | $34.0B | $37.8B |
| Total Assets | $82.9B | $85.5B | $90.5B | $94.5B | $99.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $15.7B | $20.9B | $23.1B | $26.5B | $35.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $20.0B | $20.2B | $20.5B | $20.8B | $19.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $45.3B | $49.9B | $51.8B | $55.4B | $61.7B |
| Total Equity | $37.6B | $35.6B | $38.7B | $39.1B | $37.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $15.4B | $16.1B | $18.0B | $17.3B | $15.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 2:06pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $15.2B | $18.8B | $20.8B | $20.0B | $23.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$705.0M | -$970.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.3B | -$1.5B |
| Free Cash Flow | $14.5B | $17.9B | $19.7B | $18.7B | $21.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$75.0M | -$1.9B | $0 | -$915.0M | -$887.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$3.0B | $2.2B | -$2.3B | $0 | $3.9B |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.8B | -$3.2B | -$3.8B | -$4.2B | -$4.6B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$8.7B | -$11.6B | -$12.1B | -$16.7B | -$18.3B |
| Net Change in Cash | $628.0M | $578.0M | $1.6B | -$2.2B | $5.2B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 2:06pm (22d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +21.6% | +11.4% | +10.0% | +11.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +23.2% | +10.6% | +10.7% | +11.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +24.5% | +11.4% | +9.7% | +10.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +21.5% | +15.5% | +14.3% | +1.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +23.7% | +11.3% | +9.7% | +10.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 1, 2026 2:06pm (22d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-12 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-10 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-12 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2025-08-12 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-13 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2025-02-11 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-12 | $0.59 | — | — | — |
| 2024-08-09 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2024-02-08 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-08 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-10 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-11 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-09 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-09 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-11 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-12 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-10 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-10 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-12 | $0.32 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:15Even the bull case prices 53% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 66%. Caveat: revenue-DCF fits financials poorly (reported revenue omits net interest) — treat the legs as rough.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($369.59) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +23% | 35.0% | $175.12 | -53% |
| Base — stabilizes | +15% | 35.0% | $140.23 | -62% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +8% | 35.0% | $111.24 | -70% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +12% | 35.0% | $125.61 | -66% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: Visa's quarterly revenue has climbed cleanly from $8.90B (Jun-24) to $11.23B (Mar-26), a 26% two-year climb — that's roughly 12% annualized, not decelerating meaningfully. Net margins are oscillating in a 47-54% band with no clear degradation; the "recent_earnings_yoy 1.6%" figure is misleading because Q1-26 NI of $6.02B vs Q1-25 NI of $4.58B is +31%, and the trailing four quarters ($22.23B NI) are up ~13% vs the prior four ($19.89B). So the momentum block understates recent earnings acceleration. FCF conversion is 108% of NI on the annual, ROIC is 48%, and capex is a rounding error at $1.48B on $40B revenue — this is one of the cleanest cash machines in the S&P.
Where I part company with the synthesis: a $208 composite fair value implies Visa should trade at roughly 20x earnings (~$10.30 TTM EPS on ~$21B NI / 1.95B shares). That multiple is reserved for businesses with cyclicality, capital intensity, or terminal-value risk — none of which describe a 50% net margin, 48% ROIC toll road with no meaningful capex and a decades-long duopoly. The DCF is almost certainly using a discount rate and terminal growth combination that penalizes Visa's cash quality. Mastercard trades at ~38x, American Express at ~22x (but with credit risk), and payment networks globally command premiums. A 30-40% discount to intrinsic on Visa would require a specific catalyst — interchange caps in the US, a credible CBDC displacement path, or a stablecoin-based settlement rail achieving merchant scale. None of these are imminent; the Fed's FedNow has been live for two years with negligible impact on card volumes.
The contrarian case is real but narrower than the synthesis suggests. What actually concerns me: (1) FCF CAGR of 4.7% vs revenue CAGR of 10.7% — that's a genuine divergence over five years suggesting cash conversion has softened even as reported earnings compound; (2) the current ratio of 1.08 and debt/equity of 0.66 are fine but not fortress-like for a company this profitable, implying aggressive capital return that's propped up EPS growth via buybacks rather than pure operational leverage; (3) insider activity is unambiguously one-directional — three sales in a single day in July 2026, zero opens, and this pattern is typical for Visa but worth noting at these multiples. The market-forces "neutral" call and the narrative layer's identification of a $140/share story premium are more honest than the synthesis's blanket "overvalued -38%" claim. The story premium is real; the magnitude is exaggerated.
My verdict: Visa is expensive but not 38% overvalued. Fair value on a quality-adjusted basis is closer to $290-310 — roughly 28-30x forward earnings of ~$10.50, which is a mild premium to the S&P and a discount to Mastercard, appropriate for a slower-growing but higher-margin peer. At $369, you're paying ~35x forward for high-single-digit to low-double-digit earnings growth, which prices in perfection. I partially agree with the synthesis direction (overvalued) but strongly dissent on magnitude — the $208 anchor is wrong because it treats Visa like an average business. The prior models are internally inconsistent: market-forces says "neutral," narrative says "anchored with story premium," synthesis says "-38%." The truth is the narrative model got it right — this is a durable story with a modest premium, not a bubble. I would not short this and would not chase it; a pullback to the low $300s would be a legitimate accumulation zone. New money at $369 has a poor risk-reward: limited upside to $400-420 before multiple compression, meaningful downside to $290-310 on any growth stumble or regulatory headline.
GPT Reading
Visa is exactly the kind of business that invites lazy “great company, bad stock” calls, and the first half is unquestionably true. The operating model is absurdly good: in fiscal 2025 it turned $40.0B of revenue into $26.6B of operating income and $20.1B of net income, with 80.4% gross margin, 66.4% operating margin, and 50.2% net margin. Free cash flow was $21.6B on just $1.5B of capex, and ROIC near 48% tells you this is still a tollbooth, not a balance-sheet lender. The quarterly trend also remains healthy, not broken: the last four quarters sum to roughly $42.0B of revenue versus about $37.6B in the prior-year comparable periods, around 11.5%-12% growth, while net income over those same four quarters rose to about $21.8B from roughly $19.9B, even with some quarter-to-quarter margin noise. In other words, the core machine is still compounding at a double-digit top-line pace while sustaining 50%-plus normalized net margins. That is rare at any scale, let alone at nearly $700B of equity value.
What stands out to me, though, is that the market is paying not just for quality but for unusually long-duration perfection. At $369.59, Visa trades at 36.2x earnings, 18.2x sales, 25.1x EV/EBITDA, and roughly 32x free cash flow on 2025’s $21.58B. For a business whose 5-year revenue CAGR is 10.7%, earnings CAGR is 7.8%, and FCF CAGR only 4.7%, that is rich. Even if I give Visa credit for the recent re-acceleration to ~11% revenue growth, the mismatch is obvious: the income statement says “elite mature compounder,” while the multiple says “scarce asset with very low cyclicality and many years of durable double-digit EPS growth.” I don’t think that latter assumption is crazy, but at this size it leaves little room for friction. Recent quarterly net income growth is only 1.6% YoY on the provided momentum snapshot despite 11.3% revenue growth, which is a warning that operating leverage is no longer automatic every quarter. This is still a magnificent business, but the valuation already capitalizes a lot of the next decade’s good news.
I therefore come out modestly negative on the stock at this price, though less bearish than the most punitive model outputs. A “fair” multiple for this level of quality is above the average financial stock and probably above the broad market for a long time; Visa deserves that. But a business growing revenue around 10%-12% with net income growth now less smooth than the mythology suggests should not, in my view, sit comfortably at 36x trailing earnings unless one assumes margin expansion or a clear acceleration in higher-yield volume streams. With $20.1B of annual net income, a 28x-31x earnings range feels more defensible for a dominant but mature network, implying something like $285-$315 per share rather than $370. That is not a call that the moat is cracking; it is a call that the premium has stretched past the underlying growth.
The best argument against my view is simple and strong: Visa has earned the right to look expensive for years, and many investors who fought the premium have just watched the stock keep compounding. The latest quarterly sequence is still excellent: revenue rose from $8.90B in June 2024 to $10.17B in June 2025, from $9.62B in September 2024 to $10.72B in September 2025, from $9.51B in December 2024 to $10.90B in December 2025, and from $9.59B in March 2025 to $11.23B in March 2026. Those are not tired numbers. Net margins in two of the last two quarters are 53%+, and the balance sheet is hardly stressed with $17.2B cash against $25.2B debt. If a company can sustain low-teens revenue growth, 50% net margins, and 20%-plus cash conversion while needing minimal capital, then a conventional “mature” multiple framework may systematically understate value because the moat duration is longer than normal models allow. That is the smartest bull case, and it is why I’m not calling for a collapse.
What would change my mind is not another quarter of 10%-11% revenue growth by itself; the market already assumes that. I would turn more constructive if Visa showed a cleaner re-acceleration in earnings and cash flow than the recent trailing trend implies — specifically, sustained mid-teens net income growth with net margin holding above 52% and annual free cash flow pushing toward $24B-$25B without a valuation reset higher. On the other side, I’d get materially more bearish if revenue slipped back to high-single digits while net income stayed flat-ish, because 36x earnings for a business showing clear mature-law-of-large-numbers deceleration would be hard to defend. As it stands, the company is excellent, the stock is not broken, but the entry price is doing most of the risk creation.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a payments franchise still expanding at a high-single to low-double-digit clip, but one whose earnings power is no longer accelerating in lockstep with the top line. Fiscal 2025 revenue hit $40.0B, up 11.3% from $35.9B, and the last four quarters annualize above $43B with the March 2026 print at $11.23B. Net margins remain elite—53.6% in the latest quarter, 50.2% for the full year—producing $20.1B of net income and $21.6B of free cash flow on only $1.5B of capex. ROE at 53% and ROIC at 48% confirm the economic moat is intact. Yet the growth rates that matter for valuation have cooled: earnings CAGR sits at 7.8%, FCF CAGR at a meager 4.7%, and full-year earnings advanced just 1.6%. The market is paying 36× trailing earnings, 18× sales and 25× EBITDA for a mature earner whose free-cash-flow conversion, while still excellent in absolute dollars, is no longer compounding at the pace the multiple implies.
What stands out is the widening gap between the revenue story and the cash-flow story. Sequential quarters show steady mid-teens year-on-year revenue gains and net income rebounding to $6.0B, yet the multi-year FCF trajectory is flattening. Balance-sheet leverage is modest ($25.2B debt against $17.2B cash and $37.9B equity), so the company is not levering up to manufacture returns; the returns are organic. That makes the 4.7% FCF CAGR more telling than alarming—it signals a business that has already harvested most of the easy operating leverage. At $369 the equity is capitalizing roughly $22B of current-run-rate earnings at a 31× TTM multiple and embedding the assumption that mid-teens earnings growth will reappear and persist. The raw data do not yet underwrite that reacceleration.
The strongest counter-argument is that Visa’s unit economics and network effects simply justify a permanent scarcity premium. Gross margin holds above 80%, operating margin above 66%, and the duopoly with Mastercard still funnels the overwhelming majority of global card volume. Cross-border and value-added services are higher-margin overlays that can lift the blend even if domestic transaction growth slows. A 36× multiple on a 50%-margin toll road with 10%+ top-line growth and fortress ROIC has been the market’s settled price for years; index flows and the “platform-monopoly” narrative keep the bid firm. If one capitalizes the $21.6B FCF at a 4.5–5.0% free-cash-flow yield—reasonable for a business of this durability—the implied value lands closer to $430–480B, or roughly $230–260 per share only if one assumes zero growth. Layer in even 8% perpetual growth and the DCF rises sharply, which is why believers dismiss the $229 composite fair-value estimate as too static. I weigh this differently because the observed FCF CAGR is already below 5% and regulatory and alternative-rail risks are rising, not falling; the premium therefore rests almost entirely on narrative durability rather than demonstrated reacceleration.
I would reverse to a neutral or constructive stance if the next two prints show earnings growth re-accelerating sustainably above 12–15% year-on-year while FCF conversion holds above 50% of revenue, or if the shares compress to the high-20s forward P/E without a fundamental break in the volume trajectory.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Visa is operating near the top end of the quality spectrum. Revenue grew from $24.1B (FY21) to $40.0B (FY25), a ~13% CAGR, with gross margin locked around 80% and operating margin holding 65-67% across five years. Net income scaled from $12.3B to $20.1B and FCF from $14.5B to $21.6B, converting more than 100% of net income to cash (OCF/NI 1.17x, accruals -3% of assets). The mechanical earnings-quality checks (Beneish -2.48, Altman Z 8.23) show no red flags, consistent with a network-economics business that is structurally capital-light. Capital allocation is disciplined: diluted shares fell from 2.19B to 1.97B (a -2.6% CAGR), buybacks outweighed SBC ~18x, and SBC is only 2.2% of revenue, so per-share value is being concentrated rather than leaked. The one nuance is a modest net-debt position (-$8.0B net cash on $17.2B liquid cash), but against $21.6B annual FCF this is trivial leverage, a financing choice rather than a constraint. Insider activity is neutral - the Mahon Tullier option-exercise-and-sell is routine executive liquidity, not a signal. There is nothing in the trajectory that looks manufactured; margins are flat-to-slightly-softening at the operating line (67.2 to 66.4) but that is a rounding-level drift, not deterioration.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Regulatory and litigation exposure (interchange, antitrust) disclosed in the 10-K
- Client incentives as a percentage of gross revenue and their trajectory - the main driver of net revenue conversion
- Cross-border volume growth and any concentration by top issuers/acquirers
- Debt maturity ladder and rationale for maintaining net-debt posture despite $21.6B FCF
The valuation stack points the same direction: DCF at $232.83, anchored P/E at $242.47, and an EPV floor of $124.42 blend to a composite of $208.14 and a signal-adjusted $229.01. Against a $369.59 price, that is roughly a 38% overshoot - the market is paying about 1.6x deserved value for a business the quality lens (rightly) calls a Fortress. High earnings quality means no haircut is warranted, so the deserved number does not fall further; but it also does not stretch to today's price without heroic assumptions about sustained mid-teens FCF growth, no interchange compression, and no share loss to instant-payment rails. What is priced in: perpetual duopoly economics, continued global cash-to-card conversion, and pricing power intact through the next regulatory cycle. That is the base case, not the bull case, at $369.59 - meaning the buyer gets paid only if reality exceeds an already-optimistic script. This is the classic 'wonderful business, full price' setup: quality is not in dispute, but quality you pay up for is not edge.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Cross-border volume growth trajectory in next 2 quarters - the single largest DCF sensitivity
- Any incremental interchange regulation in EU/US/India that would compress take rate
- Instant-payment / account-to-account share gains in key corridors (Pix, UPI, FedNow)
- Buyback pace and per-share FCF growth to check the anchored-P/E assumption
- Client incentives as a percent of gross revenue - the quiet margin lever
The tape is nominally risk-on (+37, VIX 16.5), but with a beta of 0.76 Visa captures little of that lift. What actually matters for this name right now is the narrative, and the narrative has a fresh crack in it: news flow in the last 72 hours is dominated by stablecoins. One headline literally states that stablecoin transaction volume now exceeds Visa and Mastercard combined; Western Union and PayPal have launched their own coins; Visa itself is out defending turf with its own stablecoin platform and a BioCatch fraud acquisition. That is a company on the back foot in the storyline, not one riding it. For a platform-monopoly archetype whose premium multiple is explicitly built on 'irreplaceability of the network,' any credible instant-settlement rail story chips at the cult coefficient that supports the 61% DCF premium. The bear thesis (interchange pressure, CBDCs, BNPL, stablecoins) is exactly what the tape is currently amplifying. Offsets are real but modest: the World Cup spend data is a friendly datapoint, the BioCatch deal shows management leaning into defense, and the durable-compounder narrative has not broken, only frayed. Net: a persistent, ordinary-to-moderate headwind on the multiple, not a collapse.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether stablecoin volume claims translate into visible transaction-share loss in Visa's next print
- Analyst target revisions in the next 2-4 weeks post the stablecoin news cycle
- Any regulatory move on interchange or CBDC pilots that would harden the bear narrative
- Whether V starts to underperform MA (pure-play read on the network-disruption trade)
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 5, 2026, V was $369.59. We expect it to be $349.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $240.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 5, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.