Business Description
Visa Inc. functions globally as a leading technology company dedicated to payments. Its primary role is to enable the secure and efficient digital transfer of funds among a wide array of participants, including individual consumers, retail businesses, banking institutions, corporations, strategic partners, and governmental bodies. At the heart of its operations is VisaNet, a highly sophisticated transaction processing network that handles the critical functions of authorizing, clearing, and settling all payment transactions. In addition to this core infrastructure, the company also provides a variety of card products, innovative digital platforms, and an extensive range of supplementary value-added services. These offerings are distributed under several widely recognized brands, including Visa, Visa Electron, Interlink, VPAY, and PLUS. Demonstrating its commitment to enhancing user experience, Visa Inc. has established a key strategic partnership with Ooredoo in Qatar, focused on improving payment solutions for Visa cardholders and Ooredoo customers within the country. The company was established in 1958 and its corporate headquarters are situated in San Francisco, California.
Business History
Generated: Jun 27, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:00am (5h ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 10.22
Total Equity: $37.91B
Shares: 1,966,000,000
Total Debt: $25.17B
Cash: $20.15B
EBITDA: $26.00B
Total Debt: $25.17B
Cash: $20.15B
Revenue: $40.00B
Revenue: $40.00B
Revenue: $40.00B
Total Equity: $37.91B
Tax Rate: 17.1%
Equity: $37.91B
Total Debt: $25.17B
Cash: $20.15B
Current Liabilities: $35.05B
Long-Term Debt: $19.60B
Total Debt: $25.17B
Total Equity: $37.91B
Shares: 1,966,000,000
Shares: 1,966,000,000
CapEx: -$1.48B
Shares: 1,966,000,000
Stock Price: $330.52
Net Income: $20.06B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
Visa's business quality is elite by virtually every mechanical test. Revenue compounded from $24.1B (2021) to $40.0B (2025), roughly 13% CAGR, while gross margin held a remarkably stable ~80% and operating margin sat in the low-60s every year (60% in 2025, down from 65.7% in 2024 - worth watching but still extraordinary). Net income scaled from $12.3B to $20.1B and FCF from $14.5B to $21.6B, with OCF/NI of 1.17x and accruals at -3% of assets confirming earnings are backed by cash, not estimates. Beneish M of -2.62 and Altman Z of 7.71 corroborate clean accounting.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Cause of 2025 operating margin compression to 60% from 65.7% - litigation accrual, marketing spend, M&A integration, or regulatory cost?
- Trajectory of cross-border volume and yields - the highest-margin component of the take rate
- Status of Visa Direct, value-added services, and stablecoin/A2A initiatives as growth offsets to mature card rails
- Regulatory and antitrust exposure (merchant interchange litigation, DOJ debit case) that could pressure long-term take rates
- Client incentives growth rate vs gross revenue - a key driver of net revenue quality
The composite fair value sits at $241.79 and the signal-adjusted FV at $258.18, implying roughly 23-28% downside from $336.23. The DCF alone gets to $303 - still ~10% below price - and the EPV floor of $119 is largely irrelevant for a compounder of this caliber but underlines that none of the standard methods reach today's quote. Even giving full credit to the Fortress quality grade (80% gross, 60%+ op margin, $21.6B FCF, buybacks), the gap between price and deserved value is real, not a methodology artifact. What's priced in: continued low-double-digit volume growth, stable interchange economics, and no meaningful regulatory or fintech share loss for a decade. That is the consensus base case, and it is already in the multiple. The bear case (interchange caps, account-to-account rails, law of large numbers on $13T volume) does not need to be right - it just needs to be partially right to compress the multiple toward the $258-303 zone. Earnings quality is high, so no haircut is warranted; the issue is purely price, not the P&L. Net: a wonderful business at a full-to-rich price. Margin of safety is negative. Fair label is Rich rather than Overvalued because the DCF is within ~10% and the cash generation is genuine.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Whether the 2025 570bp op margin compression is one-off (incentive timing, M&A) or structural
- Cross-border volume growth trajectory in next two quarters - the highest-margin revenue line
- Any updated guidance on client incentive growth rate vs net revenue
- Regulatory developments on interchange (US Credit Card Competition Act, EU caps)
- Capital return pace - buyback authorization usage and dividend growth
The macro tape is neutral-to-slightly-stressed (VIX 18, S&P 3.4% off highs, 10y at 4.38%), but V's 0.77 beta and defensive megacap profile mute that pressure materially. The active narrative on Visa is the 'platform-monopoly toll-collector' archetype - strong, durable, and consistently reinforced in this week's news flow (multiple 'buy the dip' and 'dominant payment tollbooth' pieces explicitly favoring V over MA). That is a meaningful tailwind: when the tape gets nervous, capital rotates toward exactly this kind of perceived-inevitable compounder.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether X Money / fintech P2P stories gain traction enough to become a re-rating narrative for the rails
- Interchange-fee regulatory headlines (any DOJ or EU escalation)
- Whether sector rotation in a risk-off slide actually favors V vs the broad financials tape
- Cross-border travel spending data - feeds the new travel-platform narrative
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:06am (4h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $24.1B | $29.3B | $32.7B | $35.9B | $40.0B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.0B | $5.7B | $6.6B | $7.0B | $7.9B |
| Gross Profit | $19.1B | $23.6B | $26.1B | $28.9B | $32.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $3.3B | $4.8B | $5.1B | $5.3B | $8.2B |
| Operating Income | $15.8B | $18.8B | $21.0B | $23.6B | $24.0B |
| Net Income | $12.3B | $15.0B | $17.3B | $19.7B | $20.1B |
| EBITDA | $17.4B | $19.5B | $22.6B | $25.6B | $26.0B |
| EPS | $5.63 | $7.01 | $8.29 | $9.74 | $10.22 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:00am (5h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $16.5B | $15.7B | $16.3B | $12.0B | $20.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $27.6B | $30.2B | $33.5B | $34.0B | $37.8B |
| Total Assets | $82.9B | $85.5B | $90.5B | $94.5B | $99.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $15.7B | $20.9B | $23.1B | $26.5B | $35.0B |
| Long-Term Debt | $20.0B | $20.2B | $20.5B | $20.8B | $19.6B |
| Total Liabilities | $45.3B | $49.9B | $51.8B | $55.4B | $61.7B |
| Total Equity | $37.6B | $35.6B | $38.7B | $39.1B | $37.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $15.4B | $16.1B | $18.0B | $17.3B | $15.1B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:06am (4h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $15.2B | $18.8B | $20.8B | $20.0B | $23.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$705.0M | -$970.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.3B | -$1.5B |
| Free Cash Flow | $14.5B | $17.9B | $19.7B | $18.7B | $21.6B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$75.0M | -$1.9B | $0 | -$915.0M | -$887.0M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$8.7B | -$11.6B | -$12.1B | -$16.7B | -$13.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | $628.0M | $578.0M | $1.6B | -$2.2B | $5.2B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:00am (5h ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$50.4B $49.2B – $51.2B
|
$55.6B $55.5B – $55.6B
|
$62.0B $60.6B – $63.0B
|
$65.6B $64.1B – $66.6B
|
| EBITDA |
$34.7B $33.9B – $35.3B
|
$38.3B $38.2B – $38.3B
|
$42.7B $41.7B – $43.4B
|
$45.1B $44.2B – $45.9B
|
| Net Income |
$29.2B $28.5B – $29.9B
|
$33.4B $31.4B – $35.3B
|
$38.0B $37.0B – $38.8B
|
$37.2B $36.2B – $38.0B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:06am (4h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +21.6% | +11.4% | +10.0% | +11.3% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +23.2% | +10.6% | +10.7% | +11.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +19.0% | +11.6% | +12.4% | +1.7% |
| Net Income Growth | +21.5% | +15.5% | +14.3% | +1.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +12.4% | +15.8% | +13.1% | +1.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:06am (4h ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-12 | Suh Chris | S-Sale | 10,639.00 | $324.81 | $3.5M |
| 2026-04-29 | MCINERNEY RYAN | M-Exempt | 31,455.00 | $109.82 | $3.5M |
| 2026-04-29 | MCINERNEY RYAN | M-Exempt | 31,455.00 | $109.82 | $3.5M |
| 2026-04-29 | MCINERNEY RYAN | S-Sale | 31,455.00 | $340.14 | $10.7M |
| 2026-03-11 | CARNEY LLOYD | S-Sale | 650.00 | $309.62 | $201,253 |
| 2026-02-15 | Taneja Rajat | M-Exempt | 35,537.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | Taneja Rajat | F-InKind | 17,610.00 | $314.08 | $5.5M |
| 2026-02-15 | Taneja Rajat | A-Award | 35,537.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | Taneja Rajat | M-Exempt | 35,537.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | MAHON TULLIER KELLY | M-Exempt | 35,537.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | MAHON TULLIER KELLY | F-InKind | 17,551.00 | $314.08 | $5.5M |
| 2026-02-15 | MAHON TULLIER KELLY | A-Award | 35,537.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | MAHON TULLIER KELLY | M-Exempt | 35,537.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | Fabara Paul D | M-Exempt | 21,322.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | Fabara Paul D | F-InKind | 10,421.00 | $314.08 | $3.3M |
| 2026-02-15 | Fabara Paul D | A-Award | 21,322.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | Fabara Paul D | M-Exempt | 21,322.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | MCINERNEY RYAN | M-Exempt | 10,662.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-15 | MCINERNEY RYAN | F-InKind | 5,981.00 | $314.08 | $1.9M |
| 2026-02-15 | MCINERNEY RYAN | A-Award | 10,662.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 3:00am (5h ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-12 | $0.67 | 2026-04-28 | 2026-05-12 | 2026-06-01 |
| 2026-02-10 | $0.67 | 2026-01-27 | 2026-02-10 | 2026-03-02 |
| 2025-11-12 | $0.67 | 2025-10-28 | 2025-11-12 | 2025-12-01 |
| 2025-08-12 | $0.59 | 2025-07-29 | 2025-08-12 | 2025-09-02 |
| 2025-05-13 | $0.59 | 2025-04-29 | 2025-05-13 | 2025-06-02 |
| 2025-02-11 | $0.59 | 2025-01-30 | 2025-02-11 | 2025-03-03 |
| 2024-11-12 | $0.59 | 2024-10-29 | 2024-11-12 | 2024-12-02 |
| 2024-08-09 | $0.52 | 2024-07-23 | 2024-08-09 | 2024-09-03 |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.52 | 2024-04-23 | 2024-05-17 | 2024-06-03 |
| 2024-02-08 | $0.52 | 2024-01-25 | 2024-02-09 | 2024-03-01 |
| 2023-11-08 | $0.52 | 2023-10-24 | 2023-11-09 | 2023-12-01 |
| 2023-08-10 | $0.45 | 2023-07-25 | 2023-08-11 | 2023-09-01 |
| 2023-05-11 | $0.45 | 2023-04-25 | 2023-05-12 | 2023-06-01 |
| 2023-02-09 | $0.45 | 2023-01-26 | 2023-02-10 | 2023-03-01 |
| 2022-11-09 | $0.45 | 2022-10-25 | 2022-11-11 | 2022-12-01 |
| 2022-08-11 | $0.38 | 2022-07-22 | 2022-08-12 | 2022-09-01 |
| 2022-05-12 | $0.38 | 2022-04-22 | 2022-05-13 | 2022-06-01 |
| 2022-02-10 | $0.38 | 2022-01-25 | 2022-02-11 | 2022-03-01 |
| 2021-11-10 | $0.38 | 2021-10-22 | 2021-11-12 | 2021-12-07 |
| 2021-08-12 | $0.32 | 2021-07-27 | 2021-08-13 | 2021-09-01 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
Looking at the raw quarterly trajectory first: revenue went $8.90B → $9.62B → $9.51B → $9.59B → $10.17B → $10.72B → $10.90B → $11.23B. That's actually re-acceleration, not deceleration — the last four quarters compound at roughly 13% annualized sequentially, and YoY Q1 FY26 ($11.23B vs $9.59B) is +17.1%. The "decelerating" tag in Secondary Signals is wrong, or measuring something idiosyncratic. Net income is choppier ($5.32B → $5.12B → $4.58B → $5.27B → $5.09B → $5.85B → $6.02B) but the last two prints show margin snapping back to 53.6-53.7% with absolute NI at record highs. FY25 revenue of $40.0B on FY21 $24.1B is a 13.5% CAGR, not the 10.7% the momentum module cites (which presumably uses a different window). FCF of $21.58B on $40B revenue = 54% FCF margin. This is not a decelerating business.
Now the synthesis says fair value $258 vs $330 — a 23% overvaluation call. I'm skeptical of that anchor. At $633B market cap, TTM revenue ~$43B and TTM FCF likely ~$23B, you're paying ~27x FCF for a business compounding revenue 13%+ with 54% FCF margins, ROIC of 33%, and a regulatory moat that has survived Durbin, Dodd-Frank, the EU interchange caps, and a decade of fintech "disruptors" that mostly ended up riding Visa rails (Stripe, Square, Apple Pay, Klarna). A reverse DCF at $330 with 10% WACC and 3% terminal needs roughly 8-9% FCF growth for 10 years — which is below the realized trajectory. The $258 fair value implicitly assumes growth collapses to ~5-6% or multiple compression to ~20x FCF; neither is supported by the last four quarters of data. The narrative model's "30% premium is pure narrative" framing is the kind of thing that's been wrong on Visa for 15 years.
The contrarian case is real but narrower than the bears claim. The actual risks: (1) the CFPB/DOJ antitrust suit on debit network steering, which could force genuine interchange compression — this is a tail risk the models barely engage with; (2) stablecoin rails (USDC on Solana, PYUSD) becoming a genuine bypass for cross-border, where Visa earns its highest-margin yield spreads; (3) the law of large numbers on a $13T+ payment volume base, where the market for non-cash penetration in developed economies is approaching saturation. Insider activity is all sales and option exercises with zero opens — neutral-to-mildly-negative but consistent with comp structure, not a signal. The balance sheet tile is missing debt and equity figures, which is sloppy; Visa carries ~$20B in debt against $20B cash, so net debt is negligible — irrelevant to valuation but worth noting the data file is thin there.
I dissent from the synthesis's $258 fair value and the narrative model's "30% premium is pure story." Both are anchoring on a mature-earner template that doesn't fit the Q1 FY26 print. I'd put fair value closer to $310-325 on a 25x FCF multiple applied to forward FCF of ~$25B, which makes the current $330 roughly fair, not 23% overvalued. The thesis-evaluation module's "High Conviction Required" is the right posture — this isn't a screaming buy at $330, but it's also not the obvious short or trim the composite suggests. The asymmetric risk is the antitrust outcome, not valuation; if interchange survives intact through 2026, the stock re-rates higher on the re-accelerating top line. If Visa loses the debit case, $258 becomes generous. That binary, not the DCF, is the actual investment question.
GPT Critique
Visa Inc.'s financial performance exhibits a compelling growth narrative, which stands out prominently when analyzing the raw data. Over the past fiscal years, Visa's revenue grew from $24.11B in 2021 to $40.00B in 2025, representing a robust CAGR of approximately 13.5%. This growth trajectory is further supported by the latest quarterly data, where revenue increased from $9.59B in March 2025 to $11.23B in March 2026—a notable 17.1% YoY increase. This re-acceleration in revenue growth is crucial, as it indicates Visa's ability to maintain momentum despite its large scale. The strong net income margins, consistently around 50%, further underscore Visa's efficiency and profitability. Additionally, the company's free cash flow margin of 54% highlights its strong cash generation capability, which is an attractive feature for investors seeking stability and growth.
I agree with Opus's assertion that the "decelerating" tag is inaccurate. The raw data clearly show a re-acceleration trend, contradicting the secondary signals and momentum metrics suggesting otherwise. Opus rightly points out that Visa's recent performance, particularly in the last four quarters, reflects a positive upward trajectory. Moreover, I concur with Opus's skepticism regarding the valuation synthesis's $258 fair value estimate. Visa's impressive financial metrics, including a 33% ROIC and high FCF margins, warrant a higher valuation multiple than the synthesis suggests. Opus's analysis that Visa's current market cap implies a 27x FCF multiple, with growth expectations aligned with recent performance, seems more reflective of the company's true market position. However, I diverge from Opus regarding the DOJ debit case as the primary swing factor. While regulatory risks are non-negligible, Visa's historical resilience to similar challenges suggests that the market might have already priced in these risks to some extent.
Opus's dismissal of the narrative that Visa trades at a 30% premium due to its story is justified. The data support a narrative of sustained growth and profitability, rather than one purely driven by market sentiment. However, a careful skeptic might argue that Visa's valuation still reflects optimistic assumptions about its growth prospects, especially given the potential regulatory challenges and competition from emerging fintech solutions. The current price of $330 may also be buoyed by the broader market's preference for stable, cash-generating businesses in uncertain economic times, which might not be sustainable if macro conditions change.