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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for V.F. Corporation (VFC) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -44 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -15 · Value -68 · Sentiment -76 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $9.88 vs $15.04 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
V.F. Corporation
VFC NYSEV.F. Corporation is a global branded apparel and footwear company headquartered in Denver, Colorado. The company designs, procures, markets, and distributes lifestyle apparel, footwear, and accessories for men, women, and children across the Americas, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific region. Its portfolio is organized into three primary segments: Outdoor, Active, and Work, each centered on distinct consumer uses and lifestyle categories. Through brands such as The North Face, Timberland, Vans, Dickies, JanSport, Kipling, Napapijri, Eastpak, Smartwool, Icebreaker, and Altra, V.F. Corporation participates in outdoor performance gear, action sports and streetwear, workwear, backpacks, luggage, and related accessories markets. The company reaches consumers via a mix of wholesale channels, including specialty and department stores, national chains, and partnership stores, as well as a broad direct-to-consumer network of owned retail stores, brand e-commerce sites, concession locations, and other digital platforms. Founded in 1899 and operating today as a diversified brand management platform, V.F. Corporation plays a significant role in global apparel and footwear supply chains and lifestyle consumer markets.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.64
Total Equity: $1.85B
Shares: 395,875,000
Total Debt: $3.53B
Cash: $823.94M
EBITDA: $857.10M
Total Debt: $3.53B
Cash: $823.94M
Revenue: $9.61B
Revenue: $9.61B
Revenue: $9.61B
Total Equity: $1.85B
Tax Rate: 25.3%
Equity: $1.85B
Total Debt: $3.53B
Cash: $823.94M
Current Liabilities: $2.18B
Long-Term Debt: $3.52B
Total Debt: $3.53B
Total Equity: $1.85B
Shares: 395,875,000
Shares: 395,875,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 395,875,000
Stock Price: $15.06
Net Income: $254.92M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:42pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $11.8B | $11.6B | $10.5B | $9.5B | $9.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.4B | $5.5B | $5.0B | $4.4B | $4.3B |
| Gross Profit | $6.5B | $6.1B | $5.4B | $5.1B | $5.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $4.8B | $5.8B | $5.5B | $4.8B | $4.7B |
| Operating Income | $1.6B | $327.7M | -$34.1M | $303.8M | $576.6M |
| Net Income | $1.4B | $118.6M | -$968.9M | -$189.7M | $254.9M |
| EBITDA | $1.9B | $590.0M | $285.1M | $563.4M | $857.1M |
| EPS | $3.55 | $0.31 | $-2.49 | $-0.49 | $0.65 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.53 | $0.31 | $-2.49 | $-0.48 | $0.64 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:23pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.3B | $814.9M | $674.6M | $429.4M | $823.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $4.6B | $5.2B | $4.2B | $3.8B | $4.0B |
| Total Assets | $13.3B | $14.0B | $11.6B | $9.4B | $9.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $2.7B | $2.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.6B | $5.7B | $4.7B | $3.4B | $3.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $9.8B | $11.1B | $10.0B | $7.9B | $7.4B |
| Total Equity | $3.5B | $2.9B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $443.5M | $57.1M | -$974.6M | -$1.2B | -$928.8M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:42pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $864.3M | -$655.8M | $1.0B | $465.2M | $671.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | $3.8M | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$504.2M | $1.6B | -$908.2M | -$1.8B | -$582.8M |
| Dividends Paid | -$773.2M | -$702.8M | -$303.1M | -$140.2M | -$140.7M |
| Stock Buybacks | -$350.0M | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $425.9M | -$460.8M | -$139.4M | -$245.5M | $400.9M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 2:42pm (24d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -1.9% | -10.0% | -9.1% | +1.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -5.6% | -10.8% | -6.5% | +3.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -79.9% | -110.4% | +991.8% | +89.8% |
| Net Income Growth | -91.4% | -917.0% | +80.4% | +234.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -68.9% | -51.7% | +97.6% | +52.1% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 23, 2026 9:58pm (30d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-10 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-08 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-08 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-08 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-09 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-09 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-09 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-09 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-09 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-09 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-09 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-09 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a more mixed story than the synthesis "overvalued" verdict suggests. FY2026 (ending March 2026) delivered $9.61B revenue vs $9.50B prior — the first year of growth after three years of decline from $11.84B (FY22). More importantly, operating income swung to $576.6M from $303.8M, and net income flipped to +$254.9M from -$189.7M. Operating margin recovered to 6.0% from 3.2%. Gross margin ticked up to 54.8%. Operating cash flow of $671M against a $5.92B market cap is a 11.3% OCF yield — not distressed. The Q4 (March 2026) print showing a -$119M loss looks ugly in isolation but Q4 is seasonally the weakest and prior-year Q4 was -$150M, so it's actually a $31M improvement YoY. The trajectory is bending the right way, not deteriorating.
Where I push back on the synthesis: a $9.88 DCF fair value implies you believe FY26's $255M net income and $576M operating income are near a ceiling, not a way-station. That's a strong claim on a business generating $671M OCF with gross margins still north of 54%. EV/EBITDA of 10.1x and EV/Sales of 0.9x are not obviously expensive for a branded apparel portfolio — Tapestry trades richer, Levi's similar, Hanes cheaper but structurally worse. The P/E of 23.5x is optically high only because earnings are depressed; on FY22-normalized earnings power ($1.39B), this trades at ~4x. The synthesis is essentially triangulating three DCFs off a depressed base and calling the recovery premium overvaluation — which is circular when the whole thesis IS the recovery.
The contrarian case against my more constructive read is real, though. Debt/equity at 1.9x on $3.53B total debt against $824M cash means net debt of $2.7B — that's ~29% of enterprise value and constrains error tolerance. Revenue CAGR is still -4.2% over five years; the Vans brand (roughly a third of revenue historically) remains in decline per most channel checks, and the "recent revenue YoY" of +1.1% could be lapping easy comps rather than genuine reacceleration. The FCF CAGR of -18.7% is worse than the revenue trajectory, suggesting working capital and capex leakage. The insider "P-Purchase" of 30,000 shares in June 2026 is notable but a single 30K-share buy at ~$15 is a $450K signal — meaningful but not table-pounding conviction from insiders sitting on much larger equity stakes. The F-InKind transactions are tax withholding, not selling, so they're neutral noise. The dividend at 2.4% yield with 55% payout ratio on thin earnings is a coverage risk if FY27 disappoints.
I dissent partially with the synthesis. The models are anchoring too heavily on a DCF that mechanically extrapolates recent weakness, and the narrative layer's "$5 of story premium" claim is unfalsifiable — you could equally argue $5 of the price is discount for balance sheet risk that's already improving. The right read is fairly-valued-to-modestly-undervalued around $15, with fair value in the $16-19 range if you give any credit to the FY26 operating inflection and normalize toward $400-500M sustainable net income (implying 12-15x forward P/E on recovering earnings). This is not a $9.88 stock unless you believe operating margins collapse back below 4% — and Q3 2025's 10.5% margin and the full-year 6% argue against that. It's also not a $25 stock until Vans stabilizes and net debt drops below $2B. The insider buying, accelerating quarterly trend, and swing to GAAP profitability are three concordant signals the models are underweighting relative to the stale bearish CAGR. I'd take a starter position here with add-points at $12 and trim points at $19, and I'd revisit hard after the next two quarters to see if the operating margin recovery holds outside of seasonally strong Q2/Q3.
GPT Reading
What stands out to me is not the FY26 profit recovery by itself, but how little top-line evidence there is that the franchise has truly reaccelerated. Revenue rose just 1.1% in FY26 to $9.61B after falling from $11.84B in FY22 and $11.61B in FY23, so this is still a materially smaller business than it was three to four years ago. The margin rebound is real: operating income improved to $576.6M from $303.8M and net income swung to $254.9M from a $189.7M loss. But the quality of that recovery matters. A 6.0% operating margin and 2.7% net margin are still thin for a branded apparel portfolio carrying $3.53B of debt and only $1.85B of equity. On the balance sheet, debt/equity of 1.9x is not an academic concern; it means the turnaround must keep working because there is not much room for another earnings relapse. At $15, the stock is not priced like a broken retailer, but neither is the business producing returns that justify much optimism yet.
The quarterly pattern reinforces that conclusion. Yes, the latest March quarter loss improved from -$150.8M to -$119.3M year over year, and the December and September quarters were stronger than the prior year. But the annual earnings recovery leaned heavily on the middle two quarters: September 2025 delivered $189.8M and December 2025 $300.8M, while June and March still lost a combined $235.7M. That is a business with seasonal profit concentration and limited buffer, not a cleanly normalized earner. Gross margin at 54.8% is healthy, but the translation to operating profit remains mediocre relative to history: FY22 produced $1.63B of operating income on $11.84B of revenue, versus just $576.6M on $9.61B now. The gap is too large to hand-wave away as merely “depressed earnings.” The market is already capitalizing this at 23.5x current earnings, 3.2x book, and about 10x EBITDA; those are survivable multiples for a stable compounder, but this is still a leveraged restructuring story with a shrinking multi-year revenue base.
I disagree with Opus’s core claim that the stock is “fairly valued to modestly undervalued at $15” with fair value of $16-19. The Delvantic AI Findings concludes the DCF “ignores the FY26 operating inflection”; I think that gives too much credit to one year of margin repair without sufficient revenue proof. A business that has gone from $11.84B of sales to $9.61B and from $1.39B of net income in FY22 to $254.9M in FY26 does not deserve a recovery multiple on normalized peak earnings. Opus argues the 23.5x P/E is “optically high only because earnings are depressed” and cites FY22-normalized earnings power of $1.39B, implying roughly 4x normalized P/E. I reject that framing outright. FY22 is not a conservative normalization anchor; it is an outlier peak in both profitability and scale, and using it risks valuing the stock on a business that no longer exists in its prior form. If sustainable earnings were truly headed toward Opus’s $400-500M range soon, I could support the current price; but the available data show only $254.9M net income after a long erosion, which is not enough evidence.
I do agree with Opus on a few specific points. They are right that the simple “overvalued because DCF says $9.88” conclusion is too mechanical, and they are right that the March quarter loss is less alarming than it looks in isolation because it did improve year over year. I also agree that the June insider purchase of 30,000 shares is directionally positive and that the in-kind transactions are noise. But I disagree with the stronger inference they draw from “three concordant signals” of insider buying, accelerating quarterly trend, and GAAP profitability. One insider purchase worth roughly $450K is encouraging, not decisive. “Accelerating” quarterly revenue in this case means moving from very weak comparisons to near-flat growth, not a convincing demand resurgence. And GAAP profitability of $254.9M on a $5.9B equity value is not obviously cheap when leverage is high and payout ratio is already 55% on still-fragile earnings. Opus says “this is not a $9.88 stock unless you believe operating margins collapse back below 4%.” I think that is too binary; this can easily be a $10-13 stock even with margins around 5-6% if revenue stays stuck near $9.5-9.8B and deleveraging is slow.
A careful skeptic of both my view and Opus’s would say we are both overfitting thin public numbers to a brand-turnaround narrative without segment detail. They would argue the gross margin/OCF recovery to $671.3M may be the first visible sign that the business has already been reset, and that EV/revenue below 1x for brands with durable shelf space could prove cheap if execution holds. They would also argue the opposite: that operating cash flow can flatter a restructuring in one year, and that book equity of $1.85B against $3.53B debt leaves little margin of safety if the next downturn hits before brand momentum is restored. That skeptic is right to demand more evidence. My read today is that the burden of proof still sits with the bull case, not the bear case.
Grok Reading
grok-critique step) alongside the other Big-3 seats, when a
report is run on this ticker.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
VFC has been through a severe operational deterioration: revenue fell from $11.84B in 2022 to $9.50B in 2025 (down ~20%), operating margin collapsed from 13.8% to negative territory, and the company posted cumulative net losses of roughly $1.16B across 2023-2025. FY2026 shows a tentative bounce - revenue back up to $9.61B, gross margin recovered to 54.8%, operating margin to 6.0%, net income back to $255M, and FCF of $671M. This is a real inflection, but 6% operating margin is still well below the ~14% the business earned pre-collapse, and the top line has not resumed growth in any meaningful way.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants - how much of the $3.5B+ gross debt comes due in the next 24 months
- Vans segment revenue and margin trajectory - is the biggest problem brand actually stabilizing?
- Status of Supreme divestiture proceeds and any further planned asset sales for deleveraging
- Dividend policy - historically a large cash outflow; whether the reduced dividend is preserved through the turnaround
- Inventory levels and channel health - apparel margin recoveries often mask promotional pressure
- Management commentary on FY2027 operating margin bridge back toward historical ~12-14%
The e2e composite pins fair value at $9.88 with a signal-adjusted $10.05, implying roughly -33% downside from the $15.04 price. The EPV floor of $6.57 reflects the depressed current earnings power, while the anchored-PE of $13.19 gives credit for a normalized multiple - and even that sits ~12% below today's quote. Earnings quality is clean, so no haircut is warranted, but that only means the deserved value stands as calculated - it doesn't create hidden value. The Mixed quality grade (revenue still down ~20% from 2022, operating margin halved, $2.71B net debt) argues against paying a premium multiple on trough earnings. What's priced in: a credible margin recovery plus reacceleration of Vans and North Face. That's the bull case, not the base case, and the market is already extending credit for it. Margin of safety here is negative - you're paying ~50% above the composite and ~14% above the most generous anchored method.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- FY2026 operating margin trajectory and whether the inflection is sustaining into H2
- Vans revenue stabilization vs continued decline in latest quarter
- Net debt reduction pace and any refinancing terms
- Wholesale channel inventory health and DTC mix progression
VFC is getting hit by a live, stock-specific negative catalyst: Q1 2027 missed, Vans wholesale weakness re-surfaced, and the CFO is departing - all landing on a day the Fed spooked equities and the VIX pushed above 20. For a fallen-angel turnaround name, CFO exit is exactly the kind of headline that cracks a 'prove-me' story, and the tape offers no cover: shares 'nosedived' intraday per the wires. The narrative was already moderate-intensity, moderate-durability with low cult - it has no fanbase to absorb a shock like this. Analyst tone into the print was cautious and the raised full-year guide is being ignored in favor of the loss and the CFO news, which tells you the market is in 'sell first' mode on this name. With beta near 1 and a consumer-cyclical, wholesale-exposed profile, a risk-off, high-rate tape amplifies the pressure rather than muting it - discretionary apparel is exactly where macro headwinds bite. Net: the non-fundamental pressure is decisively negative today, and the freshness of the catalyst means it likely persists for weeks as estimates and target prices get marked.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Analyst target revisions and estimate cuts in the 48-72 hours post-print
- Who is named interim/permanent CFO and the market's read on continuity
- Vans comp trajectory commentary in follow-up notes
- Whether VIX cools back under 18 and consumer discretionary rotation resumes
- Insider buying or a buyback signal to defend the tape
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