Business Description
V.F. Corporation, operating with its subsidiaries, specializes in the global design, sourcing, marketing, and distribution of branded lifestyle apparel, footwear, and complementary products. Catering to men, women, and children, its offerings reach markets across the Americas, Europe, and Asia-Pacific. The company structures its operations into three distinct segments: Outdoor, Active, and Work. Its expansive product portfolio includes a wide array of apparel, such as outdoor wear, casual and lifestyle clothing, and items crafted from merino wool and other natural fibers. It also provides a diverse selection of footwear, ranging from outdoor-inspired and performance-oriented styles to action sports, streetwear, and protective work footwear. Completing its range are various accessories, including handbags, luggage, backpacks, and totes, as well as specialized equipment and work-appropriate attire. These goods are marketed under renowned brand names like The North Face, Timberland, Smartwool, Icebreaker, Altra, Vans, Supreme, Kipling, Napapijri, Eastpak, JanSport, Dickies, and Timberland PRO. Distribution occurs through wholesale channels to specialty retailers, department stores, national chains, and mass merchants. Furthermore, V.F. Corporation engages in direct-to-consumer sales via its proprietary retail stores, concession stands, e-commerce platforms, and other digital avenues. Established in 1899, V.F. Corporation maintains its corporate headquarters in Denver, Colorado.
Business History
Generated: Jun 21, 2026 12:48pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 12:45pm (5d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.65
Total Equity: $1.85B
Shares: 395,875,000
Total Debt: $3.53B
Cash: $823.94M
EBITDA: $788.52M
Total Debt: $3.53B
Cash: $823.94M
Revenue: $9.61B
Revenue: $9.61B
Revenue: $9.61B
Total Equity: $1.85B
Tax Rate: 25.3%
Equity: $1.85B
Total Debt: $3.53B
Cash: $823.94M
Current Liabilities: $2.18B
Long-Term Debt: $3.52B
Total Debt: $3.53B
Total Equity: $1.85B
Shares: 395,875,000
Shares: 395,875,000
CapEx: -$165.81M
Shares: 395,875,000
Stock Price: $17.33
Net Income: $254.92M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
VFC's five-year trajectory shows real damage: revenue has contracted from $11.84B (2022) to $9.61B (2026), a ~19% top-line decline, while operating margin collapsed from 13.8% to a -1.5% trough in 2024 before clawing back to 6.3% in 2026. Cumulative net income over the last four years is deeply negative (~-$785M ex-2022), reflecting brand impairments and a Vans-led portfolio problem rather than a cyclical blip. Gross margin has held in the low-50s, suggesting the issue is more volume/SG&A leverage and brand health than pricing power destruction.
The balance sheet is the binding constraint: net debt of ~$2.69B against only $836M liquid cash, with Altman Z of 1.89 sitting in the grey zone. The company is self-funding — FCF rebounded to $505M in 2026 — but FCF has been volatile (-$901M in 2023, $804M in 2024 likely working-capital aided, $339M in 2025), and the dividend was already cut. Earnings quality screens clean (Beneish -2.65, negative accruals of -3.8% of assets), and share count is essentially flat (0.2% CAGR) with SBC at a disciplined 0.8% of revenue, so per-share value is not being eroded by issuance.
Management turnover under the Darrell-led reset is visible in the insider tape — large equity awards in May 2026 and one genuine open-market purchase ($515K by Carucci) — which is mildly constructive but not a fortress signal. This reads as a wounded, indebted operator showing early stabilization, not a high-quality compounder.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Vans segment revenue trajectory and whether 2026 stabilization is real or further deterioration masked by TNF strength
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant headroom — when do the next big tranches come due?
- Working-capital normalization: how much of 2024-2026 FCF came from inventory release vs. sustainable conversion
- Status of any remaining brand divestitures (e.g., Supreme proceeds deployment, other portfolio reshaping)
- Pension and lease obligations not captured in headline net-debt figure
- Wholesale vs. DTC mix shift and whether margin recovery is sustainable into 2027
VFC trades at $17.33 with a ~$6.8B market cap, against $2.7B of net debt for an EV near $9.5B. The e2e synthesis flagged 'High Conviction Required' — translation: the fair-value methods disagree because the business is mid-turnaround, and any DCF is hostage to margin assumptions. On a normalized basis, if VFC can recover to even mid-single-digit operating margins on ~$10B of revenue, that's ~$500-600M EBIT and a deserved equity value meaningfully above today's price; if margins stay negative-to-flat, the equity is a stub on top of the debt and worth less than current.
The Company-Quality lens grades this 'Shaky' (-40) — revenue down 19% over five years, operating margins negative, balance sheet stretched. That lowers deserved value materially versus a healthy VFC of the past. Earnings quality is clean (no accruals games, no dilution), so no further haircut is warranted. Net: I read deserved value in the high-teens to low-$20s under a credible repair scenario, putting today's $17.33 at roughly fair-to-modestly-cheap, not a fat-pitch bargain. The market is pricing skepticism about the turnaround, not euphoria — which is appropriate.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Latest segment revenue trends for Vans specifically — is the decline decelerating?
- Gross margin trajectory and SG&A as % of sales — evidence cost restructuring is sticking
- Net debt trajectory and any covenant headroom; refinancing schedule
- Management guidance on FY operating margin recovery cadence
- Inventory levels vs sell-through — channel health check
VFC is carrying a moderate-intensity, moderate-durability fallen-angel narrative: the market neither wants to short it aggressively nor is willing to underwrite the turnaround. Recent momentum has been quietly constructive (3-year relative move +12pp, deleveraging from 3.59x to 1.91x D/E), which suggests the bear story has lost its sharpest edge, but Vans relevance and wholesale erosion keep enthusiasm capped. With beta ~1.0, the neutral macro tape (+20 score, VIX 16.8) is a non-event — it neither saves nor sinks this name.
Analyst tone is the most interesting tell: consensus is Hold with only 4 sells against 25 buys, target $20.5 (~18% upside), and a fresh revision this month. That's a quietly constructive setup that diverges modestly from the still-skeptical bear narrative around brand decay. But the apparel/consumer-cyclical cohort is broadly out of favor, and there's no cult bid, no thematic tailwind, and no fresh catalyst flow to force a re-rate. Net: small positive drift potential, but the story isn't strong enough in either direction to dominate the print.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Vans comp trajectory in next earnings — the linchpin of the bull narrative
- Whether wholesale order books stabilize or deteriorate further into back-to-school
- Any further analyst upgrades or target hikes that would mark a narrative inflection
- Sector rotation signal — if consumer cyclicals catch a bid, VFC participates with beta
- Credit spreads / leverage commentary — a downgrade or refi headline would reignite the bear case
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 12:52pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $11.8B | $11.1B | $9.9B | $9.5B | $9.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $5.4B | $5.3B | $4.8B | $4.4B | $4.3B |
| Gross Profit | $6.5B | $5.8B | $5.1B | $5.1B | $5.3B |
| Operating Expenses | $4.8B | $4.8B | $5.3B | $4.8B | $4.7B |
| Operating Income | $1.6B | $998.7M | -$143.9M | $303.8M | $607.3M |
| Net Income | $1.4B | $118.6M | -$968.9M | -$189.7M | $254.9M |
| EBITDA | $1.9B | $1.1B | $782.2M | $729.0M | $788.5M |
| EPS | $3.55 | $0.31 | $-2.49 | $-0.49 | $0.65 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 12:48pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.3B | $814.9M | $814.9M | $429.4M | $823.9M |
| Total Current Assets | $4.6B | $5.2B | $4.2B | $3.8B | $4.0B |
| Total Assets | $13.3B | $14.0B | $11.6B | $9.4B | $9.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $3.3B | $3.5B | $3.5B | $2.7B | $2.2B |
| Long-Term Debt | $4.6B | $5.7B | $4.7B | $3.4B | $3.5B |
| Total Liabilities | $9.8B | $11.1B | $10.0B | $7.9B | $7.4B |
| Total Equity | $3.5B | $2.9B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.8B |
| Retained Earnings | $443.5M | $57.1M | -$974.6M | -$1.2B | -$928.8M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 12:52pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $864.3M | -$655.8M | $1.0B | $465.2M | $671.3M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$328.3M | -$245.1M | -$211.0M | -$126.0M | -$165.8M |
| Free Cash Flow | $536.0M | -$900.9M | $803.6M | $339.2M | $505.5M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $620.7M | $0 | $0 | $1.5B | $600.5M |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$350.0M | -$2.8M | -$2.8M | -$2.7M | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | $425.9M | -$460.8M | -$139.4M | -$245.5M | $400.9M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 12:45pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$9.5B $9.4B – $9.7B
|
$9.8B $9.6B – $10.0B
|
$10.0B $10.0B – $10.0B
|
$10.8B $10.6B – $11.1B
|
| EBITDA |
$958.4M $950.3M – $975.5M
|
$989.1M $973.1M – $1.0B
|
$1.0B $1.0B – $1.0B
|
$1.1B $1.1B – $1.1B
|
| Net Income |
$411.9M $377.3M – $482.4M
|
$507.5M $428.8M – $625.8M
|
$587.9M $351.6M – $793.0M
|
$696.7M $674.2M – $718.2M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 12:52pm (5d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | -6.4% | -10.6% | -4.1% | +1.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -10.2% | -11.7% | -0.6% | +3.5% |
| Operating Income Growth | -38.8% | -114.4% | +311.0% | +99.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -91.4% | -917.0% | +80.4% | +234.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -41.4% | -31.5% | -6.8% | +8.2% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 12:51pm (5d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-09 | Carucci Richard | P-Purchase | 30,000.00 | $17.17 | $515,010 |
| 2026-06-04 | Phillips Michael Edward | F-InKind | 1,613.00 | $16.41 | $26,469 |
| 2026-06-04 | Sim Jennifer S. | F-InKind | 4,091.00 | $16.41 | $67,133 |
| 2026-06-04 | Hyder Brent | F-InKind | 20,405.00 | $16.41 | $334,846 |
| 2026-06-04 | Darrell Bracken | F-InKind | 36,446.00 | $16.41 | $598,079 |
| 2026-06-04 | Vogel Paul Aaron | F-InKind | 10,246.00 | $16.41 | $168,137 |
| 2026-06-04 | Dalmia Abhishek | F-InKind | 11,351.00 | $16.41 | $186,270 |
| 2026-05-28 | Phillips Michael Edward | F-InKind | 941.00 | $17.41 | $16,383 |
| 2026-05-28 | Dalmia Abhishek | F-InKind | 36,750.00 | $17.41 | $639,818 |
| 2026-05-22 | Vogel Paul Aaron | A-Award | 107,785.00 | $16.70 | $1.8M |
| 2026-05-22 | Vogel Paul Aaron | A-Award | 149,266.00 | $16.70 | $2.5M |
| 2026-05-22 | GROSSMAN MINDY F | A-Award | 11,977.00 | $16.70 | $200,016 |
| 2026-05-22 | Phillips Michael Edward | A-Award | 20,959.00 | $16.70 | $350,015 |
| 2026-05-22 | Phillips Michael Edward | F-InKind | 323.00 | $16.54 | $5,342 |
| 2026-05-22 | Sim Jennifer S. | A-Award | 71,857.00 | $16.70 | $1.2M |
| 2026-05-22 | Sim Jennifer S. | A-Award | 99,511.00 | $16.70 | $1.7M |
| 2026-05-22 | Hyder Brent | A-Award | 143,713.00 | $16.70 | $2.4M |
| 2026-05-22 | Hyder Brent | A-Award | 199,021.00 | $16.70 | $3.3M |
| 2026-05-22 | Dalmia Abhishek | A-Award | 161,677.00 | $16.70 | $2.7M |
| 2026-05-22 | Dalmia Abhishek | A-Award | 223,898.00 | $16.70 | $3.7M |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jun 21, 2026 12:45pm (5d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-10 | $0.09 | 2026-05-20 | 2026-06-10 | 2026-06-18 |
| 2026-03-10 | $0.09 | 2026-01-28 | 2026-03-10 | 2026-03-19 |
| 2025-12-10 | $0.09 | 2025-10-28 | 2025-12-10 | 2025-12-18 |
| 2025-09-10 | $0.09 | 2025-07-30 | 2025-09-10 | 2025-09-18 |
| 2025-06-10 | $0.09 | 2025-05-21 | 2025-06-10 | 2025-06-18 |
| 2025-03-10 | $0.09 | 2025-01-29 | 2025-03-10 | 2025-03-20 |
| 2024-12-10 | $0.09 | 2024-10-28 | 2024-12-10 | 2024-12-18 |
| 2024-09-10 | $0.09 | 2024-08-06 | 2024-09-10 | 2024-09-18 |
| 2024-06-10 | $0.09 | 2024-05-22 | 2024-06-10 | 2024-06-20 |
| 2024-03-08 | $0.09 | 2024-02-06 | 2024-03-11 | 2024-03-20 |
| 2023-12-08 | $0.09 | 2023-10-30 | 2023-12-11 | 2023-12-20 |
| 2023-09-08 | $0.30 | 2023-08-01 | 2023-09-11 | 2023-09-20 |
| 2023-06-09 | $0.30 | 2023-05-23 | 2023-06-12 | 2023-06-20 |
| 2023-03-09 | $0.30 | 2023-02-07 | 2023-03-10 | 2023-03-21 |
| 2022-12-09 | $0.51 | 2022-10-26 | 2022-12-12 | 2022-12-20 |
| 2022-09-09 | $0.50 | 2022-07-28 | 2022-09-12 | 2022-09-20 |
| 2022-06-09 | $0.50 | 2022-05-19 | 2022-06-10 | 2022-06-21 |
| 2022-03-09 | $0.50 | 2022-01-28 | 2022-03-10 | 2022-03-21 |
| 2021-12-09 | $0.50 | 2021-10-22 | 2021-12-10 | 2021-12-20 |
| 2021-09-09 | $0.49 | 2021-07-30 | 2021-09-10 | 2021-09-20 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a more nuanced story than "distressed turnaround." Fiscal 2026 (ending March 2026) just delivered $9.61B revenue (+1.2% YoY), $607M operating income, $255M net income, and $505M FCF — versus a $190M net loss the prior year and a $969M loss two years ago. That's a real inflection, not vapor. Gross margin recovered to 54.8% (from ~51.6% in FY24), and operating margin went from -1.5% to 6.3% in two years. The quarterly cadence confirms it: Q3 (Dec 2025) printed a 10.5% net margin on $2.88B — the best quarter since the peak era. The seasonal Q1 loss (-$116M on $1.76B) is roughly half last year's Q1 loss, suggesting the cost-out program (Reinvent) is flowing through. This is more "early-innings recovery" than "melting ice cube."
That said, the synthesis verdict of "High Conviction Required" is fair, and I'd push back on the pre-flight's "distress mode" framing as already stale. The real risk isn't terminal decline — it's that the recovery is being driven by SG&A cuts and gross margin normalization rather than top-line growth. Revenue is still $2.2B below the FY22 peak, and the 1.1% YoY recent print is barely positive against easy comps. Vans is still the elephant: it was ~$3.5B at peak and is reportedly running closer to $2B now, and there's no evidence in these numbers that it has stabilized — the consolidated growth is being carried by The North Face. If Vans takes another leg down in FY27, the whole margin recovery thesis cracks because operating leverage works both ways. The balance sheet redaction is also a real problem: VFC carried ~$5.7B of debt at last disclosure, sold Supreme for ~$1.5B, and the $824M cash position doesn't tell us net leverage. At 13.3x EV/EBITDA, this isn't cheap on enterprise value even if 0.67x P/S looks optically distressed.
A careful contrarian would note three things. First, the insider activity is weak signal, not strong — one 30,000 share purchase against a wall of F-InKind (tax withholding on vesting, not a buy) and an A-Award. The "Net Insider Buying" tag oversells it. Second, the FCF CAGR of -20.7% over five years is the real history; one good year of $505M FCF doesn't establish a new baseline, especially when working capital swings in apparel can fabricate or destroy $200M+ of FCF in a single year. Third, the bull case requires believing apparel wholesale recovers AND DTC scales AND Vans returns — and the consumer cyclical backdrop in 2026 (tariff pressure, weakening discretionary spend) is the worst possible setup for that triple. The market narrative engine's "fair value $18-24" range feels generous; on $505M FCF and a 9% required return for a no-growth leveraged apparel name, you get an equity value around $5.6B, or $14/share, before subtracting net debt risk.
I dissent mildly from the synthesis "High Conviction Required" framing — I think it's actually closer to a fairly-priced recovery with asymmetric downside. At $17.33, you're paying 13.4x trailing FCF for a business with -1.6% revenue CAGR, unresolved Vans exposure, opaque leverage, and macro headwinds. The bull case (mid-single-digit growth, 8%+ operating margin, $700M+ FCF) gets you to $24-28; the bear case (Vans down another 15%, margin reversion, recession) gets you to $10-12. That's not a high-conviction long — it's a coin flip with a 2.2% dividend to wait. I'd want either (a) two more quarters of Vans-positive comps or (b) a price below $14 before committing. The market isn't wrong here; it's pricing exactly what the data supports.
GPT Critique
V.F. Corporation (VFC) presents a complex financial picture that demands careful scrutiny. The raw data suggests a narrative of recovery, albeit fragile, rather than outright distress. The most recent fiscal year ending March 2026 showed slight revenue growth to $9.61 billion, reversing previous declines, and a significant swing to profitability with $255 million in net income, following a $968.9 million loss two years prior. Gross margins have improved to 54.8%, and operating margins have turned positive, reflecting the impact of cost-cutting measures. However, the quarterly revenue oscillations and persistent vulnerability in net margins, as seen in a -5.5% margin for the most recent quarter, highlight ongoing challenges. The cash flow statement indicates a healthy free cash flow of $505.5 million, but the risk remains that this is a temporary improvement driven more by cost reductions than by sustainable revenue growth.
I find myself in partial agreement with Claude Opus's analysis but with some distinctions. Opus rightly notes the importance of VFC’s cost-cutting initiatives and improvement in margins, which are indeed indicative of an early-stage recovery. However, I diverge on the degree of optimism regarding the company's trajectory. Opus suggests that VFC is moving away from a state of distress, but I believe the recovery is tenuous due to continued reliance on SG&A cuts instead of robust top-line growth. The significant drop in revenue from Vans, one of VFC's key brands, underlines a critical vulnerability that Opus acknowledges but perhaps underestimates in terms of its potential impact on the overall margin recovery. I also agree with Opus on the fair valuation range of $16-19 based on current metrics, though I would advise caution given the broader market headwinds and competitive pressures in the apparel industry.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I might be underestimating the potential for further operational setbacks. They could point to the FCF CAGR of -20.7% over five years as a sign that the recent positive cash flow might not be sustainable. Additionally, the lack of transparency regarding VFC's exact debt situation could amplify risks, especially if the macroeconomic environment deteriorates further. The insider activity, as Opus notes, offers little reassurance about management's confidence in a turnaround.