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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Verra Mobility Corporation (VRRM) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Bounce · Gem Score +4 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -21 · Value 24 · Sentiment 28 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $14.59 vs $5.14 at analysis
Page map (sections in order; each card carries a stable
reference-name attribute you can cite):
profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
More for machine readers: site briefing at
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Verra Mobility Corporation
VRRM NASDAQVerra Mobility Corporation is a global leader in smart mobility technology solutions that make transportation safer, smarter, and more connected. The company operates through three primary divisions: Government Solutions, which delivers red-light, speed, school zone, school bus stop-arm, and bus lane camera enforcement programs for cities, school districts, and law enforcement agencies; Commercial Services, providing toll and violation management solutions along with title and registration services for rental car companies and commercial fleets; and Parking Solutions, offering SaaS, hardware, and services to streamline parking and permitting operations for universities, municipalities, and private operators. Verra Mobility enables integrated technology to manage tolls, violations, and vehicle registrations while installing photo enforcement systems to improve driver behavior and road safety. Headquartered in Arizona, the company serves customers in North America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, supporting governments, fleets, and parking operators with end-to-end solutions that enhance efficiency, compliance, and urban mobility.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.85
Total Equity: $292.96M
Shares: 161,292,000
Total Debt: $1.03B
Cash: $65.27M
EBITDA: $352.49M
Total Debt: $1.03B
Cash: $65.27M
Revenue: $132.97M
Revenue: $132.97M
Revenue: $132.97M
Total Equity: $292.96M
Tax Rate: 29.9%
Equity: $292.96M
Total Debt: $1.03B
Cash: $65.27M
Current Liabilities: $210.46M
Long-Term Debt: $1.02B
Total Debt: $1.03B
Total Equity: $292.96M
Shares: 161,292,000
Shares: 161,292,000
CapEx: -$119.09M
Shares: 161,292,000
Stock Price: $5.14
Net Income: $136.63M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:37pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $40.0M | $94.3M | $103.6M | $116.0M | $133.0M |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $438.7M | $576.9M | $628.5M | $743.2M | $740.7M |
| Operating Income | $111.9M | $164.7M | $188.8M | $136.0M | $238.4M |
| Net Income | $41.4M | $92.5M | $57.0M | $31.4M | $136.6M |
| EBITDA | $228.6M | $303.4M | $301.9M | $244.5M | $352.5M |
| EPS | $0.26 | $0.61 | $0.36 | $0.19 | $0.86 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.25 | $0.50 | $0.36 | $0.19 | $0.85 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 7:40pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $101.3M | $105.2M | $136.3M | $77.6M | $65.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $348.1M | $362.6M | $439.5M | $394.0M | $440.9M |
| Total Assets | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.6B | $1.6B |
| Current Liabilities | $175.2M | $186.8M | $214.8M | $199.7M | $210.5M |
| Long-Term Debt | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.4B |
| Total Equity | $260.0M | $231.1M | $421.5M | $265.1M | $293.0M |
| Retained Earnings | -$81.4M | -$98.1M | -$125.9M | -$269.3M | -$243.8M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:37pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $193.2M | $218.3M | $206.1M | $223.6M | $255.8M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$25.0M | -$48.2M | -$57.0M | -$70.9M | -$119.1M |
| Free Cash Flow | $168.2M | $170.2M | $149.1M | $152.8M | $136.7M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$451.2M | $0 | $0 | — | — |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $361.0M | -$9.0M | -$181.5M | -$9.0M | -$8.5M |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | -$100.0M | -$125.1M | -$100.0M | -$200.0M | -$133.4M |
| Net Change in Cash | -$16.5M | $4.7M | $30.6M | -$58.6M | -$12.8M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 9:37pm (23d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +135.9% | +9.8% | +12.0% | +14.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +47.2% | +14.6% | -28.0% | +75.3% |
| Net Income Growth | +123.1% | -38.3% | -44.8% | +334.5% |
| EBITDA Growth | +32.7% | -0.5% | -19.0% | +44.1% |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-19 11:16Recovery pays +24%; another quarter like the worst recent one costs 57%. Ratio 0.4:1.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($5.14) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +16% | 31.7% | $6.39 | +24% |
| Base — stabilizes | +11% | 27.5% | $4.75 | -8% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +5% | 23.4% | $3.45 | -33% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +6% | 13.8% | $2.23 | -57% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers have serious data-integrity problems that the synthesis engine appears to have swallowed whole. The "annual 2025 revenue" of $133M is nonsense — quarterly revenue is running $220-260M, so TTM revenue is closer to $1.05B (Q2'25 $236 + Q3'25 $262 + Q1'26 $224 + a normalized Q4 ~$240 = ~$960M-$1.0B). The negative Q4 prints of -$588M and -$542M are almost certainly reclassification/adjustment artifacts, not real revenue. The EV/revenue of 13.1x is inconsistent with a P/S of 6.2x on a $780M market cap — one of them is wrong. Given $1.03B debt and ~$65M cash, EV ≈ $1.75B; on ~$1B real revenue that's ~1.75x EV/sales, and on Q3'25 annualized EBIT of ~$60-70M/quarter the EV/EBITDA of ~5x is plausible. So the underlying business is materially cheaper and larger than the "annual" table suggests, but the canonical ratios are internally contradictory.
On the actual operating trajectory: quarterly net income has stepped up from $34M (Q2'24) to $47M (Q3'25) with margins expanding from 15% to 18%. That's real. FCF of $137M on a $780M market cap is a 17.5% FCF yield, and operating cash flow of $256M covers the $1.03B debt load in roughly 4 years. This is not a distressed balance sheet — debt/EBITDA is probably 3-3.5x, high but serviceable for a recurring-revenue municipal contractor. The insider "awards" are just RSU grants, not open-market buys, so the "no insider transactions" secondary signal is directionally right — no conviction signal either way.
Where I diverge from the synthesis: the $17.77 fair value / +269% upside claim is built on the corrupted annual revenue figure and is not credible as stated. But the pre-flight thesis — that the market is pricing existential/regulatory risk into a stable cash generator — is directionally correct and more interesting than the DCF number. Photo enforcement faces genuine political headwinds (multiple states have restricted or banned red-light cameras; NYC congestion pricing is a wildcard that could cut both ways), and the RAC toll business is tied to travel cyclicality. But at 5.7x FCF and ~5x EV/EBITDA with mid-teens revenue growth and expanding margins, you don't need the bull case to work — you need the bear case to be wrong by a moderate amount. The market-forces "value trap" warning about cash flow deterioration doesn't square with $256M OCF and $137M FCF; that signal looks like it's reacting to the same corrupted annual data.
Contrarian read a careful skeptic would push: this is a leveraged rollup (Redflex, T2 Systems acquisitions) where 3.5x debt/equity means equity holders bear real refinancing risk if rates stay high and any single large municipal contract (Chicago, NYC) walks. ROE of 47% is flattered by leverage — ROIC of 13% is the honest number and it's good but not spectacular. The "fallen angel" narrative label is apt: VRRM traded above $20 in 2023, so today's $5.14 reflects a real loss-of-confidence event I don't have visibility into (contract loss? guidance cut? litigation?). Without knowing what broke the stock in the last 12 months, buying purely on multiples is buying a falling knife. I'd want to see the last two earnings call transcripts before sizing anything. That said, at 5.7x FCF with 14% revenue growth and 18% net margins, the risk/reward asymmetry is attractive even if the $17-19 fair value is overstated by 2x. A fair value in the $9-12 range (8-10x FCF, in line with mature infrastructure services comps) implies 75-135% upside, which is still a compelling starter position for those willing to hold through headline risk.
GPT Reading
The first thing that jumps out is that the dataset is internally inconsistent in a way that makes the headline “6x P/E, 13x EV/revenue, 5x EV/EBITDA” impossible to take at face value. Quarterly operating numbers look like a real business: the last four normal quarters before 2026 Q1 were $223.3M, $236.0M, $261.9M and then a bizarre negative-$588.2M December quarter, followed by $223.6M in 2026 Q1. Net income in the clean quarters runs $32.3M to $46.8M, implying a business that can earn roughly $130M-$160M annually if nothing breaks. Cash flow also looks real: 2025 operating cash flow of $255.8M and free cash flow of $136.7M on capex of $119.1M suggest substantial cash generation, not distress. Against a $0.78B market cap, that is a mid-to-high teens FCF yield. If I trust the cash flow and the “normal” quarters more than the malformed annual revenue fields and negative December-quarter revenues, the market is valuing a leveraged but genuinely profitable infrastructure/software-services hybrid at a distressed multiple.
That said, the balance sheet is the whole argument. Total debt of $1.03B against just $65.3M of cash leaves net debt near $965M, which is larger than the equity value. Debt-to-equity of 3.5x is not a rounding error here; it means the equity is a thin residual claim. If I annualize the recent clean quarters, revenue power is around $900M-$950M, and net margin looks more like 14%-16% than the annual metric table’s absurd 103% net margin. On that normalized base, the company is not “broken,” but it is financially constrained. Equity holders are effectively buying a cash-yielding business with high leverage and some accounting noise, and the stock price says the market fears either a covenant/refinancing problem or a structural impairment in the government enforcement franchise. I think that fear is overdone at $5.14 because a business producing $136.7M of free cash flow does not need heroic assumptions to justify more than a $780M equity value, even after giving full weight to debt.
The contradiction with the model outputs is that the bullish valuation call is probably directionally right, but for the wrong level of confidence. A fair value near $18-$19 implies the market is simply irrational; I do not think the discount is that clean. The negative revenue quarters in December 2024 and December 2025 are too large to ignore as mere noise, and they tell me there are likely accounting adjustments, contract true-ups, or reporting quirks that make simple multiple work dangerous. Also, capex at $119.1M is not light, so this is not a pure software compounding machine; some of that recurring revenue requires continual asset investment. Still, if normalized earnings are even $120M and normalized FCF is $100M+, the stock at $5.14 looks priced for a much steeper decline than the quarter-to-quarter operating data currently shows. My read is not “cheap because growth”; it is “cheap because the market distrusts the accounting and the capital structure, but the cash generation still appears materially better than the price implies.”
The best bear case is straightforward and serious: this could be a value trap created by bad data masking a deteriorating core. The annual income statement fields are nonsensical relative to the quarterly series, the December quarters show huge negative revenue, and the company carries over $1B of debt with only $65M of cash. If those negative quarters reflect rebates, contract failures, impairments flowing oddly through revenue, or a business model with ugly year-end true-ups, then the “normalized” earnings power I am leaning on may not be real. Add in the possibility that municipalities and regulated customers are politically fickle, and suddenly a levered company with opaque accounting deserves a punishing multiple. A smart bear would also point out that insider activity here is all awards, not open-market buying, so there is no clean management signal that the stock is absurdly cheap. I weigh those points differently because cash flow is harder to fake than a malformed revenue line, and the clean non-December quarters do not show a collapsing business.
What would change my mind is not a narrative update but a short list of hard numbers. If the next three reported quarters show revenue holding in the $220M-$250M range, net income staying above roughly $25M per quarter, and full-year operating cash flow again comfortably above $200M with free cash flow above $100M, then the stock should rerate and I would get more aggressive. On the other hand, if another quarter shows bizarre negative revenue, or if operating cash flow drops below $150M annualized while debt remains above $1B, then the discount is justified and I would move from cautious bullishness to outright bearishness. The refinancing schedule and any disclosure explaining the December-quarter anomalies are the single most important non-earnings catalyst.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers paint a cash-generative services business that the market has abandoned. Strip out the corrupted annual revenue line ($133M is nonsense against quarterly run-rates of $223–262M) and the picture is a roughly $900M+ revenue franchise producing $137M of free cash flow and $256M of operating cash flow against a $780M equity value. That is a mid-teens FCF yield with net debt of ~$965M, EV around $1.75B, and an EV/EBITDA of roughly 5x. Sequential quarters show stable-to-growing top line—$223M in Q1 2025, $236M, $262M, then $224M again in the latest print—with net margins consistently in the 12–18% band and trailing NI of $137M. ROE at 47% and a current ratio above 2.0 confirm the operating engine still works. The 13% revenue CAGR and 55% earnings CAGR are real; the mild –4% FCF CAGR reflects elevated capex ($119M) required to maintain the hardware-and-service footprint, not collapse. At 6x earnings the stock is pricing something close to terminal decline.
What stands out is the chasm between those cash flows and the $5.14 price. Debt-to-equity of 3.5x and absolute debt of $1.03B are the legitimate anchors of the discount, yet coverage is comfortable: FCF covers a meaningful slice of principal annually and net leverage sits near 2.7x EBITDA. Insider activity is pure award grants—no open-market signal either way. The pre-flight thesis that municipalities are canceling contracts en masse is not visible in the recent revenue trajectory; the business is still printing mid-teens growth. Valuation models that spit out $18–19 are aggressive on multiple expansion, but the no-growth floor already sits well above the current quote once you accept the FCF is durable.
The strongest counter-argument is that this is a classic value trap: a levered, politically exposed photo-enforcement and toll vendor whose earnings power is one legislative cycle or major contract loss away from permanent impairment. Skeptics will correctly note that FCF has not grown, that autonomous vehicles and congestion-pricing platforms could obsolete the camera installed base over a decade, and that management’s prior acquisition binge left the balance sheet fragile. They will also point to the absurd operating-margin figures in the annual feed as evidence that the entire data set is unreliable and that true economic earnings are lower. I weigh those risks as real but already more than fully discounted: even a 40–50% haircut to FCF still leaves a double-digit free-cash-flow yield, and the tolling/commercial fleet side of the ledger is far stickier than pure red-light cameras. The narrative of existential regulatory death is fragile precisely because it has not shown up in the last six quarters of results.
I would reverse course if two consecutive quarters show revenue declining more than 10% year-over-year, if net debt/EBITDA pushes above 4x without corresponding FCF expansion, or if a major state-level ban on automated enforcement lands with clear revenue disclosure. Until then the asymmetry is sharply to the upside.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Verra Mobility looks like a genuine cash machine at the operating level: FCF has run $136-170M annually for five straight years and OCF/NI ratios are strong. The business self-funds and buybacks have run at 685% of SBC, keeping diluted share count essentially flat (-0.4% CAGR). That is real discipline on the per-share line. However, the raw revenue figures shown ($40M-$133M) are inconsistent with a company generating $137M of FCF and $136M of net income in 2025 - operating margins in the 117-280% range signal either a data artifact or that only a segment is reported here, which limits confidence in interpreting the trajectory.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Confirm consolidated revenue - the $133M 2025 figure appears to be a segment, not total company revenue
- Debt maturity schedule and covenants on the ~$1B net debt position
- Customer concentration in Government Solutions and Commercial Services segments
- Cash SBC vs stock SBC split and true buyback net of employee issuance
- Recurring vs contract-renewal revenue mix and municipal contract retention rates
Price is $5.14 against a composite fair value of $17.77 and a signal-adjusted $18.99, implying nominal upside of 240-270%. I discount the DCF ($27.10) heavily - a 5x+ multiple to price is a runaway output for a levered, low-growth services roll-up and shouldn't anchor the case. The more defensible anchors are the EPV floor at $9.00 and the anchored-PE at $7.86, both of which still sit 53-75% above today's price. Even if I haircut those further for the ~$1B net debt, weak Altman Z of 0.87, and reconciliation issues flagged by the quality lens, the deserved equity value lands somewhere in the $7-10 range - meaningfully above $5.14.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Reconcile the reported revenue vs earnings mismatch flagged by the quality lens - look at segment disclosures and any restatements
- Municipal contract renewal cadence and any cancellations in the last two quarters
- Debt maturity schedule and refinancing risk given the Altman Z of 0.87
- SBC vs buyback dollar reconciliation to confirm dilution is truly neutralized
- Free cash flow conversion and interest coverage trend
The dominant force on VRRM right now is a narrative inflection. Two months ago the Avis contract termination detonated the story (-70% single day) and cemented a fallen-angel archetype with fragile durability. This week's framework re-signing on less favorable terms is being read as a reprieve, not a win, but it removes the tail risk that anchored the bear case and triggered a 25-32% pop. That is the pressure that matters this week, and it is a tailwind. The tape itself is neutral and VRRM's 0.43 beta means macro cross-currents (10y at 4.67%, VIX 17, PE 26) barely register on this name; the stock is trading on its own story, not on the S&P. Analyst tone and consensus haven't been updated in the brief, but the price action and headlines ('Has The Bull Case Changed?') suggest sentiment is in the process of being re-rated off the floor rather than melting up. The narrative remains fragile though - the bear thesis on municipal budget cuts and photo-enforcement obsolescence is untouched by the Avis news, and cult coefficient is low, so there is no retail base to defend a drawdown. Net: a real but shallow tailwind riding a single catalyst, on a name the macro tape can't push around.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Analyst target revisions in the two weeks after the Avis framework - upgrades would confirm the sentiment turn
- Whether the final Avis contract closes on the announced terms or slips
- Any follow-on municipal contract news (renewal or cancellation) that either extends or breaks the relief rally
- Short interest change post-announcement
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 31, 2026, VRRM was $5.14. We expect it to be $7.60 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $6.50. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 31, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.