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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Verizon Communications Inc. (VZ) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Watch · Gem Score +24 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 23 · Value 25 · Sentiment -20 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $60.39 vs $47.36 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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any ticker resolves at delvantic.com/stock/TICKER ·
raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Verizon Communications Inc.
VZ NYSEVerizon Communications Inc. is a leading holding company that provides communications, information, and entertainment products and services across the United States. It operates primarily through two key segments: Consumer, which delivers wireless voice and data services, fixed wireless access broadband, and home internet via fiber and fixed wireless options, along with entertainment services like streaming video; and Business, which offers enterprise solutions including data, video, voice, internet access, security, and managed network services. The company supports a broad range of customers, from individual consumers seeking mobile connectivity and home entertainment to businesses requiring robust communication infrastructures and IoT solutions. Verizon Communications Inc. plays a pivotal role in the telecommunications sector by powering wireless networks, broadband expansion, and digital services essential for modern connectivity. Founded in 1983 and headquartered in New York, New York, it maintains a vast infrastructure supporting millions of mobile and fixed-line connections nationwide.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.06
Total Equity: $105.74B
Shares: 4,231,000,000
Total Debt: $18.62B
Cash: $19.05B
EBITDA: $47.61B
Total Debt: $18.62B
Cash: $19.05B
Revenue: $138.19B
Revenue: $138.19B
Revenue: $138.19B
Total Equity: $105.74B
Tax Rate: 22.3%
Equity: $105.74B
Total Debt: $18.62B
Cash: $19.05B
Current Liabilities: $62.37B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $18.62B
Total Equity: $105.74B
Shares: 4,231,000,000
Shares: 4,231,000,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 4,231,000,000
Stock Price: $47.36
Net Income: $17.17B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:07am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $133.6B | $136.8B | $134.0B | $134.8B | $138.2B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $32.4B | $30.5B | $22.9B | $28.7B | $29.3B |
| Net Income | $22.1B | $21.3B | $11.6B | $17.5B | $17.2B |
| EBITDA | $48.7B | $47.6B | $40.5B | $46.6B | $47.6B |
| EPS | $5.32 | $5.06 | $2.76 | $4.15 | $4.06 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $5.32 | $5.06 | $2.75 | $4.14 | $4.06 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $2.9B | $2.6B | $2.1B | $4.2B | $19.0B |
| Total Current Assets | $36.7B | $37.9B | $36.8B | $40.5B | $56.9B |
| Total Assets | $366.6B | $379.7B | $380.3B | $384.7B | $404.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $47.2B | $50.2B | $53.2B | $64.8B | $62.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $283.4B | $287.2B | $286.5B | $284.1B | $298.5B |
| Total Equity | $83.2B | $92.5B | $93.8B | $100.6B | $105.7B |
| Retained Earnings | $72.0B | $82.4B | $82.9B | $89.1B | $94.7B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:07am (24d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $39.5B | $37.1B | $37.5B | $36.9B | $37.1B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | — | — | — | — |
| Free Cash Flow | — | — | — | — | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$4.1B | $248.0M | -$30.0M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $32.3B | $15.8B | $6.6B | $10.9B | $18.6B |
| Dividends Paid | -$10.4B | -$10.8B | -$11.0B | -$11.2B | -$11.5B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$19.3B | -$50.0M | -$614.0M | $1.1B | $14.9B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jul 30, 2026 12:07am (24d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +2.4% | -2.1% | +0.6% | +2.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -6.1% | -24.9% | +25.4% | +2.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -3.7% | -45.4% | +50.7% | -1.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -2.2% | -14.9% | +15.0% | +2.2% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Jul 31, 2026 9:19am (23d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-07-10 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2026-04-10 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2026-01-12 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2025-10-10 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2025-07-10 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2025-04-10 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2025-01-10 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-10-10 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2024-07-10 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2024-04-09 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2024-01-09 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2023-10-06 | $0.67 | — | — | — |
| 2023-07-07 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2023-04-06 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2023-01-09 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-10-06 | $0.65 | — | — | — |
| 2022-07-07 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
| 2022-04-07 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
| 2022-01-07 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
| 2021-10-07 | $0.64 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Independent read first: VZ's revenue trajectory is essentially flat — 2021 rev $133.6B, 2025 rev $138.2B, a 0.85% four-year CAGR, not the 1.6% cited (which appears to be from a different endpoint). Operating income has actually *deteriorated* from $32.45B (2021) to $29.26B (2025), a 10% decline in absolute dollars while the top line crept up — that's textbook margin compression, not stability. The "21.6% earnings CAGR" is a garbage artifact of the 2023 goodwill writedown collapsing NI to $11.6B; normalized against 2021's $22.1B, net income has actually *fallen* to $17.2B, a -6% CAGR. Anyone citing 21.6% earnings growth here is being fooled by base effects, and the Market Forces model is right to call that out.
The balance sheet line here is suspicious and I don't trust it as printed. Total debt of $18.6B against $19.05B cash would make Verizon net-cash — that's flatly wrong; Verizon carries roughly $143B of long-term debt in reality, and this is one of the most levered names in the S&P. The debt/equity of 0.176 and EV/EBITDA of 4.2 are consistent with the mis-stated debt figure; real EV/EBITDA is closer to 7-8x. This materially undercuts the synthesis DCF fair value of $60.39 — if the composite is running on a truncated debt figure, the enterprise value bridge is understating leverage by ~$120B, or roughly $28/share of equity value. Adjusted, the "fair value" collapses toward the current $47 print, not above it. The pre-flight, synthesis, and narrative layers all appear to have swallowed the bad balance sheet.
Where I land: the Market Forces model is the most honest of the bunch. Verizon is losing postpaid net adds to T-Mobile quarter after quarter, FWA is a genuinely useful but low-margin band-aid that cannibalizes wireline economics, capex intensity remains ~$17-18B annually, and the dividend at 5.9% yield with a 67% payout on GAAP earnings looks safer than it is once you account for real interest expense on $140B+ of debt in a 4-5% refinance environment. Operating CF of $37B minus real capex (~$17B) minus dividends (~$11B) leaves maybe $9B for debt paydown — not enough to meaningfully deleverage. The 11.7x P/E is not cheap for a business with declining operating income and structural share loss; it's appropriate. The narrative layer's "22% discount is real but not irrational" is closer to the truth than the synthesis verdict of +28.9% upside.
A contrarian bull case does exist: if FWA subscriber growth (currently ~5M subs, targeting 8-9M by 2028) meaningfully monetizes at $50-70/month ARPU, that's incremental $3-5B revenue at high incremental margin because the 5G capex is already sunk. Enterprise 5G/private networks could add another leg. And in a genuine risk-off / rate-cut regime, a 5.9% covered-ish yield with regulated-utility characteristics gets re-rated to 5.0% yield — call it $56 on dividend math alone. But that requires the Fed to cut aggressively AND T-Mobile competitive pressure to ease, and neither is my base case. I dissent from the synthesis's "undervalued, $61 fair value" verdict — the DCF is anchored on flawed leverage inputs and normalizes 2023's writedown-distorted earnings incorrectly. Fair value is $46-52, essentially where it trades. The stock is a coupon, not a compounder, and the 5.9% yield is the return — don't expect multiple expansion. Own it if you need income and can stomach zero real growth; don't own it expecting $60+.
GPT Reading
Verizon looks exactly like what the market thinks it is on the surface — a very large, slow-growing telecom throwing off a big dividend — but the raw numbers are cleaner than the bear case implies. Revenue has moved from $133.6B in 2021 to $138.2B in 2025, which is hardly exciting, yet the more important point is that the business has regained earnings stability after the 2023 dip. Net income recovered from $11.6B in 2023 to $17.5B in 2024 and held at $17.2B in 2025, while operating income improved from $22.9B to $29.3B over that same span. Quarterly results reinforce that normalization story: aside from the obvious weak quarter in 4Q25, Verizon has been posting remarkably repeatable quarterly net margins around 14.5%-14.6%, with revenue generally in the $33.5B-$34.5B range and even the latest quarter at $34.44B versus $33.49B a year earlier. That is not a shrinking asset; it is a stagnant-but-durable one.
What stands out most is that the valuation is being set as if this earnings base is low quality or at imminent risk, yet the provided balance sheet and cash flow data do not support panic. At $47.36, the stock trades at 11.7x earnings, 1.45x sales, and only 4.2x EV/EBITDA, while generating $37.1B of operating cash flow against $17.2B of net income. A 5.9% dividend yield with a 66.9% payout ratio is not obviously distressed if earnings stay around current levels. I also think the “unsustainable dividend” framing overreaches given the numbers here: even with a sub-1 current ratio, this is a utility-like cash engine, not a liquidity event. The debt presentation is oddly low for Verizon at $18.6B, which makes me cautious about taking leverage comfort too far, but even if that figure is incomplete, the equity base of $105.7B and the cash balance of $19.1B argue against an immediate balance-sheet problem. The market seems to be capitalizing Verizon like a bond proxy with no terminal confidence, yet the operating data say the core franchise is still monetizing well enough to deserve at least a market multiple for a defensive asset.
I also think some of the model outputs are internally contradictory. One model says the stock is undervalued toward $60, another calls it a value trap with unsustainable dividend coverage, and both can’t be right unless the accounting earnings are badly overstated or capex/refinancing needs are about to overwhelm cash generation. The evidence supplied here doesn’t get me there. Yes, revenue CAGR of 1.6% is meager and recent earnings slipped 1.9% year over year, but that is not the same as secular collapse. More importantly, the P/E already reflects a no-growth world. If Verizon can simply hold annual net income around $16B-$18B and keep quarterly margins near the 14% range, a stock under 12x earnings with a near-6% yield looks more mispriced than dangerous. I would not underwrite a growth rerating, but I do think the market is too punitive for a business whose earnings volatility appears to have normalized.
The strongest case against this view is straightforward: Verizon may be optically cheap because the market does not believe those earnings and cash flows are durable after true capital intensity, competitive pressure, and refinancing costs. Annual revenue has effectively gone nowhere for four years, net income in 2025 is still well below the $21B-$22B earned in 2021-2022, and 4Q25 showed a sharp margin drop to 6.4%, reminding you how quickly “stable telecom” can get messy. If the debt figure provided understates economic leverage, then EV-based cheapness is less comforting than it looks. The current ratio of 0.91 is also not what you want in a rate-sensitive, capex-heavy business if operating trends soften. And the bear argument on industry structure is credible even without subscriber data here: if wireless pricing stays promotional and broadband substitution pressures legacy mix, then Verizon may be ex-growth and gradually de-rating for the right reasons. In that scenario, 11.7x earnings is not cheap; it is fair for a business with little real growth and latent balance-sheet drag.
What would change my mind is not narrative evidence but operating slippage. If the next few quarters show revenue falling back below $33B, net margins no longer recovering to the 14% area, or annual operating cash flow dropping materially below the current $37B run-rate, then the “cheap and stable” thesis breaks and I would stop defending the dividend valuation. Conversely, if Verizon can put up another year around $138B-$140B of revenue, maintain operating income near or above $29B, and avoid another abnormal quarter like 4Q25, I think the market will have to concede that this is a cash-generative utility at too low a multiple.
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a mature cash engine that has stopped growing but has not broken. Verizon printed $138.19B of revenue in 2025, only 3.4% above the $133.61B of 2021, a 1.6% CAGR that confirms the business is essentially flat. Yet operating income recovered to $29.26B and net income to $17.17B after the 2023 trough of $11.61B, restoring a 12.4% net margin and 21.2% operating margin. Quarterly run-rate is consistent: five of the last eight quarters delivered $4.88–5.05B of net income at a tight 14.5–14.6% margin; the two soft prints (Q3 2024 at 9.9% and Q4 2025 at 6.4%) look like discrete charges rather than structural margin collapse. Operating cash flow of $37.14B easily funds the roughly $11.5B dividend implied by the 66.9% payout, and the balance-sheet snapshot shows $19.05B cash against only $18.62B of debt, a 0.18 debt-to-equity ratio that removes the classic telecom leverage overhang from the thesis. At 11.7× earnings, 4.2× EV/EBITDA and a 5.9% yield, the market is capitalizing this cash stream as if it is in permanent decline; a no-growth floor already sits near the current $47 price, so any stability is free optionality.
The valuation synthesis fair-value band around $60–61 is therefore directionally correct: the stock screens cheap on every cash-flow and earnings multiple relative to its own history and to a utility-like required return. ROIC of 21.6% and ROE of 16.2% demonstrate that the capital already deployed still earns well above cost of capital even without top-line expansion. Recent revenue growth of +2.5% year-on-year and high revenue-confidence tags further undercut the idea of an accelerating collapse. Insider activity is pure award noise and supplies no signal either way.
The strongest contrary case is that flat revenue plus slight negative FCF CAGR (–0.5%) and a –1.9% recent earnings year-on-year print already embed the market-share leakage and wireless commoditization the bears emphasize. The 2021–22 peak net income of $21–22B has not been re-attained; the 21.6% earnings CAGR is merely a rebound from the 2023 writedown year and will fade. A 67% payout leaves limited cushion if another charge-heavy quarter arrives or if capex (unreported here but historically heavy) re-accelerates for spectrum or fiber. The current ratio of 0.91 and the Q4 2025 margin collapse to 6.4% on record quarterly revenue are real warnings that earnings quality can gap lower without warning. In that framing the 5.9% yield is compensation for a melting ice cube, not a bargain, and the $60 DCF overstates durability.
I would reverse to a fair-or-overvalued stance if two consecutive quarters show revenue declining year-on-year, if the payout ratio is forced above 80%, or if net margin settles sustainably below 10% without an identifiable one-time item. Conversely, any sustained print above 3% revenue growth or a clear FCF inflection would raise conviction further.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Verizon is a mature earner running the business with remarkable steadiness: revenue $133.6B to $138.2B across 2021-2025, operating margin holding in a 17-24% band, and free cash flow essentially locked at $37B/yr (2021: $39.5B, 2025: $37.1B). OCF/NI of 2.21x and accruals of -5.2% of assets point to earnings that are conservatively stated and fully cash-backed - reported net income of $17.2B in 2025 is more than covered by cash generation. Diluted share count has crept from 4.15B to 4.23B (0.5% CAGR), so per-share value is not being materially eroded by dilution.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Absolute debt load, maturity ladder, and weighted average interest cost driving the Altman Z distress reading
- Capex trajectory and whether $37B FCF is sustainable post-5G/fiber investment cycle
- Wireless subscriber net adds and churn trends underlying the flat revenue line
- Pension and lease obligations that may not appear in headline debt
- Dividend payout ratio vs FCF and remaining cushion for debt reduction
The composite fair value of $60.39 and signal-adjusted $61.05 both lean on an EPV-floor method, which is the right lens for a mature telecom throwing off ~$37B of FCF. Against a $47.36 print that implies roughly 27-29% upside, or put differently, the market is capitalizing VZ's steady-state earnings at a meaningful discount to a no-growth reproduction/EPV anchor. That gap is real, but it exists for a reason: gross debt is enormous, the Altman Z of 1.29 sits in the distress zone, and the ~6%+ dividend yield is the market's way of demanding compensation for leverage and terminal-value uncertainty from FWA cannibalization and wireless commoditization.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Sustainability of postpaid phone net adds and ARPU trend in next print
- FWA subscriber growth and unit economics vs wireline cannibalization
- Net debt trajectory and any refinancing at higher rates
- Management commentary on dividend policy and capex intensity post-5G build
- Any one-time items inflating the $37B FCF baseline
The macro tape is mildly risk-on with VIX at 15.9 and the S&P near highs, but VZ's 0.23 beta means almost none of that tailwind actually lands on this name - risk-on tapes reward stories and high-beta cyclicals, not 6%-yield telecom utilities. Meanwhile the 10y at 4.75% is a direct, persistent headwind for a levered, dividend-anchored bond proxy: yield-hungry capital has better risk-free alternatives, which is exactly why the stock sits ~22% below DCF fair value despite stable cash flows. Net macro press: modest headwind, not decisive. The active narrative is a moderate, durable 'steady compounder' with low cult coefficient - meaning no mania to fade but also no story engine to re-rate the stock higher. The bear framing (commoditizing wireless, FWA cannibalizing wireline, dividend sustainability doubts) is the prevailing whisper, and the Aug 1 headline about a snag in a 'key service' feeds that bear thread directly. The Glide.id carrier-authentication news is a genuine but small positive optic - it reinforces the 'irreplaceable infrastructure' angle without moving the needle on growth perception. Net: forces roughly cancel. Low beta insulates from the tape both ways; the narrative leans faintly negative but is too sleepy to press hard. Balanced, with a slight headwind tilt from rates and the FWA slowdown story.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any further deterioration in FWA net adds in the next earnings print - would harden the bear narrative sharply
- 10y yield direction - a drop toward 4% would materially relieve the bond-proxy headwind
- Analyst target revisions post the FWA-slowdown headline
- Dividend coverage commentary or asset-sale announcements that could crack the sustainability whisper
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 4, 2026, VZ was $47.36. We expect it to be $52.90 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $44.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 4, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.