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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Workday Inc. (WDAY) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-23): Designation Low · Gem Score -24 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 28 · Value -67 · Sentiment 59 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $119.48 vs $200.01 at analysis
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Workday Inc.
WDAY NASDAQWorkday Inc. is a provider of enterprise cloud applications focused on finance and human resources for organizations worldwide. The company offers integrated suites for financial management, human capital management, and analytics that help businesses manage core processes such as general ledger, expense management, procurement, payroll, time tracking, talent management, and workforce planning. Its platforms are designed to centralize data and workflows, enabling real-time reporting and decision-making across finance and HR functions. Workday serves a broad range of customers, including corporations, educational institutions, and government agencies across diverse industries such as healthcare, professional services, manufacturing, retail, life sciences, and the public sector. The company emphasizes cloud-native architecture and mobile accessibility, allowing users to securely access applications from multiple devices. Founded in 2005 and headquartered in Pleasanton, California, Workday Inc. occupies a significant role in the enterprise software market as a key provider of cloud-based systems that support operational efficiency and organizational governance for medium and large enterprises.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.59
Total Equity: $7.81B
Shares: 268,117,000
Total Debt: $2.99B
Cash: $1.50B
EBITDA: N/A
Total Debt: $2.99B
Cash: $1.50B
Revenue: $9.55B
Revenue: $9.55B
Revenue: $9.55B
Total Equity: $7.81B
Tax Rate: 31.3%
Equity: $7.81B
Total Debt: $2.99B
Cash: $1.50B
Current Liabilities: $6.38B
Long-Term Debt: $2.99B
Total Debt: $2.99B
Total Equity: $7.81B
Shares: 268,117,000
Shares: 268,117,000
CapEx: -$162.00M
Shares: 268,117,000
Stock Price: $200.01
Net Income: $693.00M
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:09pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $5.1B | $6.2B | $7.3B | $8.4B | $9.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | $5.3B | $6.4B | $7.1B | $8.0B | $8.8B |
| Operating Income | -$116.5M | -$222.2M | $183.0M | $415.0M | $721.0M |
| Net Income | $29.4M | -$366.7M | $1.4B | $526.0M | $693.0M |
| EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — |
| EPS | $0.12 | $-1.44 | $5.28 | $1.98 | $2.61 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $0.12 | $-1.44 | $5.21 | $1.95 | $2.59 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 2:53pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $1.5B | $1.9B | $2.0B | $1.5B | $1.5B |
| Total Current Assets | $5.2B | $8.1B | $9.9B | $10.5B | $8.4B |
| Total Assets | $10.5B | $13.5B | $16.5B | $18.0B | $18.1B |
| Current Liabilities | $5.1B | $4.6B | $5.1B | $5.5B | $6.4B |
| Long-Term Debt | $617.4M | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.0B | $3.0B |
| Total Liabilities | $6.0B | $7.9B | $8.4B | $8.9B | $10.3B |
| Total Equity | $4.5B | $5.6B | $8.1B | $9.0B | $7.8B |
| Retained Earnings | -$2.7B | -$3.1B | -$1.7B | -$1.2B | -$512.0M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:09pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $1.7B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.5B | $2.9B |
| Capital Expenditure | — | -$364.0M | -$232.0M | -$269.0M | -$162.0M |
| Free Cash Flow | — | $1.3B | $1.9B | $2.2B | $2.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$1.2B | $0 | -$8.0M | -$825.0M | -$2.1B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$38.0M | $1.1B | $0 | $0 | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$74.7M | -$423.0M | -$700.0M | -$2.9B |
| Net Change in Cash | $152.8M | $354.5M | $129.0M | -$470.0M | -$45.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 22, 2026 3:09pm (1d ago)| Metric | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +21.0% | +16.8% | +16.4% | +13.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | -90.8% | +182.4% | +126.8% | +73.7% |
| Net Income Growth | -1,348.6% | +476.6% | -61.9% | +31.7% |
| EBITDA Growth | — | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — if the last quarter repeats
Live · as of 2026-08-23 02:47Even the bull case prices 39% below today — the ratio here measures the model-vs-market gap, not payoff odds. Another quarter like the worst recent one costs 78%.
| Case | Growth | Margin | Fair value | vs price ($200.01) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull — recovery | +23% | 20.2% | $121.41 | -39% |
| Base — stabilizes | +15% | 17.5% | $84.36 | -58% |
| Bear — keeps slipping | +8% | 14.9% | $56.94 | -72% |
| Stress — last quarter repeats | +13% | 9.5% | $43.90 | -78% |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-22 15:16The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw quarterly tape first: revenue has climbed from $2.09B (Jul-24) to $2.54B (Apr-26), a clean ~22% two-year lift, but sequential deceleration is real — the last four sequentials are +4.9%, +3.4%, +3.9%, +0.4%. That final $2.54B print against $2.53B prior is a warning shot. Net income is lumpier ($68M → $145M → $222M most recent quarters), but the trailing four-quarter NI of ~$847M against a $49.4B market cap yields a ~58x earnings multiple on operating results — not the 77x headline P/E, but still demanding. FCF is the genuinely strong pillar: $2.78B TTM implies ~5.6% FCF yield, which for a durable enterprise SaaS with switching costs is defensible but not cheap. Balance sheet is fine but not fortress: $2.99B debt vs $1.50B cash means net debt exists, and ROIC of 5.3% against a cost of capital probably north of 8% means Workday is currently destroying incremental economic value at the margin — a fact the platform-monopoly narrative papers over.
The synthesis pegs fair value at $120 (-40%). I think that's directionally right but slightly too harsh. A $2.78B FCF base growing 15% for five years then fading to 8%, discounted at 9%, gets you to roughly $55-60B equity value, or $220-240/share — actually *above* current price. The synthesis DCF must be assuming faster margin/growth mean-reversion or a higher discount rate. My read: fair value is $150-170, not $120, meaning WDAY is modestly overvalued (~15-25%), not egregiously so. The Market Forces "neutral" call and the Narrative layer's $80B story premium framing are closer to my read than the synthesis's -40% verdict.
The contrarian case that nobody is making forcefully enough: Workday's operating margin is *still only 7.5%* GAAP after 20 years of scale. Compare to Oracle (~30%), Adobe (~35%), even SAP (~24%). The bull story assumes latent margin expansion, but eight quarters of data show operating margin oscillating between 3-10% with no clear trend line up. If Workday is structurally a 10-12% operating margin business — because HCM implementation costs, R&D intensity against Oracle Fusion, and stock-based comp dilution are permanent features — then the 77x P/E is pricing a margin story that isn't arriving. The insider activity reinforces this: ten transactions listed, nine are sales, zero opens. That's not "neutral," that's a distributed exit. The C-Conversion + immediate sales on July 9 is the classic executive de-risking pattern at what insiders perceive as full-to-rich pricing.
Where the data is thin: no gross margin disclosed in the annual pulls, which for a SaaS company is the single most important line — you cannot properly assess operating leverage without it. The "earnings_cagr -29.2%" is a garbage metric distorted by the $1.38B FY24 NI (which included a large deferred tax benefit — non-recurring). The synthesis and momentum modules both partially trip on this. Also, the "recent_revenue_yoy 13.1%" is decelerating from mid-teens toward low-teens, and enterprise software history says once you break below 12% growth, the multiple compresses hard regardless of FCF (see Salesforce 2022-23). I dissent partially from the synthesis: the direction (overvalued) is right, the magnitude ($120 fair value) overshoots. I'd fade WDAY at $200, cover/accumulate at $155-165, and only pound the table below $140. Insider selling + decelerating top line + stalled GAAP margins in a 77x P/E stock is a classic "quality trap at the wrong price" — good business, expensive stock, no near-term catalyst to close the gap upward.
GPT Reading
At $200, Workday is being valued like a high-quality compounder that still has meaningful runway, but the numbers in front of us look more like a solid large-cap SaaS incumbent entering its margin-harvest phase with only low-teens growth. Revenue has grown from $7.26B in FY2024 to $9.55B in FY2026, a healthy 14%-15% CAGR, and the quarterly line remains steady: $2.09B, $2.16B, $2.21B, $2.24B, then $2.35B, $2.43B, $2.53B, $2.54B. That is dependable, but it also shows the shape of maturity: recent YoY growth around 13% and sequential growth in the latest quarter of just 0.4%. Meanwhile, annual operating income improved nicely from $183M in FY2024 to $415M in FY2025 and $721M in FY2026, so the business is absolutely scaling. The issue is valuation, not viability. A $49.4B market cap on $9.55B of revenue is about 5.2x sales, which is not crazy for elite software, but the earnings base is still thin enough that the stock sits at 77x earnings and roughly 18x free cash flow on $2.78B FCF. That multiple would be easier to defend if revenue were reaccelerating or margins were breaking sharply higher; neither is evident yet.
What stands out most is the gap between superb cash generation and merely decent accounting profitability. FY2026 net income was $693M, only a 7.3% net margin, while operating cash flow was $2.94B and free cash flow $2.78B, implying FCF margin near 29%. That cash conversion is the best part of the story and why Workday deserves a premium to slower legacy software. But investors should be careful not to pay a growth-stock multiple for a cash-flow profile that is partly flattered by the SaaS model’s timing benefits while GAAP profitability remains modest. Quarterly net margins ranged from 3.0% to 10.4% over the last six reported periods; that is improvement, but not the clean, structurally high-margin profile of a fully matured software platform. Balance sheet risk is manageable rather than pristine: $1.50B cash against $2.99B debt, so net debt is not alarming, but this is not a fortress balance sheet argument either. The raw data tell me Workday is a high-quality franchise that has earned respect, not a business that obviously merits a “pay whatever it takes” multiple.
The strongest pushback is straightforward: this is exactly the sort of software company the market should pay up for. Revenue is remarkably resilient, free cash flow is huge relative to earnings, and operating leverage is real. Operating income has nearly quadrupled in two years, from $183M to $721M, and recent quarterly net income has stepped up versus the prior-year periods: $222M versus $68M two comparable Aprils later is a dramatic improvement. If management can keep revenue growing 12%-14% while lifting operating margin from 7.6% toward the mid-teens, today’s 77x trailing P/E could compress very quickly without the stock falling much. On that framing, the right lens is EV/revenue around 5.7x or FCF yield around 5.6%, both reasonable for durable enterprise software with sticky HR and finance workflows. A bull would also note that the most recent revenue print of $2.54B still rose 13.4% year over year; this is not a broken story, just a large one.
I weigh those positives differently because the market already seems to be underwriting that favorable margin path while ignoring the growth ceiling implied by the quarterly cadence. To justify $200 cleanly, I want either sustained mid-teens revenue growth or much clearer evidence that GAAP earnings can inflect toward $1.5B+ over a few years. Today we have neither. Instead we have a company with excellent FCF, decent-but-not-exceptional returns metrics—ROIC 5.3%, ROE 8.9%—and a steady stream of insider selling and conversions that does not prove anything on its own but certainly does not signal obvious internal conviction at this price. The prior model calling this a “mature earner” is directionally right; where I disagree slightly is that “mature earner” can still deserve a premium if it is under-monetized. Workday may be under-monetized operationally, but the stock is not under-monetized valuation-wise.
What would change my mind is specific evidence that growth is not settling into the low teens. If quarterly revenue can move from $2.54B to something like $2.65B+ within the next couple of quarters while maintaining 13%-15% YoY growth, I’d revisit the maturity concern. More importantly, if annual operating margin can move from 7.6% to 10%+ with net income pushing past $1.0B without any FCF deterioration, the current valuation starts to look more supportable. On the other hand, if growth slips below 11%-12% while margins stay stuck in the high-single digits, I’d expect the market to re-rate this closer to 4x-4.5x sales, which points materially below $200.
Grok Reading
Workday’s numbers describe a franchise that has already crossed into mature-earner territory and is being asked to keep paying growth-stock rent. Revenue has compounded from $5.14B to $9.55B over five years, a 14.7% CAGR, but the slope is clearly flattening: the latest quarter printed $2.54B against $2.24B a year earlier (roughly 13% YoY), and sequential growth from $2.53B to $2.54B was essentially flat. GAAP profitability has finally arrived—operating income scaled from a $222M loss in FY2023 to $721M in FY2026, net income to $693M—but the real story is cash. Operating cash flow of $2.94B and free cash flow of $2.78B on $9.55B of revenue imply a ~29% FCF margin, dwarfing the 7.6% operating and 7.3% net margins. That gap is classic SaaS deferred-revenue mechanics, and it is the only metric that keeps the equity from looking absurd at 77× earnings. At a $49.4B enterprise, the FCF yield is about 5.6%; that is serviceable for a sticky HCM/finance platform, not a bargain. Returns on capital remain mediocre—ROE 8.9%, ROIC 5.3%, ROA 3.8%—so the multiple is not being earned by capital efficiency. Debt of $2.99B against $1.50B cash and $7.81B equity is manageable (D/E 0.38), and the current ratio of 1.32 is adequate. Insider tape is pure supply: a cluster of sales and conversions in July 2026 with zero open-market buying. The quantitative models’ $120 fair-value anchor is too punitive relative to $2.78B of FCF, but the direction of their call is right: at 5.6× sales and 77× earnings with decelerating mid-teens growth, the stock is priced for margin expansion and re-acceleration that the recent quarterly run-rate does not yet support.
The cleanest bull rebuttal is the cash engine itself. A durable enterprise franchise throwing off nearly $2.8B of FCF with only $162M of capex, net revenue retention historically north of 30% expansion, and a balance sheet that is not stressed can reasonably clear 18–20× FCF in a normalized rate environment—implying a $50–56B equity value, i.e., roughly flat to modestly above the current $200 print. Operating leverage is visible in the annual progression (op margin from negative to 7.6% in three years), and if Financials modules continue to land inside the installed HCM base, revenue growth could stabilize in the mid-teens while FCF margins push through 30%. The narrative layer—switching costs, “system of record” status, AI-adjacent workflow expansion—is durable rather than meme-driven, and Oracle/SAP’s cloud displacement has been slower than the bear case advertised. On that reading, $200 is roughly full fair value for a high-quality compounder, not a 40% short.
What flips the verdict is simple and numeric. Four consecutive quarters of revenue growth re-accelerating above 16% YoY with FCF holding above $700M per quarter would justify the current multiple and push me to fairly valued or modestly undervalued; conversely, a print of sub-10% revenue growth or FCF margin compression below 25% would confirm the overvaluation and open a path toward the mid-$150s. Guidance for FY2027 subscription growth and any explicit AI attach-rate metrics are the near-term tell.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Workday is a mature-stage SaaS platform executing a clean top-line compounding story: revenue grew from $5.14B (FY22) to $9.55B (FY26), roughly 17% CAGR, with GAAP operating margin turning positive and expanding from -2.3% to 7.5% over that span. FCF has scaled in lockstep, from $1.65B to $2.78B, and OCF/NI of 12.4x plus deeply negative accruals (-11.7% of assets) indicate reported earnings are backed by real cash, not accounting stretch. Balance sheet is sturdy: $5.44B liquid, $2.46B net cash, Altman Z of 3.64, and no reliance on external capital.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Customer concentration and net revenue retention disclosures in the 10-K
- Composition of the FY24 net income spike (deferred tax asset release vs operating)
- RPO / cRPO trajectory to confirm bookings health matches revenue growth
- Details of any convertible or debt instruments underlying the $3B gross debt
- Segment split between HCM and Financials and international growth mix
Price is $200.01 against a composite fair value of $119.48 and signal-adjusted $120.03, implying roughly 40% downside on the blended math. The DCF alone lands at $169.65 - still ~15% below spot - while the EPV floor of $19.14 is a runaway output reflecting the SBC-heavy GAAP earnings base and should be treated as a directional reminder that current owner-earnings do not support the price, not a literal target. Split the difference and deserved value sits in the $150-170 zone for a solid (not fortress) SaaS compounder with mid-teens growth and honest ~7.5% GAAP margins after 17% SBC. What is priced in at $200 and a ~5x sales / ~$49B cap: durable mid-teens growth, sustained FCF conversion, and successful defense against SAP/Oracle upmarket pressure. That is a reasonable base case but leaves no cushion - the buyback largely offsets dilution rather than shrinking the float, so per-share compounding relies on multiple holding. Quality is real, but you are paying for it in full.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Forward subscription revenue guide and net revenue retention trend
- SBC as % of revenue trajectory and whether buybacks are net-reducing share count
- Large-deal win rates vs SAP SuccessFactors and Oracle Fusion
- Operating margin expansion cadence toward stated long-term targets
Sentiment on WDAY is unusually hot for a mega-cap SaaS name. The Aug 13 Reuters scoop that Silver Lake is in talks to take Workday private triggered its best single day in a decade (+17.8%) and put a live take-out floor under the stock; that rumor is the single dominant force on the tape right now and swamps everything else. On top of that, a 63% three-month rip, a fresh AI Research team announcement, and a bullish ABR skew from sell-side are all pushing the same direction.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any confirmation, denial, or price leak on the Silver Lake talks
- Aug earnings print - guide and net revenue retention vs the platform-monopoly story
- Whether options skew and short interest reflect deal certainty or fade
- Sector rotation - if risk-off returns, high-multiple SaaS gets hit first
Enterprise software demand is in expansion, so the demand backdrop is not the swing factor — the swing factor is whether the system-of-record layer keeps pricing on a per-employee basis while AI agents compress the very headcount that meters the invoice. Workday's defensible asset is the finance/HR data model that AI needs to act on; its vulnerable asset is the seat count that prices it. Meanwhile suite consolidation pressure from SAP/Oracle turns each renewal into a bundle negotiation. Net: durable revenue, slowly compressing growth rate, expanding margins.
When we made this prediction on Aug 23, 2026, WDAY was $200.01. We expect it to be $162.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $155.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 23, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.