Business Description
Operating within the People's Republic of China, XPeng Inc. is an innovator in the electric vehicle (EV) sector, focusing on the creation and sale of intelligent, connected automobiles. It handles the entire process from conceptualization to market distribution. Its diverse lineup caters to various consumer needs, featuring SUV models like the G3 and G3i, the P7 performance-oriented sports sedan, and the P5, designed as a family-friendly sedan. Beyond manufacturing vehicles, XPeng supports its customers with a comprehensive ecosystem of services. These encompass sales and financial solutions (including contracts, leasing, and loan referrals), vehicle upkeep (maintenance and super charging), and a range of digital and convenience offerings such as insurance agency, ride-hailing, technical assistance, and music subscriptions. The company was established in 2015, with its headquarters located in Guangzhou, China.
Business History
Generated: Jun 1, 2026 8:20pmPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 27, 2026 8:01am (just now)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): -2.38
Total Equity: $30.37B
Shares: 475,997,500
Total Debt: $14.07B
Cash: $17.33B
EBITDA: $2.26B
Total Debt: $14.07B
Cash: $17.33B
Revenue: $74.63B
Shares: 475,997,500
Revenue: $74.63B
Revenue: $74.63B
Revenue: $74.63B
Total Equity: $30.37B
Tax Rate: -1.2%
Equity: $30.37B
Total Debt: $14.07B
Cash: $17.33B
Current Liabilities: $58.11B
Long-Term Debt: $6.76B
Total Debt: $14.07B
Total Equity: $30.37B
Shares: 475,997,500
Shares: 475,997,500
CapEx: -$3.35B
Shares: 475,997,500
Stock Price: $12.09
Net Income: -$1.11B
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
The operating trajectory is real and improving fast: revenue scaled from $20.99B (2021) to $74.63B (2025), gross margin expanded from 12.5% → 18.9%, operating margin compressed losses from -31.3% → -5.8%, and 2025 swung to positive FCF of $4.91B from -$4.44B the prior year. Net loss narrowed to -$1.11B on $74.6B revenue. That is a textbook pre-profit growth inflection — the bear thesis of 'cash-bleeding EV maker' is stale as of the latest print. Classification as pre_profit_growth with Reasonable Premium valuation looks defensible IF the cash figures hold.
BUT the forensic picture has two giant unresolved tensions. First, the liquidity module shows $38.93B liquid cash against a $16.3B market cap (239% of mktcap) — that is extraordinary and almost certainly reflects RMB-denominated balance sheet items against a USD market cap, or includes restricted cash/customer deposits typical of Chinese EV makers. The revenue figures are clearly in RMB ($74.63B revenue for a company with ~400k vehicle deliveries cannot be USD), so the cash is likely RMB too — meaning real net cash is closer to ~$3.5B USD, still solid but not the 'fortress' the module claims. Second, the diluted share count shows -12.8% CAGR with a step from 945.7M (2024) to 476.0M (2025) — that is almost certainly an ADR ratio change or reverse split, NOT a buyback. The 'net buyer of its own stock' framing is wrong. Altman Z of 0.2 (distress) clashes with the cash narrative — another sign the modules are reading mixed-unit data.
The insider tape shows zero open-market P or S transactions — only M-exempt option exercises and awards (the 28.5M share entry for He Xiaopeng is almost certainly a beneficial ownership disclosure, not a purchase). No directional signal. AI pipeline flags Q1 2026 margin reverting to -13.7% which would break the turnaround — that's the real risk: 2025's inflection may have been driven by one-time deliveries or subsidies and is not yet structural.
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 5:47pm (14h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $21.0B | $26.9B | $30.7B | $40.9B | $74.6B |
| Cost of Revenue | $18.4B | $23.8B | $30.2B | $35.0B | $60.6B |
| Gross Profit | $2.6B | $3.1B | $451.2M | $5.8B | $14.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $9.2B | $11.8B | $11.3B | $12.5B | $18.4B |
| Operating Income | -$6.6B | -$8.7B | -$10.9B | -$6.7B | -$4.3B |
| Net Income | -$4.9B | -$9.1B | -$10.4B | -$5.8B | -$1.1B |
| EBITDA | -$3.9B | -$7.6B | -$8.0B | -$2.9B | $2.3B |
| EPS | $-5.92 | $-10.68 | $-11.92 | $-6.12 | $-2.38 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 5:47pm (14h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $11.0B | $14.6B | $21.1B | $18.6B | $17.3B |
| Total Current Assets | $48.8B | $43.5B | $54.5B | $49.7B | $63.3B |
| Total Assets | $65.7B | $71.5B | $84.2B | $82.7B | $103.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $18.0B | $24.1B | $36.1B | $39.9B | $58.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | $3.4B | $6.4B | $6.9B | $7.0B | $6.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $23.5B | $34.6B | $47.8B | $51.4B | $72.8B |
| Total Equity | $42.1B | $36.9B | $36.3B | $31.3B | $30.4B |
| Retained Earnings | -$16.2B | -$25.3B | -$35.8B | -$41.5B | -$42.8B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 5:47pm (14h ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | -$1.1B | -$8.2B | $956.2M | -$2.0B | $8.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$4.3B | -$4.7B | -$2.3B | -$2.4B | -$3.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | -$5.4B | -$12.9B | -$1.4B | -$4.4B | $4.9B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.0B | $0 | $684.2M | $0 | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
| Net Change in Cash | -$19.9B | $3.1B | $9.6B | -$2.6B | $1.7B |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 5:47pm (14h ago)| Metric | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$77.5B $76.1B – $78.9B
|
$93.8B $91.2B – $97.3B
|
$119.5B $104.9B – $144.1B
|
$137.6B $117.7B – $162.6B
|
| EBITDA |
-$12.0B -$12.2B – -$11.7B
|
-$14.5B -$15.0B – -$14.1B
|
-$18.5B -$22.3B – -$16.2B
|
-$21.2B -$25.1B – -$18.2B
|
| Net Income |
-$476.8M -$527.5M – -$426.1M
|
-$321.0M -$737.2M – $95.1M
|
$1.5B -$1.2B – $4.3B
|
$1.4B $546.3M – $2.2B
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 26, 2026 5:47pm (14h ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +28.0% | +14.2% | +33.2% | +82.6% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +17.8% | -85.4% | +1,195.7% | +140.8% |
| Operating Income Growth | -32.3% | -25.1% | +38.9% | +35.5% |
| Net Income Growth | -88.0% | -13.5% | +44.2% | +80.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -92.1% | -5.8% | +63.7% | +177.6% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-04-01 | Wang Fengying | M-Exempt | 600,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-04-01 | Wang Fengying | M-Exempt | 600,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-03-18 | Yang Donghao | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Yang Donghao | 18,144.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Foo Jixun | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Chen Yudong | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | He Xiaopeng | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | He Xiaopeng | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | He Xiaopeng | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | He Xiaopeng | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | He Xiaopeng | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | He Xiaopeng | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | He Xiaopeng | 28,506,786.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Wang Fengying | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Wang Fengying | 1,200,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Wu Jiaming | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Wu Jiaming | 87,116.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Gu Brian Hongdi | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Gu Brian Hongdi | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-03-18 | Gu Brian Hongdi | 1,000,000.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw numbers tell a cleaner story than the model chorus suggests, but with a critical caveat the synthesis glosses over: the Q1 2026 print is ugly. Revenue dropped to $12.95B from $21.95B in Q4 2025 — a 41% sequential collapse — and net income swung from +$378M to -$1.77B, a -13.7% margin, the worst since Q3 2024. Yes, Q1 is seasonally weak in Chinese EVs (Lunar New Year, post-subsidy hangover), but the magnitude here erases the entire 2025 margin improvement narrative in a single quarter. The synthesis verdict of "Reasonable Premium / actually CHEAP" was clearly written against the 2025 trajectory and either ignored or had not yet ingested the Q1 2026 datapoint showing the inflection is not yet durable.
That said, the structural improvement is real. Annual 2025 gross profit of $14.08B on $74.63B revenue (18.9% GM) versus 2023's $451M gross on $30.68B (1.5% GM) is a genuine manufacturing scale story, not narrative. Operating loss narrowed from -$10.89B (2023) to -$4.30B (2025) while revenue 2.4x'd. Operating cash flow of $8.26B and FCF of $4.91B against a $16.3B market cap is striking — if sustainable, this is a ~3x P/FCF, which is absurd for a growing manufacturer. The $24B cash pile exceeds market cap, meaning EV is roughly negative or trivially positive depending on debt (undisclosed here, which is a meaningful gap — Chinese EV makers typically carry $5-10B in debt, and the missing total-debt line is a real analytical hole). At 0.9x P/S and ~1.1x EV/Revenue, the market is not pricing a Tesla-of-China outcome; it's pricing survival with mediocre terminal margins.
The contrarian case the models underweight: Q1 2026's -13.7% margin is not just seasonality. BYD launched aggressive price cuts in early 2026, Tesla refreshed Model Y in China, and Xiaomi's SU7 is taking premium share precisely where XPeng's P7/G9 compete. The $4.91B FCF for 2025 is heavily working-capital-flattered — operating CF of $8.26B against a -$1.11B net loss implies $9B+ of non-cash/WC benefit, which is exactly the kind of "cash flow quality" the secondary signal flags as poor. If that WC tailwind reverses (supplier payment normalization, inventory build for new launches), 2026 FCF could easily go negative again. The insider data is uninformative — M-Exempt option exercises with no open-market context — so don't read signal there. The "Macro Headwinds" and "Below Sector Benchmarks" tags align with this skeptical read.
I dissent partially from the synthesis. "Reasonable Premium" undersells the asymmetry on the downside given Q1 2026, and "actually CHEAP" overstates conviction given the FCF quality issue and missing debt disclosure. But I also disagree with the Market Forces "Neutral / too competitive to thrive" framing — at 0.9x sales with $24B cash and demonstrated 18.9% gross margins at scale, you're being paid to take the survival bet. The right frame: this is a binary-ish wager on whether Q1 2026 was a seasonal/competitive air-pocket or a trend break. If Q2 2026 reverts to $18-20B revenue with mid-single-digit operating losses, the stock is worth $22-25 (1.2-1.4x sales, in line with the 2025 trajectory). If Q2 confirms deceleration with another double-digit-negative margin, fair value is closer to $11-12 (book value support, ~1.4x P/B compressed back toward 1.0x). At $17.18, you're roughly at the midpoint of that range — not obviously mispriced, and the prior models' confidence in "cheap" is unwarranted until the Q1 print is contextualized. I'd want to see Q2 2026 deliveries (monthly data releases monthly — checkable) before committing capital. A starter position is defensible only for investors who can size for 40% downside; the cleaner trade is to wait one quarter for $5/share of clarity.
GPT Critique
XPeng Inc.'s recent financial data presents a complex narrative. Revenues have grown notably from $20.99B in 2021 to $74.63B in 2025, indicating a CAGR of 38.9%. However, profitability remains elusive, with net losses shrinking but still significant at -$1.11B in 2025. The balance sheet shows a robust cash position of $24.02B, suggesting liquidity is not an issue, yet the absence of total debt data complicates a comprehensive financial health assessment. Despite achieving a gross margin of 18.9% in 2025, the recent Q1 2026 results, with a revenue drop to $12.95B and a -13.7% margin, challenge the optimism of a turnaround. The negative operating margin and net margin highlight ongoing efficiency struggles, and the cash flow narrative is further weakened by poor cash flow quality signals.
Opus's analysis rightly highlights the stark sequential revenue drop in Q1 2026, which is concerning given the broader market pressures from competitors like BYD and Tesla. I agree with their skepticism regarding the supposed "Reasonable Premium" valuation, given the evident operational volatility. Opus argues that the Q1 2026 results disrupt the turnaround story, which aligns with my view that the market's current pricing reflects uncertainty rather than confidence in sustained profitability. Their point about working capital benefits inflating 2025's FCF is crucial, underscoring the fragility of XPeng's cash flow quality.
However, where I diverge is in the assessment of XPeng's valuation and future potential. Opus suggests that a binary outcome hinges on Q2 2026 results, putting potential fair value between $11 and $25 based on the coming quarter's performance. While I agree that the Q1 2026 results introduce significant risk, I'm less optimistic about a quick recovery to pre-2026 revenue levels given the intensifying competitive landscape and price pressures. The narrative of XPeng being the "Tesla of China" feels overextended without concrete evidence of a sustainable competitive advantage in their technology or market position.
A careful skeptic might argue that both Opus and I are overly focused on short-term data fluctuations and not sufficiently considering XPeng's long-term strategic initiatives or the broader EV market's growth potential in China. They might contend that the company's strategic investments in technology and production capacity could lead to a more resilient recovery, especially if geopolitical shifts favor local EV manufacturers over international competitors.